


Warwick University Caribbean Studies

Intellectuals in the Twentieth-Century Caribbean

Volume II Unity in Variety:
the Hispanic and Francophone Caribbean



Edited by Alistair Hennessy

34 NVZI

Hen

19 JAN 1993

£12.95

Warwick University Caribbean Studies

**Intellectuals in the
Twentieth-century
Caribbean**

VOLUME II

**Unity in Variety:
the Hispanic and Francophone Caribbean**

**Edited by
Alistair Hennessy**



**MACMILLAN
CARIBBEAN**

SHL

© Copyright text Alistair Hennessy 1992

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims or damages.

First published 1992

Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke

*Associated companies and representatives in Accra,
Auckland, Delhi, Dublin, Gaborone, Hamburg, Harare,
Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Manzini, Melbourne,
Mexico City, Nairobi, New York, Singapore, Tokyo.*

ISBN 0 - 333 - 56939 - 3

Printed in Hong Kong

A catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library.

For Mellor

Cover based on a painting by Aubrey Williams presented to
the Centre for Caribbean Studies, University of Warwick.

Series Preface

The Centre for Caribbean Studies at the University of Warwick was founded in 1984 in order to stimulate academic interest and research in a region which, in spite of its creative vitality and geopolitical importance, has not received the academic recognition it deserves in its own right. In the past, the Caribbean has tended to be subsumed under either Commonwealth or Latin American Studies. The purpose of the Centre is to teach and research on the region (which includes those circum-Caribbean areas sharing similar traits with the islands) from a comparative, cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary perspective. It is intended that this Pan-Caribbean approach will be reflected in the publication each year of papers from the Centre's annual symposium as well as in other volumes.

This is the second volume rising out of the Centre's third annual symposium. It is complementary to that on the Commonwealth Caribbean in this series, A. Hennessy (ed.), *Intellectuals in the Twentieth-Century Caribbean, Vol. I Spectre of the New Class: the Commonwealth Caribbean*, with which it should be compared. This volume covers the Spanish- and French-speaking countries, identifying those influences which mark off their intellectual traditions from those of the English-speaking countries. Chapters not only deal with Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, but also with Mexico and Venezuela, relating the Caribbean experience to the wider cultural universe of Hispanic America. Chapters on Haiti and Martinique analyse the distinctive Francophone tradition. In addition to pervasive European influences, attention is paid to the African dimension. Themes discussed in this volume relate to those discussed in Volume I.

It is hoped that this and the companion volume *Spectre of the New Class* will pose new questions and stimulate further research on topics which urgently need investigating.

Alistair Hennessy
Series Editor

Warwick University Caribbean Studies

Andrew Sanders

The Powerless People – The Amerindians of the Corentyne River

Editors: Jean Besson and Janet Momsen

Land and Development in the Caribbean

Kevin Singh

The Bloodstained Tombs – The Muharram Massacre in Trinidad 1884

David Nicholls

From Dessalines to Duvalier – Race, Colour and National Independence

Editors: Malcolm Cross and Gad Heuman

Labour in the Caribbean – From Emancipation to Independence

Harry Goulbourne

Teachers, Education and Politics in Jamaica, 1892-1972

Neil Price

Behind the Planter's Back – Lower Class Response to Marginality in Bequia Island, St Vincent

Douglas Hall

In Miserable Slavery – Thomas Thistlewood in Jamaica, 1750-86

Ramesh Ramsaran

The Commonwealth Caribbean in the World Economy

Editor: M. Gilkes

The Literate Imagination – Essays on the Novels of Wilson Harris

Miguel Barnet (Editor: Alistair Hennessy)

Runaway – The Autobiography of Estaban Montejo

Editor: Paul Sutton

Europe and the Caribbean

Patrick Ryan

The Jamaican People 1880-1902 – Race, Class and Social Control

Editors: Delisle Worrell, Compton Bourne and Dinesh Dodhia

Financing Development in the Caribbean

Steven Vertovec

Hindu Trinidad: Religion, Ethnicity and Social Change

Editor: Alistair Hennessy

Intellectuals in the Twentieth-Century Caribbean:

Vol. I Spectre of the New Class: the Commonwealth Caribbean

Vol. II Unity in Variety: the Hispanic and Francophone Caribbean

Contents

Series Preface	iii
The Contributors	vii
Foreword	x
Preface	xii
<i>Alistair Hennessy</i>	
CHAPTER 1	
The Hispanic and Francophone tradition	
<i>Alistair Hennessy</i>	1
CHAPTER 2	
Intellectuals in comparative perspective: The case of Mexico	
<i>Roderic A. Camp</i>	36
CHAPTER 3	
Venezuela: intellectuals in a non-intellectual society	
<i>Orlando Albornoz</i>	49
CHAPTER 4	
The intellectual in Cuba: The national-popular tradition	
<i>Antoni Kapcia</i>	58
CHAPTER 5	
Intellectuals and the Cuban revolution	
<i>Nicola Miller</i>	83
CHAPTER 6	
The Hispanic-Caribbean national discourse: Antonio Pedreira and Ramiro Guerra	
<i>Arcadio Diaz-Quñones</i>	99
CHAPTER 7	
The dilemmas of Puerto Rican intellectuals	
<i>Juan García Passalacqua</i>	122
CHAPTER 8	
Ideology, intellectuals and identity: The Dominican Republic 1880-1980	
<i>Harmannus Hoetink</i>	132

CHAPTER 9	Politics and populist historiography in the Caribbean: Juan Bosch and Eric Williams <i>Anthony P. Maingot</i>	145
CHAPTER 10	Blazing mirrors: The crisis of the Haitian intellectual <i>Michael Dash</i>	175
CHAPTER 11	Between the particular and the universal: Dilemmas of the Martinican intellectual <i>Richard Burton</i>	186
CHAPTER 12	Mexican intellectuals and collective biography in the twentieth century <i>Roderic A. Camp</i>	211
CHAPTER 13	Future agenda: some notes <i>Alistair Hennessy</i>	225
	Selected bibliography	233
	Index	238

Contributors

Orlando Alborno is Professor of Sociology at the Universidad Central de Venezuela at Caracas and is a leading authority on the sociology of education. He has worked extensively on Latin American universities and student movements. Among his many publications are *Juventud y Educación en Venezuela: inserción y reproducción social* (1989).

Richard Burton is Lecturer in French in the School of African and Asian Studies at the University of Sussex. He has published widely on literary, political, social and historical aspects of Martinique – *Vichyisme et Vichyistes à la Martinique 1940-43* and *Assimilation and Independence: prospects for Martinique*. He has also published widely on Baudelaire and is at present editing a collection of essays on the French West Indies for this series.

Roderic A. Camp is Director of Latin American Studies at Central College, University of Iowa, Pella. He has engaged in field research on Mexico since 1966. In addition to *Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth Century Mexico* (1985), his most recent works include *Memoirs of a Mexican Politician* (1988), *Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico*, *Mexican Political Biographies 1884-1934* (1991). His current research interests include the Catholic Church, the military, and political generations in Mexico.

Michael Dash is Reader in Francophone Literature at the Mona campus of the University of the West Indies. He is a leading authority on Haiti and among his publications are: *Literature and Ideology in Haiti, 1915-61* (1975), *Jacques Stephen Alexis* (1972) and *Haiti and the United States: National Stereotypes and the Literary Imagination* (1988) as well as the translations *The Ripening* and *Caribbean Discourse* by Edouard Glissant. He is presently working on a study of Glissant's work.

Arcadio Diaz-Quinones is Professor at Princeton University, where he teaches Latin American literature, and where he is currently director of the Program in Latin American Studies. Born and trained in Puerto Rico, he taught at the Universidad de Puerto Rico for over ten years. He has written on a number of Caribbean authors: Tomas Blanco, Palies Matos, René Marqués and Pedro Henriques Ureña, and has

published a book on *Cintio Vitier: la memoria integradora* (1987).

Juan Marcel García Passalacqua is currently Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science, Yale University, and has been a former aide to Governor Luís Muñoz Marín. His numerous books include *Crisis Política en Puerto Rico* (1970) and *La Alternativa Política* (1973), as well as many articles in professional journals. He also has a weekly column in *El Nuevo Día*, Puerto Rico's largest daily newspaper.

Alistair Hennessy is Professor of History and Director of the Centre for Caribbean Studies at the University of Warwick where eighteen years ago he founded the unique School of Comparative American Studies. He is the author of many articles and books on Spanish and Latin American politics and history including *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican movement, 1868-1874* (1962), *The Frontier in Latin American History* (1978) and most recently an edited collection of essays *The Land that England lost: Argentina and Britain: a special relationship* (1991). He has written extensively on Cuba and is completing a project on West European-Cuban relations during the Revolution. He is currently working on Caribbean cultural history and on the impact of West Indian plantation and slave-trade profits on British social and cultural life in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Harmannus Hoetink is Professor of Caribbean and Latin American Sociology at the University of Utrecht and Associate Fellow of the Centre for Caribbean Studies at Warwick. He is a past director of the Institute of Caribbean Studies at the University of Puerto Rico. During his twenty years in the Caribbean he also lived in Curaçao and the Dominican Republic. His books include, among others, *The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations* (1971), *Slavery and Race Relations in the Americas* (1973) and the *Dominican People 1850-1900* (1983), originally published in 1972 as *El Pueblo Dominicano 1850-1900*.

Antoni Kapcia is Principal Lecturer in Spanish at the Wolverhampton Polytechnic and a Visiting Lecturer in the Centre for Caribbean Studies at Warwick. He did his Ph.D. on Cuban cultural history and is the author of many articles in this area. He is at present writing on twentieth-century Cuban political history.

Anthony P. Maingot is Professor of Sociology and Editor of

Hemisphere, a magazine of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, at Florida International University. His research and publications have been focused on the social history and political sociology of Caribbean Basin societies. His most recent book is *Small Country Development and International Labor Flows: Experiences in Central America and the Caribbean* (Westview Press, 1991).

Nicola Miller is Lecturer in Latin American History at University College, London and was previously a Research Fellow at King's College, Cambridge. She is an authority on Soviet-Latin American relations and is the author of: *Soviet relations with Latin America, 1959-87*, Cambridge, CUP, 1989.

Foreword

Sir Raymond Carr

Since its foundation in 1985 The Caribbean Centre of the University of Warwick has made an important and unique contribution to our knowledge of the region. As this volume abundantly illustrates, the study of the diverse societies of the Caribbean can enrich our understanding of the role of intellectuals in the Third World. They contribute to the formation of what John Stuart Mill called the 'community of recollection', so necessary for national identity, and are often prepared to manipulate history for political purposes.

British historians and social scientists find it difficult to understand the influence of intellectuals in Latin societies with a revolutionary tradition, or in new nations. There is a comfortable consensus: Gladstone and Disraeli do not excite the passions that are aroused by the different historical interpretations of Danton and Robespierre. It is difficult to imagine a British equivalent of José Martí whose legacy has had to be absorbed or manipulated by every Cuban politician, or to conceive how a society's self-image can be influenced by a single work as was the case with Pedreira's *Insularismo* in Puerto Rico. We do not appoint novelists and poets as ambassadors; and even if we did their resignations would not perturb society as did the resignation of Octavio Paz in protest against the repression of student unrest in Mexico in 1968. The essays on Cuba illustrate both the traditional contribution of intellectuals to revolutionary movements and the suppression of intellectuals by a revolution that has degenerated into authoritarian militarism.

Former Spanish colonies still reflect the social and political *mores* of the metropolitan power, subtle and difficult to detect as they are. But there is a marked difference in the influence of metropolitan intellectuals – poetry excepted – in the cases of France and Spain. France embodied universal values and achievements of its intellectuals were acknowledged and admired by their European peers. This, apart from the role of French liberal régimes, accounts for the difficulties of flinging off the assimilationist tradition in Martinique. Paris was the intellectual home of Haitian exiles as Madrid never was for those of Cuba or Puerto Rico. Spain had nothing equivalent to offer; it was seen as conservative and reactionary, peddling *Hispanidad* for political purposes. Only with the Second Republic of 1931-36 and with the arrival of Republican exiles in Mexico and elsewhere did this change. Francoism attracted some

conservatives, and some radical nationalists were prepared to set up the culture of the old master Spain against the materialism of the new master, the United States.

All this has changed since 1975; the peaceful transition from an authoritarian régime to a pluralist democracy has centred attention on Spain; Spain will monopolize the Quincentenary of 1492, whereas the Quatercentenary was more celebrated in the United States than in Spain itself.

Studies in Mexico, not often considered as a Caribbean country, and Venezuela are included in this collection. Both provide valuable insights on the role of the university and the capital city – particularly in Mexico, where the political system has been successful in absorbing the university élites since the administration and the public sector offer jobs that the private sector does not. This has weakened the role of intellectuals in society; but they are recovering some of their independence as critics of the established order.

Not only students of Caribbean countries but all those concerned with developing societies will learn much from this volume. It reflects the vitality of Warwick's Caribbean Centre, the creation of the intellectual curiosity and administrative zeal of Alistair Hennessy.

Preface

This book is a companion volume to that on the Commonwealth Caribbean. Both grew out of one of the Centre's annual symposia. Details of the symposium, of those who participated, and acknowledgements, may be found in the Preface to Volume I, which also includes two chapters on intellectuals in general and prospects for the future. The two volumes are designed to be read together.

The vitality and creativity of Caribbean thought – there is scarcely a Third World ideology that does not have a Caribbean provenance – was itself sufficient reason for examining intellectuals in a Pan-Caribbean context, and for attempting to throw some light on the reasons for this vitality. In doing so, however, one has to be aware that the intellectual's role and the function of intellectual activity itself is changing. How are thinkers in the Caribbean responding to these changes? In order to answer this question it is first necessary to look at the wide differences in modes of thought which divide the major linguistic groups and at the ways in which thinkers have been trapped in their separate linguistic and historical traditions. The region shares common social and economic problems but if there is to be any closer integration of the islands in the face of major outside changes, both expected and unexpected, such differences need to be explored and better understood.

The prominent place accorded to Cuba in this volume reflects the importance which the Revolution has had both on the Caribbean and on the Third World generally, raising the question of the relevance of the Cuban experience for the other islands. One of the more interesting and controversial aspects of this experience has been a reformulation of the role which intellectuals should play in social and economic change. In the re-ordering of social priorities a break has been made from the cherished traditions of the Western liberal humanist intelligentsia; but has the price paid been too high?

This volume follows a similar pattern to the first. The opening chapter by Alistair Hennessy discusses some of the distinctive features of the Hispanic and Francophone tradition. It is followed by two chapters which examine structural and institutional factors. Roderic Camp's analysis of Mexican intellectuals puts the Caribbean into a wider

perspective and although there are differences in scale, many Mexican issues can be compared with the Hispanic Caribbean. Orlando Alborno's chapter on Venezuelan universities highlights the way in which the Hispanic-American state universities have been undermined by their failure to meet the challenges of development and how this failure has led to the expansion of private vocational universities which question the very idea of the university itself. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the case of Cuba. Antoni Kapcia traces the complexities of the Cuban intellectual tradition, and shows the relevance of the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Nicola Miller looks specifically at the cultural crisis of the later 1960s and early 1970s, arguing that culture became a casualty of economic and political developments as well as of increasing dependence on the Soviet Union.

Chapters 6 and 7 focus on Puerto Rico. Arcadio Diaz Quiñones uses nationalist discourse theory to compare two nationalist theorists, the Puerto Rican Antonio Pedreira and the Cuban Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, locating both within an exclusivist Hispanic tradition which deprecated the African heritage in both countries. Juan García Passalacqua surveys the various approaches to the national question in Puerto Rico and shows how recent theorizing has broken away from Pedreira's categories by placing an emphasis on the positive aspects of the African heritage. In Chapter 8 Harmannus Hoetink analyses the different intellectual traditions in the Dominican Republic and proposes a suggestive hypothesis for the way intellectuals operate in a corrupted political environment. Anthony Maingot, in Chapter 9, analyses the way in which history has been used – and perverted – by being made to serve the political interests of the moment in the historical writings of Juan Bosch and Eric Williams. This comparative analysis, which also includes some consideration of C.L.R. James, throws light on the differences between Hispanic and Anglophone modes of historical writing. In Chapter 10, Michael Dash analyses the critical treatment of Haitian intellectuals in Haitian literature, showing how intellectuals have been trapped in a web of self-delusion. However, trafficking in illusions is by no means confined to Haitian intellectuals, although their particular dilemmas may be more acute than elsewhere.

In Chapter 11 Richard Burton analyses in depth the complexities of the response of Martinican intellectuals to the French policy of assimilation. There is a comparison to be made from his chapter with the situation of Puerto Rican intellectuals faced by a policy of Americanization. Roderic Camp in Chapter 12 picks up and develops some of the points he made in Chapter 2 by suggesting approaches to the study of intellectuals through the technique of collective biography. Although he takes his examples from Mexico there are lessons for the

Caribbean in the methodology used here. In a short conclusion Hennessy sketches an agenda for future research.

The observance of magical dates has become something of a fetish. If the coincidence of the Quincentenary of Columbus chancing on an *Old World* with the European revolution of 1992 provides an occasion for fundamental rethinking to meet new challenges, it will have served some useful purpose. It is hoped that readers will recognize the importance of the topics treated here and of some of the questions raised, and that they may be stimulated to undertake further research.

CHAPTER 1

The Hispanic and Francophone tradition

Alistair Hennessy

Defining an intellectual

Who are the intellectuals? Does the description any longer have a meaning? Agitating this question has spawned a large, diverse and often contradictory literature. It has not been our purpose here to join this debate except indirectly. In the companion volume to this some general consideration was given to the problem of definition but participants at the original symposium were not corralled into agreeing with any particular formulation. Nevertheless, the hypothesis was advanced in Volume I that the expectations which societies place on men of thought, or intellectuals, account for the way in which they fulfil particular social and political roles. Divergent historical experiences and the part which men of thought have played in those experiences have shaped perceptions which society subsequently has of them, as well as the perception which they have of themselves.

What then is an 'intellectual' in the terms considered here? The word makes a late entry into the political vocabulary, and was applied as a noun to those French writers who came together in defence of Captain Dreyfus in the 1890s:

The word', writes Zygmunt Bauman, 'was addressed to a motley collection of novelists, poets, artists, journalists, scientists and other public figures who felt it their moral responsibility, and their collective right, to interfere directly with the political process through influencing the minds of the nation and moulding the action of political leaders.'¹

The two important notions here are 'moral responsibility' and 'collective right'. Intellectuals in this view are 'moral antennae' and guardians of values which are felt to be threatened by alien forces. The category of intellectuals, Bauman continues, was:

a widely opened invitation to join in a certain kind of practice of a global-societal import. And so it remained to this day. It makes little sense therefore to ask the question 'who are the

intellectuals?' and expect in reply a set of objective measurements or even a finger-pointing exercise . . . The intentional meaning of 'being an intellectual' is to rise above the partial occupation of one's profession or artistic genre and engage with the global issues of truth, judgement and taste of the time. The line dividing 'intellectuals' and 'non-intellectuals' is drawn and re-drawn by decision to join a particular mode of activity.

However, in an age of increasing specialization and of daily changes in the technologies of communication and control, is there any role left for intellectuals except to 'cry in the wilderness'? We are moving into an age where 'information' is becoming a substitute for judgement and where we are in danger of drowning in a sea of information which is becoming increasingly difficult to process and interpret.

Bauman's analysis is concerned with those at the centre rather than those on the periphery and although intellectuals on the latter may share some of the concerns of the former, their thought is more often focused on breaking away from, or re-formulating, those universal values which have been propagated ever since the Age of Enlightenment, when thinkers sought to codify universally applicable laws of reason. The form which this redefining has taken may be subsumed under the general heading of the search for identity. Those who can articulate the sense of difference become the mentors of nationalism as did those German philosophers who spearheaded the Romantic and metaphysical reaction against the universalist principle of the French Revolution and its Napoleonic successor. The British West Indies remained comparatively unmoved by these currents unlike those islands Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hispaniola, and Martinique considered in this book.² For them the impact of the French Revolution was decisive in the intellectual formation of their respective leaders, most strikingly, of course, in the case of St Dominigue, the western part of Hispaniola which was the first and most decisive example of the impact of the Revolution outside Europe.

In that period, two currents of thought clashed, those of universalism and differentiation (in political terms empire and nation), which often co-existed in the same person. In the case of the Hispanic Caribbean and Spanish America the figure of the Venezuelan Simón Bolívar is an example. Whilst asserting that Hispanic Americans were

neither Indian nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the Spanish usurpers. In short, though Americans by birth we derive our rights from Europe . . .³

he could nevertheless ransack European political writings in order to construct the 'perfect' but totally unworkable Bolivian Constitution of 1826 and, in the Congress of Panama of the same year, to envisage a federation of New World states to counterbalance the hegemonic pretensions of the United States implicit in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

The French Caribbean

In the case of the French Caribbean, Toussaint l'Ouverture and Henri Christophe were to turn the ideas of the French Revolution against their masters, believing, mistakenly as it turned out, that colour was no bar to inclusion within the pale of civilization as it was then understood. Although the Enlightenment generated the ideas of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, one of its more pernicious but less publicized legacies was to classify peoples according to their physical characteristics, and to establish a 'Chain of Being' which it has subsequently proved very difficult to break. Thinkers in the French West Indies, whether in independent Haiti or in Martinique and Guadeloupe become intimately yoked to France and French ways of thinking, trapped in the labyrinth of rationalist orthodoxies.

It is a characteristic of nations which have experienced total revolution that they couch their beliefs in terms of philosophical absolutes and moral imperatives and proselytize among the less fortunate, if need be compelling them to see the error of their ways, and achieve freedom through obedience to the laws of necessity. To die wise is better than to live in ignorance and to die virtuous better than to live in vice. Salvation could be found by becoming a black Frenchman. 'The Negro' comments Frantz Fanon 'who knows the mother country is a demigod . . . Many of them, after stays of varying length in metropolitan France, go home to be deified'.⁴ The mystique of being an intellectual clung to the returnee like the odour of garlic.

Although Haiti achieved its political independence in 1804, it was still culturally dependent on France through the official language, the Catholic Church and the French blood in the veins of the mulatto élite who distanced themselves from the mass of the black peasantry by emphasizing their ties with France. Religion, language and colour became differentiating bench marks and it was not until the humiliation of foreign occupation by United States marines between 1915 and 1934 that a consensus of sorts was established, based on a positive evaluation of the African heritage as promoted in the writings of Jean Price-Mars and others.

The Spanish context

In Spain where there had been nothing comparable to the restructuring of the French Revolution the terms of discourse were in marked contrast. There was no secular priesthood to elaborate an alternative legitimating ideology to that of the Catholic Church. Spain had had *pensadores*, the equivalent of the *philosophes*, some of whom became ministers in Charles III's government, but their reforms, aimed at modernizing the imperial state to meet the British threat, were dissipated under the impact of the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808. Those thinkers who had sought inspiration in French ideas, the *afrancesados*, were accused of undermining the nation's traditional Catholic beliefs. Although Spain was to bequeath the word 'liberal' to the European political vocabulary its practitioners were to be on the defensive throughout the nineteenth century, out of touch with the real will of the country with its deeply rooted Catholic culture. Liberalism was a minority creed which could only survive the challenge from traditionalists by allying with the military, thus becoming associated with *caudillismo*. Spanish and Spanish American intellectuals have always had to act within the context of a recurring conflict between '*generales*' and '*doctores*'. An example of the importance accorded to *pensadores* was the role Bolívar assigned to 'moral censors', selected for their wisdom, in his Angostura address of 1819. But idealism was too often submerged in the muddy waters of corruption. The ramifications of the institution of *compadrazgo* (godparenthood) and fierce family and regional loyalties meant that furthering the interests of one's own relations, however distant, did not carry the moral opprobrium which it would do in societies ruled by impersonal bureaucratic norms.⁵ Intellectuals themselves did not escape from the temptations of *amiguismo* and *personalismo*. Spain did not, therefore, either provide a model for civic virtue or generate enthusiasm for its intellectual life.

Although the Catholic Church was weaker in the Caribbean than on the mainland of Spanish America, it was nevertheless still the legitimating ideology. There was no alternative sect tradition, as in the British West Indies, in which thinkers and social critics could be nurtured. In Catholic societies generally masonry has provided one form of philosophical heterodoxy and in Spain Krausism (to be discussed later) another. Both Spanish liberalism and republicanism were broken reeds, either implicated, in the case of the former, in colonial exploitation, or powerless, in the case of the latter, to make fundamental changes. Until the revival of Spanish letters after 1898 Spanish American writers, economists and politicians would look to France, Britain or the United States for models and examples.

Foreign intellectuals and the Cuban Revolution

Inevitably this volume is dominated by Cuba. This is not to deny the significance and growing importance of both Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic or of the Francophone countries but Cuba must command our attention. This is not so much because of its size, great though that is by comparison, but rather because of the manner in which the Revolution since 1959 has changed our way of looking at the rest of the Caribbean, at Latin America and at the Third World in general. The richness of Cuban culture, the complexities, anxieties and deliberations of its thinkers in movements such as Annexationism, Reformism, Autonomism and, finally, in the long maturing of its nationalist ideology, culminating in the Independence movement, deserve closer analysis and wider exposure than they have hitherto received in the rest of the Caribbean.⁶ It would, however, be wrong to assume that because Cuba might now appear to some to be like some whale stranded on a private beach crowded by practitioners of the New Right, lessons from its history and the Revolution no longer have any relevance.

In particular, the Revolution has posed the challenging question of the influence of intellectuals in the process of social and revolutionary change. In the early 1960s the Revolution had been welcomed by the Western liberal intelligentsia and throughout Latin America receiving the imprimatur of leading intellectuals like C. Wright Mills and Jean-Paul Sartre. Cuba's attraction lay in seeming to be a new type of revolution, breaking the log jam of both theory and practice.

Doubts, it is true, were expressed in the early days. Concern was shown at the speed of radicalization which seemed to be progressing far beyond the reformist aims of Fidel Castro's 'History will absolve me' speech of 1953. This view was most pungently expressed by Theodore Draper. As an ex-communist he was avidly listened to in spite of his almost total ignorance of the dynamics of Cuban history. But this only reflected a general ignorance of Cuban affairs in the United States before 1959. It would be unwise, nevertheless, to underestimate the influence of his 'middle-class revolution betrayed' thesis in sounding alarm bells.

For others, however, the hope was entertained that Castro was sufficiently wilful in the Hispanic *caudillo* tradition and had enough independence of mind to resist the blandishments of the communists especially in view of their previous close association with Batista. This hope was particularly strong among the West European Left and the liberals who had never shared the American obsession, embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, of America for the Americans. Nor did they share the backyard syndrome of the United States. Europeans had learnt to

live in the backyard of the USSR. In Europe coexistence meant what it said, to coexist with large communist parties within national boundaries and to work out a *modus vivendi* with them. To many Europeans the American attitude to communism seemed simplistic and had the effect of achieving what it was designed to avoid, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The West European non-communist Left, remembering the 'god that failed', needed to restore their faith in a socialist utopia whilst for others, concerned with the Third World, and the processes of decolonization, Cuba seemed to offer a possible model. With the collapse of the Bandung axis and the polycentrism of the early 1960s Havana offered a 'third way' between Moscow and Peking. Even after the Revolution moved further to the Left in the aftermath of the bungled Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 many of those who had enthusiastically supported the Revolution in its early days continued to do so, arguing that Cuba was the only example of a Revolution where the communists had been taken over, instead of taking over!⁷ West European governments, quite apart from intellectuals on the Left, refused to join the blockade of Cuba and were to play a substantial role in ensuring the Revolution's survival.⁸ For their part, old Cuba hands, recalling the fleshpots of Havana, believed that Cubans were too easy going to submit to the iron discipline of communist mores and that the old Adam would win out in the end.

However, the most important reason why intellectuals abroad were attracted to the Revolution was the role assigned to intellectuals in both theory and practice. The Cuban radical tradition had assigned a prominent role to the *intelectual comprometido* but it provided no guide to either the mechanism of change or the processes of institutionalization. The most articulate and influential theoretical expression of revolutionary theory was by Régis Debray in his *Revolution in the Revolution* (1967) with its emphasis on the intellectuals' role as the outside agent in the *foco* of the rural guerrilla.⁹ This complemented Castro's earlier views on intellectuals in 1961 and Che Guevara's *Man and Socialism in Cuba* (1965) which gave a new twist to the moralism which had always been a major thread in the radical tradition. These approaches shared an emphasis on voluntarism. Revolutionaries had to make the revolution and not wait for the objective conditions to mature as in orthodox communist theory. Nor could the industrial proletariat be expected to play a vanguard role in Latin America where many of its leaders had been corrupted and co-opted. For the Western intelligentsia, dismayed by the consumerism of the industrial working class, and the increasing bureaucracy of orthodox communism, a revolutionary theory which assigned a role to *déraciné* intellectuals as

leaders of a rural-based peasant guerrilla movement had obvious attractions. Furthermore, the youthfulness of the 26th July movement had a special appeal to students who, influenced by Marcuse and others as well as by the youth culture of the 1960s, began to assign to themselves a new political role in advanced industrial societies where the revolutionary impetus seemed to have run into the sand.¹⁰

This model of revolution failed with the defeat of guerrilla movements throughout Latin America and the death of Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. This led to a cooling-off of enthusiasm abroad for the revolution and at the same time a tightening of control of intellectuals inside Cuba in the early 1970s which presaged a new concept of the intellectual in the revolutionary process and stressed their subordination to the dictates of the vanguard party. The role of intellectuals as independent critics was scorned. Technocrats edged out the humanist intelligentsia in much the same way, but for different reasons, that technocrats in capitalist societies were beginning to marginalize the old liberal intelligentsia apart from those able to make the adjustment to the media revolution. If Cuban intellectuals could no longer influence political decisions the importance of the cultural programme afforded them a role, provided they did not express dissentient views. Those unwilling to accept the change went into exile, swelling a diaspora which now included many of Cuba's ablest writers and academics.

Diasporas

One of the issues raised in the previous volume was the nature of the relationship between diaspora and homeland. As with the Commonwealth Caribbean so also there are Spanish- and French-speaking diasporas. Unlike the Commonwealth Caribbean, however, where emigration has been primarily economic and very rarely political, in the case of Cuba under Batista and Castro, in Haiti under Duvalier and in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo the motive has been mostly political. The oldest migration was that of Cuban tobacco workers to Tampa and Key West in the 1860s, to be followed by political exiles during the wars of independence, among whom was José Martí, the most important intellectual to be discussed in this book. By allowing the safety valve of emigration Castro defused internal opposition but in doing so he encouraged one of the largest political emigrations of modern times.¹¹

Unlike the dual stream of migrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean to North America and Britain, emigrants from the Spanish

and French islands have not been bifurcated in the same way. There are Haitian exiles (primarily intellectuals) in France, and Cubans in Spain but the ex-colonial power has not acted as a magnet in these cases as it has in that of Britain. Haitians have also emigrated to Francophone Quebec and to the United States, and although there has been some Cuban emigration to Latin America and Puerto Rico the United States has been the preferred destination. Haitians may feel isolated in their US exile but this is no longer the case for Spanish speakers as they move into long-established communities and share a cultural and linguistic universe with millions of other Hispanics. The high proportion of political exiles inevitably include many intellectuals, which raises the issue of loss of talent from the homeland as well as the efficacy or otherwise of their political opposition and criticism from exile.

For the French West Indies the situation is different. Being DOMS (Overseas Department) there are, in theory at least, no migrants nor a diaspora as the French West Indies are an integral part of France. The case of Puerto Rico is different again, since there emigration has been for economic reasons, reaching high proportions but with the complexities of choice between Commonwealth status, statehood or independence; where do the loyalties and affinities of Puerto Ricans in the United States now lie? Of all Caribbean peoples the Puerto Ricans feel the problem of identity most acutely and intellectuals have reacted more outspokenly because of the contrast with comparable islands which have secured their independence. To be part of the United States after nearly a century seems to cast doubt on the ability or will of Puerto Ricans to stand up for their rights.¹²

Racial complexity

A major difference between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Spanish-speaking islands is that the latter have been settlement as well as plantation colonies. This not only facilitated the earlier growth of a nationalist ethos, especially in Cuba, but resulted in a wider and more complex process of race mixing. This has led some observers to infer that the Hispanic Caribbean has no racial problem. Colour may not have the same connotations as in the Commonwealth islands and there are qualitative differences. It is striking, for example, to notice how reactions to Africa and the African heritage vary.¹³ The proportionately smaller black population in the Hispanic islands has been accompanied by a lower awareness of Africa. This is not related to numbers so much as to the fact that there has been no Hispanic equivalent to the colonies of West Indians in London or French West Indians in Paris and the

growth there, as a consequence, of a closer relationship between West Indians and Africans. Pan-Africanism emerged in the former and Négritude in the latter. Nor has there been a Hispanic equivalent to Marcus Garvey and earlier Back-to-Africa movements. Part of the explanation for these differences lies in the close cultural links which the Hispanic islands have had with the rest of Latin America.

After Cuban intervention in Angola in 1976 this absence of close African links changed. Many more Cubans than in the rest of the Caribbean have now been exposed to Africa at first hand and so have a more realistic view than the abstract and mythical attitudes which have become so common in the Commonwealth and French West Indies. There is also now in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic a wider interest in the African heritage due to the influence of return migrants who have mixed with American blacks and been exposed to Africanist ideologies. In Cuba an integrationist policy has not completely resolved the problem of race. The position of the black intellectual in Cuba is therefore explored at some length later.

The French West Indies have been under continuous French rule since 1635 and are now officially integral parts of France. 'Martinique is France,' wrote V.S. Naipaul.¹⁴ 'Arriving from Trinidad, you feel that you have not crossed the Caribbean but the English Channel.' This incestuous relationship has meant that intellectuals in Martinique and Guadeloupe do not share the same convoluted relationship with the United States as is experienced by those in the Hispanic islands, all of which have suffered at some time (as has Haiti) from United States occupation. Whatever the disadvantages of the French connection they are not those of a suffocating Americanization. French assimilationism poses its own problems but it also elicits a different type of response to that in the rest of the Caribbean.

Although Haitian intellectuals may move within a French cultural universe the fact of independence and the mystique of being the first Black Republic have enhanced pride in being of African origin. *Noirisme* and active daily African realities, reflected most widely in the voodoo religion, give Haitian intellectual theorizing its unique cast.¹⁵ But for most intellectuals, and especially those in the Hispanic world, attitudes were formed in a university environment in which expressions of popular culture were given short shrift until the 1920s and 1930s, and it is only within the past few years that popular culture has become an area for reputable academic study within universities. Anthropology, for example, has been slow to develop as an academic discipline within the Caribbean.

The university context

In contrast to the short life of universities in the French West Indies, Haiti and the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Hispanic Caribbean has had a long university tradition.¹⁶ The University of Santo Domingo, the first in the Americas, was founded by the Dominican Order in 1528. It had a troubled history after it was closed in 1802, being only reopened fitfully in the course of the nineteenth century. It finally received its autonomy in 1961. For long an élite institution, it has now become a mass university with over 50,000 students. The problem of overcrowding has tended to drive the children of the élite to study at private universities, or to study abroad, as many did in the nineteenth century when commercial links with Germany through the tobacco trade led Dominicans to study there.

The University of Havana was founded in 1728, also by the Dominicans. Six years later it came under royal patronage and was secularized in 1842. As its professors tended to be Creoles (except for the Spanish Rector) it became a centre of nationalist agitation during the colonial period. It received its autonomy as a consequence of the 1933 Revolution, but in 1962 the university was brought under tight state control, thus sanitizing it politically and ending its history as a centre of turbulent disaffection.

Puerto Rico, in contrast, did not have a university until the Americans founded one in 1903, based on the North American land-grant college with an emphasis on practical training. As the élite favoured the traditional Hispanic university's emphasis on arts and letters, especially law, they tended to send their children to the United States. English was the language of instruction until 1948 when it was replaced by Spanish. UPR became a centre for nationalist agitation, especially in the 1930s when Albizu Campos received most of his support from university students. Spanish American universities have tended to be as much political as academic institutions as a consequence of the University Reform movement which is discussed later. In Haiti and the French West Indies the university was based on the French model but because of their recent founding they lack the prestige of French universities where children of the élite continue to study.¹⁶

Although the role of the universities in the Caribbean has been crucial in the formation of intellectuals it has varied widely according to the developments described. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth century the formative influences, especially in the case of the Puerto Rican Eugenio María de Hostos and the Cuban José Martí, have to be sought in the time they spent in Spanish universities.

Spanish nineteenth-century influences

'Unity in Variety', the sub-title of this volume, was the key maxim of an obscure nineteenth-century Spanish intellectual, Francisco Pi y Margall who, for a period of only four months, was President of the short-lived First Spanish Republic in 1873.¹⁷ Although largely forgotten after his death in 1901, he was rediscovered by Spanish anarchists in the 1930s who admired him for his austere morality and the fixity of his views. They saw him as a precursor, since his extreme federal ideas, advocating the breaking down of power in all its forms and at all levels, had much in common with their own. He was also that rare case – a Spanish politician who was admired in Cuba. He was the only deputy with the courage to defend the Cubans in the Spanish Cortes at the time of the revolt against Spain in 1895.¹⁸ It was not that Pi saw independence as the solution to the Cuban problem. He believed that the best future for Spain's remaining colonial possessions, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, would be to have autonomy and federal status within a federation which would have included the breaking down of Spain itself into its natural constituents. Contemporary Spain is gradually moving towards this ideal but for the Hispanic Caribbean as for Hispanic America generally, it remains a dream.¹⁹

Yet who is to say, given the subsequent history of these ex-Spanish colonies, that Pi y Margall's vision might not have been a preferable solution? Both the Cuban José Martí and the Puerto Rican Eugenio María de Hostos (although Dominican by adoption) argued for a federation of Hispanic Caribbean states. But although united by language, religion and culture, political realities were too strong, historical traditions, social and economic structures too diverse to make union in whatever form (except in sentiment) a practicable possibility.

As with the rest of the Caribbean each island had its own insular concerns. The Dominican Republic, independent since 1844, was obsessed by its relationship with neighbouring Haiti with which it has a land frontier, and by whom it was occupied for 22 years. Puerto Rico, for long a backwater with a struggling economy, was unable to emulate Cuba in its war against Spain. The failed Grito de Lares of 1868 was not to be the prelude to a war of independence as was the successful Grito de Yara of the same year in Cuba; and thus many Puerto Ricans feel a sense of inadequacy, faced with an unheroic past, and are now divided over the choice between independence, statehood or continuing Commonwealth status.

Although sharing in a wider Hispanic cultural universe (as the Columbus quincentenary will constantly stress) the discourse of intellectuals is conditioned by the imperatives of their own particular

society in a way which makes the problem of integration in the ostensibly more fragmented English-speaking islands seem simple in comparison and more amenable to a federal solution.

In his federal vision, Pi y Margall illustrates the case of the intellectual in politics who can often be right for the wrong reasons. At what point does principle give way to expediency? This has been the dilemma of intellectuals who put their head into a political noose. Inflexible adherence to an ideology, which may be accounted a fault in a politician, can, in a corrupted environment, be regarded as a virtue. A flight to theory and a cult of ideas, a spiritualization of the mundane can become an obsession. As with both Pi's federal supporters and the anarchists it becomes the politics of impracticability and a passport to failure.

Federalism is often canvassed (more than ever now with the crisis of the 'new world order') as a necessary solution to the balkanization of the Caribbean but to argue, in neo-Hegelian fashion, that federalism is the inevitable goal towards which modern states are moving, however modish with the example of the Brussels of 1992, has to be tempered by a recognition of the hard facts of economic and political realities.

Pi's career also illustrates another feature of intellectuals in peripheral societies: it is often ideas which have little relevance or success in their country of origin which get taken up with passion elsewhere. For Pi y Margall it was the theories of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, which could not dent the Jacobin/Napoleonic centralism of the French state but which seemed to be the solution to Spain's recurring problem of regionalism.²⁰ In Cuba, rather than Proudhon's ideas (except through his influence on early Spanish anarchist immigrants) it was the philosophy of Karl Friedrich Krause, a long-forgotten *privatdozent* of Heidelberg University, which was to influence Hostos and Martí and, through the latter, Fidel Castro (whose thinking in moral categories dimly reflects early Krausist influence).²¹

José Martí: the '*intelectual comprometido*'

Any consideration of Hispanic intellectuals in the Caribbean must start with the life and ideas of José Martí (1853-1895).²² Although dying in battle in the early weeks of the war against Spain, his ideas were to inform and inspire every subsequent generation of Cuban thinkers and were to be the major influence on Castro, thus giving the Revolution a sense of continuity with the war of independence which broke out in 1868. At the age of sixteen, Martí had identified with Cuban aspirations for independence and for this he was deported to Spain where

at the University of Zaragoza he came under the influence of Krausism. His Spanish experience convinced him that Pi y Margall's federal republicans were in no position, even when in power in 1873, to grant Cuba autonomy, let alone independence. For the rest of his life he was, in his own words, married to the cause of *Cuba Libre*. Unlike Mazzini, with whom he might be compared, his early death spared him the fate of seeing his hopes dashed. The Cuban Republic was a travesty of his concept of *Cuba Libre*.²³ Independence was to be limited by the Platt Amendment which, until abrogated in 1934, permitted the United States to intervene should they consider their interests to be threatened. The plantation system against which he argued was not only strengthened and expanded but was dominated by foreigners, especially the United States. Democracy was nullified by a rampant spoils system. Instead of racial harmony American ideas of racial inequality were introduced during the US occupation between 1898 and 1902. Blacks who had provided the majority of the soldiers in the guerrilla war against Spain did not acquire land, gain access to education or share in the spoils. The beneficiaries of independence were to be, paradoxically, new waves of Spanish immigrants who monopolized commerce and the retail trade, ensuring that blacks remained at the bottom of the social pyramid.²⁴

Martí's legacies were however many and varied. The frequently used title of the 'Apostle' is indicative of the reverential awe in which he has been held. The cult which grew up round his memory is puzzling even to those familiar with the canonization of other Latin American secular heroes such as Bolívar or San Martín.²⁵ Every political leader or group, whether Grau San Martín who named his Revolutionary Cuban Party (PRC) after Martí's own party, or Batista who patronized the centenary celebrations of 1953, or Castro who quoted him and not Marx as his mentor in his 'History will absolve me' speech, claimed to be his intellectual heir. Even the communists with whom he would have had nothing in common declared him as their precursor, as illustrated by a documentary film of his life in which an empty seat in the hall prepared for a party congress is symbolically left empty for '*el primer representante*'. When the counter-revolutionaries of Miami named their radio and TV stations after him, beaming anti-revolutionary propaganda into Cuba, this was the ultimate provocation. One explanation for the harnessing of his name in such an eclectic way is that his thought was not systematic and so his apotheogms and ideas become a reservoir to be dredged to suit the needs of the moment.

This quasi-religious reverence stems from the redemptive elements in his thought. As Cuba had suffered from a protracted war of independence – a nineteenth-century Vietnam – it had earned the right of leadership against foreign powers. These powers included not only

Spain, about whom Martí, with a Spanish father and a Canary Island mother, had ambivalent feelings (always distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' Spaniards) but also the United States against whose economic encroachments he sounded a warning. Although Latin Americans may not share Cuban effusiveness he has a compelling attraction for them as well, both for his staunch anti-Americanism, through his writings in the Latin American continental press and also through his literary works which made him a key figure in the Spanish *modernista* movement.

To these cultural influences must be added his example as the *intellectual comprometido*, the committed intellectual who is also a man of action. A mild, peaceable man, as befitted a disciple of Krause's '*armonismo*', he nevertheless took to the battlefield in the opening weeks of the war to be immediately killed in a skirmish, embracing martyrdom and anticipating, it would seem, that his influence would be greater dead than alive.

It was not until the crisis of the early 1920s, caused by the collapse of the First World War sugar boom, and with accelerating American economic penetration, that Martí was rediscovered by a new generation of young Cubans. His moralism was particularly appealing to those idealists among university students who were dismayed by the way in which Havana was becoming the 'trash can' of the Caribbean.²⁶ Prohibition in the United States was driving gangsters and tourists down to Havana, whose reputation as 'red light' capital of the Caribbean was finally sealed, to be reflected in erotomaniac literature such as Cabrera Infante's *Infante's Inferno* (1979).²⁷

The political university and the student movement

Although there had been some educational reform of the school system during the American occupation, no attempt had been made to reform higher education. Hence the impact of the Latin American University Reform Movement when it finally reached Cuba in 1923.²⁸ This movement had started in the Argentine university of Córdoba in 1918 in response to the need to overhaul and democratize the university in order to meet the challenge of modernization. The Reform was to have far-reaching implications. Student demands, with their political, nationalist and anti-imperialist overtones, struck a responsive chord throughout Latin America at a time when United States influence was replacing that of Britain. Activists arrogated to themselves the role of

expediciencies of age, were represented on faculty boards to keep a watching brief on their professors would become a model for society. The public's high degree of tolerance towards student protest was due to their often being the only form of opposition to corrupt dictators. As early as 1910 an American observer commented 'there is perhaps nobody in this community, any single man or institution desires less to antagonize, nor anybody, that were antagonized, or *vice versa*, pleased, can make its opinions quite so obvious to all concerned, as can the students of Havana University!'²⁹

After its foundation in 1923 the Federation of University Students (FEU) was to be at the centre of Cuban radical politics, both in resisting the dictator Machado after 1928 (during the 1933 Revolution which overthrew him and when they were represented in the revolutionary government of Grau San Martín, himself a university professor), and in the rebellion against Batista leading up to the Revolution of 1959. Although there have been student disturbances at the University of the West Indies in the Rodney Riots at Mona in 1968 and in Trinidad in 1970, student activity elsewhere is not legitimated by anything comparable to the philosophy of the Córdoba reform movement.

However, in common with most Spanish American universities, the Reform movement politicized Havana university – without modernizing it. Student politics became a complex mixture of idealism and self-interest. The rediscovery of Martí's principles in the 1920s provided an idealistic legitimation for radical protest by those excluded from the spoils of office. The unresponsiveness of the university to society's needs by overproducing underemployed and unemployed graduates fuelled discontent. Law, by far the largest faculty, was regarded as an entrée to politics as well as for manipulating the spoils system. A law degree was also a passport to a lucrative practice in foreign firms operating in Cuba. But students graduating from a university disrupted by strikes (it was closed down between 1930 and 1933), diverted by politics and taught by a demoralized and often incompetent part-time professoriat were at a disadvantage when compared with foreign expatriates or Cuban students who had graduated from North American colleges.

The subordination of academic matters to politics and the minimal attention paid to science had disastrous effects in Cuba as elsewhere in Spanish America by depriving society of indigenous-trained specialists, and provided a powerful impetus, as Albornozy shows in the case of Venezuela (and as has also occurred in the Dominican Republic), to the establishment of apolitical private universities, often heavily endowed by business and foreign foundations, to provide the vocational training which politicized universities could not or would not offer.³⁰

One of the consequences of the Cuban Revolution's educational reforms has been to emasculate students as a political force and to modernize the university to enable it to meet society's needs. This has been done by re-ordering academic priorities, by changing the prestige ratings of the professions, by upgrading applied sciences and practical subjects, by breaking down privileged access to the university and by implicitly changing the concept and function of the intellectual. The thrust of this educational restructuring has been to create a technical and scientific sub-culture on the premise that no Third World revolution can survive unless it can generate its own technical cadres, to supply both domestic needs and those of foreign aid programmes.³¹ Without some measure of scientific independence, political and economic independence becomes a mirage. Here perhaps the Cuban example has some lessons for the rest of the Caribbean.

Intellectuals in the Revolution

Kapcia traces the convoluted development of the national popular tradition among Cuban intellectuals, showing their seminal role in framing the language, symbols and mythology of radical and nationalist dissent. By radicalizing the 'hidden' popular consciousness and orienting the Revolution's search for an identity they contributed to the formulation of a new sense of nationhood. Culture was established as a vital element in revolutionary transformation through education, literacy campaigns, in a comprehensive publishing programme and most important of all in developing, uniquely for the Caribbean, a dynamic film industry. The cinema has been crucial in consolidating the Revolution, and its use may be compared with Russian experience in the 1920s.³² It has now an important role in raising consciousness and in disseminating the Revolution's achievements through the wide distribution of Cuban films, the central role which Havana plays as host to the annual International Film Festival and the training of directors and technicians in the Foundation headed by García Marquéz.

By the end of the 1960s there was a marked change in Cuban cultural policy after the failure of the guerrilla campaign in Latin America and the death of Che Guevara in 1967. In the ensuing crisis the purpose and function of intellectuals was called into question. The change can be seen by comparing two quotations, from Castro's 'Words to Intellectuals' in 1961 and from his speech in 1971 after the Padilla affair. In the former he said:

The Revolution has to understand the real situation and should therefore act in such a manner that the whole group of artists and intellectuals who are not genuinely revolutionaries can find within the revolution a place to work and create, a place where their creative spirit, even though they are not revolutionary writers and artists, has the opportunity and freedom to be expressed. This means: within the revolution everything, against the revolution nothing.³³

After the furore caused by the Padilla affair and the alienation of many foreign and Latin American intellectuals who had previously supported Cuba he said:

We do not pay homage to those false values which reflect the structures of societies that despise our people. We reject the pretension of the mafia of pseudo-leftist bourgeois intellectuals to become the *critical* conscience of society. The critical conscience of society is the people themselves and, in the first place, the working class . . . The fact of being an intellectual does not bestow any particular privileges . . . Hypocrites will be against Cuba. Really honest and revolutionary intellectuals will understand the justice of our position.³⁴

As Miller points out, external events were a determining cause in the change of attitude. Cultural policy was a casualty of the need to toe the Soviet line as Cuba became increasingly dependent on Soviet support.

Castro's dismissal of Western liberals' reservations as bourgeois scruples has to be put into this international context but it also obscured those temperamental incompatibilities between, on the one side, cautious, unimaginative bureaucrats, fearful of change and of taking initiatives or being too critical, who are bound by the iron hoops of precedent and, on the other, the writer's free-ranging imagination. Cuba was no longer a guerrilla state with internalized constraints but one with a paranoid siege mentality, a centralized command economy, the largest army in Latin America and an increasingly institutionalized state structure. The loss of the valued support of foreign intellectuals increased a sense of isolation. The idea of the Cuban Revolution being a 'third way' which had proved so attractive to foreign sympathizers – 'socialism in liberty' – in the early days of the Revolution now gave way to the attempt to swing the non-aligned group behind the Soviet Union and to a repudiation of the 'two imperialisms' thesis.³⁵ The closer dependence on Soviet models in culture as well as in economics seemed to be backtracking on that earlier openness when Castro had called for

a creative Marxism and not one which accepted uncritically foreign models.

The ending of Western liberals' love affair with Cuba gave an impetus to a new and (to many) a startling change in Cuba's foreign policy, and it marks a further move away from the guerrilla mentality of the early 1960s. The occasion was provided by the collapse of Portuguese power in Africa in 1975. A year later the Cubans sent an expedition to Angola and initiated a remarkable change of direction. This new African orientation was a substitute for the failure of the guerrilla campaigns in Latin America. At a time when many Cuban intellectuals were beginning to be alienated from the régime and foreign sympathizers were losing interest, active military involvement in the struggle against apartheid – the 'Last Great Cause' – injected new life into the Revolution, refurbishing its tarnished image and inspiring enthusiasm among a new generation who had not experienced the heroic days of early struggle.

Inevitably, this period was marked by a renewed emphasis on Cuba's African heritage. The redirection of foreign policy not only gave high international visibility but was seen to be repaying a historical debt to Africa for the depredations of the slave trade. This official view did not go uncontested.³⁶ It has been argued that Castro's African policy was an opportunistic manipulation of Cuban blacks and that the earlier advice of black intellectuals had been ignored, in particular that of Walterio Carbonell whose Afrocentric plan for foreign policy had been rejected out of hand in late 1959. This plan was proposed as the key to a network of Third World alliances. Had it been adopted, dependence on the Soviet Union might have been avoided and Cuba could have emerged as a genuine leader of the Third World instead of becoming a Soviet surrogate. This argument is part of a wider critique of the Revolution's attitude to blacks which it was alleged had ignored their cultural interests by following an uncompromising integrationist policy. The issue of colour became a key component in the construction of a Third World ideology while the emphasis on Cuba's African roots, forcefully expressed by the white ethnologist Miguel Barnet, among others, involved the resurrection of the submerged history of Cuban blacks since independence.³⁷

Roots of the nation

This view of the African roots of Cuban nationality contrasts strikingly with previous elaborations of the origins of Cuban nationalism as expressed by Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, a leading pre-revolutionary

historian, whose views are analysed, together with those of his Puerto Rican contemporary Antonio Pedreira, by Diaz Quiñones (Chapter 6 of this volume). Both Guerra and Pedreira idealized the small landholder, heirs of the plantation owners of the nineteenth century who had been decimated during the course of the war of independence and displaced by foreign-owned sugar mills during the Second Sugar Revolution in the 1880s.³⁸ Both saw the *latifundium*, as Martí had before, as the source of all Cuba's ills. Guerra's book *Sugar and Abolition in the Antilles* (1927) had had a profound influence on Cuban radicals including Castro, but in emphasizing the role of the *patricios* as the guardian of nationality both writers had discounted any positive contribution made by blacks. To both, blacks were a threat to civilized values. Both resort to the 'barbarism versus civilization' dichotomy which had been a stock-in-trade of Latin American intellectuals up to the 1920s. In Guerra's case the threat to 'civilized' values was greater because of the influx of black migrant labour from the British West Indies and Haiti, found necessary to sustain the hated *latifundium*.

The barbarism-civilization dichotomy had been first formulated in *Facundo* (1846) by the Argentine Domingo Sarmiento, who had been so influenced by the role which European immigrants had played in the construction of democracy in the United States that he advocated the introduction of immigrants from Europe with their European values to offset the threat from illiterate cowboy *caudillos* as well as what he considered to be the pernicious effects of the Spanish colonial legacy.³⁹ In this view, the future lay with a Europeanized élite. A further legitimization for the patrician élite came in 1900 with the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó's *Ariel* in which the spiritualized values of Latin civilization are contrasted to the materialist values of the United States.⁴⁰ This ideology of sublimation was consolation for the materially weak at a time of encroaching American power in the aftermath of the US occupation of Cuba following Spanish defeat in the Cuban-Spanish American war of 1898. No one would guess from Rodó's text that the majority of Latin America's population were Indian, black, mestizo or mulatto.

Hispanismo and the re-discovery of the Spanish heritage

A further legitimization of this elitist view was embodied in Ortega y Gasset's influential *Revolt of the Masses* (1929). Ortega's influence on the Spanish American intelligentsia (including Guerra and Pedreira) cannot be exaggerated. Through his *Revista de Occidente* and his writings in the Madrid daily *El Sol* and in the continental press, the

Latin American intelligentsia were introduced to the latest European thinkers, especially Germans.⁴¹

Important though this aspect of Ortega's influence might have been, his popularity reflected a renewed interest in Spain which had previously been despised and rejected as a model in the nineteenth century when it had been wracked by revolution and disturbances. But the 1898 débâcle with its final dénouement of imperial power, released a torrent of self-questioning in the writings of the 'Generation of 1898'. With writers of the stature of Unamuno, Machado, Pio Baroja, Costa, Azorin, Ganivet and Ramiro de Maeztu the values of the Hispanic legacy now began to be critically assessed and better appreciated. Relieved of the burdens of empire, Spanish intellectuals tried to forge a new relationship with Latin America through *Hispanismo* which emphasized the binding ties of culture, language and religion between Spanish-speaking nations throughout the world.⁴²

The new positive evaluation of the Hispanic heritage was one aspect of the distancing from non-Hispanic Europe which had torn itself apart in the First World War, in which Spain, as a neutral power, had not been involved. It was now quite respectable, therefore, for writers like Guerra y Sánchez and Pedreira to take refuge in an idealization of the Spanish past as a way of offsetting encroaching Americanization in a way which would have been impossible when Spain had been the colonial power.

In contrast, for Albizu Campos, the militant Puerto Rican *independentista*, the emphasis was more extreme. Pro-Spanish sentiment had overtones of *Hispanidad*, the other current of Hispanic thought deriving from Ramiro de Maeztu's *Defensa de la Hispanidad* which glorified the imperial past and which became the bible of right-wing nationalists after its publication in 1934.⁴³ The Spanish Civil War, in which Maeztu was murdered, became a touchstone for the conflict between the 'White Legend' and the 'Black Legend' of Spanish history deeply dividing Cubans during this period, to an even greater extent than it did other Hispanic Americans.⁴⁴

The distancing from a discredited Europe which the revindication of Spain implied found a further legitimation in Spengler's *Decline of the West* which had been translated into Spanish in 1923, only three years after its publication in German. Spengler's view that history moved in cycles and not in linear progression, and that civilizations grew and declined organically struck a responsive chord among Latin American thinkers who sensed that with the exhaustion of Europe after the War a new cycle of civilization would begin in Latin America. The growth of 'New Worldism' (of which US isolationism was an aspect) took the form, in Latin America and the Caribbean, of a search for

roots – the *manera de ser*, the mystical essence of nationality of *cubanidad*, *mexicanidad*, or *argentinidad*. A powerful impetus to this had come from the Mexican Revolution after 1910, and especially during the cultural renaissance of the 1920s when in the words of José Vasconcelos, Mexico's leading intellectual, civilization returned to the tropics from whence it had sprung. Mexicans could extol their pre-Columbian past both in the existence of a large indigenous population and of numerous ruins. In the Caribbean there were few indigenous inhabitants left and no historical monuments except those of the colonial power. There were, however, vibrant expressions of African cultures, especially in music, dance and religion, as well as in a vital social life. Afro-Cubanism seemed to be one way of asserting independence from European cultural values.

The African dimension

White intellectuals throughout the Caribbean, but especially in Cuba, became fascinated by the 'other' as Europeans had been before them.⁴⁵ African sculpture had been rediscovered by painters such as Picasso, and in the post-war malaise in the 1920s the *avant garde* and surrealists were attracted to the 'primitive' and to the Dionysiac release of spontaneous energy which was attributed to the African spirit. Paris was to be one source of the new interest – as in the doctrine of *Négritude* formulated, paradoxically, by Europeanized black intellectuals. In the Caribbean, the Harlem Renaissance was a more significant influence and Caribbean intellectuals, especially blacks, saw it as an explosion of an authentically *black* culture.

Since the 1890s a number of strategies for black liberation had been canvassed in the United States, many of which were contradictory, but the significance of the Harlem Renaissance lay in its affirmation of black culture in its own right. British West Indians had been active in the Renaissance as a consequence of their migration to Harlem. Marcus Garvey represented one strand, the African Blood Brotherhood another, and a third, culturally the most important, was represented by the Jamaican Claude McKay. McKay never returned to Jamaica after leaving it in 1912 and it was left to the black American poet Langston Hughes, who spoke Spanish, to make the link with Cuba.⁴⁶ He first met the mulatto poet Nicolás Guillén in Havana in 1930. Hughes's impact was immediate, and resulted in the first affirmation by a Cuban poet of an authentic black poetic voice with the publication of Guillén's *Motivos de Son* in 1930.

Guillén's poetic odyssey ranged from early escapist poetry through

the *Motivos de Son* and the more daring use of African rhythms in *Songoro Cosongo* (1931) to the Caribbean vision of *West Indies Ltd* (1934); on to a wider international dimension in his journalistic writings prompted by the Abyssinian and Spanish Civil War; and to the socially committed poetry after his entry into the communist party in 1937. He finally became Cuba's national poet in 1961, and the director of UNEAC (the Union of Cuban Writers and Artists), thus playing the role of the poet of the revolution as well as that of cultural bureaucrat.⁴⁷

Guillén was the most prominent but not the only representative of Afro-Cubanism. A key figure in drawing attention to Cuba's African legacy had been Fernando Ortiz who although white had been drawn to study Cuban blacks through his criminological studies.⁴⁸ Once his interest was aroused he devoted the rest of his life to studying black culture in language, folklore, music and religion. His early writings, *Los negros brujos* (1906), *Los negros esclavos* (1910) and more especially his *Glosario de Afronegrismos* (1923) were sources for *negrista* poets – the whites José Guirão, José Taillet and Emilio Ballegas, who shared with their Puerto Rican contemporary Luis Palés Matos an interest in the 'Other' in much the same way as European and North American white writers and artists had been attracted to African art, music and dance. With Guillén, however, Cuban blacks found a voice which had been smothered since the early years of independence.

In spite of the part which blacks played in the war against Spain, they did not benefit from independence. On the contrary, the small group of middle-class blacks who began to emerge in the early 1890s with their own press and clubs were to be gradually marginalized. This can be partly explained by the introduction of American racist assumptions on the part of the occupying US army, a high proportion of whom were Southerners, and partly by fear on the part of the white Cuban élite of the threat posed by veterans of the guerrilla army. The Platt Amendment was welcomed by this élite as a guarantee of American protection against black radicalism. The formation of the Independent Party of Colour (PIC) by Evaristo Estenoz in 1906 confirmed their worst fears, and in 1910 a law was passed forbidding parties to be organized on the basis of colour. Ironically, this law was named the Morúa law after Morúa Delgado, president of the Senate and a leading black intellectual.⁴⁹

Morúa had been one of a group of blacks close to Martí in exile which included the journalists Juan Gualberto Gómez and Rafael Serra, whose paper *Doctrina de Martí*, published in New York in 1896 after Martí's death, was one of the first to take up Martí's ideas at a time when it seemed that the leadership of the independence struggle was passing into the hands of conservatives.⁵⁰ Morúa had been a novelist

who wrote realistically, as the son of a slave, of the black experience, criticizing the sacrosanct classic of nineteenth-century Cuban literature, Cirilo Villaverde's *Cecilia Valdés* (1882), for expressing white prejudices. Dying two months after his law was passed, Morúa did not live to see the Race War of 1912 in Oriente in which as many as 3000 blacks may have been killed, with the aid of US marines.⁵¹

In spite of the threat which this revolt posed, legislation was passed in 1913 admitting the importation of Haitian and British West Indian cane-cutters. This both drove down wages and divided the rural black labour force culturally, forcing Cuban blacks back on to their own cultural resources, represented by their religious and secret societies. So far from integrating blacks, Morúa's law led to a wider separation both between races and between blacks themselves as they became increasingly ghettoized in Havana's slums or on the plantations.

Morúa was in the integrationist tradition of Martí for whom there were neither blacks nor whites, only Cubans. This was a view shared by Guillén, who for all his emphasis on the African heritage was a spokesman for *mulatez* and Afro-Latinity. Comparatively unaffected by the French cultural mirage, he was profoundly influenced by Federico García Lorca whom he met in Havana in 1930, by the revival of the traditional Spanish *romance*, through his friendship with Rafael Alberti the Spanish communist poet as well as with the peasant-poet Miguel Hernández whom he was to meet later in Spain. Guillén's poetry was a subtle blending of African and Spanish traditions.

The most striking expression of the repudiation of European example is in the work of Alejo Carpentier, whose first novel *Ecue-Yamba-O* (1933) was in the nativist Afro-Cuban tradition. Born in Havana of French-Russian parents, much of his life was spent abroad in voluntary exile in Paris between 1928 and 1939 after his imprisonment by Machado, and in Venezuela between 1945 and 1959, finally returning to Cuba in 1959 to head the state publishing house, and returning to Paris in 1966 as Cuban cultural attaché. He died in Paris in 1980.⁵²

Carpentier and the 'new' world of 'lo real maravilloso'.

Carpentier had been influenced by Spengler but it was the rise of Nazism and Fascism which finally destroyed his faith in European rationalism. Moving in surrealist circles in Paris had been another stimulus in undermining his faith in accepted verities although the surrealist subversion of artistic and literary norms seemed to him superficial in comparison with the marvellous reality of the Caribbean and Latin America. This had been brought home to him during a visit to Haiti in 1943 out of

which came *El reino de este mundo* (1949), his first novel since 1933.⁵³ The realization that voodoo and not the ideas of the Enlightenment had been the inspirational and sustaining force behind the successful slave rising against the French forced him to reconsider the dynamics of New World culture and the uniqueness of its imaginative universe. From his Haitian novel sprang the doctrine of *lo real maravilloso* which was to inspire a new generation of Latin American writers and underpin the 'boom'.

In Carpentier's view the Caribbean could become the Mediterranean of a new civilization. Latin American reality with its variegated cultures, the co-existence of Europeanized and Americanized cities and pre-Columbian Indians, with immigrants like the Greek gold prospector Yannes in *The Lost Steps* (1953) fleeing from an exhausted Mediterranean – 'The sea without fish, the neglected Tyrian purple, the decay of the myths, and a great lost hope' – was qualitatively so different from European reality that it could not be contained within accepted literary conventions.

The turning away from Europe is encapsulated in a passage which deserves to be quoted in full from his key novel *The Lost Steps*, in which a musicologist (like Carpentier himself), tiring of the boredom of life in New York and of his actress wife, journeys to seek the origins of music in the Amazonian forest together with Mouche his pretentious French mistress full of the platitudes of existentialism.⁵⁴ During a break in their journey, Mouche is questioned by three young artists:

The musician was so White, the poet so Indian, the painter so Black, that they brought to mind the Three Wise Men as they stood around the hammock where Mouche lay lazily stretched, answering the questions they asked her as though playing a part in an Adoration of the Magi. The conversation had a single theme: Paris. And I noticed that the three of them were questioning her as Christians in the Middle Ages might have questioned a pilgrim returning from the Holy Land . . .

I cut into the conversation with the malicious intention of breaking up Mouche's big scene, asking the young men about the history of their country, the first manifestations of its colonial literature, its folk traditions; and it was evident that my changing the subject was most distasteful to them. I asked them, . . . if they had ever been in the jungle. The Indian poet, shrugging his shoulder, answered that there was nothing to see there, and such trips were for foreigners who wanted to collect bows and quivers. Culture, observed the Negro emphatically, was not to be found in the jungle. In the

musician's opinion the artist today could live only where thought and creation were only alive, returning to that city was engraved on the mind of his comrades ... the Three Young Wise Men would soon land in this net [as Carpentier had done himself and was to do again when appointed cultural attaché in Paris] led by the star shining above the great manger of St. Germain-des-Prés ... I saw them growing gaunt and pale in their unlikely studios – the Indian turning green, the Negro's smile gone, the White man perverted – more and more forgetful of the sun they had left behind, trying desperately to imitate what came naturally to those whose rightful place was in the net. Years later, having frittered away their youth, they would return, with vacant eyes, all initiative gone, without heart, to set themselves to the only task appropriate to the milieu that was slowly revealing to me the nature of its value; Adam's task of giving things their names.

The novel, like all Carpentier's writings, is complex, multi-faceted, elaborated with florid baroquisms, and reflects the ambivalences involved in any intellectual's odyssey of self-discovery. For Carpentier, as for many European-influenced intellectuals, there could be no final resting-place.

In the face of encroaching Americanization, mass culture and its levelling democratic implications, asserting the superior values of a Eurocentric élite culture served as a means for the Spanish American élite to distance themselves psychologically from the populace. Since independence the colonized had become the colonizers, living off the profits of cheap black or Indian labour. Hating oneself for being what one was not reflected the resentment of an élite excluded from the resources and stimuli of the metropolis. Boredom as always was a powerfully corrosive agent in their discontent.

The significance of the Cuban reformulation of the intellectual's role lay in the assertion that the Third World intellectual has no choice. Commitment, and by implication contentment, meant dirtying one's hands, which in an ex-slave society where manual work was despised was a revolutionary act in itself. Castro wielding a machete in the sugar harvest has a symbolic significance far beyond the press publicity stunt.

Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic

Sugar wealth made Havana a colonial metropolis, threatening a reversal of roles by which Spain, bankrupt and riven by civil wars, might become

a colony of its own colony. Cuban riches had been at the root of the nineteenth-century crisis in which the plantocracy's wealth was not matched by political power.

In Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic the crisis was not so acute. Both were underpopulated economic backwaters; neither were in a position to challenge Spanish power. The Dominican Republic achieved its independence because there was little to be coveted, and Spain did not want to be embroiled in the complications of Haiti's ambitions.

In contrast, Puerto Rico remained a colony, since although economically poor it had a strategic importance, as it was to have for the Americans after 1898. The countryside with its subsistence peasant farmers was isolated from the towns, especially San Juan, the centre of the military and commercial élite. Sugar production with a plantocracy of mainly immigrant origin was restricted to certain geographical regions. In the aftermath of the American occupation after 1898, when *hacendados* were faced by expanding US-owned corporations, the *jibaro* was idealized by intellectuals as the symbol of nationality in an ideology of '*contraplantación*', a counter-culture of marronage.⁵⁵ *Costumbrista* writings in mid-century provided evidence on which later writers could construct their vision of the nation's origins.

Hostos, Puerto Rico's leading intellectual, spent most of his life in exile, particularly in the Dominican Republic where he died refusing to return to Puerto Rico until it was independent. His sociological writings were among the first examples of their kind in Spanish America. Like Martí, he had been exposed to Krausism in Spain but he was also influenced by positivism and has been compared, in some of his views, to the Mexican *científicos*. But whereas they provided a legitimation for foreign investment and the expansion of the *latifundium* which pauperized large sections of the Mexican peasantry, Hostos strongly attacked sugar monoculture, as Ramiro Guerra and Antonio Pedreira were to do in Cuba and Puerto Rico.

In the Dominican Republic different historical circumstances changed the thrust of the argument.⁵⁶ In spite of sugar being introduced into Hispaniola in the 1520s, the lure of mainland wealth turned the Spanish part of the island into a backwater, in contrast to French St Domingue which became the richest colony in the Caribbean until the slave revolt of the 1790s. Cattle rearing, with its minimal labour needs, became the staple of the southern region of the newly independent Dominican Republic after 1844, while in the north tobacco flourished in the seclusion of the Cibao valley. The contrast between cattle *caudillos* with their *macho* ways and the peasant farmers of the Cibao recalls that

dichotomy of Fernando Ortiz's most famous book *Cuban Counterpoint* in which he contrasted the slave crop of sugar with the free crop of tobacco.⁵⁷ However, both independent farmers and the cattle *caudillos* were to be casualties of sugar plantations introduced in the 1870s.⁵⁸ The Dominican Republic was unique in the Caribbean as sugar was not dependent on slavery, which had been abolished as early as 1822. The slave issue did not therefore dominate intellectual discourse as it did in Cuba. Dominican writers, like Hostos, were to be concerned with the fate of those peasants who had been dispossessed of their lands by the expanding sugar plantations and by the late-century crisis of the tobacco industry. Writers nostalgically idealized the peasant culture of the Cibao in much the same way that the *jibaro* and *guajiro* were to be later idealized in Puerto Rico and Cuba. Fear of Haiti was another theme of concern to writers so that the most famous novel of the nineteenth century, Manuel de José Galván's *Enriquillo*, idealizes the disappeared Indian, but as Hoetink points out the emphasis on the Indian roots of Dominican nationality was a means of establishing a sense of continuity with the nation's origins. As in Puerto Rico, so now Dominicans in assessing their history are beginning to accept their African heritage influenced by returning migrants from the United States with an aroused self-awareness as well as by the spectacular success of black Dominican players in the American baseball league.

The political uses of history

It is a truism that the conception of the past influences the way we look at the present and the future. Recalling the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s politicians 'learning a lesson from the past' framed their policies accordingly towards Nasser in Egypt and Hussein in Iraq. The way in which such conceptions are formulated and condition our thinking is the concern of historiography. To some, indeed, the proper study of history *is* historiography. In this view, the historical past is a jumble of unrelated but discoverable facts which is ordered and given shape in the mind of the historian. Hence only by subjecting to the closest scrutiny the historian's motives, choice of topic, prejudices and predilections can we approximate to 'objective' history. (This is partially what Anthony Maingot sets out to illustrate in his chapter on the political use of history by Eric Williams and Juan Bosch.)⁵⁹

There is a sense in which the colonizers colonize the history of the colonized. Battalions of graduate students are marched into unstudied areas of the colonial and ex-colonial world. It could be described as an academic equivalent of the Hobson thesis. As the returns on

researching domestic history decline at home and the competition grows fiercer because the topics available become exhausted, so graduates are channelled into new pastures where the grass is greener, the fields more open and the competition less intense. The reverse process scarcely exists. Very few historians from the colonies have studied the history of the metropolitan power. One person to do so was Eric Williams, whose *Capitalism and Slavery* has arguably been the most influential historical work to come out of the English-speaking Caribbean, altering our perception of the relationship between slavery, the expansion of capitalism and the industrial revolution. Some fifty years after its publication it still rouses the excitement and interest of historians, who continue to refine his ideas. In entering politics and forsaking the academic life Williams had to give up his scholarly interest, turning his back on archival scholarship but not on his interest in history.

Now, however, the message became more direct. History became 'gossip' in Lamming's phrase or a manifesto for an oppressed people in Williams's own words. Maingot explores the instrumental use of history by politicians in comparing Eric Williams with his contemporary the Dominican Juan Bosch. Both were intellectuals; both believed in using history for immediate ends. Both addressed themselves to the wider history of the Caribbean rather than to their own national histories. Bosch focused on the early-nineteenth-century period of the emancipation struggle against Spain and on the role which Simon Bolívar played, the 'Liberator', himself an intellectual – the first of the genre of 'military intellectuals', fusing in his person the attributes of *caudillo* with those of the *pensador*.

In comparing these two committed intellectuals Maingot shows how Bosch especially changed his interpretation to suit the changing needs of the political situation. By using the comparative method Maingot makes an original contribution to understanding national styles of historiography, reflecting diverse national historical traditions.

The Francophone islands

In spite of being predominantly black, in contrast to the wider colour spectrum of the Spanish islands, colour is still a divisive issue in the French West Indies, even in Haiti. Dash uses the metaphor of Christophe's Hall of Mirrors from Carpentier's *Kingdom of this World* to argue that Haitian intellectuals magnify their self-importance to the extent that they become blind to reality. They have been roughly treated by Haitian writers who, at least in the cases he quotes, have the virtue of being able to laugh at their own kind.

The case of René Depestre's intellectual odyssey illustrates the dilemma both of the rootless exile and of the Marxist whose recognition of the centrality of race brought him into conflict with the Communist party of which he was a member. An unusual perspective in exploring Haitian reality is to look at the built heritage as the architect Patrick Delatour has done.⁶⁰ The Citadelle of Henri Christophe, built inland on an inaccessible mountaintop site, is significant as a unique example of black architecture, in the absence of many visible material legacies from the slave past, and stands as a counterpoint to the nearby Europeanized palace of Sans Souci, which reflects the other side of Henri Christophe's ambivalent attitude to Europe. The Citadelle stands as a towering symbol of marronage and of the culture of resistance. Maroons become national heroes, like Esteban Montejo in Cuba – frontiersmen of the black Caribbean, comparable in mythology to Frederick Jackson Turner's white frontiersmen in the United States. Together with the guerrilla tradition, whether of Cuban *mambises*, Dominican *gavilleros* or Haitian *cacos*, they are heroes in the mythology of resistance.⁶¹

The French obsession with linguistic purity, a reaction to the domination of English as an international language, exacerbates the contrast between French and Creole which is the language of the Haitian peasantry. If the past was preserved in oral tradition as Jean Price-Mars argued in *Ainsi Parle l'Oncle* (1928), then Creole as the language of 90 per cent of the population ought to have been afforded official recognition. For long resisted by the mulatto élite for fear that it would politicize 'the masses', and by the Roman Catholic hierarchy for its association with voodoo, Creole finally became an official language beside French in the Constitution of 1987, a positive legacy perhaps of Duvalier, who always regarded himself as an intellectual and who claimed to understand the Haitian peasantry in a way that mulattos never could.

In Martinique, where the pressures of French culture and education have been intense Creole has had to struggle not to degenerate into a folkloric *Patois* – a '*Creole francisé*' or '*français creolisé*'. On the cultural level as on the economic level, Martinique is threatened by an 'annihilation through unproductive consumerism ... Négritude in Martinique today means Black Emmanuelle II'. Mimetic consumerism threatens to drown all specificity in an ocean of Frenchness.⁶²

A similar view might apply to Puerto Rico where *independentistas*, resenting what they also regard as the corrupting influence of consumerism, have been generals without an army. Overtly high standards of living and the bait of leading a better life in the United States have acted as an effective safety valve perpetuating the status quo, as has

in a different way been the case in revolutionary Cuba. However, the declaration of Spanish as the official language of Puerto Rico is at least acknowledgement of the failure of cultural Americanization, whereas in the French West Indies the only escape from French is to turn to Creole.

Burton's analysis of the asphyxiating impact of metropolitan influences on Martinican intellectuals focuses on the *mélange* of responses to official assimilationism by Marxism, Négritude, *Antillanité* and *Creolité*. Magnetized by France, French West Indian thinkers have been isolated from the rest of the Caribbean. The doctrine of Négritude, for example, was a creation of French Caribbean and African intellectuals supported by Sartre and others in Paris and owed little to the black experience elsewhere in the Caribbean.

The language of Négritude betrays its French provenance in everything Aimé Césaire wrote, whether it was the influence of Rimbaud, Lautréamont or the Surrealists. The only Anglophone West Indian writer to have influenced Négritude in its formative years was the Jamaican Claude McKay, whose novel *Banjo Boy*, set on the Marseilles water front, was translated into French within two years of its publication.⁶³ Marcus Garvey, from a much lower intellectual baseline did more to promote Pan-Caribbeanism than the Négritude writers whose influence has only recently begun to have an impact on the rest of the Caribbean.

Frantz Fanon (1925-61) is not included in Burton's analysis as his major influence was to be in Africa, but the impact on him of his early years in Martinique before he finally left for France at the age of twenty-two, never to return, were crucial to the formulation of his ideas.⁶⁴ The origins of *Black Skin, White Masks* which revolutionised the psychoanalytical analysis of black complexes were to be found in his Caribbean experience, as may be seen from his chapter on the centrality of language. Seeing at first hand the racism of Vichyite sailors blockaded in Fort de France during the war and then experiencing it at first hand as a Free French soldier in Africa provided the impetus to his later commitment.

The cases of the French West Indies and Puerto Rico are the most acute examples of the crisis of identity which has been one consequence of intellectuals becoming trapped within particular philosophical traditions which assume the universal validity of certain values. To break away and discover a new authenticity and to assume 'Adam's task of giving things their name' involves embarking on a long odyssey of self-discovery. Cultural decolonization, as the remainder of this book should make clear, is more complex and tangled than those political and economic processes which have been too often studied as discrete

phenomena. The time has come to stitch the various strands together into a seamless web, but in order to do so, as much attention needs to be paid to the thinkers as to the thought.

Notes

- 1 Z. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters: of modernity, post modernity and intellectuals*, (Oxford, Polity Press, 1987), pp. 1-2. This book is fundamental for the changing role of intellectuals as is A. Gouldner, *The Future of the Intellectuals: the rise of the New Class* (London, Macmillan, 1979).
- 2 The American Revolution had a greater impact, not so much in ideological as in economic terms, as the fact that it could square the circle combining the Rights of Man with the continuation of slavery consoled the plantocracy, who rightly came to fear much more the influence of the French Revolution in neighbouring Haiti and, from an ideological point of view, the activities of the Free Churches which included Black Baptists.
- 3 H.A. Bierck (ed.) *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, Vol. I, (New York, The Colonial Press, 1951), p.110.
- 4 F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (London, Pluto Press, 1986), p.19.
- 5 *Compadrazgo* implies a stronger moral obligation between godparent and godchild than is implied in the English relationship. The obligation between the two is as strong, even stronger than between parents and children. Intellectuals would not be exempt from such an obligation.
- 6 Annexationism was the movement in the 1840s and 1850s for Cuba to be annexed to the United States. The views of Cuban planters, wishing to preserve slavery, were reciprocated by Southern planters wishing to add another slave state to the South to strengthen them in their conflict with the North. Annexationist sentiment lingered on among the white Cuban élite even after independence. Reformism in the 1860s sought to influence the Spanish government to grant Cuba political representation. It collapsed in the face of military intransigence and was overtaken by the outbreak of the Ten Years War in 1868 coinciding with the Spanish Revolution of 1868 which ushered in a six-year period of political confusion. Autonomism was the attempt between the end of the Ten Years War in 1878 and the outbreak of war again in 1895 to achieve autonomous status for Cuba. The economic crisis of the early 1890s destroyed this hope and gave an impetus to a revived independence struggle.
- 7 As in the purge of the 'old communists' of the PSP in 1962, when Anibal Escalante was accused of trying to infiltrate and take over the cells of the new party which Castro was trying to establish.
- 8 For this see the forthcoming book (1992) by A. Hennessy and G. Lambie (eds.) on West European-Cuban relations since 1959.
- 9 The new revolutionary equation consisted of *décraciné* intellectuals, a depressed rural peasantry and marginalized urban groups. The guerrilla *foco*, in an inaccessible location, would be a microcosm of the wider revolution and would be the 'small motor', sparking off revolution elsewhere by both its military and social example. In theory the *foco* would re-educate town-based intellectuals in rural problems and by making them dependent for survival on peasant support convert them in deed and not

- only in word to trust and belief in the 'people'. In Castro's view the experience was akin to religious conversion.
- 10 We still only dimly understand the reasons for the 'youthquake' of the 1960s. Margaret Mead's insight that we had moved into a new type of culture which she terms 'pre-figurative' in which for largely technological reasons parents had to start learning from their children is highly suggestive.
 - 11 There is an enormous literature on Cuban emigration. See the various issues of the *International Migration Review* and *Cuban Studies*. One of the best treatments is A. Portes and R.L. Bach, *Latin Journey: Cubans and Mexicans in the United States* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985).
 - 12 For Puerto Rican emigration, see *International Migration Review* and Part III of A. López and J. Petras, *Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans* (John Wiley, New York, 1974). and generally R. Carr, *Puerto Rico: a colonial experiment*, (New York, New York University Press, 1984).
 - 13 G.R. Coulthard, *Race and Colour in Caribbean Literature* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962).
 - 14 V.S. Naipaul, *The Middle Passage* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1988), p.211.
 - 15 For an authoritative history of Haiti which deals extensively with these issues see D. Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, (London, Macmillan, 1988).
 - 16 For universities see *The International Handbook of Universities and other Institutes of Higher Learning* (Basingstoke, Stockton Press, 1989). The University of Haiti was founded in 1944 and that of the French West Indies (Antilles-Guyane) in 1970. The University of the Netherlands Antilles was founded in 1979.
 - 17 C.A.M. Hennessy, *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican Movement, 1868-74*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962).
 - 18 See Conangla Fontanilles, *Pi y Margall y Cuba* (Havana, Editorial Lex, 1947).
 - 19 For Spain see essays by Hennessy and Brassloff in Murray Forsyth (ed.) *Federalism and Nationalism* (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1989).
 - 20 The Spanish translation of Proudhon's *Du Principe Fédératif* was published in 1868 on the eve of the Spanish Revolution of that year. Senghor was to be strongly influenced by Proudhon too. See J.L. Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1971), pp.186-7.
 - 21 Krause is incomprehensible in the original except to those attuned to the rarified atmosphere of German metaphysics. One of his concepts has fifteen hyphens. By far the best guide is J. López Morillas, *The Krausist Movement and Ideological Change in Spain, 1854-1874*, trans. Frances López Morillas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981). The most accessible account of his influence on Martí is in P. Turton, *José Martí, architect of Cuba's freedom* (London, Zed Books, 1986).
 - 22 There is an enormous literature on Martí. His collected works run to thirty-seven volumes. An excellent collection of essays is C. Abel and N. Torrents (eds) *José Martí: revolutionary democrat* (London, Athlone Press, 1986).
 - 23 The best coverage in English is Louis A. Pérez Jr, *Between Empires 1878-1902* (Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1983); his general history of Cuba, *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (Oxford

- University Press, New York, 1988 and his *Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934*, (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986).
- 24 The parallel with Brazil, where recently emancipated slaves were similarly disadvantaged by the rush of European immigrants, is striking.
- 25 R.B. Gray, *José Martí: Cuban Patriot* (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1962) is still a useful overview of the legend.
- 26 The phrase is from Carlos Loveira's novel, *Generales y Doctores*. From being a Cuban organizer of trade unions in Mexico he became the leading novelist in Cuba in the 1920s. There is a useful edition of this book by S.M. Bryant and J. Riis Owre (New York, Oxford University Press, 1965).
- 27 Guillermo Cabrera Infante, *Infante's Inferno* (London, Faber and Faber, 1984). The Spanish title is *La Habana para un Infante Difunto* (1979). His most famous book is *Three Trapped Tigers* (London, Picador, 1980, originally published in 1965). Linguistically exuberant, showing the influence of film techniques, it is a comic evocation of pre-revolutionary Havana. He is now a British citizen. His long essay 'Bites from the bearded crocodile', *London Review of Books Anthology I*, is a hostile commentary on revolutionary culture.
- 28 The only treatment in English is J. Maier and R.W. Weatherhead, *The Latin American University* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1979). For students see Hennessy's chapter and also his 'University students in national politics' in C. Veliz (ed.) *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London, Oxford University Press, 1967). For Cuban students see J. Suchlicki, *University Students in Cuba, 1920-1968* (Coral Gables, University of Miami, 1969).
- 29 I. Wright, *Cuba* (New York, 1910).
- 30 For the spiralling growth of private universities in Latin America see D.C. Levy, *Higher Education and the State in Latin America* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986). Although this focuses on Brazil, Chile and Mexico, the picture is similar elsewhere, including the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
- 31 A useful comparative treatment is Armytage, *The Rise of the Technocrats: a social history* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965).
- 32 See M. Chanan, *The Cuban Image: cinema and cultural politics in Cuba* (London, BFI Publishing, 1985), and J. King, *Magical Reels: a history of cinema in Latin America* (London, Verso Books, 1990), Chapter 7.
- 33 J. King, *Magical Reels*, *op.cit.* (1990) quoted p.151.
- 34 *Ibid.*, quoted p.153.
- 35 The 'two imperialisms' thesis argued that there was no difference in practice between the United States and the USSR as far as their foreign policy was concerned. This was strongly repudiated by the Cubans at the Non-Aligned Conference at Lusaka.
- 36 The key work for this is the controversial book by C. Moore, *Castro, the Blacks and Africa*, (Center for Afro-American Studies, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1988). Moore spoke eloquently on this theme at the symposium.
- 37 M. Barnett, *The African Presence in Cuban Culture* (Warwick University Centre for Caribbean Studies, Second Walter Rodney Memorial Lecture, 1986).
- 38 The second sugar revolution refers to the changes which took place after the Ten Years' War in the 1880s. The old plantations were split between

- their cane-growing and industrial, grinding function, in response to a demand for more efficient production in the face of beet sugar. It required heavy capital inputs which could only come from abroad, especially the United States. The old plantocracy was replaced by the impersonal sugar corporation on which Cubans were represented but usually in a minority.
- 39 There is a useful edition: J.E. Rodó, *Ariel*, ed. G. Brotherston (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967).
- 40 D. Sarmiento, *Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants or Civilization and Barbarism*, trans. by Mrs Mann (New York, Hafners, 1962, first published 1868).
- 41 For a rare overview of this important figure who has been neglected for too long in the English-speaking press see A. Dobson, *An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989). *The Revolt of the Masses* (1931) which came out in translation was his most famous book outside Spain.
- 42 *Hispanismo* is comprehensively treated in F.B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and their relations with Spanish America* (London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1971).
- 43 Ramiro de Maeztu is an interesting example of a thinker turning away from Europe to exalt traditional Spanish values. The son of a Cuban father and English mother, he was fervently anglophile until sent to the Western front as a war correspondent. The experience convinced him that Spanish traditional values could be the salvation of Europe.
- 44 For this see Hennessy, chapter on Cuba in M. Falcoff and F.B. Pike (eds) *The Spanish Civil War, 1936-9: American hemispheric perspectives* (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1982).
- 45 See the second volume of H. Honour, *The Image of the Black in Western Art* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1989).
- 46 For McKay see Wayne Cooper, *Claude McKay: Rebel Sojourner in the Harlem Renaissance* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1987). and for Hughes, see A. Rampersad, *The life of Langston Hughes*, Vol. I 1902-41, Vol. II 1941-67 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986 and 1988). There is an interesting comparison to be made between the role of Carl van Vechten the white author of *Nigger Heaven* and Fernández de Castro, editor of the *Diario de la Marina*, the conservative Havana daily, as midwives for black writing in Harlem and Havana respectively.
- 47 For Guillén see the fundamental study by A. Augier, *Nicolás Guillén, Estudio Crítico-Biográfico*, and R. Marquéz's introduction to his translation of Guillén, *Man-making Words: selected poems of Nicolás Guillén*, trans. R. Marquéz and D.A. McMurray (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1972). For *Négrismo* see L.N. Wilson, *La Poesía Afroantillana* (Miami, Ediciones Universal, 1979). Stimulating insights into Guillén may be found in V.M. Kutzinski, *Against the American Grain: myth and history in William Carlos Williams, Jay Wright and Nicolás Guillén* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1987).
- 48 There is no full-length study of Ortiz in English although the bulk of his work has recently been reprinted in Havana.
- 49 For Morúa see R.L. Jackson, *Black Writers in Latin America* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1979).
- 50 There is a useful treatment of blacks in exile in G.E. Poyo, 'With All and for the Good of All': the emergence of popular nationalism in the Cuban

- communities of the United States, 1848-1898*, (North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1989). Gualberto Gómez, *Por Cuba Libre* (Havana, Oficina del historiador de la ciudad de la Habana, 1954).
- 51 There has been something of a conspiracy of silence about 1912, but see R. Feroselle, *Política y Color en Cuba: la guerrita de 1912* (Montevideo, 1974).
- 52 A useful introduction to Carpentier is D.L. Shaw, *Alejo Carpentier* (New York, Twayne, 1979). More detailed is R. Gonzalez Echevarría, *Alejo Carpentier: the Pilgrim at Home* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977).
- 53 Translated as *The Kingdom of this World* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1967).
- 54 *The Lost Steps* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968), pp.65-6.
- 55 For an interesting and subtle Marxist analysis, see A. Quintero Rivera, *Patricios y Plebeyos: burgueses, hacendados, artesanos y obreros* (Rio Piedras, Ediciones Huracán, 1988).
- 56 Hostos has not received the attention from the English-speaking world that his importance merits. For useful short treatments, see G. Lewis in *Main Currents of Caribbean Thought* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1983). and in H. Hoetink, *The Dominican People, 1850-1900* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
- 57 *Contrapunteo Cubano del Tabaco y el Azúcar*, Introduction by Bronislaw Malinowski (La Habana, Consejo Nacional de Cultura, 1963, originally published 1940). The English translation is, *Cuban Counterpoint: tobacco and sugar*, trans. Harriet de Onis (New York, Knopf, 1947).
- 58 For an analysis of the labour problem, see the essays by M. Baud and H. Hoetink in M. Cross and G. Heuman (eds) *Labour in the Caribbean* (London, Macmillan, 1988).
- 59 Compare this chapter with that by P. Sutton comparing Williams and Walter Rodney in Volume I.
- 60 In his presentation at the symposium. Space forbade the inclusion of his paper in which he compared René Depestres, as the *poet engagé*, and the pedagogue Pradel Pompilus, and which he delivered with great panache. Delatour has been involved in the restoration of the Citadelle as a national monument. Unlike contemporary fortresses built on the coast, reflecting the naval conflicts of the colonial powers, Christophe's fortress was a visible symbol of Haitian independence sited, as maroon settlements would have been, inland.
- 61 *Mambises* was the name given to guerrillas in Oriente in the Cuban War of Independence. *Gavilleros* were the peasant guerrillas in the eastern part of the Dominican Republic who resisted US marines between 1916 and 1924. The *cacos* were Haitian guerrillas, mostly wealthier peasants, who also resisted US marines in 1919.
- 62 Quoted in Richard Burton, *Assimilation or Independence? Prospects for Martinique* (Montreal, McGill Centre for Development Studies, Occasional Monograph no. 13, 1978), pp. 34, 38.
- 63 There is a chapter on McKay in Michel Fabre, *La Rive Noire*, which discusses the role of black American writers in Paris. McKay did not become a US citizen until 1940.
- 64 For Fanon see Homi Bhabha's introduction to *Black Skin, White Masks*, *op.cit.* and J. McCulloch, *Black Soul, White Artifact: Fanon's clinical psychology and social theory* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983) from a wide and increasing number of studies on Fanon.

CHAPTER 2

Intellectuals in comparative perspective: the case of Mexico

Roderic A. Camp

Our understanding of intellectual life in the Caribbean and Latin America is comparatively shallow and speculative. Whereas some literature on intellectual ideas exists for the region, there has been almost no original research or synthesis of secondary materials on the structure of intellectual life. Such questions as who are the leading intellectuals, what are their origins, how are they educated, how are they recruited, what is their relationship to the State, what is their relationship to other intellectuals, and what are the consequences of these and other characteristics for intellectual ideas and the development of an intellectual community, have remained unanswered.

The dearth of analysis on Latin American intellectuals is no different from that which exists for Third World countries in general. Most of the literature from which comparisons can be drawn have focused on the United States, France and England, apart from Edward Shils's seminal study of India in the mid-1950s.¹ In Latin America, some attention has been paid to Mexico, and to a lesser extent Chile and Argentina. In this chapter comparisons will be made between Mexico and the Caribbean, because of Mexico's geographic proximity both to the Caribbean and to the United States. Most of the conditions that have produced characteristics of intellectual life exist in all Third World countries, regardless of colonial origins and influences. These characteristics are more exaggerated in the Caribbean because of its relative underdevelopment, its dependence on the industrialized economies, and its size.

Defining an intellectual

Any serious analysis of intellectual life must first define an intellectual. This is not an easy task. The literature, both academic and popular, suggests a plentitude of concepts, some rather complex, others bordering on the downright silly. These definitions fall into several categories. One distinguishes intellectuals on the basis of a broad set of criteria, allowing

for a rather large membership as opposed to more select criteria conceptualizing intellectuals as an élite; another measures intellectuals largely by their discipline and intellectual product. Because literary figures have produced the great bulk of writings on intellectual life, a tendency exists to think only of literary figures, especially novelists, as intellectuals. This tendency is pronounced in the Caribbean since the educational structure and opportunities for intellectuals in the sciences are *practically non-existent* (Cuba excepted). Finally, some observers have sought to characterize intellectuals as social critics of the State, assuming, *a priori*, that an intellectual cannot support the Government.

Many of these definitions are confused, and carry preconceived prejudices which obscure a clear understanding of the structural features of Latin American intellectual life. In the first place, it is essential to allow all disciplines equal access to the intellectual label. Today, when the State has so much influence on the direction of society, and where technology and the social sciences have become increasingly complex, it would be meaningless to confine intellectuals to literary figures. Secondly, in North America intellectuals have tended not to enter public service, in sharp contrast to developing societies. Finally, those who would describe intellectuals merely as college-educated misunderstand the function of intellectuals, confusing the concept of a highly educated class with the vanguard of that class, the intellectual.

I conceptualize an intellectual as part of a cultural élite. The intellectual is a person who is not only well educated, but uses knowledge to influence fellow intellectuals and the educated community as a whole. More specifically, an intellectual is someone who creates, evaluates, analyses or presents transcendental symbols, values, ideas, and interpretations on a regular basis to a broad audience. The intellectual's discipline is irrelevant to the successful completion of this task. It does not make any difference what cultural product the intellectual offers, whether it is art, music, mathematics or hard science, only that his ideas reach individuals outside his own immediate discipline.

Intellectuals emerged from the educated class, generally the intelligentsia, or what Alvin Gouldner has labelled the New Class.² Whereas the two words, intellectuals and intelligentsia have been used interchangeably, I would suggest that intellectuals are élite members of the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia provide an audience for intellectual ideas, generally controlling the resources in both the private and public sectors. Other than high levels of formal education and an awareness of the importance of technology, what most ties the intellectual to the broader intelligentsia is a common vocabulary. This vocabulary, at least in the Western Hemisphere, is not national, but international.

Intellectuals from Latin America, the Caribbean and the United States often disagree, but they share the same conceptual vocabulary.

The role of government

Intellectuals, as defined above, have been far more important in Mexico specifically, and Latin America generally, than in the United States. Two essential reasons emerge for this. First, in the Spanish world, the State played a crucial role in the economic and social development of society; secondly, since the Spanish conquest of the New World, the distinction has been blurred between political and intellectual activities.

When government plays a significant economic role in society, private initiative tends to expand slowly, and to lack prestige. For professional people in the colonial period, the most attractive source of employment was the State. The only other source of employment, limited because of its special qualities, was the Church. In the English-speaking Caribbean, the British colonial government played a lesser role, as institutions there were less developed. Voluntary exile in Europe or in the United States has been the preferred option for many as an alternative to service in the bureaucracy.

In the Hispanic Caribbean its earlier independence, in contrast to the English-speaking Caribbean, provided a longer period for structural change. Instead of the State exerting less influence, however, in some respects its impact and prestige grew. Intellectuals today, whether in Mexico or elsewhere in Latin America, share much in common with the intellectual class of the nineteenth century. The major difference between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that many intellectuals who pursued political careers, did so successfully through the military, or at least as participants in the frequent civil disputes and wars which wracked much of Latin America.

Whether a strong State impeded the development of an active private sector, or the natural under-development of the private sector encouraged an encroaching State, a society's level of economic development is crucial to the role of intellectuals, their relationship to the State, and their relationship to each other. Throughout the Third World, Latin America and the Caribbean, intellectuals have maintained a symbiotic relationship to the state. In Mexico, for example, most intellectuals in the twentieth century have pursued careers in government, simply because it is difficult to find employment elsewhere.³

Caribbean economies offer very few opportunities for well-educated, indigenous leaders. Even in a country such as Mexico, which

economically is far more developed than small Caribbean countries, there are few opportunities for intellectuals in the private sector, with the exception of publishing. Most other intellectuals outside the public sector seek employment in academia although many posts tend to be part-time. But even in independent India, with its numerous state-supported universities, Shils concluded that Indian intellectuals preferred government to university life, because of higher economic rewards and the prestige of public employment.

Concentration in the capital city

The level of economic development, the strength of the private sector, and the distribution of growth patterns in Third World countries have contributed to some important similarities between intellectuals in Mexico and elsewhere in the Third World. One of the most important characteristics of intellectuals in Third World countries is that they tend to concentrate in the political capital, in marked contrast, for example, to North America with its regional poles of intellectual activity. Since 1920, more than 90 per cent of Mexico's leading intellectuals have lived in the capital city. Intellectuals have tended to be drawn to capital cities because they are not only the centre of political power, but also serve as leading social and cultural centres.

The fact that nine out of ten Mexican intellectuals have chosen to reside in their country's capital has serious consequences for intellectual life, as well as broader consequences for the country both socially and politically. In the first place, once a single city overwhelmingly dominates intellectual life, the provinces are drained of sharp minds, and deprived of a cultural life of their own, retarding the development of prestigious and identifiable intellectual activities. Even in such large cities as Guadalajara and Monterrey, Mexico's second and third in population, which are larger in population than some individual Caribbean countries, little cultural activity exists. In fact, provincial intellectuals complain that they must move to Mexico City, or at least travel frequently to the capital in order to acquire national prestige. They believe it is impossible to achieve national recognition and remain in their native cities. Intellectual life in Latin America is characterized by an internal brain drain, where cities such as Managua, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Montevideo, Santiago, Buenos Aires, and Caracas draw off a disproportionate group of cultural élites. Where there is more than one city of equivalent size, with consequent rivalry between them, there can develop rival poles of intellectual activity, as in the coastal-versus-interior rivalry between Córdoba and Buenos Aires in Argentina, or

between Guayaquil and Quito in Ecuador. In Mexico, Guadalajara has had an active intellectual life, especially in the early years of the Revolution, but it has never been able to challenge Mexico City effectively.

The concentration of intellectual talent in Latin American capital cities, including Mexico City, is similar to the importance of Paris and London (although, in Britain, London has never managed to eclipse Oxford and Cambridge, and Scottish intellectual life has always gone its own way). The United States is the exception to the pattern of concentration of cultural and political élites in the same city. In spite of being the political capital of the United States, Washington DC has attracted few leading intellectuals. Although a large concentration has resided within a fifty-mile radius of New York City, North American intellectuals can be found dispersed throughout various regions, including New England and the West Coast.

Residence in a capital city is obligatory for those with political ambition. One of the most significant social consequences of this is that it encourages inter-marriage among cultural élites. It is not uncommon for leading Mexican intellectual families to be related by marriage to each other. As women come to receive stronger recognition in the cultural world, they have often married leading figures in various fields. Even more important, intellectual families in Mexico have married into political families. The same pattern is true, to a lesser extent, among entrepreneurial (and landed) élites and intellectuals.

One of the reasons why intellectuals pursue public careers in Latin America, and in most other Third World cultures, is that they live in close proximity to other leadership groups. Their environment is that of the national capital. They not only eat in the same restaurants, send their children to the same schools and join the same clubs, but their ambience is dominated by the national politics of their societies. Because most of them live in capital cities, they are socially familiar with one another, even if they are affiliated with different intellectual groups.

Proximity does not necessarily lead to ideological homogeneity among intellectuals. It does lead, however, to social integration and familiarity. The number of leading intellectuals in Latin America and the Caribbean is small. In a country such as Mexico, with a population bordering on 86 million, only a few hundred individuals belong to the national intellectual élite.

This concentration of intellectuals in capital cities is both a cause and a result of the concentration of supporting cultural activities in the same place. In Mexico City, and in nearly every other Latin American political capital, can be found the leading cultural academies, universities, libraries, newspapers, magazines, and publishing houses. The same is true in Africa and Asia, and Shils found that even in India,

with its many huge cities, New Delhi retained the vast majority of these institutions (with the important exception of Bombay which is the film capital). The concentration of supporting institutions in the political capitals reinforces the tendency of intellectuals to reside there, perpetuating a vicious circle. Institutions and intellectuals feed off one another.

Most intellectuals, if a university is available, attend school in the capital city. These universities tend to be public, and those which aspiring politicians attend. In Mexico, both intellectuals and politicians tend to graduate from the National Preparatory School. As alternative preparatory schools became available, politicians from upper-middle-class families, and the majority of intellectuals, attended other – usually private – institutions. At the university level, despite the growth of the private sector, the National Autonomous University has maintained its dominant position over the education of both politicians and intellectuals. The same pattern can be found in Panama, Guatemala and Venezuela. The post-1958 political and intellectual generation in Venezuela, for example, were graduates of the Central University in Caracas in the 1920s, a generation which has determined the outlines of the present political structure in their country.

Choice of discipline

The disciplines pursued by leading intellectuals are also important to their future as élite intellectuals and their relationship to other leadership groups. Law has traditionally provided an entrée to politics. In Mexico, for example, four out of ten intellectuals were law graduates and a disproportionate group who were lawyers became politicians. Among more recent generations, however, the humanities, social sciences and literature have become increasingly important, replacing law as the first choice. Throughout Latin America and especially in the Caribbean (with the exception of revolutionary Cuba) the sciences have been underdeveloped institutionally, and consequently under-represented among cultural élites.

One important consequence of choice of discipline is that both academic disciplines and the intellectual élites themselves tend to become self-perpetuating. The reason for this is that established intellectuals certify younger, prospective intellectuals as meriting national recognition. One of the most important places they meet is within the university, as teachers and students. This mentor-discipline relationship is a means by which potential intellectuals are identified and promoted. Consequently, lawyers tend to promote lawyers, novelists tend to select novelists and this is one explanation for the fact that academic disciplines are slow to

change. Even when leading intellectuals have once altered their curricular choices, these are sustained at least among the next generation, because a younger group of intellectuals has already been selected.

Throughout Latin America, one of the most important sources of political recruitment is the university. In Mexico, the public university has been far more important in this respect than private institutions in contrast to England, for example, where the private school system (incongruously known as 'public school'!) has tended to dominate political life. In the United States, the source of political leadership has been more balanced between the public and private systems. The reason why universities in Latin America, whether public or private, are so important to political recruitment is that leading politicians teach, for the prestige it confers, usually at their Alma Maters.

In Mexico, for example, politicians who are part-time college professors recruit prospective politicians and intellectuals into public life. Thus, intellectuals follow public careers for structural and not just historical or economic reasons. Top political leaders attract their brightest students into the national bureaucracy. Even if these students, who later become intellectuals, do not make public life a career, they have been exposed to it in their early years. More importantly, bright students are socialized by their mentors to pursue public careers, a phenomenon foreign to education in the United States, except perhaps in Ivy League universities.

Divisions between intellectuals

For many years, Latin American intellectuals, more so than any leadership group, have travelled abroad for their university education, especially for advanced degree work—a pattern followed in the Caribbean as well. The reason for this is that educational opportunities are often lacking in their own countries and the quality of university education may be low or the resources limited. In Mexico, most younger intellectuals have studied abroad.

Studying abroad can have far-reaching consequences. Where students have studies, with whom, and the disciplines they have pursued influence their ideology and personal values, often making them highly critical of the societies in which they live by comparing them unfavourably to the societies where they have studied abroad. Some want to bring features from their foreign experience to their own society. Others reject foreign qualities and models, seeing the value of creating indigenous solutions to indigenous problems. Whichever the belief, tensions often result with their peers who have not been abroad.

Similarly, studying in highly industrialized countries brings with it Western cultural values, which of course Latin America shares. But the technological orientation of the contemporary West, its various social, political and economic models, influence Latin American cultural élites. The culture of critical discourse becomes shared, and hence influences values. One of the most important concepts which foreign intellectuals borrow from their experiences in the United States is the tendency of North American intellectuals to be vociferous social critics, especially of Government. However, when Latin American intellectuals return to their own societies, characterized by a different tradition of intellectual-state relationships where the State is stronger, this tendency produces many unexpected consequences and frustrations for both intellectuals and politicians.

The influence of North American culture on Latin American intellectuals is not only confined to this specific relationship. The close proximity of Mexico and the Caribbean to the United States makes the latter's cultural influence in art, music, fashion, literature, politics, science and other areas even more important. In other words, an intellectual in these regions does not have to travel abroad to be affected by an alien culture. North American cultural imperialism is an insidious influence which seeps into a society, usually through its élite, but even more through film and television.

The most intriguing difference between the Latin American intellectual community and that found in the United States is the degree to which intellectuals have served the public sector. Over half of all Mexican intellectuals pursued governmental or political careers. Significantly, this pattern is changing among younger intellectuals. Younger intellectuals, for the first time in Mexican history, are questioning the appropriateness of serving the State. It is possible that such a change will also take place elsewhere in Latin America, but it is not likely, especially among the smaller countries, where fewer opportunities exist than in the relatively larger Mexican economy. Moreover, the economic problems most Caribbean countries presently face are equal in severity to those found in Mexico, and these further strengthen dependence on the State.

One reason why this change has come about in Mexico is the growing influence of the North American intellectual model. This model, in terms of intellectual-state relations, is one of clear separation. Intellectuals, opprobriously termed 'egg-heads', tend to be distrusted in American government. Few American presidents, with the possible exceptions of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, would qualify as intellectuals.

Mexican intellectuals have now begun to redefine the role of

intellectuals. As part of their redefinition, they are questioning whether or not an intellectual can simultaneously serve the State and rightly claim the status of being an intellectual. In Mexico this trend was encouraged by the events of 1968. After the student movement was violently suppressed in Mexico City, one of Mexico's leading intellectuals, Octavio Paz, resigned as ambassador to India. He was the only leading intellectual openly to leave a government post in protest against the government's treatment of the students. As the events unfolded, numerous repercussions occurred. One of these was a questioning attitude among younger politicians, the middle class and intellectuals, that the Mexican model no longer served their interests. A political system dominated by the PRI and its all-embracing patronage system has always been heavily criticized by independent intellectuals, but the events of 1968 crystallized opposition to the system. Its legitimacy, even among its supporters, was put increasingly in doubt. In their broader criticisms intellectuals argue for greater independence of the State.

Today in Mexico three types of intellectuals exist:

1. The first type, growing in importance, consists of those who are self-employed or who work for institutions independent of the State. These intellectuals are not representatives of the ideological interests of any group.

2. Also growing in importance are a second group whose members are independent of the State, but who are strongly identified with leading cultural groups.

3. A third group, declining in importance, might be called an 'establishment élite', because they represent and work for the State, although they advocate diverse intellectual orientations within the State itself. One of the most important divisions among these groups is whether they are willing to serve the State or remain outside of it.

When Charles Kadushin examined North American intellectuals in the 1970s, he asked them whether they desired to be involved directly in government policy-making, or whether they should be involved directly in the political process. Universally, intellectuals responded negatively to both questions.⁴ In Latin America and the Caribbean, most intellectuals believe, on the contrary, that they should be involved with government. If they had the opportunity to work for the State, most would accept. In Mexico, intellectuals who have served the State suggest the following arguments for doing so.

1. They believed first of all that they had a moral obligation to help society. This argument takes on particularly strong overtones in societies where *per capita* income is low, and where disparities in income are large. For example, many notable Mexican physicians have served long careers in the public-health field rather than in private practice. Those

Mexican physicians who have become leading intellectual figures have, for the most part, served the State in some capacity.

2. Related to the first argument is the belief that in underdeveloped countries the State is the only institution through which intellectuals can influence society. As suggested above, the State plays an overwhelming role in economic development, often controlling resources unavailable to the private sector. Intellectuals who advocate specific policy goals as a means of altering or reinforcing certain values, believe their best chances for success lie within the State's apparatus.

3. Finally, most have selfish motives. A government post brings them influence and prestige. In most of these societies high-level government positions are seen as more prestigious than comparable jobs in the private sector.

Mexican intellectuals who have remained independent of the State, or who believe intellectuals should not be employed by the State, make counter-arguments. They believe that any intellectual who joins the State loses moral stature, in relation both to the intelligentsia and to other intellectuals. In particular, they imply that an intellectual's independence from the State is inherent in the definition of an intellectual and his function. Most importantly, they suggest that two groups of intellectuals in Mexico, one employed by the State, and the other independent of it, are different from one another. However, the ideas of those employed by the State lose credence among independent intellectuals, as intellectuals who are employed by the State find it impossible to survive in those positions without defending the State, thus losing their independence. The events of 1968 in Mexico clearly illustrate this problem. Octavio Paz, ambassador to India, resigned, but Antonio Carrillo Flores, a leading jurist, and Agustín Yáñez, one of Mexico's notable novelists, remained close-mouthed and in their cabinet posts. Younger intellectuals have not identified with either of these two men.

This division between the two sets of intellectuals has become quite sharp in Mexico. Such a division may well be apparent in other Latin American countries and the Caribbean, with a consequence that politicians tend to shut out those intellectuals who are independent of the State, listening only to those who willingly work for the government. In other words, politicians listen to one group of intellectuals, rather than another, and so lose the faculty of independent judgement.

The other important consequence of a division within the intellectual community is that intellectuals are encouraged to pursue careers in other fields, or become self-employed. Most self-employed intellectuals in Latin America have been professional people. In Mexico today, it is more possible for intellectuals to operate their own businesses, but this depends on the growth of a dynamic private sector.

Censorship

The intellectual's relationship with the State has many implications for intellectual life. The aspect of their relationship which receives most attention from the intellectual community is censorship. Fear of censorship is widespread throughout Latin America, the reason being that communication, regardless of the medium, is essential to the definition of an intellectual. Once Government or any other institution or group infringes on an intellectual's ability to communicate regularly to a large audience, he or she is not functioning as an intellectual.

Two basic attitudes toward freedom of speech and press exist – libertarian and authoritarian. It is easy to forget that an authoritarian attitude toward the media is the norm rather than the exception in most cultures. Again, this tradition is tied to the concept of the State dominating society, usually in a patronizing fashion, rather than being responsive to the demands of that society. Intellectuals not employed by the State are particularly sensitive to censorship as many are involved in publishing and the media, and in academia.

Latin American intellectuals readily criticize state censorship. But in societies where private-sector advertising is limited, public-sector advertising takes on added importance. Most of the key magazines and newspapers in Mexico rely heavily on government advertising to survive. When an editor or publication becomes too critical, the Mexican government has wielded its economic influence (e.g. by withholding newsprint) to silence or change editorial policies. One particular consequence of state-initiated censorship is to force intellectuals to leave their own societies and work in exile where they can often become divorced from the realities of their own culture.

In Latin American societies self-censorship, the most insidious form of censorship, is rarely discussed. It tends to be less important in those societies where overt state censorship dominates. However, self-censorship is significant because it divides an already weak intellectual community into disparate groups, strengthening the position of establishment intellectuals as against independent intellectual groups.

Conclusions

The intellectual community in most Latin American societies is divided as elsewhere into competitive groups. The typical pattern found in Latin America and the Caribbean is one of an intellectual circle led by a senior figure who serves as a mentor to younger intellectuals. Often, the mentor is an editor of a journal or review. Normally, these groups share some

type of ideological alliance. Unfortunately, journals in Third World countries tend to be short-lived. Consequently, groups continuously reform around new publications.

An important consequence of strong group identities is that it is very difficult for an individual intellectual to be recognized on the basis of his or her merits without being sponsored by a group, whether it is an artist trying to have his work shown in the cultural capital, or an essayist attempting to publish his writings. Without group sponsorship, work may never be seen by the appropriate public, will not be recognized or critically evaluated. Those intellectual élites who reside in capital cities are notable for their ignorance of, or scorn for, cultural trends of what is happening in the provinces.

Intellectuals who find their path to national recognition blocked in this fashion often try to gain recognition abroad. Recognition in Europe and the United States serves as a prestigious, alternative path for acquiring the appropriate credentials for a national reputation in one's own society. Rufino Tamayo, Mexico's most prestigious living painter, relied on critical acclaim in New York at a time when his work was largely ignored in Mexico and it was necessary for the muralists Rivera, Orozco and Siqueiros to receive the imprimatur of critics in the despised United States before being recognized at home.

These and other characteristics of intellectual life have many consequences for Latin America, and for the future of intellectuals' influence in their societies. Intellectuals do not necessarily represent a society's culture or reflect its value system. The structure of intellectual life can often give outsiders a distorted impression of a nation's cultural life when the majority of intellectuals are urban-based, male, and exposed to foreign influences, and hence may be unconcerned about or ignorant of rural problems, despite the fact that societies in this region are essentially rural, and must solve agrarian problems to achieve higher levels of development. These same rural regions can be the source of most political opposition to the typical government élite, especially in Central America.

Intellectuals who have sought greater independence from the State have increasingly concentrated in universities as a place of refuge. Intellectuals think of academia as an environment untainted by state intervention. Yet when political extremes characterize Latin American societies, then universities such as those in Argentina, Chile, Brazil or Cuba lose immunity from state control. To survive, intellectuals retreat into a private world, distancing themselves from their cultures in general, and rural culture in particular. In other regions universities are so lacking in resources that intellectuals cannot easily integrate themselves into these institutions.

Although intellectuals offer scathing criticisms of the State in Latin America there is little in their background to suggest that they would behave differently from politicians in their societies. Past experience from Latin America, regardless of whether the political model is authoritarian or socialist, suggests an inability on the part of either politicians or intellectuals to tolerate dissent, or to engage in meaningful dialogue with those who oppose their views. Dissent, in intellectual debate or in the political arena, has yet to be legitimized. Until attitudes toward self-censorship are altered, and greater tolerance of opposing views is accepted, intellectual contributions to development are, either through cultural communication or through participation in the State, likely to be limited.

Notes

- 1 The best comparative study is that by Lewis Coser, 'The Differing Roles of Intellectuals in Contemporary France, England and America' (unpublished paper presented at the Symposium on the Sociology of the Intellectual, Buenos Aires, 3-5 July, 1967). The best Third World study is that by Edward Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity: the Indian situation* (The Hague, Mouton, 1961).
- 2 For Gouldner's ideas on this subject, see his *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York, Seabury Press, 1979).
- 3 See my *Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth Century Mexico* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985).
- 4 Charles Kadushin, *American Intellectual Elite* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1974).

CHAPTER 3

Venezuela: intellectuals in a non-intellectual society

Orlando Alborno

Venezuelan universities are academic institutions in a society which by its social development can be called a non-intellectual society. In such a society intellectuals are, by definition, members of the ruling élite.

The development of universities

The contemporary Venezuelan university has followed the model of the Spanish-American university but over the past thirty years the pattern has diversified with the creation of a variety of other institutions less dependent on the State. This swing to private universities reflects a general trend throughout most of Latin America where state universities have failed to produce the élites required for development.¹ The reasons for this failure can be related to the influence of the ideological, politicized university.

The origins of the university can be traced to the University Reform movement with its inception in 1918 in the Argentine University of Córdoba. The Venezuelan University did not escape this influence which affirmed the ideological and political role of the university and the right of the national intelligentsia to have an institution of its own. Until 1956 the only universities were those run by the State and controlled by the Government. Such was the attractive power of the Reform movement that governments were compelled to recognize the university's autonomy although paying the salaries of the academic staff.

Owing to the crisis of the late 1950s and 1960s, under the impact of domestic Venezuelan political events – such as the overthrow of the dictator Pérez Jiménez in 1958 but more particularly because of the magnetic appeal of the Cuban Revolution among university professors and students – governments began to whittle down the role of the autonomous university and to bypass it by encouraging the growth of private, non-ideological institutions.

Private universities had already been created under the military dictatorship between 1945 and 1948. These institutions had a non-

ideological profile and were intended to cater for a burgeoning middle class, legitimizing their social role. One of the two new universities was a proprietary school; the other was a Catholic university.² Both belonged to the professional type of university, comparatively uncommitted to intellectual matters (especially when defined in term of a critical spirit and social criticism). Their role was simply to produce graduates for the labour market.

In 1970, the Venezuelan government took another step designed to reduce the influence of the autonomous universities by opening 'experimental universities', tightly controlled by the political élite. In fact, no new autonomous university has been established in Venezuela since then, although some autonomy has been given to one or two of the *universidades experimentales*, although they continue to remain largely under the control of the Government and the political élite.³

In the late 1980s, therefore, the Venezuelan university system had departed from the Córdoba model by laying more stress on the private sector and by developing a closer relationship to the political élite. The situation is also complicated by the fact that the private interest and that of the political élite tend to coincide. Many universities opened in the last decade are the consequence of negotiation between members of the élite of the ruling political party and private interests anxious to obtain a share of the very profitable market in post-secondary degrees.

Thus the intellectual role of the university as well as its political impact in society has been diminished by the Government's strategy which curtailed the role of the autonomous university by giving preference to 'new' universities which were better equipped to satisfy the needs of the market and to produce the personal services demanded by society. These universities do not share the same respect for the tradition of intellectual life as do the autonomous universities. Defining their role as non-political, they advance an ideology couched in terms of a narrow professionalism. This is reflected in their concentration on ideologically neutral disciplines rather than on the ideologically charged disciplines in the social sciences and humanities which encourage a critical spirit.⁴

Thus private universities have a low political profile because they are under government control. Because of the narrow professional orientation of students they escape those political tensions which are a feature of the autonomous universities. Although politics has not been excluded from the latter, student activism is far weaker than in the heady days of the 1960s when the major active political voice was that of university students in contrast to their apoliticism today.⁵ Faculty members in autonomous universities may still be active politically but

usually in *gremialista*, i.e. trade-union activities concerned with administrative and salary matters, rather than with wider national issues. Marxism has lost its appeal.

Thus the Hispanic American tradition in the Venezuelan university is on the wane, to be replaced by the US model. Relics of the Hispanic model remain in the French influence of the *catedra*, in an oral tradition of verbal methodology, and in the *lección*. The historical tradition is still alive, although enfeebled, but nowadays no university would be opened in Venezuela unless it followed the pattern of US institutions, with the department instead of the *catedra* as the unit of the learning-teaching process, the presentation of '*proyectos*' instead of papers or essays, linked to industrial/commercial matters, and with students being more interested in their own professional advancement than in political life.

There is also a wide gulf separating faculty members of the autonomous and private universities. At the former, the faculty members are permanent staff with security of tenure who can therefore take an active part in politics without risk, whereas in private universities staff are mainly temporary, on short-term contracts which may be renewed or not at the discretion of the trustees of the institution, be they a person, faculty or corporation. Some faculty members may work in both an autonomous university and at a private institution, provided they take care to confine their political actions and views to the time spent in the autonomous university.

In any case, as most members of the faculty in private universities have full-time jobs outside the university, they do not have the time to devote themselves to political activities. Some may work full-time in public administration or in a private enterprise and so devote only a few hours a week to the university. Political activism is thus confined to autonomous universities which are frequently disrupted by strikers so that public opinion is alienated.⁶

The non-intellectual society

Venezuelan academics function within a non-intellectual society and are rarely responsive to the needs of a society of which they have little understanding and with whom they have little or nothing in common intellectually. Officially, the illiterary rate in Venezuela is 10 per cent although some estimate that as many as half the population are outside the written culture.

The major influence in cultural life in Venezuela is the media, both radio and television. Almost 95 per cent of Venezuelans have a television set and all have radios, though only 34 per cent have access to

newspapers and only 11 per cent to books, other than text books. In basic and secondary schools, books are not provided and even at university level students have access only to poor library facilities. If books and text books are the most important element in modern intellectual life then Venezuelan society is non-intellectual by definition. This does not mean that there are not impressive printing houses and book stores and excellent newspapers but their readership is restricted to a minority, a middle and upper class who have more in common with their counterparts abroad than with the lower class in Venezuelan society.

Intellectuals, therefore, as minority members of an élite, are far removed from the Venezuelan masses who do not have an intellectual outlook and lack a critical commitment to life. Alienation is an everyday process, through the fantasy life of television viewing. Soap operas, for instance, occupy four hours daily, two hours between 1 and 3 pm and two more between 9 and 11 pm. In addition, one in very five minutes is devoted to advertisement, quite apart from subliminal propaganda which may be unwittingly imbibed by the captive audience.

This is not to say that universities and other post-secondary institutions are paragons of intellectual endeavour. In many cases, academic life is just the *aula*, the place where lessons are given and the students merely turn up to learn the notes they take from their teachers.

Venezuelan intellectuals

It is not easy to define the concept of an intellectual. Adopting Robert Merton's definition, it can be said that in Venezuela there are a number of people devoted to academic matters – all those employed in universities – but intellectuals in the proper sense of the word are a real minority. Merton makes the important distinction between an intellectual and a mere disseminator of knowledge. He writes

I shall consider persons as intellectual in so far as they devote themselves to cultivating and formulating knowledge . . . Thus, we normally include teachers and professors among intellectuals. As a rough approximation, this may be adequate, but it does not follow that every teacher or professor is an intellectual . . . the limiting case occurs when a teacher merely communicates the content of a textbook, without further interpretation or application. In such cases, the teacher is no more an intellectual than a radio announcer who merely reads a script prepared for him by others. He is then a cog in the transmission belt of communicating ideas forged by others.⁷

By this definition few university professors in Venezuela can be described as intellectuals nor can universities be described as *casas del intelecto*. Intellectuals not only create and re-create knowledge and culture, they live it as a part of life. But one can spend a full lifetime within Venezuelan universities without being bothered at all by the symbols of an intellectual life. So one has to look outside the universities to find the active intellectuals in Venezuelan society, who complement those within the autonomous institutions.

Outside the universities there is an intense intellectual life, sponsored both by the Government and by private interests although mainly restricted to the metropolitan centres of the country as well as to a minority of the middle and upper class. In fact intellectuals live well in Venezuela, as elsewhere. At the autonomous universities they are protected by *gremialismo*: they are intellectuals without risk. Members of the faculty at autonomous universities as well as those at experimental universities are there for life. But they do not pursue an intellectual life within an intellectual community, because they are in the proper sense of the word quite autonomous. Their main obligation is to teach, not to do research, and since they work in non-residential universities they do not have to carry on a community academic life. They are transients – ‘taxi professors’ – simply visiting the university to deliver their lectures, not to lead any kind of community life, as expected in universities in the developed world.

Venezuelan academics carry a light academic load. They are obliged to teach no more than twelve hours a week and that under certain conditions, but in reality the average is around six hours a week for eight months a year. Some, of course, will remain in the university. In health sciences, engineering and the like, members of the faculty are under pressure to stay in their institutions a number of hours a week, because they both do research and see students, and they also play a conventional role of being members of a faculty. But in the rest of the university, in the social sciences, humanities and law, the routine of the member of the faculty is to remain on the campus only to teach their light academic load.

An important characteristic of the Venezuelan intellectual, who is being paid for life for being a university teacher, is that he or she has time to devote his or her energies to personal or intellectual activities. Through having this free time and because they are members of the élite of society, they are able to move easily between academia and the corridors of political power. If the Venezuelan academic is not solely a man of ideas he is also, almost by definition, a man of power.

Conclusion

To sum up, the Venezuelan university does not engage intellectuals. They simply obtain from academia a way of life, quite a decent way of life, in comparison with the standard of living of the rest of the population, but they have not been taken over by academia. The contrast with the USA could scarcely be more marked. Jacoby explains a different phenomenon in the case of the USA: he says that intellectuals have almost forgotten, or bypassed, their traditional roles as critics of society and have become conventional members of academia.³

In Venezuela the intellectual's role as social critic has been modified by political and social changes. Since 1958, when the military dictatorship was overthrown, until the early 1980s, intellectuals were leaders of the political opposition in Venezuela: in the 1960s they provided intellectual support for the guerrilla movement and in the 1970s they led the political opposition, in terms of a permanent criticism of the ways in which Venezuelan society was being ruled. But in the 1980s a *volteface* occurred when former leaders of the Left became part of the political establishment.

This process can be seen during the second government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Former members of the political Left, aggressive in their opposition to the political party of Pérez, joined him, and some of them were even members of his Cabinet or were members of Parliament, supporting his policies. But this question goes beyond personalities. It is now quite proper for the political Left to support social democratic ideologies and for former radicals to join the government even at the expense of being party militants.⁹

Another factor affecting the role of intellectuals in Venezuelan society is the economic situation. As Venezuelan libraries are poorly stocked, Venezuelan academics have to rely on their personal libraries in order to be able to keep abreast of current events in their scientific or technical life. However, with financial crisis educational goods and services, like libraries at universities, become redundant in a very short time and in fact some universities stopped buying books and periodicals after 1985.

There is now an increasing sense of intellectual isolation. Books cannot be bought, research trips cannot be made and in general a process of academic stagnation has become the trend rather than the exception. This impoverishes still more the role of intellectuals in Venezuelan society. In common with some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which suffered the financial and economic crisis of the 1980s, middle-class sectors of society have been severely affected and one has to put intellectuals in that social class, a sector of the society

which will be constrained just to make a living, unable to enjoy intellectual life, and particularly books.

In the late 1980s Venezuelan intellectuals are ceasing to be social critics and are becoming conformist and conventional members of the establishment and members of a social class that is suffering the impact of economic depression. On top of that the Venezuelan government is applying a managerial model to education with its main expression being privatization.¹⁰ It is difficult now to identify intellectuals as social critics or as in any sense comprising a new class.

In the last twenty years the whole panorama of the Latin American and the Hispanic Caribbean university has changed dramatically. There is no longer a single model but a variety of models which must be differentiated. True, the old autonomous metropolitan universities retain their importance, but their monopoly has been challenged by a variety of new types of university which compel us to re-define the intellectual's function. We can speak of several models:

- a) the traditional autonomous universities, transformed as national universities after the independence period;
- b) those modern institutions which were almost all created after 1945;
- c) several types of private university, some of them clerical institutions, some proprietary schools and some corporate universities;
- d) the state-controlled universities, under socialist governments, as in Cuba or revolutionary Nicaragua;
- e) the model based fully on the American university, as in Puerto Rico;
- f) the neo-colonial model, following the pattern of former colonial universities, such as the French or the British, in the Caribbean.
- g) a new non-university higher education system, both public and private, expanded in the last decade, that caters mainly for students wishing to go on into technical careers.

Intellectuals will play a role in each country according to the specific model of university to which they have access. In the Venezuelan case we have multiple models, with three large sectors: a) the traditional autonomous universities, b) those created by the private interest, be it of the type of Catholic institutions (Universidad Católica Andres Bello), proprietary institutions (Universidad Santa María, etc.) or the corporate university (Universidad Metropolitana), and c) the governmental university, created by the State but run by the Government, as a counterpart to the autonomous institutions (Universidad Simon Bolívar, Universidad Simon Rodrigues, etc.)

Intellectual activity will be confined to academic matters in both the private and the governmental universities. Only in the autonomous institutions do the members of the faculty, who still constitute the bulk of intellectuals in Venezuelan society, have access to intellectual

activities, be they political or strictly academic, publishing books and so on. These universities have editorial houses and periodical publications. Instead the other types mentioned above will mainly restrict their activities to their teaching duties.

The major political activity is of a trade-union variety with strikes and protests over working arrangements at two-yearly intervals. This becomes a substitute for a genuine sense of academic community on those occasions when both governmental and autonomous universities join ranks against the Government which finances both. This is not the case with the private universities, because they have their own arrangements discussed on a personal basis. Furthermore, men are more active than women in Venezuelan universities and there is also a concentration of intellectual activities in the capital city Caracas, comparable to other Latin American countries.

Venezuelan intellectuals are, at the beginning of the 1990s, playing a very conventional role. Marxism has lost its compulsive attraction. The Cuban dream has faded: Fidel Castro is seen as an embattled dictator. There seems to be no substance any more in being anti-American. In the Noriega affair the Venezuelan government approved almost off-hand all the opinions expressed by the American government. It is perhaps the end of ideology. Many former guerrilla leaders are now working hand in hand with their former enemies, the leaders of the social democratic party, Acción Democrática.

Intellectuals, perhaps, need enemies to be alive and active. The only enemies available in Venezuela, are the ghosts of the past. New enemies will have to be created. When that happens Venezuelan intellectuals might return to the traditional role of the intellectual as social critic and as a powerful force in constructing alternatives to conventional thought.

Notes

- 1 For the role of the private university in the region see Daniel C. Levy, *Higher Education and the State in Latin America, Private Challenge to Public Dominance* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968). The emphasis of Levy is on Chile, Mexico and Brazil but the Venezuelan situation does not differ much from that of those three countries.
- 2 There is a very interesting distinction among the different Catholic universities in Latin America. In Colombia the Javeriana University and in Chile the Catholic University are very strong in their ideological and intellectual commitment. This is not the case of the Venezuelan Catholic university, which is more a professional institution than a Catholic University elsewhere, in spite of the fact that it seems more closely related

to the Social Christian Democratic party – nevertheless without playing a substantial role in the ideological arena.

- 3 This is a complex procedure but in Venezuela universities are created after the President first gives them approval. Before doing so, however, they have to be analysed by a governmental body, the *Consejo Nacional de Universidades*, who will study the technical proposal and give the technical approval. This ‘technical’ approval is in fact a political one. The specific office that studies the proposal is the *Oficina de Planificación del Sector Universitario*, which is under the control of the political party in power and ordinarily staffed by party members.
- 4 The new private universities, generally speaking, train people only in engineering, in management, in computing sciences and the like, and avoid careers like law, social sciences and education. This means that only the autonomous universities prepare graduates for highly ideological/intellectual careers.
- 5 On the question of student political activism see my chapter ‘Venezuela’, in Philip G. Altbach (ed.) *Student Political Activism, An International Reference Handbook* (New York, Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 405-16. For a more detailed analysis of Venezuelan youth see my book *Juventud y Educación en Venezuela: Inserción y Reproducción Social* (Caracas, Cuadernos Lagoven, 1989). Data analysed in this book show that contemporary Venezuelan youth is highly depoliticized.
- 6 Whenever there is a strike at the autonomous universities and for any reason they stop their activities the private universities carry on with their academic life. These universities have almost no responsibilities in the areas of extra-curricular activities or are weak in the area of graduate studies, being devoted almost full-time to training people for the professions, some of them with a heavy proportion of their students attending evening classes, because they work full-time during daytime. It is obvious that these students lack the leeway to be able to spend time in political demonstrations, beside the fact that they pay a fee to study.
- 7 Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York, 1949), pp. 209-10.
- 8 See Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York, Basic Books, 1987). This is a change from the times when Lipset, Coser or Bell were discussing the role of the American intellectual in the open society.
- 9 One case in point is that the author of what is in the opinion of many people in Venezuela the best attack on the nationalization of oil during the first period of Pérez (1974-9) was one of the main ministers in the Pérez government.
- 10 An interesting comparison with the educational policies in Britain can be made. In Venezuela the political orientation of the government is toward social democracy and populism and nevertheless they are trying to privatize the educational system, particularly at the higher education level. Quite the contrary seems to happen under the Thatcherite government in Britain. For this see the ‘Introduction’ by Denis Lawton in *The Education Reform Act: Choice and Control*, edited by Denis Lawton (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1989).

CHAPTER 4

The intellectual in Cuba: the national-popular tradition

Antoni Kapcia

In much of the experience of the Third World in general and of Latin America in particular the role of the intellectual in political life has tended to be either marginal or élitist. Yet the experience of Cuba's intellectuals, like much in the island's history, has been generally distinct from this pattern, following instead a trajectory from a position of respect and some considerable significance, through a steady process of alienation, finally arriving at a contradictory position *vis à vis* a radical social revolution, a revolution which itself had grown partly out of a dissident ideological tradition, originally established and articulated by this same intellectual vanguard.

This experience stemmed from the unique process of Cuban history, which passed from a decrepit, anachronistic colonialism, through the suffocation and frustration of an aggressive neo-colonialism, later modified by a more subtle, and therefore more suffocating, hegemonic domination, under United States tutelage, finally arriving at a revolutionary process that created new horizons and new dilemmas.

The intellectual vanguard

Within Cuba's colonial period, two features stood out particularly:

- a) the decrepitude of the Spanish colonial system, which, surviving on the island only by default, owing to the determination of both the United States and Britain to prevent each other's control of the strategically important colony, steadily lost any claim to legitimacy. One effect of this was the failure of the colonial élite to exercise effective control, except through coercion and blackmail; the other effect was to militate against the development of any discernible social cohesion or any cohesive national identity.

- b) the increasing economic orientation of the island towards the United States.

Both factors combined to lead to an increasing cultural orientation towards the North. The long-term effect of these developments was a

cleavage and then a conflict, between a stagnant colonialism and an assertive 'New World' expansionism. This in turn gave a renewed impetus to a Cuban nationalism which had been already discernible but not developed earlier in the nineteenth century, at the time of the independence of the other Iberian colonies in the hemisphere. Inevitably, however, this latest manifestation of nationalism in Latin America bore little relation to its continental forebears. Instead of the largely Eurocentric or Jeffersonian liberal concept of 'nation', what began to develop in Cuba was a more sophisticated and more socially conscious concept of an independence that, almost by definition, implied a social and cultural transformation. In this way, a new intellectual tradition began to emerge from the colonial vacuum.

The distinctiveness of this nationalism had two basic roots. The first was the fundamental social transformations brought about by the nineteenth-century sugar revolution—the destruction of the *criollo* (Cuban-born) planter class, the financial and commercial domination of both Spanish and North American interests, and a double process of proletarianization and marginalization. This experience had the effect of creating potentially dissident, and alienated, social groups who shared an identifiable 'enemy' and a common interest.

The second factor that helped produce this new nationalism was the role of José Martí (1853–1896), articulator of the growing national sentiment, organizer of the revolutionary forces in exile and the epitome and instigator of the dissident Cuban intellectual tradition. Martí's intellectual heritage was predictably eclectic (given Cuba's unique position in the crossflow of political and intellectual currents and the intellectual vacuum of its colonial system).¹ His ideas developed rapidly, and largely empirically, towards a more radical perspective—radicalized above all by his growing awareness (during many years of exile there) of the political and economic system of the United States and its intentions towards its southern neighbours, and by his contact with, and appreciation of, the emigrant Cuban working class. His impact on Cuban political development was seminal, helped both by his remarkable capacity to represent and organize the exiled nationalist groups and by his expressive articulation of the diffuse but emerging national consciousness. In part, these capacities may be attributed to the traditional Hispanic respect for the *pensador*, and to Martí's undoubted literary talents, but above all to the fact that, as a journalist, he had the opportunities to articulate, propagandize and travel amongst the various exile communities. In other words (and, in the light of later Cuban developments, this is of some considerable importance), Martí was significant not only for his ideas, but also for his ability to realize his intellectual arguments in concrete action, that is as *homo faber*

precisely because of the advantages brought by being *homo poeta*.

Martí thus established a tradition of respect for and commitment by the intellectual; moreover, the general body of ideas² that Martí both represented and expressed became the intellectual basis of the newly radicalized national sentiment that culminated in the Second War of Independence from 1895. The outcome of that war—the United States' intervention and the Spanish-American War of 1898—ultimately took on a wider significance, as the turning point in global hegemony, the point at which the balance tipped away from the ageing European powers towards the growing power of the United States. Yet, the War also has something of a 'Third World' significance; it was perhaps the first 'Third World' war of liberation, rather than the last Latin American war of independence. For not only did it aim beyond political independence alone to an implicit social transformation, but it also involved, ultimately, a relationship and a conflict with a modern, twentieth-century imperialism, in the form of the rising power of the United States.

The sequel to the war was the bitter frustration of Cuban nationalists—alienated, in their own country, by the United States' four-year military occupation of the island and by the semi-colonial system established by the American-created state apparatus, legitimized by the Platt Amendment³ and cemented by the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903.⁴ This new, more dynamic, more effectively hegemonic neo-colonialism had a critical effect on the new nationalist movement, weakening it as a national, radical and popular expression.

This process was reinforced considerably by the accompanying social and economic dislocation of the new 'pseudo-republic'. On the one hand, the Cuban planter class, already weakened commercially and financially by the suffocation of the Spanish colonial monopoly and the catastrophic devastation of the war, now disintegrated as North Americans came to dominate sugar and finance. Thus, the new state was deprived of the possibility of a powerful autonomous bourgeoisie. The Cuban élite (itself a diffuse combination of the old Spanish élite, the newer, pro-American—even annexationist—Cuban entrepreneurs, and the few remaining independent planters) became more dependent and more managerial in its function. At the same time, the petty bourgeoisie, dependent on the State and yoked to the sugar economy, became politically ambivalent *vis à vis* a Cuban national identity. Political discourse thus became divided, and then confused, by the post-Platt reality, and a political cleavage opened up, between the aspirations of a potentially powerful nationalist consensus and the reality of the needs of survival.

As a result, the new Cuba lacked the institutions vital for social cohesion. The Catholic Church, for example, remained, even after

independence, a largely Spanish institution, administered from Spain and catering for the remaining ex-colonial élite. Deprived of any popular legitimacy, it could not be a force for cohesion or socialization. It was further weakened by the post-1898 invasion of North American Protestant missionaries, who, especially in the rural areas, began to proselytize extensively. The weakness of the Catholic presence, together with this Protestant activity, meant that the Cuban countryside could boast no 'traditional' intellectuals in the Gramscian sense. Furthermore, since the bureaucracy was still dominated by the Spanish élite and increasingly geared to the patronage system, it failed to function as a source of social stability, continuity and efficiency. Lastly, Cuba had no military force comparable to other Latin American countries. The Rural Guard that had replaced the demobilized Liberation Army was deliberately oriented towards North American values and was intended as much to protect the interests of foreign plantation-owners as to fulfill a specifically military function for an independent Cuba. Alienated, therefore, from Cuban society in general, the military failed to create an officer caste which might have enabled it to function as a viable social institution.

In this vacuum, the intellectual vanguard began to take on a politically significant role. It was particularly well placed to articulate the *independentista* opinion of the majority. It enjoyed a prestige established by Martí, and by Enrique José Varona, who, as a conservative colleague of Martí, had overseen the educational reforms which established a modern system in the new Cuba. It found a potential mass audience, in the politicized returned migrant workers, the newly unionized labour force and the multitude of *ex-mambí* guerrillas⁵ whom the new system had excluded, as well as among the Cuban petty bourgeoisie, who were now in an increasingly exposed position, dependent as they were on patronage and ambivalent about the new relationship with the United States. Most of all, the Cuban intellectual élite was open to external intellectual and ideological stimuli, capable of giving it the tools and the legitimacy to galvanize the existing dissident base, both as intellectuals *per se* and as exemplars of this disarticulated petty bourgeoisie.

There was also a dislocation within the educational framework of the new Cuban republic. For the secondary school system, developed by the occupation authorities before 1902, tended naturally to reinforce the neo-colonial values on which the new system depended, while the university system (limited though it was) was oriented more to the traditional Hispanic mould, that is to concepts of intellectual prestige and autonomy, and especially to European ideas. This cleavage, indeed, highlighted what can be seen as one characteristic of the intellectual in a

dependent society, namely that the terms of reference of *political* discourse tend to be internal, defined by the perceived needs of a 'real', national context, and by a 'realistic' awareness of the imperfections of a distorted political system; the terms of reference of *intellectual* discourse, however, tend to be external, defined according to a perceived tradition outside that national context, either external to the society in question or outside the 'underdeveloped' environment generally.

Between 1920 and 1923 that cleavage began to close. The collapse of the Cuban sugar and finance sectors following the *Danza de los Millones* boom of 1920-1⁶ dislocated both economy and society, and disrupted the patronage system on which much employment, in both the working and middle classes, depended. This created a potential for radical dissent in two critically important social groups, the students and the organized working class.

The Havana students took the public initiative in realizing that potential. In 1923, a series of student federations and congresses, each more radical than the preceding one, committed Cuban students to the radical mission of alliance with the working class in opposition to both the élite and to imperialism. Two manifestations of this new (occasionally patronizing) posture were the political alliance between the students and the disenchanted Association of Veterans (of the 1895-8 War) and the creation of the *Universidad Popular José Martí*, a workers' educational institution staffed by some of the more committed intellectuals. The students' protest was further legitimized by the parallel stance taken by a group of the more established intellectuals, who also protested against the bases of a corrupt system.⁷

This radicalization can be attributed to a conjunction of the particular social patterns and changes, the economic crisis of the early 1920s and the influx of new ideas which found a receptive intellectual élite searching for explanation of their, and Cuba's, dilemma and for legitimation of their new posture. On this occasion, however, these external stimuli were not solely Western European, as they had always been, but also ideas that reflected more closely the new reality of a dramatically changed and changing world.

Perhaps the most fundamental of these was Marxism, for, in the Cuba of the 1920s, this was less the body of theory which this term represented to many European intellectuals than the more specifically Marxist-Leninist variety, with its emphasis on the nature of imperialism and the need for revolutionary action. It was, moreover, a Marxism that tended to be refracted through the prism of such thinkers as the Peruvian José Mariátegui, who attempted to fuse the essentials of the Marxist view with the reality of the Latin American context. It was, therefore,

in a sense, a more 'applied' Marxism that became incorporated into the fabric of nationalist and radical discourse in Cuba.

A further related influence was the philosophy expounded by another Peruvian, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, in the form of *aprimo*, whose synthesis of Marxism, relativity and the Latin American reality led him to formulate an anti-imperialism that was both populist and relativist. The impact of *aprima* theories was considerable in certain parts of the continent, and especially so in a Cuban intelligentsia receptive to new, but perhaps not revolutionary, ways of interpreting its confused reality.

This, of course, also coincided with the dramatic impact, still felt throughout the continent, of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 (which, in spite of its brutality and its obvious shortcomings, still presented an example of revolutionary nationalism), of an indigenous search for cultural identity, and (of particular importance for the student generation) of a revolutionary role for education. In this respect, the influence of the Argentine University Reform movement of Córdoba, of 1918, should be considered. This movement argued the case for radical commitment by the Latin American students as well as for education to be relevant to the continent's needs; it was a campaign that was clearly echoed by the Cuban reformers of 1923. Mention should also be made of the influence in this intellectual 'melting-pot' of *arielismo*,⁸ which with its Romantic emphasis on the essential 'spirituality' of the Latin South, as opposed to the materialism of the North, and on the eternal values of youth, naturally provided a part of the philosophical underpinning of the new student thinking. Nor should it be considered strange that this quintessentially Romantic, Classicist and paternalistic approach coexisted in the same groups, and even in the same individuals, with either more radical or Positivist attitudes. Contradiction is one of the hallmarks, and one of the dilemmas (although some might see it as a strength), of the ambivalent petty-bourgeois intellectuals of dependent societies. Yet, above all, what this plethora of new ideas represented, confused though they might be in inspiration and effect, was the growth of relatively indigenous (but decidedly not indigenist) perceptions of their own reality.

Of all the new generation of intellectuals in Cuba, none stood out more than Julio Antonio Mella. One of the most dynamic and popular of the leaders of the Havana students, his ideological trajectory took him through *aprimo* (briefly and peripherally), via Mariátegui, to Marxism. It was Mella who, in company with Carlos Baliño, one of Martí's political *confrères* in the PRC⁹ and a trade-union activist, founded the Cuban Communist Party in 1925. This latest development was, therefore, of some considerable significance: the Communist Party (of such

importance in later Cuban politics) had grown out of a conjuncture of the radicalized student vanguard, indigenous union radicalism and the popular nationalism that underpinned much of the independence struggle and the post-independence resistance.

Indeed, the growth of the Party in the late 1920s confirmed the political significance of the intellectual vanguard, since many of the leading activists were already established in the intellectual élite: Rubén Martínez Villena, the poet, Juan Marinello, Nicolás Guillén, José Z. Tallet. Nor was this surprising, since that vanguard had played a critically central role in the wave of politicization after 1920, articulating the newly developing nationalist ideology, an ideology that already existed in inchoate form at a popular level, but which was now given intellectual coherence and respectability, political direction and ideological impetus.

The development of this dissident constituency, although it tended to lose its collective cohesion (under the pressure of ideological debate and political repression), led inexorably to its dénouement in 1933. For in that year, the government of the dictatorial Machado (himself elected in 1924 as a response to this student-instigated pressure) was overthrown, victim ultimately of a tripartite movement that powerfully expressed the nature of Cuban radicalism.

His removal was due, most fundamentally, to pressure from a radicalized working class, represented firstly by the growing trade-union movement, which, after its battles of the mid-1920s, had become more organized and determined, particularly under the leadership of a Communist Party still led by the intellectual vanguard. It was a political force of no great size but of considerable political maturity and discipline, which still manifested a residual nationalist consciousness, and which therefore saw the removal of Machado as a national as well as social issue. Yet that working-class pressure was also represented by the non-commissioned officers who rose in revolt in September 1933 in what can be seen as a genuinely revolutionary act against the increasingly exclusive and suffocatingly neo-colonial system. The second pressure came from the sergeants' allies in September, the radical students. For the consensus of 1923 had since split, fundamentally between the 'radicals' (the more Marxist-inclined, who gravitated towards the *Ala Izquierda Estudiantil* or Student Left Wing, and the *Liga Antimperialista*) and the 'reformists' (who tended towards a more *aprista* perspective of national liberation). The latter, easily routed by Machado in 1927, had since regrouped and reinvigorated itself to become the leadership of the DEU (*Directorio Estudiantil Universitario*), which led the revolt of 1933.

The third element of the accidental coalition, and in the long run perhaps the most significant, was the activist expression of the increasingly

dissident bourgeoisie. This represented above all those sectors of the élite who, either suffering directly from the dislocations of the latest financial collapse, of 1929-31, or sensing the urgent need for the system to readjust to the new, post-Crash, reality, placed themselves on the side of change and against the anachronistic authoritarianism of Machado's corrupt and repressive system. These 'modernizers' were most visibly represented by the 'action groups' who spearheaded the violence of 1931-3 that finally destabilized the Machado régime, and most especially by the cellular ABC organisation, which combined a corporatist perspective alongside radical activism.

The result was the unique creation of a government of students and sergeants, a government headed first by a 'Pentarchy' of non-political professionals and intellectuals, then by the more politically astute Ramón Grau San Martín, himself a university professor of physiology. If any development clearly expressed the significance of the intellectual élite, this was it; yet, ironically, it also clearly expressed the essential fragility of that significance in the new environment. For the revolutionary coalition represented three things: the residual hegemony of the student-intellectual vanguard, the power vacuum that allowed such a government to come so easily to office, and the lack of economic and political base that rapidly led to the removal of the less ideologically and socially cohesive student group at the hands of the real power in the land, Batista's army. Unable to achieve total domination without the students in 1933 and more fundamentally radical than the bourgeois DEU, the army had by 1934 become more coherent as a force, under the politically astute, dynamic and opportunist leadership of Batista. Only one person was ever really capable of challenging Batista: Grau's Interior Minister, Antonio Guiteras, himself yet another indication of the peculiar political-intellectual mix that had created the 1933 situation – a 'freelance', heterodox socialist who shared some of the DEU's perspectives but who clearly had well-tuned political instincts and who commanded a remarkable popularity, even within the ranks of the police and the army.¹⁰

The year 1933 therefore epitomized both the prestige and hegemony of the Cuban intellectual vanguard (a vanguard in its own right and in the popular conception) at a precise moment of political, social and economic dislocation; but it also epitomized that vanguard's essential weakness – that, by late 1933, it enjoyed and commanded no real, lasting, base. This enabled Batista, in the vacuum, to move against them and to enforce the desired rationalization of the post-1934 system. Those who 'desired' it were of course the newly dissident élite and the aspiring entrepreneurial ('national') bourgeoisie. Therefore, the political system was substantially restructured – through a consensual economic nationalism,

through welfare reforms and through the construction of a carefully managed populism. So too was the economic relationship with the United States – a rearrangement even more necessary after the Depression and the post-Depression retrenchment by the dominant trading partner, and now enshrined in the 1934 Reciprocity Treaty.

But that inevitable restructuring created a crisis for the intellectual vanguard, as it now had to face the realities of the changed relationship between Cuba and the United States, no longer so clear-cut as before 1929, under the Platt Amendment, and therefore less easily identified in popular political demonology. Indeed, one lasting achievement of the builders of the post-1934 Cuba was precisely to have set up a relationship that proved to be more complex and more subtle than the former, neo-colonial, link, all of which effectively confused (and defused) nationalist sentiment against the United States; an increasing number of Cubans experienced or perceived an improvement in their economic conditions, or, at least, recognized a need to adjust in order to survive.

Nevertheless the newly dominant bourgeoisie had a problem: although it was to benefit from the new arrangement, which gave it more economic and political space and a façade of power, the economy remained dependent. In other words its new power was false, a falsity which they sought to mask and to legitimize by the creation of a populism that was to function only at certain levels.

For, while Batista (between 1934 and 1944) and the *Auténtico*¹¹ governments of 1944-52 proved remarkably successful in the task of mobilization (the initial objective of any populist device), the system which they manipulated never managed to go beyond that to the critical stage of integration. The efficacy of the mobilization stage was achieved by the use of a 'revolutionary' ideology, borrowed from the 'heroic' age of 1923-33 – in other words, that very ideology articulated by the intellectual vanguard, which posited social reform and nationalism. After 1934, first Batista and then the 1933 'veterans' who created and dominated the *PRC-Auténtico* laid claim, often with some justification, to the reformist-nationalist constituency. But in both cases, especially in that of Grau San Martín's *Auténticos*, nationalism was a purely manipulated and manipulative force and body of ideas, which, in practice (and such indeed was, at least in part, the intention), had the effect of suppressing and disaggregating the existing popular base for nationalism.

The result was a marked degeneration of the whole political system. This now became even more fundamentally corrupt and clientilist, and even more false in its claims to be reformist and nationalist, seeming above all to be epitomized by the institutionalization of political

'gangsterism' (*bonchismo* or *pistolerismo*).¹² More serious, however, for the Cuban polity generally, was the degeneration of the nationalist consensus, (and even of a sense of national identity), which had been fostered by a popular consciousness of a historical tradition (in which Martí, and the *mambí* struggle were fundamental), by a sophisticated intellectual legitimation and by a cultural syncretism of Hispanic and African-derived influences (of which Guillén's poetry was an expression). Now, after 1934, the 'cultural invasion'¹³ from the *Norte* and the assault on that collective ideology were of such potential and yet of such subtlety that they had the effect of alienating the intellectual élite from its Cuban context. The cultural philistinism of the 'Americanized' and materialist Cuban bourgeoisie now denied that élite the space it had hitherto enjoyed, and as a group, therefore, the intellectuals moved from their perceived role as 'national-popular vanguard' to the status of marginalized minority.

The intellectuals were also alienated from their hitherto mass constituency, which now became apparently depoliticized, confused and diffuse, open to take-over by other 'vanguards', notably the 'nationalist' Auténticos and their progeny, the *Ortodoxos*,¹⁴ and the Communists. Yet the Communist Party too, once the haven for dissident intellectuals, was by the late 1930s and early 1940s increasingly proletarian in both outlook and membership (itself a reflection of its national strength). It was also, more significantly in this context, increasingly Stalinist in its structure and attitudes, not least regarding the previously prestigious intellectuals, who were now marginalized as a political force within the Party (with the possible exception of Guillén).

Intellectuals responded to the collective crisis in three distinct ways. Firstly, there were those who chose to resign themselves to the new cultural hegemony of the United States and to the reality of an 'Americanized' Cuba, by 'Americanizing' their cultural values, seeking to imitate the 'better' products of the culture they had perhaps hitherto disdained. Faulkner, Hemingway and the other newer examples of the North American narrative became the inspiration for one group of Cuban writers. This applied especially to prose writers, whose outlets were materially reduced to the periodic publication of short stories in usually non-literary magazines—a reflection in itself of the deterioration of the cultural milieu in Cuba. This path of imitation was paralleled by those who, disdaining the 'crass' culture of the North Americans, preferred to imitate European models. Thus, for one considerable sector of the intellectual élite at least, Cuba had forfeited any claim to cultural identity; for these intellectuals, as writers, culture was to be found in either the United States or the traditional 'pole' of Europe.

A second route was taken by those who sought physical escape,

those for whom the pressures of a corrupt, and corrupting, 'deculturated' and increasingly uncultured society were too great and too depressing to bear, or those who quite simply saw more opportunity abroad. The result was a diaspora of almost a whole generation of younger writers and intellectuals, who tended to gravitate as a matter of course either to New York or to the traditional Latin American Mecca of Paris. Once again, therefore, it was an attraction towards the two powerful external poles, the newer, more vibrant, North or the older, more 'cultured', Europe. In either case, by migrating, for whatever reason, these intellectuals effectively participated in their own further cultural colonization, confirming the hegemony of centres other than their native one and rejecting, with varying degrees of resignation, their traditional symbiosis with the popular movement and the growth of a Cuban identity. In part, such a rejection simply reflected the fact that intellectuals in Cuba were no longer regarded as natural leaders by this movement.

A third group of the hitherto 'committed' intellectual élite responded to the new situation by withdrawing from activism and commitment, either resorting to facile rhetorical posturing or indulging in a romantic nostalgia for the 'golden age' of 1923-33. This 'retreat' paralleled the increasing pursuit of deliberate evasion among the apolitical intellectuals, who sought expression in surrealism, black humour and fantasy, *barroquismo* and the 'art for art's sake' creeds of the cultural standard-bearer, the *Orígenes* magazine.¹⁵ In both cases, the 'escape' could be seen as a natural and indeed justifiable response to the distasteful reality of a Cuba that was run by corrupt politicians and gangsters, that was in no sense independent and that was increasingly losing its identity. This reality was epitomized by the so-called 'action groups' that were the visible legacy of 1933. Out of the radicalism of ABC and Guiteras's *Joven Cuba* had grown a proliferation of pseudo-political, pseudo-ideological 'gangs' that took over the world of student politics and helped to provide the muscle for the flawed populism that sought to legitimate the system. In a sense, these groups were not only the epitome of the degeneration of nationalism and radicalism, but also of the concept of an intellectual 'vanguard', a caricature of the intellectual as *homo faber*.

The roots of this degeneration were not difficult to identify. Most fundamental was the vacuum of both the Cuban polity and the Cuban economy. By the late 1930s, and certainly throughout the 1940s, Cuba was a state weakened by the weight of decades of United States' hegemony and undermined by the subtlety of the post-1934 neo-colonial rearrangement. It was a society disintegrating under the weight of an endemic corruption, which reflected both the clientilist structure, and,

increasingly, the speculation, nepotism and fraud of *Auténtico* rule. The very openness of that corruption was a critical factor in the steady collapse of legitimacy that Cuba now underwent. This process was further reinforced by the lack of effective political control, the domination by Batista and his military clique, and by the fraudulent nature of both Batista's and the *Auténtico*'s nationalism and radicalism. The new relationship with the United States complicated the issue, by giving the appearance of greater independence (after the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934), although little had in fact changed. As a result, the hitherto 'intolerable' was now tolerated as a matter of 'realism'. The newly installed 'quota system'¹⁶ was a case in point (and indeed the real basis of the new relationship), since it gave Cubans the security which they sought after the scares of 1921 and 1929, but also, by implication, deprived the Cuban economy of any autonomy it might have claimed and also of any incentive that might have encouraged indigenous entrepreneurial development. The 'quota' was in effect a replacement for the Platt Amendment, cloaking the reality behind the apparent 'Cubanization' of the economy which, instigated by Batista, tended to develop in those areas of the economy that did not threaten basic United States interests or from which those interests had in any case withdrawn during and after the Depression.

The second basic factor that created the new mood and patterns of political activity was the decline of social cohesion consequent upon these economic and political changes. For now the cohesive power of nationalism as a collective ideology no longer operated. Instead, given the continuing failure of the 'traditional' factors of cohesion to perform adequately (namely, the Church, the bureaucracy and the military), such collective cohesion as there was tended to emanate from other sources, notably from the trade unions and the organized expressions of Afro-Cuban culture.

Progressive alienation

By the 1950s, the trade unions had evolved into a powerful political force. This came about as a result of successive arrangements firstly between the Popular Socialist Party (Communist)¹⁷ and the Batista-led or Batista-backed governments, and, later, between the Grau and Prío governments of 1944-52 and the *Auténtico*-led unions from 1946. These unions were, contradictorily, still the repository of a formal militancy, at a grass-roots level, and were often perceived as the forum for a collective popular identity, in spite of the 'Stalinism' and 'Browderism' of the Communists, and later the evident corruption of

Mujal's unions. Parallel to this, something of a popular identity was also kept alive by black culture, and especially by the survival and popularity of the *santería* cults.¹⁸ Batista's implicit patronage of the cults (or at least the popular perception that he approved them) gave them some legitimacy as a subculture.

However, for those who could not share in either of these collective experiences the resulting social vacuum produced the development of a collective self-doubt. Faced with the degeneration of political culture, of nationalism (as governments appropriated the symbols of Martí, converting him into an anodyne, statuesque myth), and of the whole tradition of 'revolution', which now was reduced by Cuba's political parties to little more than the sum total of an array of 'reforms' (some radical but most cosmetic), the Cuban populace began to sink still further into that collective self-denigration and cynicism that came to be known as the *choteo*.¹⁹ As a result, the remnants of a positive sense of national identity began to disappear, or, more precisely, to be driven further underground into the realms of the collective subconscious. Equally, for the intellectual élite, the new political situation began seriously to undermine their collective self-confidence and political consciousness. Did Cuba any longer offer them any real hope or role? That élite, once relatively cohesive, now began to disintegrate into at least three distinct groups: the increasingly Americanized bourgeois intellectuals, the alienated cultural élite (the ex-vanguard), and the 'popular' intellectuals of the Communist Party, the unions and the parallel black culture.

Intellectuals as a group now went the way most intellectual élites in dependent societies tend to go: from activism at the centre of events to a loss of identity at the periphery. However, what they had already achieved was significant. For the language, symbols and mythology of nationalist and radical politics, created by successive generations of committed intellectuals from 1895 to 1933, had become the basic language of Cuban radicalism and nationalism.

This language and mythology extolled struggle (*lucha*) and action, not least by the intellectual vanguard, which, in other contexts might be expected to remain aloof. It was logically an ideology of patriotism, but one which, besides being essentially moral, embraced the whole of the perceived Cuban nation. This socially egalitarian *martiano* vision, however, of a single unified multi-racial and classless Cuba, tended to exclude or ignore the existing black culture, which was relegated to the safe exoticism of artistic culture or to the studies of a handful of 'eccentric' folklorists. It was also an essentially male vision, as reflected in the implicit *machismo* of 'heroism', action and struggle.

It was also a language and an ideology of change, whether through

simple reform, 'revolution' (whatever that term had come to mean) or through the complexities of a basic component of this mythology, generationalism. For to incorporate the concept of generations into a national culture in a dependent society is to celebrate two contradictory aspects. On the one hand, the concept represents the conservation of the 'true', repressed, nation, of traditions established by earlier generations which continue to inspire and legitimize the actions of the current generation – and a sense of a shared historical tradition was long an integral part of Cuban radical ideology. On the other hand, generationalism represents a belief in the duty of each generation to assert the need for change and to reject the perceived failures and 'betrayals' of the immediately preceding generation, presumably the one currently in power.

This mythology, therefore, not only helped to galvanize opposition to a patently illegitimate system, articulating the various strands of the subculture, but also remained as a potential channel for dissidence and legitimator of revolt. However, with an irony characteristic of the Cuba of the 1934-59 period, that same ideology was also the basis for the manipulation of the system which the post-1934 rearrangement ushered in. Yet, by its very nature, that ideology and that language proved to be potentially dangerous implements for any manipulation; for a language of moralism, nationalism and change conflicted so clearly with the reality of corruption, dependence and conservatism of post-1934 Cuba that it gradually began to undermine the self-confidence of a superficial system and expose its spurious legitimacy. In other words, at the very point where the intellectual vanguard, having lost its way, had either withdrawn from commitment or resigned itself to the reality of a 'false' Cuba, or, in a few cases (notably the protagonists of 1933 who proceeded to dominate the Auténtico Party), had become pre-eminent components of the manipulative system, the long-term effect of its ideological achievements was to galvanize the subculture of dissent.

This development came with the coincidence of three critical moments. The first was the ultimate shock of Batista's coup in March 1952. For, however illegitimate the Cuban system, it could at least claim to be nominally constitutional and civilian, and, as such, could theoretically offer the hope of self-correction. Yet the ease with which Batista sprang his coup and the total collapse of opposition following it (as the various forces in the system either postured emptily, kept silence or chose to collaborate) dashed all hopes of that self-correction. Coming fast on the heels of the blow to popular morale and to the hopes of decency and change which the death of the *Ortodoxo* leader Eduardo Chibás represented,²⁰ the coup was the ultimate degradation of the

independence ideal. What at first sight seemed to be simply an honest formalization of the basic post-1934 system actually affected the morale of large sectors of the Cuban public in a totally unforeseen way – although the apparent apathy which greeted this formalization seemed to belie that.

That blow coincided with two anniversaries, the fiftieth anniversary of Cuban independence and the centenary of Martí's birth. Both, of course, were celebrated publicly and popularly, but both put seriously in question the significance of the coup. For it could be seen as ironic that a poorly resisted coup, organized by Batista (who had so clearly represented in the 1933-40 period the nationalist and reformist hopes of a large part of the Cuban electorate and who had ushered in a period of reform and prosperity, only then to initiate a new wave of fraud and manipulation), should occur in the very year that commemorated an independence which had always been fraudulent, manipulated by the United States and those sectors of the élite who benefited from the relationship. The 'betrayal' of independence, of the *mambises*, of the generations who had fought for the Cuban nation, now seemed to be paralleled by the betrayal of hope and democracy. The centenary of Martí was even more significant perhaps, provoking as it did an unprecedented flood of publications on Martí and on his thought, and also because it represented that very 'ideal' which had been betrayed. The contrast between Martí and Batista, between Martí's vision of a free Cuba and the degraded reality of a supine Cuba under the rule of a corrupt élite and an ex-sergeant, could not be hidden or explained away.

Indeed, it was that contrast which inspired those few Cubans who chose to challenge the new régime. Known at the time as the 'generation of the centenary' these few, predominantly young and initially drawn from the politicized ranks of the students of Havana and Santiago (always the dissident and nationalist part of Cuba) and of the youth wing of Chibás's party, now organized action against the dictatorship. That action was Fidel Castro's assault on the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba, which gave its name to the movement built up subsequently (the July 26 Movement). That assault and the propagandizing that ensued, particularly in Castro's famous defence speech, 'History will absolve me', coincided perfectly with the public mood of disillusion, frustration, resignation and outrage. What better to challenge the new degradation than an action that was designed as much as a rallying gesture as a serious revolt, an action carried out by a group so patently representative not just of 'the generation of the centenary' of Cuba's betrayed national hero, but of the whole radical-nationalist tradition in its student, proletarian and *Ortodoxo* roots?

It was, ultimately, an action that not only caught the imagination and brought popular respect and admiration, but also articulated the 'hidden' but widespread popular ideology of nationalism. Most noticeably, 'History will absolve me' and all the Movement's manifestos in the years of the ensuing insurrection (1954-8) stressed their intellectual and ideological inheritance from a tradition of Cuban radicals, from Martí, from Mella, from the generation of 1933 and latterly from Chibás. It was, despite subsequent North American and Cuban accusations, not a Marxist ideology, or even one 'prone' to Marxism, but an ideology that justifiably claimed a Cuban pedigree; an ideology into which, as we have already seen, Marxism in various forms fed, along with a range of other influences. The essential point was, however, that the revolution, at both the activist and the popular level, did not lack an ideology, as was so often thought; the ideology which it represented, and which naturally went on developing after 1959, was definite and in many ways clearly formed.

Intellectuals on the periphery

For the progenitors, or articulators, of that ideology – the established, older intellectuals – the irony could not have been greater. Despite their past and their achievements, they were no longer central to Cuban political discourse and they no longer exercised political hegemony. That role was now taken by the 'new intellectuals' of the revolutionary vanguard: like Martí, Mella, Guiteras and the heroes of 1933, intellectuals who *acted*; *homo faber* once again.

The revolutionary victory of 1959 therefore found them in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the revolution clearly welcomed the support of intellectuals as a group, and indeed needed them, to articulate, legitimate, educate and contribute to the collective task with their particular skills. Moreover, in one sense they were ideally placed to play a significant role, given their claim to historical legitimacy and the fact that the revolution extolled the need for Cuba to have a 'culture of its own' as one of the four basic aims of the struggle.²¹

Yet, on the other hand, the process of alienation, marginalization and deculturation that they had all undergone since 1934 had not only separated them from their 'natural' context, but had also moved them towards intellectual and artistic concepts of deliberate alienation and autonomy. The experience of Europe and the United States in the 1940s and 1950s had attracted them towards, for example, Sartrean notions and away from their tradition of commitment. There was therefore an innate contradiction in their new position.

However, in the enthusiasm of the early years of the revolution, such contradictions seemed either unimportant or invisible. As the new situation brought them a wealth of opportunities, appointments, prestige, publicity and even influence, as the emigrés returned in droves and as the intellectual vanguard once more apparently took up its political vanguard role, there seemed indeed no contradiction at all. The essential point was, however, that, although it may well have seen itself as one, the new intellectual élite was not in fact a political vanguard, and its commitment, although enthusiastic and effusive, lacked coherence. This became apparent as the process developed. Rapid radicalization, the polarization of perspectives and the new demands of the post-revolutionary situation, the resultant 'siege mentality' which set new limits and ordered new priorities, and the growing evidence of an inherent anti-intellectualism (both from the old, now influential PSP communists and from the activist mentality of the revolutionary vanguard) all made that weakness much clearer. Castro's intended mollification of 1961 (his 'Words to the Intellectuals') really solved nothing in the long run.²²

From 1962, in fact – the year both of the watershed of the Missile Crisis/Crisis del Caribe and of the internal conflict within the revolutionary vanguard (between PSP activists and a *fidelista* perspective of revolution) – both survival and politicization became the watchwords, and the roles of both education and the intellectual came gradually to be more clearly defined: to serve the revolution. In this way, not only was the concept of a role very firmly created, within a group that had come to reject such a proposition, but also the whole revolutionary process was demanding ever more of the very people whose importance it was steadily reducing. In this context, conflict became inevitable, between the essentially individualist ethos of a 'westernized' élite (itself a significant change from the 1895-1933 period), who looked to the 'models' of Sartre, Mario Vargas Llosa and the Californian 'beat' poets, and the increasingly collectivist ethos of a revolution that expected their commitment (given their privileges), and began to visualize the possibility, and certainly the desirability, of creating a new generation of 'organic' intellectuals (in the Gramscian sense) through the years of popular mobilization and the spread of education to the whole population. For the revolutionary vanguard, the prospect of a situation of 'every worker a student' offered a vista totally different from the previous Cuban experience.

As a consequence, by the late 1960s, the intellectuals (and especially those who had been 'exiles' before 1959) had come to feel increasingly frustrated and alienated. This experience covered all the generations: the 'older' generation who had withdrawn in the 1940s, the 'middle'

generation who had spent their intellectually formative years abroad, and the 'younger' writers who had largely begun to write with the advent of the revolution and who now particularly bore the brunt of the new moralism and 'anti-deviant' attitudes that had become prevalent in certain quarters.²³

For some of the intellectual élite, this conflict had to be solved by a process of self-decolonization, a process that paralleled the revolution's own traumatic and disorienting search for identity in so many ways.²⁴ This decolonization necessarily rejected the concept of universality (as an implicitly Western capitalist criterion) in favour of the growing '*tercermundismo*' of the revolution. In other words, instead of simply going back to supposed Cuban roots, the 'decolonizing' intellectuals now chose to see Cuba and its revolution as part of a wider process of liberation and search for identity. Cuba was not an outgrowth of Western culture, as even Martí had seemed to believe and as the alienated intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s certainly maintained, but a dynamic part of the dispossessed Third World – dispossessed of its cultural heritage and independence along with its political and economic birthright. It followed therefore that this same process of intellectual decolonization implicitly demystified the concept of 'vanguard' as it had hitherto been understood.

Indeed, it could be said that the inherent vanguardism of both the intellectual élite and the revolutionary leadership was one of the essential, or at least symptomatic, problems of the whole 1962-70 period – whether that vanguardism was the product of Leninism within the PSP or of the 'Guevarist' ethos more generally. For it ignored the fact that the reality underlying the revolution was a process of popular radicalization at the grass-roots that generated its own momentum and its own dynamic which conflicted with any attempt to 'lead' or to force the pace. That conflict was the root of the problems of 1968-70.

Conclusion

What then is the overall judgement of the Cuban experience? Into what analytical framework can the so clearly unique case of Cuba be placed, in order to make some sort of comparative sense of such apparently contradictory experiences? Fundamentally, one need go no further than that offered by Gramsci. For, while his concepts of hegemony and the intellectual may have applied specifically to a non-dependent, European, framework, thereby making it difficult to fit the perspective into an environment whose social formations had been distorted by the experience of dependence, there can be little doubt that the concept

of hegemony eloquently explains the subtleties of neo-colonialism. Moreover, his division between 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals probably suits the European experience less well than it suits dependent societies, where there is a palpable division between those who articulate the colonial values and those who articulate the dissident national consciousness, which is itself a class issue. This consciousness can be seen as a response to the compliance by politically and economically dominant classes or sub-classes in the colonization of their own societies and also as a means of defensively seeking a collective identity. The precariousness and ambiguity of the intellectuals' position within this complex set of relationships was an essential problem in the intensely contradictory system in pre-1959 Cuba.

In that system intellectuals had played a critical role in the early formation of the dissident national consciousness, as articulators, as educators and as leaders, and were particularly well placed and endowed to fill the hegemonic vacuum, and to absorb influences and respond to stimuli that would explain and legitimate their position. Yet at no stage can it be said that the Cuban intellectuals actually created that consciousness, for the experience of social change, the 'sugar revolution', the independence struggle and the disillusion after 1902 had created the basis for that.

As a result, the Cuban intellectual élite had accepted as a matter of course the concept of commitment and the reality of an organic relationship with a popular consciousness; it had even accepted, in a break with the European tradition from which it had in part sprung, the necessity of intellectual commitment being translated into action, of the intellectual being, naturally and by definition, *homo faber*. As such, there was a natural willingness of this élite to co-operate on equal terms with the few genuinely 'organic' intellectuals who were produced by the process of rapid social change and proletarianization (particularly those active in the early Communist Party).

The irony of this willing activism, however, in the long run, was that it tended to reduce and undermine the élite's relevance as intellectuals; the intellectuals of 1923, 1933 and 1953 were not so much 'thinkers' or 'educators' as 'activists'. Therefore the complexities of the post-1934 period simply made that marginalization more likely and so made their difficulties after 1959, more complex and problematic.

However, on balance, even given that process of alienation, both before and after 1959, the intellectuals as a specific, identifiable group in the development of Cuban society had already made three fundamental contributions to the political discourse of that society – and, as such, to the pattern of the revolution that emerged and developed.

The first achievement was their seminal role in framing the

language, the symbols and the whole positive mythology of radical and nationalist dissent in Cuba; in other words, in framing the terms for the development of a nationalist ideology. In this very clear sense, therefore, Cuban intellectuals eventually helped to radicalize and to articulate the 'hidden', popular, consciousness of both the 1950s and the 1960s and, therefore, to develop the revolutionary ideology that both created the revolution and was created by it. The revolution of 1959 was, after all, no mere coup 'from above', which proceeded to determine the pattern of the revolutionary process for the 'masses'; it was a complex process of 'vanguard' activism interrelating with the 'submerged' consciousness of a politicized, but alienated, population, a consciousness which rapidly began to play a role as protagonist in the pattern of events. The contribution of the intellectuals to that consciousness and to that complex relationship was fundamental.

The second basic achievement of the Cuban intellectual élite was in helping to orient the revolution's, and the Cubans', search for identity and to formulate a new national consciousness. As early as the 1890s, the intellectual vanguard was already questioning the validity of accepted Eurocentric models for Cuba's future; the 'vanguard' of 1923 certainly pointed the way towards analyses and prescriptions that emanated from non-European sources and that posited non-European (or, at least, non-Western European) solutions to Cuba's peculiar problems. The process of deculturation, denationalization and marginalization that Cuba as a whole suffered from then on only served to reinforce the value of that orientation. It was therefore almost inevitable that, as the Cubans after 1959 began to come to terms with their own identity, they should do so to a large extent in the terms set by the existing intellectual tradition (up to 1934), a tradition which had, of course, ceased to be 'intellectual' and become 'political'. The tortuous search for identity which the revolutionary process engendered (and indeed represented) in all spheres, inexorably moved to a new 'Cubanism' through a deliberately constructed relativism. In a sense, it could be said that the revolution has spent three decades being unable to decide whether it is North American, Latin American, Caribbean or 'Thirdworldist', and is now feeling its way to a more confident, less negative, 'Cubanism'. Having started the century with a self-image of Ariel, and spent the 1960s in a febrile, defiant, self-image of Caliban, the Cubans have begun to develop and create a sense of identity that is both positive and aggressively syncretic, in both political and cultural directions – something that clearly is a basis for much of Cuba's significance in the Third World. If Cuba has taught the Third World anything, it is the basic lesson, 'Teach yourself'. The intellectuals' role in that orientation cannot be underestimated.

The third achievement has been the establishment of 'culture' (itself defined widely) as not just a desirable but a vital element of any revolutionary transformation and any revolutionized society. That applies both to the fundamental and much-vaunted role of education in the revolution, from the heady days of the Literacy Campaign of 1961 (since a model for many Third World countries), and to the conventional concept of artistic culture (although rarely conventionally expressed). Without question, the role that successive generations of Cuban intellectuals played in the political struggles for an independent Cuba, since 1895, contributed mostly to that development. It is clear, therefore, that the overall picture of the intellectual in modern Cuban history is complex and contradictory, but perhaps no more complex and no more contradictory than the society from which they sprang, which gave them an identity and a role, which then rejected them *en masse*, but which eventually determined its own, revolutionary, direction according to maps which those same intellectuals had drawn up.

Notes

- 1 The debate as to Martí's intellectual and ideological pedigree has been long, bitter and inconclusive, in both Cuban and non-Cuban historiography, with each 'side' claiming Martí as its own. Perhaps the most cogent and perceptive study of the complexities of Martí's beliefs and influences is that offered by Peter Turton's *José Martí: Architect of Cuba's Freedom* (London, Zed Press, 1986).
- 2 Martí's ideas were too diffuse, extensive, wide-ranging and changing to allow a characterization of them as a 'philosophy'. The term that many commentators prefer, therefore, is *ideario*.
- 3 The Platt Amendment was imposed on the Cuban Constituent Assembly of 1901 by United States pressure and against bitter resistance, unsurprisingly given that it sought to undermine any independence that the rest of the Constitution presumed. For its main stipulations were: i) a limitation on the ability of the new Cuban state to treat with foreign powers, and contract foreign loans, other than with the United States; ii) the right of the United States to intervene militarily if order and stability should be threatened; iii) the cession, in perpetuity, of tracts of Cuban territory to the United States for the purpose of military bases. Guantanamo, for example, at the eastern end of the island is still a US naval base.
- 4 The Reciprocity Treaty was the formal means whereby the Cuba-United States economic relationship was established. It basically attributed to Cuba a role as a preferential supplier of (raw) sugar to the United States in exchange for extensive tariff concessions to importers of United States manufactures. The effect was to tie Cuba to one product and one market and to undermine any prospect of indigenous manufacturing.
- 5 *Mambí* was the term adopted by the rebels of the 1868-78 and 1895-8 independence struggles.

- 6 In 1918 the expected collapse of world sugar prices did not materialize, as pre-war producers returned to large-scale production only slowly. Therefore, as demand rocketed, Cuba was ideally placed to take advantage of the opportunity by rapidly increasing production at a time of spiralling prices (from 3.58 cents per pound to over 20). The result was a boom in both expectations and consumption, financed largely by heavy external borrowing. In the second half of 1920, however, the predictable price collapse caused extensive bankruptcy in Cuban sugar holdings and Cuban finance institutions.
- 7 This refers to the *Protesta de los Trece*, a protest by thirteen prominent intellectuals, in 1923, against the fraudulent sale of government property and, more widely, against what they saw as an essentially corrupt system.
- 8 This refers to the intellectual 'movement' that responded to the publication, in 1900, of *Ariel*, by the Uruguayan writer, Enrique Rodó.
- 9 The *Partido Revolucionario Cubano* was founded by Martí and rapidly became the organizer of the Cuban exile community and the revolt of 1895.
- 10 In 1934, Guiteras set up his own 'action group', *Joven Cuba* (Young Cuba), to resist Batista and to continue the revolutionary struggle of 1933-4. In 1935, he was instrumental in organizing the general strike against Batista.
- 11 Grau San Martín and other leaders of the 1933 revolution (including some of the ABC) set up the PRC (*Partido Revolucionario Cubano*), deliberately adopting the title of Martí's party, as a means of defending the gains and the spirit of 1933.
- 12 *Bonchismo* took its name from the Havana-based student action group of the 1940s, *El Bonche Universitario*. It spawned a plethora of similar, mostly more violent, 'action groups' that came to dominate the increasingly murky world of Havana student politics.
- 13 Paulo Freire's term, in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972), pp.121-2.
- 14 Set up in 1947, the *Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxos)* was the creation of certain youth and regional sectors of the PRC, who were driven to set up their own party either through disenchantment with the corrupt reformism of the party or through frustration at the increasing exclusivism of the party hierarchy. Led by the demagogic, but popular, Eduardo (Eddy) Chibás, the party rapidly gained ground in the electorate, basing its appeal on the issue of moralism and the personality of Chibás.
- 15 *Orígenes* was the instrument, above all, of Lezama Lima, who, through it, established lines of thought that remained influential in Cuba for long after the magazine closed.
- 16 In 1934, the system was established whereby an annual quota of sugar sales to the United States was allocated to Cuba (along with other preferred producers); the critical issues were the changeable annual figure (dependence on which became an obsession) and the fact that it was fixed by the United States unilaterally.
- 17 In the 1930s, partly as a response to the era of 'Popular Front' politics and partly to gain respectability, the Party adopted the PSP label which it kept until the 1960s.
- 18 Here the term is a catch-all for the diverse sects and cults that survived and flourished in Cuba's black communities.
- 19 The *choteo* was the term given by Cubans to the tendency to disparage supposedly negative traits of the Cuban character.

- 20 Chibás died, in 1951, from wounds self-inflicted in dramatic fashion at the end of his weekly, anti-corruption, radio broadcast.
- 21 'Progam-Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement from Bonachea, R. & Valdés, N. (eds), *Cuba in Revolution* (New York, Doubleday & Co., 1972), p.127. The other three were: a free and sovereign fatherland, a democratic republic and an independent economy.
- 22 In 1961, Castro responded to a fierce intellectual and political debate, between the publishers of the *Lunes de Revolución* cultural supplement and some of those in the political vanguard who resented the cultural freedom/licence which it represented. He called a gathering, in Havana, of intellectuals and propounded the revolution's philosophy *vis à vis* artistic freedom and expression, including the famous words 'Within the Revolution everything, against the Revolution nothing'. Following this meeting, UNEAC (the Union of Writers) was established.
- 23 The epithets 'middle' and 'younger' here refer to the conventional division of the 1960s literature into two 'waves', the first being those born between 1925 and 1940, and the second being those born thereafter. The differences between some of the former and the revolution came to a head particularly in the so-called 'Padilla affair' of 1970-71, having dominated the cultural hierarchy for the first few years of the revolution; the latter's problems (for those few who came into conflict with the revolution) tended to focus on the issues of bohemianism and homosexuality.
- 24 It is possible to see much of the revolution's apparent disorientation in the first twelve years or so, regarding its political definitions and paths, its economic models and its whole ethos, as illustrative of its often obsessive search for a truly independent definition of revolution and development, passing through a series of 'borrowed' or imported models to a more indigenous set of criteria.

Chronology of events: Cuba from 1868 to 1971

- 1868 First War of Independence begins
1878 War ends
1892 José Martí founds, in New York, the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC)
1895 Second War of Independence begins
Marti is killed in combat
1898 USA intervenes in the War; Spain is defeated
US occupation of Cuba begins
1900 Education reforms (under Varona) are initiated
1901 The Cuban Constitutional Convention is obliged to accept the Platt Amendment as an integral part of the new Constitution
1902 Cuban independence is granted
1903 Cuba and the USA sign the Reciprocity Treaty, which confirms Cuba's role as supplier of sugar to the US market and as market for US manufactured goods
1906 US troops intervene (under the Platt Amendment)
1917 Further US intervention
1921 Cuban sugar and banking holdings collapse, after the *Danza de los Millones* boom
1923 13 leading intellectuals organize the *Protesta de los Trece* (against corruption)
Student protest movement begins, led by Julio Antonio Mella
The FEU student federation is founded, together with the *Universidad Popular José Martí*
1924 Gerardo Machado is elected on a liberal nationalist platform
1925 The Cuban Communist Party founded (by Mella and others)
1927 Machado disbands the FEU
'*Revista de Avance*' magazine is founded
1928 Guirao and Tallet publish Cuba's first *negrista* poems
1929 The Great Crash leads to the collapse of Cuban exports
Machado rules by decree
1930 The DEU student body is founded, to replace the FEU
1931 The entire DEU leadership is arrested
The Student Left Wing (*Ala Izquierda Estudiantil*) is set up
ABC is set up as a terrorist organization
1933 Machado is deposed (August)
The DEU and Batista's NCOs organize a revolutionary take-over (September)
Grau San Martín becomes President, with Antonio Guiteras as Interior Minister
1934 (January) Batista takes over Cuba
Guiteras's *Joven Cuba* armed group and Grau's Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party (*PRC-Auténtico*) are set up
The Platt Amendment is abrogated
A new Reciprocity Treaty is signed and the quota system established
1935 Batista defeats the general strike and Guiteras is killed
1938 The Communist Party joins Batista's *Coalición Democrática Socialista*
1940 The Constitutional Convention passes a new Constitution
Batista is elected President

- 1944 The Communist Party becomes the Popular Socialist Party (PSP)
Grau is elected president
Orígenes magazine is founded
- 1947 The *PRC-Ortodoxo* is founded, under Chibás
- 1948 The *Auténticos* are re-elected, under Prío Socarrás
Ciclón magazine is founded
- 1951 Chibás commits suicide
The pro-PSP *Nuestro Tiempo* magazine is founded
- 1952 50th anniversary celebrations of independence
Batista organizes his coup (March)
- 1953 Centenary celebrations of Martí's birth
Castro's assault on the Moncada barracks in Santiago (26 July)
Castro's 'History will absolve me' defence speech at trial
- 1955 Castro is released in an amnesty and departs for Mexico
- 1956 26 July Movement organizes invasion of Cuba in the yacht 'Granma'
Closure of *Orígenes*
- 1958 Closure of *Ciclón*
- 1959 (1 January) Victory of the 26 July Movement
The '*Lunes de Revolución*' supplement and '*Casa de las Américas*' are founded
- 1960 The USA imposes its economic blockade
- 1961 Bay of Pigs/Playa Girón invasion and break with the USA
The Literacy Campaign is organized
Castro declares Cuba's commitment to Marxism-Leninism
The debate about Cabrera Infante's film 'PM' ends with Castro's '*Palabras a los intelectuales*'
Lunes de Revolución is closed
UNEAC, the writers' and artists' union is established
- 1962 The Cuban Missile Crisis/Crisis del Caribe
The 'Escalante Affair' (demotion and purge of PSP cadres from the ranks of the newly formed ORI party)
- 1965 The Cuban Communist Party is set up
- 1967 Guevara is killed in Bolivia
Relations between Cuba and Soviet Union deteriorate
- 1968 The Revolutionary Offensive is launched in the economy
The second 'Escalante Affair' (purge of his 'microfaction' from the Cuban Communist Party)
The International Cultural Congress takes place in Havana
UNEAC prizes are awarded to Padilla's '*Fuera del Juego*' (poetry) and Arrufat's '*Los Siete contra Tebas*' (theatre), but with 'disclaimers' on political grounds
- 1970 Failure of the 'Ten Million Ton Harvest'
A process of 'institutionalization' begins, with an apparent return to political and economic orthodoxy
- 1971 The 'Padilla Affair' erupts
The First National Congress on Education and Culture redefines the role of art and the intellectual in Cuba

CHAPTER 5

The intellectual in the Cuban Revolution

Nicola Miller

It was no coincidence that the notorious Latin American literary ‘boom’ took off only a few years after the consolidation of the Cuban Revolution. Castro’s victory and successful defiance of the United States brought Latin America to the world’s attention, and heightened the self-consciousness of Latin American intellectuals. Cuba’s role as the inspirational model for a new society was eagerly latched on to by Western progressive intellectuals, for whom Europe (East or West) no longer offered any convincing visions. In the aftermath of Khrushchev’s 1956 denunciation of Stalinism, the liberal intelligentsia was obliged to face up to the appalling costs of ‘progress’ in the Soviet Union, and to moderate, if not abandon, commitment to the Bolshevik ideal. Cuba effectively replaced Europe as the battleground for opposing political ideologies. It became the touchstone of political engagement, as had Spain in the 1930s. There was no need to take up arms to defend Castro’s republic, but many became ‘tourists of the tropical revolution’,¹ most famously Sartre and de Beauvoir in 1960.

Intellectuals and politics

Why is it that issues such as the Cuban Revolution compel intellectuals to adopt positions, whether for or against, which tend to be so intense and passionate? Perhaps, as Cuban defector Guillermo Cabrera Infante has put it with characteristic trenchancy: ‘Intellectuals feel the same impulse toward action that an impotent man feels toward sex: the same need to be reverent voyeurs. As they aren’t capable of taking part in such activity they think it must contain some extraordinary value, the fulfillment of body and spirit, happiness.’² A short anecdote from the memoirs of Carlos Franqui, editor of the newspaper *Revolución*, illustrates the myth perfectly. Franqui recounts how Fidel publicly tore up the military treaty between Cuba and the United States, and Franqui promptly seized the copy to photograph for his front page. He subsequently mislaid it, and then discovered that Fidel wanted the

treaty to take to New York in order to tear it up again in a dramatic gesture for the consumption of the United Nations. 'The day before Fidel's scheduled departure, the document turned up in *Revolución's* safe. That night I slept with the treaty. The next morning I got up early, tucked the treaty under my arm, and headed for the airport *feeling like a real left-wing intellectual*.'³

Probably more significant is the idea that political engagement is an essential component of the process of establishing and legitimizing oneself as 'an intellectual' (rather than 'a writer' or 'an academic'). This is particularly true in Latin America, where, as Carlos Fuentes has said, the very act of writing, or bearing witness, is 'a revolutionary fact, . . . [a denial that] we live in the best of worlds'.⁴ What is truly at stake here, namely the whole question of the identity and role of an intellectual, is graphically revealed by the fact that those writers who challenge the prevailing Leftist position amongst Latin American intellectuals invest far more energy in attacking the positions of their adversaries towards, say, the Cuban Revolution, than in criticizing the revolution itself. Mario Vargas Llosa, for example, ceaselessly inveighs against those 'politically irresponsible' writers who express any sympathy, however guarded, for the régime in Havana.

The Cuban government and the intellectual community abroad

The Cuban régime, rapidly isolated politically and economically, was not slow in seizing the cultural front as a major plank of its defence. Influential figures within the government, among them Carlos Franqui, were arguing that Cuba should enlist the support of the international intelligentsia, and appear to have convinced Fidel Castro of its value.⁵ Havana made a conscious attempt to become the cultural centre of Latin America, and thereby provided a much-needed site of exchange for writers and artists who had previously worked in considerable isolation, with little contact across national borders. In 1960 Casa de la Américas was founded to co-ordinate cultural relations with the rest of Latin America.

Thus, in the first few years of the revolution, at least, Cuba was making a conscious effort to offer intellectuals opportunities for active involvement. At an individual level, for example, on a visit to Caracas early in 1959 Castro sought out Pablo Neruda, who had written a book of poems (*Canción de Gesta*) in commemoration of the revolutionary victory, and discussed with him the possibility of a press agency covering the whole of Latin America, an idea which later crystallized into *Prensa*

Latina.⁶ Alejo Carpentier was appointed Vice-President of the National Council of Culture in 1959 and in 1962 became head of the state publishing house. More generally, leading Latin American and European intellectuals were invited to participate in Casa's activities, serving on editorial boards and judging prizes. Perhaps the most famous example of Castro's appeals to intellectuals was the call to cut all links with the United States, which prompted Hans Magnus Enzensberger to resign his post at an American university.

The crunch came, however, as an increasing clamp-down on intellectual freedom from the mid-1960s culminated in the notorious Padilla affair of 1971, an incident which split the intellectual community, particularly within Latin America. The spectacle of the poet Heberto Padilla publicly denouncing himself, his wife and friends in a confession which many believed could only have been forced, proved too much for some former supporters of the revolution, most notably Mario Vargas Llosa, who switched from ardent supporter to vehement detractor almost literally overnight.

What follows seeks to offer a brief account of why the Cuban revolution moved from the relative openness of the early 1960s, when the goodwill of the international intelligentsia was actively courted, to the far more restrictive cultural climate of the 1970s, when the views of that same intelligentsia were brusquely dismissed by Cuban officials. My argument will suggest that the cultural issue has been used by Castro as a political football. Policy has changed partly according to a need to mediate amongst rival tendencies within Cuba, and partly as a measure of the state of relations with the Soviet Union.

Cultural policies of the Cuban revolution

Cultural policy, like many other policies, was unclear in the early stages of the revolution and, as on other issues, rival sectors were competing for influence. As mentioned above, a grouping developed around the newspaper *Revolución* and its cultural supplement *Lunes* (which had a circulation of 250,000), advocating the promotion of culture and diversity of cultural expression. In opposition to these ideas were the Communists (members of the *Partido Socialista Popular* – PSP), whose role in the revolution was substantially increasing in significance throughout 1960. There were initially only a few defectors, the best-known of whom was Severo Sarduy, who chose to leave Cuba in 1960. The first major clash of views on cultural policy came in 1961, and it was probably not coincidental that this was the first year of a mass

literacy campaign. It was also, of course, the year that the revolution was declared, on the eve of the Bay of Pigs in April, to be socialist.

The P.M. affair

I. A version of events

P.M. was a short film which showed Cubans drinking and enjoying themselves in night-time Havana. It was made at the end of 1960, and shown in April 1961 on television in the hour sponsored every Monday by the magazine *Lunes*. The editors of *Lunes*, one of whom was Guillermo Cabrera Infante, then took a copy of the film to the *Comisión Revisora*, hoping to show it in a private cinema. The Film Institute not only refused permission but confiscated the copy. Cabrera Infante then called a meeting of his *Lunes* colleagues and, in his words, 'we decided unanimously to draw up a manifesto, protesting against the censorship and confiscation of the film'. About two hundred signatures were collected from intellectuals and artists and presented to the official cultural organization headed by Communist and poet Nicolás Guillén.

Cabrera Infante continues the story thus: 'At this moment Havana was living in some sort of cultural fever of expectation of some international event destined as propaganda and publicity for the regime . . . Four weeks later the First Congress of Cuban Writers and Artists was announced, to which dozens of foreign delegates had been invited.'⁷ There was concern that the manifesto, which had been endorsed by President Dorticós, could bring out differences.

A sort of secret movement immediately began to approach Fidel Castro – instigated by Carlos Franqui . . ., with the consent and advice of the PSP's commission for culture – and it was decided to postpone the Congress, due to open at the beginning of June, until the last days of August. Instead of the Congress there would be a series of meetings with Fidel Castro in the National Library. They were very private meetings, confined to well-known and recognised intellectuals: invitations were issued by telephone and those attending were doubly checked by agents of State Security . . .⁸

The meetings were attended by Fidel Castro, President Dorticós, Armando Hart (Minister of Education), Edith García Buchaca, then Communist Commissar of Culture, later President of the Council of Culture and herself accused in 1964 of being an 'imperialist agent'; Alfredo Guevara, head of the Cuban Film Institute, Carlos Franqui and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.

In the course of these meetings, held on three consecutive Fridays in June 1961, leaders of the PSP accused the *Lunes de Revolución* group of fostering division, undermining the revolution, attacking the Soviet Union and hankering after decadent, bourgeois Western culture, as represented by movements such as surrealism and existentialism. Indeed, as Cabrera Infante points out, 'At the trial, P.M. was not so much a prisoner in the dock as Exhibit A for the prosecution of *Lunes*: it was not the film that was on trial but the magazine and its liberal concepts of culture...'⁹

Lunes discussed avant-garde art; it included Trotsky's ideas on art, and articles on André Breton, but also the Communist Manifesto, John Reed and Mayakovsky. The magazine published Fidel, Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. However, it did not always offer clear editorial views of the contradictory articles. Carlos Franqui has written:

Our thesis was that we had to break down the barriers that separated élite culture from mass culture. We wanted to bring the highest quality of culture to hundreds of thousands of readers. We were motivated by a motto we got directly from José Martí: 'Culture brings freedom'. So we published huge editions with pictures and texts by Marx, Borges, Sartre, Neruda, Faulkner, Lezama Lima, Martí, Breton, Picasso, Miró, Virginia Woolf, Trotsky, Bernanos, and Brecht. We also published protest issues on cultural colonialism in Puerto Rico, Latin America, and Asia. We called into question all the commonplaces of Cuban history and literature. Even *Lunes's* typography was a scandal for left- and right-wing prudes. We played with letters in the same way that Apollinaire, the futurists, the Dadaists, and the surrealists had done. And we included black and Cuban folk traditions as well. We tried to translate Cuban culture into visual symbols.¹⁰

The discussions in the National Library culminated in Castro's famous dictum on cultural policy, reputedly prefaced by flinging his pistol down on the table: 'within the revolution, everything, against the revolution, nothing'. This ultimately meaningless formulation enabled Castro to appear to have aligned himself on the side of freedom of expression, and represented a cosmetic defeat for the Communists. In practice, however, the film was never distributed, *Lunes* was closed down shortly after, and its three editors sent abroad.

A few months later, in August 1961, the Cuban National Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC) was founded, with long-standing Communist Nicolás Guillén as its director. The declaration of principles at the founding of UNEAC included a far more explicit formulation

■ than Castro's concerning the relationship between the artist and the revolution:

We regard it as absolutely essential that all writers and artists, regardless of individual aesthetic differences, should take part in the great work of defending and consolidating the Revolution.

2. *The political context*

When considering the background to the *P.M.* affair, the first point to be made is that the timing of the film was clearly unfortunate. In the midst of the national crisis of the Bay of Pigs invasion, scenes of carefree indulgence could be seen to conflict somewhat with images of heroism and the Government's need to rally the population around the defence of the revolution. Moreover, in Cuba, because of the US link, night-life and its seamier side have historically been associated with the imperialist presence, and have therefore been doubly condemned. Indeed, one of the first measures the revolutionary régime took was to 'clean up' the bars and night-clubs of Havana.

Secondly, it was clearly politically tortuous for members of the PSP to tolerate the display in Cuba of heretical works, for example by Trotsky, Pasternak, Kafka and Joyce, when these were all banned in the Soviet Union, where there was an ideological/cultural crisis developing with the breakdown of Zhdanovism. Moreover, Castro had just declared the revolution 'socialist', but at that time this designation was hardly accepted in the Kremlin. Nor was the position of the Communists within the Cuban government securely established: it was not until July 1961 that Castro announced the formation of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations, in which former PSP members had significant influence. Desirous of maximizing their own position both with Castro and in Moscow, in their role as brokers for obtaining Soviet assistance, their credibility was somewhat weakened if they could not show themselves able to determine policy on such a relatively lightweight issue as cultural affairs. For the Communists, then, cultural policy was tactically chosen to test their overall influence within the revolution.

Thirdly, and crucially, at that time Castro found it expedient to let the Communists have their way on the cultural issue. This decision was taken in the context of the Bay of Pigs invasion and Castro's overall strategy of organizing Cuban society along lines acceptable to the Soviet Union as part of a campaign to secure Soviet military and economic protection for his revolution. The Cuban leader, however, succeeded at this stage in keeping himself largely untainted from accusations of

repressiveness, thus enabling him to use cultural policy to work against the Communists when it suited him to do so. This happened, for example, in the wake of the first series of denunciations of conspiracy against Aníbal Escalante and other PSP members (in March 1962) and in the context of the disillusionment and tense relations with the Soviet Union after the Missile Crisis. In 1963, for example, Castro stated that when 'Russia's satellites in Havana' had asked him to ban an abstract painting, as Khrushchev had done in the Soviet Union, he replied 'Our enemies are capitalism and imperialism, not abstract painting.'

Over the next few years heightened debate was being conducted in Cuba over whether to adopt a Soviet-style economic policy, and the polemic with Moscow over the armed versus peaceful road to revolution was intensifying. These years saw various denunciations of Socialist Realism, not least by Che Guevara, who described it in *Man and Socialism in Cuba* as the 'corpse of 19th century bourgeois painting'. More ominously, perhaps, for those concerned with freedom of expression, in 1965 Castro stated: 'Art is not an end in itself. Man is the end. Making men happier, better.'

Homosexuality •

During 1965-6 the issue of homosexuality came to the fore, affecting several artists and writers. Under the 1939 Penal Code homosexuality was a criminal offence in Cuba, and this clause was retained in the 1979 revised Penal Code. Publication of José Lezama Lima's *Paradiso* was delayed because of the notorious Chapter XI which contained homosexual scenes; the novel was eventually published because of his international reputation. The *El Puente* literary group was forced to disband because of suspected homosexuality; Allen Ginsberg, who was involved in the group, was unceremoniously expelled from Cuba and put on a plane to Prague, where he was welcomed. Shortly afterwards short-story writer Calvert Casey escaped to Italy via Poland.

The military had set up what were known as Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP), used to 'rehabilitate' homosexuals and other 'deviants'. Five prominent artists were summoned to UMAP. The writers' union UNEAC called an emergency session and enlisted Fidel's support. UMAP was disbanded and Fidel personally apologized to the artists, but the issue was never discussed publicly.

The Padilla Affair

This took place against a general background of increasingly evident government pressure on writers from 1967 onwards, the context of which is discussed below. In April 1967 copyright and royalties were suspended and a restructuring brought all publishing under the state-run Institute of the Book. It was henceforth impossible for a writer to publish within Cuba without state approval.

Heberto Padilla had a special role as an intellectually dissident but politically loyal writer. Because of this, 'his very existence came to seem a guarantee of the Cuban government's tolerance of freedom of speech and by the same token the government's treatment of Padilla became a touchstone by which to measure its intentions towards Cuba's intellectuals in general'.¹¹

The events of 1971, which attracted international attention, had their roots back in 1968, when Heberto Padilla attacked a story (*Pasión de Urbino*) by the vice-president of the National Council of Culture, Lisandro Otero, complaining that Cabrera Infante's *Tres Tristes Tigres* had not been published in Cuba despite its artistic superiority. This article was published in *El Caimán Barbudo*, the literary supplement of the Communist youth paper *Juventud Rebelde*. The *Caimán* group claimed to be opposed both to 'terrorist dogmatic' tendencies and 'hysterical-liberal' (individualist) tendencies in the debates over freedom of expression.

In August 1968 Cabrera Infante (a former friend of Padilla's) who, as mentioned earlier, had gone into voluntary exile in 1965, gave an interview to an Argentinian magazine, *Primera Plana*, in which he publicly attacked the revolution for the first time, commenting on Padilla's review and sympathizing with his growing difficulties in Cuba. He went on to denounce the conditions under which Cuban writers had to live:

Padilla is now in the position in which every intelligent and honest person living in a communist world finds himself, that is of a spiritual exile who has only three choices before him: to opt for opportunism and demagogy by making a political recantation; jail; or genuine exile.¹²

As a result of this, the editorial board of *El Caimán* was forced to resign for publishing an article praising a traitor to the revolution.

The controversy resumed later in 1968 when an international jury unanimously awarded Padilla the UNEAC prize for poetry. Strong attempts were made by the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), through UNEAC, particularly Nicolás Guillén, to influence the jury. These were,

however, completely unsuccessful. The book was eventually published, with an introduction written by UNEAC condemning it as counter-revolutionary. The introduction also took care to praise the Soviet Union, which was the subject of less-than-flattering images in one section of Padilla's book, 'The Iron Birch-Tree', deriving from his two-year visit to the USSR. Padilla was not arrested then, as many anticipated, but he lost his job with *Granma* and failed to get another until making a direct appeal to Castro in 1970.

The early part of November 1968 saw the intervention of the armed forces into the debate. Headed by Raúl Castro, who is notoriously anti-culture, the armed forces clearly had their own interests in preserving the myth of the revolutionary as fighter, and in reaffirming their role as guardians of the revolution. In the first of a series of five articles in the armed forces' journal *Verde Olivo*, Cabrera Infante and everyone associated with him, including Calvert Casey, Rodríguez Monegal (editor of *Mundo Nuevo*) and Padilla were denounced as counter-revolutionary. In the wake of the public denunciation in June 1968 of Aníbal Escalante for conspiring in what became known as the 'microfaction' to introduce Soviet-style policies into Cuba, the article stated, 'The fact is that microfaction and counter-revolution are the same thing.'¹³

The influence of events in Czechoslovakia was also manifest. In a subsequent article Padilla was accused of having an artistic vanity comparable to Czech writers before the Soviet invasion of August 1968, an article which was reprinted in *Granma*. Later that November, Lisandro Otero wrote of 'the presence among us of secret counter-revolutionaries who propose to cause the same problems here as in Czechoslovakia.'¹⁴ A further article was directed against playwright Antón Arrufat, whose *Los siete contra Tebas* was a thinly disguised criticism of the lack of freedom and the unfulfilled promises of the revolutionary government.

On 24 November a final article called for greater political awareness and reviewed Castro's 1961 *Palabras a los intelectuales* and Guevara's *El Hombre y el Socialismo en Cuba*:

The Revolution has not been nor is it interested in curbing artistic imagination or experimentation but rather in developing them; but it is not going to stop combatting those who plan to use that freedom which the people, absolutely by themselves, first won and now defend with their blood to stab the Revolution in the back and with the greatest impudence, moreover, claim to be the defenders of our culture.¹⁵

Padilla, under pressure from UNEAC, sent a formal reply to Cabrera Infante, which was printed in *Primera Plana* in December 1968, saying '... I write these lines in freedom, in Cuba, and ... I do not

find myself in any of the situations he mentioned'. He attacks Cabrera Infante, saying that he 'shirks responsibility, he renounces history: he has accepted the rules of the game. Instead of violent social change he chooses irresponsible, uncommitted placidity.'¹⁶ He goes on:

No revolution is a bed of roses and I do not wish to suggest that ours is one. There are problems, many problems ... Guillermo Cabrera Infante draws the conclusion that it is now impossible to live in our country. I believe the contrary. I believe that it is here that we must live and fight so that our country may become better every day ... He who appeared so certain and forthright now offers me the three options of treason. But I am here and shall remain here, participating with my life and work in the construction of a better, more just society. For a revolutionary writer there is only one alternative: Revolution or nothing.¹⁷

Cabrera Infante replied on 14 January 1969 denouncing persecution of artists in Cuba dating back to the *P.M.* affair. He says that the positive comments he offered in 1965 were only made so that he could be allowed to leave Cuba. 'Yes, I surrendered my voice in Cuba then, and would have ... given everything, even my life, to escape that paradise and its *ad hoc* sin (... Che Guevara quoted by *Verde Olivo*): "the sin of ... our intellectuals and artists is their original sin: they are not authentic revolutionaries"'.¹⁸

The tightening of the noose on intellectuals was announced by Nicolás Guillén at the 1969 UNEAC award ceremony, when he said: 'Cuban writers and artists have the same responsibilities as our soldiers with respect to the defence of the nation ... He who does not [fulfill his duty] regardless of his position, will receive the most severe revolutionary punishment for his fault.'¹⁹ It was furthermore announced that in future the juries for UNEAC awards would consist of Cuban writers only.

This, then, is the background to what became known internationally as 'the Padilla affair', which was the arrest and imprisoning of Padilla from 20 March to 25 April 1971. On 27 April he recanted publicly at a UNEAC meeting and stated that he was the source of criticism of Cuba by writers such as K.S. Karol and René Dumont (*Guerrillas in Power* and *Cuba Est-il socialiste?* were both published in 1970), whom it was later convincingly demonstrated that he had never met. Fidel affirmed that he had personally ordered Padilla's arrest.

First letter of protest to Castro

Soon after the arrest a letter of protest was sent to Castro. Some of the most notable signatories included Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, Italo Calvino, Julio Cortázar, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Carlos Fuentes, Gabriel García Márquez, Juan Goytisolo,¹ Alberto Moravia, Maurice Nadeau, Octavio Paz, Francisco Rosi and Mario Vargas Llosa. Although they 'reaffirmed their solidarity', they stated that 'we fear the re-emergence of a sectarian tendency stronger and more dangerous than that which you denounced in March 1962 [the first Escalante affair] and to which Major Che Guevara referred on several occasions ...' They went on to point out that a favourable international conjuncture was beginning to emerge [left-wing governments in Chile, Peru and Bolivia] 'to break the criminal blockade on Cuba ...' and that 'repressive measures against intellectuals and writers ... can only have deeply negative repercussions among the anti-imperialist forces of the entire world.'

Padilla's statement

The self-incriminating statement made by Padilla is worth quoting in some detail, as it indirectly reveals the concerns of the Cuban regime. Padilla said:

... in public I showed myself as an unquestionable militant of the revolution, and in private as a vulgar man in opposition, as a true counter-revolutionary. To believe that this is possible is the mistake of many writers ... I wanted to identify a certain situation in Cuba with a certain situation abroad at a certain stage of socialism, which had been overcome in those socialist countries. And these friends who have supported me [i.e. the Latin American and West European intellectuals] are basically ignorant of my life during the past few years. They are ignorant of the fact that I have been involved in such activities and have assumed such attitudes. It is a natural reaction from writers of the capitalist world and I hope that when they understand the revolution's generosity and see me here speaking to you freely, they will rectify their positions and admit that the Cuban revolution is superior to the man with whom they have shown their solidarity.

... what was central to my mistakes was that I was dazzled by big cities, by international recognition, by foreign cultures. This was the point of departure for all my mistakes ... the correlation of forces in Latin America cannot allow a single front – the cultural front – to be weak.²⁰

Padilla had been planning to publish, in Spain, a novel called *Heroes are grazing in my garden*, the principal character of which was a disillusioned man who constantly railed against the revolution. Padilla later recalled that the title of this book – taken from a poem by Roque Dalton – infuriated his interrogators: ‘only *animals* graze – horses, for example, which was Fidel Castro’s nickname in those days’.²¹ Once released, Padilla lived under virtual house arrest, unable to publish any works in Cuba. In 1980 he left Cuba to join his wife in the United States.

Castro’s speech

At the First National Congress of Education and Culture, held from 23 to 30 April 1971, Castro made a major speech in response to the intellectuals’ letter. He attacked ‘the mafia of pseudo-leftists’ in ‘bourgeois salons, 10,000 miles away’, and announced that they would no longer be invited on to Cuban juries and indeed that to get a prize ‘they’ll have to be real revolutionaries, real writers and poets’.

This was very different from a speech Castro had made early in 1968, when he had paid tribute to intellectuals attending a Cultural Congress in Havana (most of whom were the same people who had signed the 1971 letter), whose presence, Castro said, did Cuba honour. It was they, he then recalled, rather than the Western Communist Parties, who had come to Cuba’s defence during the Missile Crisis.

• The Congress explicitly defined the government’s new policy on culture. Art was to be an instrument of the revolution; culture in a socialist society was not the exclusive property of an élite but rather the activity of the masses. Works of art were to be judged politically according to their usefulness to man and society. An apolitical attitude towards culture was despicable and reactionary, and great care must be exercised henceforth in order to avoid inviting foreign writers and intellectuals whose works and ideals were in conflict with the interests of the revolution.

On 5 May 1971 Mario Vargas Llosa sent an open letter resigning from the international board of Casa de las Américas. In a public response, Haydée Santamaría accused Vargas Llosa of various crimes and attacked him as a counter-revolutionary. He remained the main target in the wake of the Padilla affair, having already antagonized the Cuban government by criticizing, in September 1968, Castro’s declared support for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The second letter of protest

A second letter was sent from Paris on May 20, signed by most of those who had put their names to the first, expressing ‘our shame and our anger’ at Padilla’s speech, and stating that:

The sad text of the confession which Heberto Padilla has signed can only have been obtained by using methods that are the negation of revolutionary legality and justice. The content and form of that confession . . . are reminiscent of the most sordid moments of Stalinism, with its prefabricated judgements and its witch-hunts.²²

This was not signed by Julio Cortázar or Gabriel García Márquez. Although most intellectuals subsequently reaffirmed solidarity, from that point on the issue of support for the Cuban revolution was a divisive one in progressive left-wing literary circles.

In order to understand the Padilla affair, it is crucial to examine the political and international context in which it took place. During the late 1960s the Cuban régime was under severe pressure and suffered a series of shocks to its position:

1. In 1967 Che Guevara died in Bolivia. This led to the virtual abandonment of the policy of using guerrilla warfare tactics to break out of isolation within the Western hemisphere by creating like-minded governments in other Latin American countries. However, in the period between the abandonment of *foquismo* and the successful development of diplomatic initiatives in the early 1970s, the issue of the security of the revolution was perhaps even more sensitive than usual.

2. This period saw tensions and disputes with the Soviet Union which also diminished the security of the revolution. Displeasure with Cuban criticisms of Soviet policy in Latin America, Havana's promotion of the armed struggle and a whole range of other issues culminated in Soviet sanctions early in 1968, when oil supplies were cut back.

3. The public denunciation early in 1968 of the 'microfaction' indicated to many in the Cuban government the need to tighten up on internal security.

4. The reluctant endorsement – dictated by the basic security need to remain under Soviet protection – of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in itself caused severe disillusionment amongst many intellectuals abroad about the degree of Cuban independence. Given the importance of the role played by Czech intellectuals in the Prague Spring, it brought to the fore the whole issue of the place of intellectuals within a revolutionary society, as was indicated by the articles in the armed forces' journal. Padilla's novel, which was smuggled out of Cuba, also indicates the importance of this issue in the minds of the Cuban authorities. An autobiographical work, its main theme is artistic repression under Castro. The Afterword describes his detention and interrogations, in the course of which the Lieutenant says, 'We have to

do something about this state of affairs with regard to the intellectuals of Cuba – if we don't want to wind up like Czechoslovakia.'²³

6. This was the time when the government attempted the virtual elimination of the private sector, and the mobilization of the population on the basis of the call to realize Che Guevara's concept of the New Man. This resulted in the drive towards the failed ten-million-ton harvest of 1970, and Castro's need to undertake public self-criticism afterwards. There was then also the need to negotiate a massive influx of aid from the Soviet Union to revive the Cuban economy, which was made official by the incorporation of Cuba into Comecon in 1972. It was not, therefore, a time when Castro could afford to be perceived as lacking control over a population in which the levels of dissatisfaction were relatively high. Thus, the Padilla affair took place at a time when the Cuban Revolution perceived itself to be particularly vulnerable.

Intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s

The 1970s, when a Soviet-style constitution came into place and Cuban life became increasingly bureaucratized, saw a corresponding clamp-down on intellectual activity. The bookshops became virtually empty, foreign newspapers and magazines were unobtainable, and the only outside source of information was Miami radio and television. The 1976 Constitution guarantees stylistic freedom, but not freedom of content.

The establishment of a Ministry of Culture and a vice-presidency of the Council of State for education, science and culture led to increased centralization. The 1979 Penal Code makes it illegal to 'incite against public order, international solidarity or the socialist state by means of oral, written or any other kind of propaganda'. The most notable cases of individual persecution since then have included the following:

Reinaldo Arenas, author of *Farewell to the sea (Otra vez el mar)*, who openly welcomed the revolution, was harassed during the 1960s because of his homosexuality, spent some time in a forced labour camp in 1970 and a spell in detention in 1974. He left on the Mariel exodus in 1980.

Ariel Hidalgo, academic and writer, was accused in 1981 of 'enemy propaganda' for having written a critique of Cuba from the Left, and spent seven years in jail before leaving for Miami on his release.

Armando Valladares was arrested with 16 others in December 1960 after the discovery of three bomb-making workshops in Havana. He was tried for 'offences against the powers of the State' and

sentenced to 30 years, which was later reduced to 25. Some years after his imprisonment he began to write poetry, which was smuggled out to his wife in Miami, where it was published in 1976 as *Desde mi silla de ruedas* (*From my wheel-chair*). It was also included in a book on his case, *Prisonnier de Castro*, published in France in 1979. There is considerable controversy over the original charge, and Valladares was a *planteado*, that is he refused to accept the rehabilitation programme of the State, but most agree that he was detained for so long (his co-defendants were all freed earlier) because of this writing and publication abroad. He was eventually released in 1982 after representations to Castro by Régis Debray and President Mitterand.

As is well known, Cuba has largely resisted Soviet-style liberalization in the arts and media (known as *glasnost*), although there have been some recent signs of literary revival. Cuba still functions as an important forum for Latin American art, most notably film. From the early days, the Cuban Revolution has exploited the potential of the small and large screen, and Castro has taken a personal interest in the Latin American Film Foundation, its film school and the annual film festival, which has become renowned world-wide. However, Cuba's role as locus of ideological contestation was largely replaced during the 1980s by Sandinista Nicaragua, where most of the leaders were poets or novelists, and it seemed far more possible for the dreams of Western liberals to be fulfilled.

Notes

- 1 See Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'Tourists of the Revolution,' in *Dreamers of the Absolute* (London, Radius, 1988), pp.224-52, for an analysis of this phenomenon.
- 2 Guillermo Cabrera Infante, in Rita Guibert, *Seven Voices* (New York, Vintage, 1973), p.383.
- 3 Carlos Franqui, *Family Portrait*.
- 4 Carlos Fuentes, *The Enemy: Words*, trans. Suzanne Jill Levine, *Triquarterly*, 23-4 (Winter-Spring 1972), p.120.
- 5 It may have been Carlos Franqui who convinced Fidel of the importance of culture. He recalls that in 1959 he went to Europe: 'I was . . . intent on carrying out my cultural guerrilla war. *Revolución* would invite Picasso [who had a Cuban grandmother], Sartre, Breton, Le Corbusier, and other Europeans to Cuba. Neruda would be the first Latin American. I went personally to ask people if they would help us out. I ran into Sartre in Paris, at a rehearsal of one of his plays. He first granted me a few minutes, which soon turned into hours of discussion about Cuba, revolution, socialism, Marxism . . . The result was the visit of Jean-Paul Sartre and

Simone de Beauvoir to Cuba.' *Family Portrait*, p.46.

- 6 Neruda and his wife visited Cuba as guests of *Revolución* in 1960. Carlos Franqui recalls: 'We all went down to the dock to meet him – all of us except the poet Nicolás Guillén, a Communist like Neruda himself. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and the other Party faithful were also conspicuously absent ... There was a certain amount of sabotage against Neruda, perpetrated by the Communists, by Guillén (who couldn't abide Neruda's superiority as a poet) and by some frustrated intellectuals who all signed a shameful letter of denunciation of Neruda. Raúl Castro, oddly enough, was also involved. Somehow Neruda was caught up in the cultural battle raging around *Lunes* and *Revolución*, and his recent book, *Estravagario*, was a cause of ideological concern because in it, Neruda, self-critical, spoke out in favour of the freedom of poets, of all men, to write, to love, and to live. It was a clear departure from the Stalinist dictum about not writing any but committed poetry.' *Family Portrait*, pp.99-100.
- 7 Cabrera Infante, *Seven Voices*, p.350.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp.350-1.
- 9 *Ibid.* pp.353-4.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p.129.
- 11 *Index on Censorship* (London, Writers and Scholarship) 1:2 (Summer 1972), p.66.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p.72.
- 13 Menton, Seymour, *Prose Fiction of the Cuban Revolution* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1975), p.136.
- 14 *Index on Censorship*, p.67.
- 15 Lourdes Casal, in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Revolutionary Change in Cuba* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press), 1971, p.40.
- 16 *Index on Censorship*, p.74.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p.75.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p.80.
- 19 *Granma Weekly Review*, 7 December 1969, p.9.
- 20 *Index on Censorship*, pp.84-7 and 105-6.
- 21 Heberto Padilla, 'Afterword', trans. Andrew Hurley, in Doris Meyer (ed.), *Lives on the Line* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp.92-103, 95.
- 22 *Index on Censorship*, p.125.
- 23 Padilla, 'Afterword', *op. cit.* (1989) p.94.

CHAPTER 6

The Hispanic-Caribbean National Discourse: Antonio S. Pedreira and Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez *Arcadio Díaz-Quiñones*

mas nosotros . . . que no somos indios ni europeos, sino una especie media entre los legítimos propietarios del país y los usurpadores españoles: en suma, siendo nosotros americanos por nacimiento y nuestros derechos los de Europa, tenemos que disputar éstos a los del país y que mantenernos en él contra la invasión de los invasores . . .¹

I

Over the course of the colonial period, intellectual élites constituted, as Angel Rama has suggested, a numerically small yet powerful *ciudad letrada* (Republic of Letters). Although subordinated to the metropolitan centres, men of letters commanded significant power. Through the exercise of the written word, the 'owners of writing,' the clerks and the scribes, ecclesiastics, royal officials, lawyers – in a largely illiterate environment – acquired extraordinary authority, deriving support from State and Church. At the same time, men of letters contributed to the legitimacy of the élite's political authority and wealth. This specialized social group – embedded in the male-dominated, politico-philosophical tradition – distanced itself from the majority of the indigenous, *mestizo*, slave or servile populations, which did not have access to the written word. 'Property and language,' writes Rama, 'defined the borders of the ruling class . . . The use of language forged a social hierarchy, gave proof of preeminence and established a defensive barricade in an environment that was hostile, and above all, inferior.'² The basis of social cohesion was to a great extent sustained by a large network of *letrados* who manipulated symbolic languages and directed their messages to peoples of different languages and cultures in a system controlled by hierarchies of knowledge and power.

Some might argue that conceptualizing such a specialized élite implies that they could exert total control. Certainly, no discussion of the distribution of power and knowledge can ignore the hierarchical structure of colonial and post-colonial society. But the history of the relationship between the educated European élite and the subaltern

groups is in fact neither unilinear nor monolithic. Intellectual patterns and points of cultural intersection, as well as forms of identity and resistance, were a more mixed and multi-faceted process than Rama would lead us to believe. As Nancy M. Farriss, Rolena Adorno, and others have demonstrated for the colonial period, the boundaries between the élites and the subaltern are not always so clear. They are frequently characterized by a complexity of very dynamic appropriations, on both sides, that ought not be ignored.³

Nevertheless, Rama does emphasize the links between cultural and political hegemony, and from that point of view his categories are quite productive. He delineates the large-scale dominant features of the *ciudad letrada*. The focus of his essay is placed squarely on the social consequences of a very restricted literacy, clearing the way for a re-examination of intellectual discourses and practices. Drawing on Max Weber's theory of bureaucratization, and on Foucault, he refers to the impersonal order, with its own norms and regulations, which constitutes a group based on expertise and technical superiority. Thus the problem of *authority* manifested itself in both social and intellectual dimensions, and was from the start intertwined with more general cultural problems posed by social differentiation.

In this essay I would like to explore the role of the *letrados* in modern definitions of nationhood in the Hispanic-Caribbean: the élite culture of nationalism. More specifically, I will attempt to show through some examples how the intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s, in their search for foundations that would enable them to struggle against colonial domination, produced powerful national narratives. Nationalism has become one of the most significant sources of identity in modern society. Antonio S. Pedreira (1898-1939) and Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez (1880-1970), upon whose thought my discussion will be centred, contributed to a nationalist historiography that assumed an inherent unity for the past, and created meaning through social, racial and/or sexual exclusions. My specific concern is how the nation is repeatedly constructed in key texts belonging to a modern tradition located within the colonial context, and how political identity, as Joan W. Scott has put it, 'like social institutions and cultural symbols, is a form of knowledge production.'⁴ Moreover, I would like to discuss the problem of *beginnings* in the acute and penetrating – and, indeed problematical – sense in which Edward W. Said theorizes the term. Nationalist discourse implies the location of a *beginning* for the intellectual tradition which enables the *letrado* to write his text. Said writes: 'Very frequently, especially when the search for a beginning is pursued within a moral and imaginative framework, the beginning implies the end – or, rather, implicates it.'⁵ We will see, in rough outline

at least, that the search for national tradition has led many intellectuals to historical reconstructions in which they constitute themselves as morally free subjects capable of retaining the 'superior' values of Western rational thought.

II

Any discussion of these issues must begin by identifying how intellectuals claim for their own the literary and political practices which allow them to define the nation.⁶ The definition of the nation is linked to the power of writing and to the traditions defined by the *letrados*. It consists of a poetic and political practice that searches for both the symbolic and social sources of coherence. It is through an *imaginary* process that discourse can 'name' a national reality, construct a national subject, impose on it ideological and institutional limits, define its characteristics.⁷ The nation is conceived, defined and redefined, with the purpose of validating projects of transformation, or of resisting changes. Here, one of the main arguments of Partha Chatterjee, in a recent and important book on the subject, provides an essential insight: nationalist discourse is constituted in the historical process, borrowing from Western rationalism and struggling 'with an entire body of systematic knowledge, a struggle that is political at the same time as it is intellectual.' Chatterjee wishes to restore a dialectical tension to the conception of the nation and its constitution as a discourse of power. Nationalist discourse in the colonial context, he argues, is simultaneously a negation and an affirmation:

[The] politics [implicit in nationalist thinking] impels it to open up that framework of knowledge which presumes to dominate it, to displace that framework, to subvert its authority, to challenge its morality. Yet in its very constitution as a discourse of power, nationalist thought cannot remain only a negation; it is also a *positive* discourse which seeks to replace the structure of colonial power with a new order, that of national power.⁸

The 'story' of the nation is narrated and organized through the construction of an idea of unity, rupture, or continuity; heroes, mythological origins, images of kinship or family, and identities are programmatically defined. Very often, in the midst of all kinds of forces that are considered centrifugal, 'national' essences are defined in order to 'complete' the 'unfinished' or interrupted nation. This point of view requires lessening the sharp opposition between the 'historical' and the 'imaginary', as has been shown by, among others, Lionel Gossman in

his studies on French Romantic and liberal historiography – on Thierry and Michelet, for instance – or by Hayden White and Michel de Certeau.⁹ The allegory of the nation is put together according to narrative conventions, and in the midst of a struggle for meaning (the *ciudad letrada* is in no way homogeneous). The ‘facts’ have to be transformed into ‘story’, that is to say, into a plot that makes them intelligible to a group of readers who share a background of relatively unquestioned values, beliefs and commitments. Fictionalization adopts diverse forms, and as Michel de Certeau has observed, tends to hide its strategies and conventions:

In general, every story that relates what is happening or what has happened constitutes something real to the extent that it pretends to be the representation of a past reality. It takes on authority by passing itself off as the witness of that is or what has been. [...] It is always in the name of the ‘real’ that one produces and moves the faithful. Historiography acquires this power in so far as it presents and interprets the ‘facts’. [...] However, the ‘real’ as represented by historiography does not correspond to the ‘real’ that determines its production . . . Representation thus disguises the praxis that organizes it.¹⁰

III

Nationalist discourse and national narratives are particularly central to nineteenth-century Latin America and the Caribbean. Any consideration of this question in the twentieth century will profit from looking back at the period of emancipation and the wars of independence. The early nineteenth century marks the beginning of a ‘modern’ tradition. The *ciudad letrada*, which is not meant to be, as Rama recognizes, one fixed, stable category, was, during the nineteenth century, able to adapt and transform itself, all the while claiming the right to determine the use and meaning of words. The political significance of the role the *letrados* played in the symbolic and the social order was decisive: they disseminated emancipatory ideas, drafted bold liberal constitutions, and elaborated a discourse of difference relative to the former metropolis based on a polarized model of society: Americans versus Spaniards, ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Confronted with the ‘enemy’, as the potential for conflict became clearer and more threatening, ‘unity’ had to be forged: the great internal social and cultural differences were minimized. Paradigms of rupture with the Iberian past, the first liberal and modernizing projects, the rewriting of history, and the search for new ‘origins’ which made history and the future intelligible, were all elaborated by the *letrados*. The result

was a transfiguration of the past in light both of the present and of a desired future.

In Bolívar's texts, for example, an American subject is constructed within the framework of a narrative dominated by the dichotomy *civilization/barbarism*. Bolívar sought to transform America through a set of European values which did not include the Spanish legacy. His thinking is shaped by the notion of *difference*. A differentiating 'we' was founded on the values of reason and 'civilization', while Spain became the image of the 'other', occupying the pole of an anachronistic 'barbarism'. This is perhaps clearest in Bolívar's *Carta de Jamaica* of 1815 (*The Jamaica letter*), one of America's founding texts, in which ideological conflicts become open and acrimonious. Difference becomes a weapon, and radical discontinuities become more profound. In Bolívar's allegory of the nation, Spain becomes the 'denaturalized stepmother', a negative moment which must itself be overcome. At the same time, he claims that European 'civilization' would involve the inculcation of new needs, particularly the need to introduce Western technology as part of the civilizing process. The old idols had to be repudiated: 'the destiny of America has been irrevocably set; the bond that united it to Spain is cut . . . greater is the hatred that the Peninsula has inspired in us than the very sea that separates us.'¹¹ When defining the American subject, Bolívar refers explicitly to the European rights which empower and authorize his own voice:

[...] we are neither Indian nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the Spanish usurpers. In short, though Americans by birth, we derived our rights from Europe, and we have to assert these rights against the rights of the natives, and at the same time we must defend ourselves against the invaders.'¹²

José Martí, in the second half of the nineteenth century, under pressure from the Cuban revolutionary war of 1868 and marked by his experiences in prison and exile, affirms nationality by establishing differentiation. In one of his first definitive texts, *La República Española ante la Revolución Cubana* (1873) – *The Spanish Republic and the Cuban Revolution* – a text addressed to liberal republican Spaniards who had supported the colonial war – distance is marked by the implacable image of 'corpses', the central heroes of his account. The martyrs of Cuban independence become an image of profound discontinuity. The new nation, Cuba, is embodied in those corpses. Speaking as a republican, he appreciates the intellectual authority of a politico-philosophical community, and strains against it, since the universal values of republicanism have been discredited by the Spaniards. Where men are not

legally equal citizens, there are no real republican institutions.

Martí uses conceptual and narrative strategies, indirect discourse, and narrated monologue, which enables him to present the colonial 'crime', and to assume the voice of a mobile observer. In a striking passage he refers to a vast space that no dialectic can bridge: 'the chasm that divided Spain and Cuba has been filled, by the will of Spain, with corpses . . . The republic knows that a vast space of death separates it from the unfortunate island.'¹³ For Martí, otherness finds a radical expression in Spain itself, while, at the same time, he calls for the realization of Cuban unity, abolishing the internal contradictions of a slave society. National consciousness is consciousness of difference, embracing and subsuming all other narratives and events, creating new meanings and contributing to self-knowledge. Cubans and Spaniards are locked in an impossible encounter; a disenchantment and breaking-off mark the beginning of Martí's story. That is the legacy of colonialism:

Cubans do not live like Spaniards; the history of Cuba is not the history of Spain; Spain, through her own doing, has made what was once for her an unfading glory into profound misfortune. They are each sustained by commerce with different nations, they are each engaged in relations with different countries, and they each take pleasure in opposite customs. They have neither identical goals nor beloved memories to unite them.'¹⁴

IV

I want to situate Pedreira and Guerra within the framework of this nineteenth-century background of nationalist discourse.¹⁵ Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Cuba and Puerto Rico, despite their differences, offered noteworthy similarities. Both islands had entered a process of very accelerated modernization, but in the context of a new colonial dependency and of an economy dominated by sugar. Modernization modified existing social values, and was, at the same time, profoundly distorting. Poverty, illiteracy, and chronic underemployment during sugar's 'dead season' (*tiempo muerto*) were disproportionately concentrated in the rural sector. These conditions provided the context in which a militant nationalist and socialist culture took shape. It was a difficult time of political soul-searching and debate, reaching a qualitatively new stage of conscious self-affirmation.¹⁶ In the case of Cuba, after a long war of national independence, the island entered a powerful North American imperial universe which did not easily tolerate nationalism.¹⁷ During that contradictory modernization the

ciudad letrada of both countries continued transforming itself, looking for new legitimizing spaces, and most of all, redefining the nation, eagerly rewriting history and 'nationalizing' letters. This is most striking in the 'classic' texts and distinctive voices of Antonio S. Pedreira and Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez. Their works go beyond the limits of history, sociology or literary criticism, offering imaginative suggestions about culture, race, and society. Both emerged as major figures, their essays went through various editions and reprintings and became canonical textbooks.

The founding texts of the Puerto Ricans Antonio S. Pedreira *Insularismo* (1934), and Tomás Blanco, with his *Prontuario histórico de Puerto Rico* (1935) and *El prejuicio racial en Puerto Rico* (1937), have all contributed towards shaping the discourse of 'the Puerto Rican' and 'the Puerto Rican essence'.¹⁸ In them one finds a set of interpretive conventions, a reformulation of historical discourse, and a vision of 'origins'. From many points of view, Pedreira and Blanco could be compared with several Cuban intellectuals who around this same period were producing belligerent texts such as *Azúcar y población en las Antillas* by Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez (1927), *Indagación del choteo* by Jorge Mañach (1928), or *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar* by Fernando Ortiz (1940). Like Pedreira and Blanco, Mañach and Fernando Ortiz became well-known writers for their interpretations of social and cultural history, particularly as interpreters of the climactic event of 1898 and the drastic historical transformations that occurred in the islands after the United States intervention. Their main concerns focused on the definition of 'culture', the building of a literary tradition, issues of poverty and social injustice, the debate on racial and national categories, and the destruction wrought upon the islands by colonialism and the schemes of the sugar corporations.¹⁹

'One must not think that we are fully formed. Not enough time has elapsed for us to create our collective personality,' proclaims Antonio S. Pedreira to his ideal readers, identified in the text as the Puerto Rican *juventud letrada* – the 'lettered youth'. In the context of intense political debates generated by the struggles against North American sugar monopolies, Pedreira formulates in his essay *Insularismo* (1934) definitions which express the need to 'complete' the fragmented nation. Blocked and distorted by political events, it was a nation 'unfinished' due to the changes brought about by the United States' hegemony since 1898. Readers of *Insularismo* experienced an exciting sense of discovery, as the ample commentary on it testifies. It generated readings and texts that accepted the general organizing metaphors and paradigms offered in the text. *Insularismo* proposed a way out of a debased insularity and debilitating isolation.²⁰

For Pedreira, interpretation was required in order to find a profound meaning different from the meaning that history appears to have. There is a hidden truth, very similar to the revelation of a text's deep meaning, which may be recovered. But the authorized narrator must have a pre-understanding of the whole and the parts. 'I keep looking intuitively,' he affirms, 'for the hidden meaning of the facts that characterize the trajectory taken by our people's life . . . My aim,' he writes, underlining the metaphors of depth and concealment, 'is to point out the disperse elements that can give meaning to our personality', and 'to define a group of beings that has still not been able to delineate adequately its collective life.'²¹

Obviously, Pedreira, like Mañach, here draws strength from, and appropriates notions expressed by, Ortega y Gasset and Spengler. He proposes a defence of a certain 'select few' and the 'reconstruction' of the country against the empire of the sugar corporations. 'Sugar cane at once annihilates us and gives us life,' he writes. 'Corporations at once exploit us and feed the worker; absenteeism carries off our wealth and the country has no capital to take its place.'²² Control of the land is a central issue for Pedreira, and he dedicates many pages to it. He emphasizes the need to defend the Creole landowners 'who from day to day surrender their country estates, overwhelmed by the economic restrictions of corporations.' The programmatic emphasis of his criticism is clear in the introductory pages: 'The bitterness that this essay might exude is saturated with hopes of renewal.' Great historical narratives are modern in so far as they make a strong statement for new beginnings, as Agnes Heller has reminded us.²³ The tone in which Pedreira's story is told is reminiscent at times, of course, of Rodó's *Ariel*, and the truth which the narrative claims for itself is explicitly prospective.²⁴

What form does Pedreira's national history take? He establishes a chronological frame which allows for the formulation of a historical 'destiny', and a space of legitimation for his heroes. His language is deliberately metaphorical: it is a matter of Puerto Rico's 'awakening' to history, of origins, which later are represented symbolically as an 'infancy'. Infancy will be a persistent paradigm in his version of history, essential to the text's coherence and intelligibility, and to his view that 'the people', childlike and dependent, can be educated.²⁵ The possibility of knowing something about history as an ordered whole rests precisely on this sort of periodization:

. . . the first three centuries of history constitute our period of latency. From the lap of the discovering nation, we opened our eyes to the world for the first time. Then we began to crawl

and get knocked about; with the beginning of the nineteenth century, we took, with marked difficulty, our first steps in the field of culture.²⁶

On the other hand, the paradigm *ascension-fall*, recurrent in the text, permits him to weave his account, and compose the 'plot' of the entire book, discovering the thread which guides it. The ascending movement of Puerto Rico's 'personality' remained 'half finished', interrupted in the year 1898. In a typical statement, he exalts the nineteenth century as a progressive period in which liberal nationality affirmed itself, marking the beginning of a political will, when 'we began to work . . . manifesting our spiritual differentiation . . . when we succeeded in taking into our own hands the reins of our collective destiny, the Spanish-American war spoiled the attempt, leaving us half finished and at a disadvantage.'²⁷

Three 'moments' impart meaning to the history narrated by Pedreira. They establish the bases for a project of reconstruction, for escaping the 'period of transition', and for the dispersion which is the 'crisis' of the present. He needs to reconcile the present 'disorder' with a project for the future. History is an attempt to institute order in a society whose realized form of life has been checked and frustrated by a new imperial culture and power, an invasion from without. Pedreira's interpretive canon appears in the first pages, incorporating the notion of discontinuity and implying the essential final and completing possibility. History will be brought together through the mediation of a privileged consciousness, capable of articulating the *telos* of the nation:

I see three supreme moments in the development of our people: the first, a moment of formation and passive accumulation, beginning with the discovery and the conquest and ending with the last years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth; the second, a moment of awakening and a beginning, linking up with the earlier one and closing with the Spanish-American war, and the third, a moment of indecision and transition, the very one in which we find ourselves. So, then, in the first moment we were nothing more than a faithful prolongation of Hispanic culture; in the second we began to discover an independent stance within that culture, and in the third we have tried to continue its development, though it has been modified: Western culture (the Anglo-Saxon) has been superimposed on our growth. I am not interested, for now, in discussing the result of this last graft, but rather in pointing out the discontinuity of our

personal evolution, which was not able to come to fruition. We experienced a birth and a growth, but not a renaissance.²⁸

That 'chronology' allows him to tell the 'story' of the land, of letters and of political life, always underlining the paradigm of *ascension-fall*, on occasion tinged with a nostalgia for a lost paradise. *Insularismo* may be considered one of the most eloquent statements of the longing for a political class, the *criollos liberales* of the nineteenth century, but also of the longing for the restoration of the small landowner living in individual farming units. This is what occurs, for example, in the important section that he dedicated to the 'land and its meaning'. There, he addresses the problem of the land squeeze created by the engulfment perpetrated by the sugar corporations. He continually contrasts an ideal past of small landowners with the present large sugar refineries. Once again, the 'three moments' appear. They cover the 'origins' and the 'decadence', and culminate in the destruction of 'small-scale farming', in order to make way for the 'corporations' superlative exploitation'. The large landed estate—the *latifundio*—is the fall. The beginnings of a social order were forced into disarray:

It is curious to note that the economic aspect of the land clearly varies according to the three moments in which we divided the course of our history. In the first, slow and unitary, the *repartimientos* and the *encomiendas* formed a vast rural estate, half cultivated, with a considerable inactive margin of forests, pastures, marshes and untillable lands. In the second, restless and decisive, the land is fragmented in very abundant parcels, the result of which is a higher yield from the land with small farms providing for the greater part of our diet. And in the third, undefined and problematic, the land is deprived of its small owners, and ignoring the law limiting possession to 500 acres, it returns to a larger division of the land, though this time under the super-exploitation of the absentee corporations, which, because of their will to monopolize, are responsible, among other things, for the dietetic slavery in which our people live today.²⁹

Parallel to this, Pedreira frames his narrative with racial categories conceived in binary terms and stated without embarrassment. He affirms the weakness of the 'inferior race', that is, of Puerto Rico's African heritage, while the Europeans and their descendants, in striking contrast, are associated with reason and civilization. They are the rational masters of their own destiny. Although Pedreira avoids dealing with slavery as an issue, he speaks of a 'biological civil war', of races

whose 'substance and dispositions are clashing', and maintains that 'two antagonistic races of difficult conjugation and different cultures are fighting in the *mestizo*'. Within him, two races coexist: 'one being the superior and the other the inferior'. One, it could be said, constitutes the deconstruction of the other. In Hegelian terms, he recognizes in the *mestizo* the dialectics of the master and the slave. Between both races, he adds, one finds 'the distance that separates the free man from the slave, the civilized man from the barbarian, the European from the African'.³⁰ This racial ideology always corresponds to the dichotomy *civilization-barbarism*, which can also be read as two radically antithetical spheres, body and spirit, innocence and corruption, will and inclination.

The dichotomy *civilization-barbarism* will have, according to Pedreira, decisive consequences for Puerto Rican nationality and history. From his perspective, it posed a potential threat that could only destroy the fabric of the virtues of enlightened society. The role of the critic is to expose all the moral disfigurements and false appearances created by this threat. In his allegory of national identity, not everything deserves to be 'integrated' and not everyone is entitled to citizenship: the 'inferior race' is a 'disintegrating' force, it only creates resentment, and is permeated by 'otherness'. 'Heroism', that is, courage and manliness, comes from 'European blood', from the representatives of reason and order in the midst of chaos, the agents of intellectual and moral reform. 'Indecision' comes from 'African blood', which his writing never ceases to deprecate. The 'African' is a grotesque figure, embodying incompleteness and indefinability. The descendants of Africans are not capable of intellectual or spiritual expression. Again, this is represented in terms of the coexistence of the slave and the master:

At the root of our population, we will find without great effort a biological war of disintegrating and contrary forces that have slowed down the definitive formation of our ways as a people. The owner and farm-labourer who live in us do not succeed in smoothing things over and we bring together our status as owners with the sad situation of being perpetual tenants. The firmness and will of the European coexist with the doubt and resentment of the African. And in the most crucial moments our decisions vacillate in a non-stop coming and going, looking for somewhere to settle. Our rebellions are momentary; our docility permanent. In instances of historical transcendence, when the martial rhythms of European blood flower in our gestures, we are capable of the greatest undertakings and most courageous heroism. But when the gesture comes soaked in

waves of African blood, we remain indecisive, as if dumb-founded before coloured beads or intimidated by the cinematic vision of witches and ghosts.³¹

'The plebeian', he comments in the section significantly entitled 'Intermezzo: A Ship Adrift', 'has felt satisfied upon seeing his values rise at the expense of the decline of learned men'. Those obscured by necessity will inexorably diminish the role of the educated élite: 'Democracy, today in crisis in the greater part of the world, has established norms which benefit the inept while denying its favors to the intelligent.'³² In *Insularismo*, Pedreira establishes the identity and legitimacy of the *letrados*, the 'best and the brightest' who are the main protagonists of his history, and who – here we hear the echo of Ortega – now feel threatened by the 'inept' and their nihilistic destruction of all standards and moral values. 'If we do not improve ourselves culturally,' he says, 'we will be condemned to the sad condition of farm hands.' He dedicates a complete section to recounting the literary history, to 'organizing it', and to presenting a defence of 'national' literatures. His heroes are the representative men, the liberal autonomists and abolitionists of the nineteenth century, whom he proposes as models to be emulated, even though they had a rather brief flowering. They are representative of the needs, interests, and aspirations of an elite capable of assuming a leading role through negotiation and discourse, and whose ideals could be fulfilled by persuasion rather than force: 'When I ask myself about patriotic integrity, I rank Baldorioty in first place; when I look for a genius, I find him in Ruiz Belvis or in Betances; a philosophical mind: in Matienzo or López Landrón; a journalist: Brau or Muñoz Rivera.'³³

Next to these men, women, according to the sexual division of labour which Pedreira proposes, 'should be concerned with becoming the true housewives we need here'. 'The fragile reactions of feminine psychology' are for him a 'problem' in the educational field. Women are out of their proper place, and Pedreira fears their influence in the public sphere. According to him, they control education but lack both emotional depth and intellectual rigour. It is preferable, he claims, that 'men shape or mould the character of the pupil', on account of their 'particular manner of encountering life, or running into it, and facing up to things'.³⁴ Little more is said about the rest of the 'people', except for reiterations of their infantilism and docility: it is necessary to 'educate them'.

Pedreira grounds his authority in the mediating function of the enlightened heir: his order is paternalistic, but at the service of scientific and technological development in the public political sphere. His

negative, critical assessment was destined to contribute to the establishment of a new space for political and intellectual leadership.

V

The system of ideas and representations concerning a *positive* nationalist discourse runs throughout Cuban intellectual production of these years. The historian Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez incribes himself at the centre of the space occupied by the Cuban *ciudad letrada*; from the historiographical perspective he will renew the patriarchal truths. The nucleus of his discourse of identity is the definition of origins, which in his case will be, fundamentally, the exaltation of the *patricios* – the rural landowners – as a national historical subject. Like Pedreira, he writes *against* the sugar corporations. His essay *Azúcar y población en las Antillas* (1927) launches a manifesto against the sugar *latifundium*, a system of land exploitation in which the best land was owned on a large scale by foreigners. According to Guerra, this was an exterior element which deformed Cuban life, and even worse, undermined nationality with the introduction into Cuba of the *braceros*, the Haitian and Jamaican contract labourers. 'We must fight against the *latifundium*,' he proclaims, 'we must assemble and organize against it all the defensive forces which the Cuban community disposes of.' In Cuba, Guerra writes, 'within a quarter of a century either the *latifundium* or the republic will no longer exist. The Cuban people will have land and independence, or they will have lost them both.' Capitalist modernity based on the sugar economy is the product of imperialism, and threatens to destroy the Hispano-Creole foundations of the nation. 'We must return to the land and affirm ourselves there or perish,' he proclaims. The mythological figure of Antaeus imparts a special dimension to his proposal: 'Each time Antaeus' body touched his divine mother, the earth, she gave him back his force and revived him. In the fight against the *latifundium* the Cuban people play the role of Antaeus.'³³ In Guerra's historical interpretations there is a persistent 'sacralization' of the land, and a constant celebration of the Creole landowners, the privileged protagonists of the narrative he is constructing. He can sketch, simultaneously, the outlines of an intellectual history and a history of the land. The Creoles brought letters and modernity, reforms and white immigration. They brought into existence a new public world:

... landowners were, as a rule, those who worked with great tenacity in the *Sociedad Económica* and in the *Junta de Fomento*; landowners were the ones who made it possible for Padre Varela and Saco to begin in Cuba the teaching of

physics and chemistry in response to the needs of the sugar industry; landowners were the ones who brought the chemist Casaseca and the ones who founded our first botanical garden and our first school of agriculture; it was the landowners who in addition to introducing steam engines in the sugar mill, organized, as we have said, our first public service railway companies, and it was also the landowners, finally, who besides procuring and sponsoring all the economic, social, and political reforms introduced in Cuba in the first decades of the century, advocated energetically white immigration and colonization ...³⁶

His essay begins with an observation that very quickly becomes a programmatic interpretive line: 'all the Caribbean islands which remained under Spain's power up to the nineteenth century constituted communities in which the white population predominated, while those colonized by other European nations are almost exclusively inhabited by persons of the black race.'³⁷ This statement immediately takes on a special value associated with civilization and progress: 'Only Spain is seen forming colonies of a social and economically superior organization, summoned to be set up as independent and progressive nations, in all the lands bathed by the Caribbean.' It is no less significant that for Guerra the importation of labourers from the English-speaking Caribbean and Haiti was an unpleasant and disturbing process which threatened to put a halt to the development of civilization and nationality. The presence of *braceros* fuelled a growing sense that Cubans were in danger of being outnumbered by black workers. Open discrimination is prohibited in Guerra's text, but the reader can frequently sense that he was bitterly hostile to *braceros*: 'Either Cuba aspires to continue being a learned and progressive nation, or it resigns itself to its future as a colony of plantations, renouncing its history, its present, and its ideals. Either Barbados or Canada.'

The search for a *beginning* is made more urgent, precisely because Cuban nationhood is perceived as endangered. The uniqueness and integrity of Cuba can be traced to its Spanish and Creole *beginnings*, prior to the plantation system and the *latifundium*. Sidney Mintz summarizes Guerra's narrative: 'Cuba as a Spanish colony had more nationhood than the colonies of the other European powers', thanks to the late development of the slave plantation.³⁸ These *beginnings* enable the Cubans to struggle against the subversive character of the *latifundium*. For Guerra, nationality merges with property, and specifically with small landowners who went about establishing themselves during the first centuries of the Spanish colony. It is a

nationalism based on a specific territory and its unique Spanish heritage. The following passage is worth quoting in full:

Cuban land originally was allotted, divided, and cultivated by the first Spanish settlers and their descendants. A thriving community was gradually established, one whose members were deeply attached to the soil they tilled and were better adapted than any Europeans to the natural and social environment. Mainly rural folk and landowners, they believed in their national identity and fought first for Spain and later for political independence until they became a sovereign state. Cuba existed as a nation from the time the native-born colonists, who far outnumbered the peninsular Spanish residents, divided up and took possession of the island territory and fashioned for themselves an economic life, based on their agricultural activities, distinct from that in Spain. Economic independence was the essential precondition of spiritual and political independence.

The latifundium system is reversing this process. It consolidates thousands of small farms into immense agrarian units; it uproots the farmer from his land; it destroys the rural landowning and independent farming class, backbone of the nation; and finally, it puts an end to national economic independence by converting the society into a mere dependency, a satellite, a workshop, at the service of some foreign power. It reverses the lengthy process which shaped Cuban society and polity and undermines, subverts, and obliterates its national identity.³⁹

Guerra's narration is organized around a genealogical axis and the consecration of the land. Women are absent or invisible. Guerra elaborates his discourse on the basis of difference, but now it is the difference of a white and civilized Cuba in opposition to other Caribbean countries: Barbados and Haiti, he writes, 'were two horrible dungeons: Cuba was the nucleus of a community summoned to the highest calling in the centre of the Atlantic coasts'. He claims that history is the struggle for the possession of land and for civilization's values.

History prior to the *latifundium* is the work of illustrious *patricios*, the rural landowners, who moved in the domain of high culture, an enlightened and heroic circle, the defenders of autonomy and progress, whose genealogy he traces. The devotion to the family was extolled and given national overtones. The continuity of the family became a symbol of the continuity of the nation. They are certainly the most powerful component of national tradition:

... Cuban agrarian society was firmly established, and Cuba could count on thousands of solidly united families, attached to their own soil and personally directing its cultivation – a generally prosperous people, anxious for progress, for political autonomy, and for the opportunity to serve their country.

From the class of rural landowners came the Aguilera, Céspedes, Maceo Osorio, Figueredo, Cisneros Betancourt, Aldama, Morales Lemus, Frías, Mazorra, Alfonso, Agramonte, Echeverría, Iznaga, and other families in that long series of distinguished citizens who have shaped Cuba economically, socially, and politically. They were a hard-working, enterprising people who were widely traveled and who sent their children to school in France and England. In the Economic Society, the Agricultural, Industrial, and Commercial Consulates, the Development Board, the Information Board, during the Yara Revolution, and in the Autonomist Party, they made memorable efforts to guarantee that Cuba should have the social and governmental institutions and the public liberties that are the crowning achievement of any group effort toward progress and civilization.⁴⁰

The narrator places himself explicitly within this tradition, hoping to be himself remembered. The same passionate defence of patrician origins is made in his chronicle *Mudos testigos* (1948) an autobiographical text of capital importance in which family and ideological continuity are emblemized in the founding *trees* which are the 'witnesses', and in the spaces previously occupied by the owners of coffee plantations whose family history is also a founding model of Cuban nationality.⁴¹

The *trees* provide a powerful conceptual metaphor for modelling the relation of the family members to their 'roots' in the land. They are 'family trees' and serve to establish a link between noble lineage and cultural leadership: it is a hereditary prerogative. In the introduction to the book, Guerra opposes 'social history' to 'economic history', and offers a defence of the imagination: 'The incentive of social history, like that of all true historical endeavour, belongs essentially to the imagination'. In *Mudos testigos* there is a utopia projected into the past; the rural landowners bring together those national quintessential qualities that become the realm of hope: an original and pure Cuba, patriarchal, celebrated by the author as the source of his own authority. From the vantage point of the *trees*, the observer can follow the paths of people over the terrain, the details of the historical landscape and the key to understanding how one group acquires authority or achieves hegemony.

In this text the nation is conceived, in a manner similar to Pedreira, from the perspective of the inheritor: the role of the historian is to act as repository of the élite's collective memory and historical rights. Guerra records assiduously a collection of deeds, agreements and testaments that refer to the land. This sacred space was the place of the ancestors, a tradition supported by legal documents. The roots in the land provided a powerful identity. The testaments take up a good part of the book, and function also as a legitimating metaphor, the *genealogical tree*, the sacred emblem of origins and continuity. The appeal of this emblem was both simple and compelling:

After Valdés disappeared, the surviving silent witnesses would attest to the creation brought about by them, would contemplate new and different things and be a spiritual and material link between the dead past and the times to come, full of life, but also of difficulties, problems, and struggles. These silent witnesses were the tradition of a constructive effort, materialized in the tree of life which gives shade and fruit, and offers refuge to the birds, branches for their nests ... Generations pass, but the nourishing land and the sun, a fountain of energy, remain.⁴²

VI

In order to undo the forgetting, both Pedreira and Guerra felt the need to uncover the origins, and they wrote with passion and eloquence about its orientation and finality. *Culture*, and especially *national culture*, became a political reality. Their new emphasis on difference and on drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion was a literary and historical strategy against the colonial state. In *Insularismo* and *Azúcar y población en las Antillas*, Pedreira and Guerra created their own *beginnings*, the historical space and time in which the memory of the liberal *letrados* – an earlier, more fortunately located generation – would be secure for a time. Certainly, the socio-economic and cultural changes to which they were exposed were sweeping ones. Their nationalistic understanding of historical culture belongs to their battle to regain power and authority.

In their narratives, the lack of a 'complete' nation is caused mainly by the presence of 'others' who weaken and check the development of very real and enlightened foundations. However, the emptiness of the present is only provisional: there is hope for renewal and political action, provided that intellectuals are willing to lead and, themselves, make progress as they struggle to control the 'revolt of the masses', to use Ortega's disdainful notion. Ultimately, the basis for their

optimism rested on the assumption that the historical process had an immanent *telos* which gradually would unfold from the past. The as yet undefined nature of the final shape of the nation encouraged both Pedreira and Guerra to give full rein to their imagination. There was no disagreement about the need for cultural innovation, but they wanted to define very clearly the nature and foundation of this activity.

In the production of nationalist discourse, as Chatterjee has put it, 'elitism becomes inescapable . . . because the act of cultural synthesis can, in fact, be performed only by a supremely cultivated and refined intellect. It is a project of national-cultural regeneration in which the intelligentsia leads and the nation follows.'⁴³ Let us recall the important statement by Bolívar alluded to at the beginning of this essay: 'though Americans by birth, we derive our rights from Europe.' The political character of nationalist discourse is evident, but this politics is based on the autonomy of will and the consciousness of an intellectual tradition, and on the virtues of enlightened small landowners. The very passion of Pedreira and Guerra's confidence comes from an enlightened conception of Man, in its progressive transformation of nature, and rests largely, perhaps paradoxically, on the 'superiority' of Western civilization and its tradition of exclusions. Their loyalty to Spain and to the Hispanic beginnings was in a way based on their belief that they could indeed surpass their models and create a new image for their countries, one which would also serve to transform them into modern nations.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues Gervasio García, Juan Gelpí, Angel Quintero-Rivera and María Elena Rodríguez Castro, with whom I have discussed frequently the issues raised here. Rolena Adorno, Robert Conn, Pedro García, Jorge Klor de Alva and Karl D. Uitti kindly read a very tentative draft, and offered valuable assistance.

Notes

- 1 I quote from Bolívar's *Carta de Jamaica* (the *Jamaica Letter*) of 1815: '... we are, moreover, neither Indian nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the Spanish usurpers. In short, though Americans by birth we derive our rights from Europe, and we have to assert these rights against the rights of the natives, and at the same time we must defend ourselves against the invaders.' Trans. Lewis Bertrand, in Harold A. Bierck (ed.) *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, I

(New York, the Colonial Press, 1951), p.110. I will refer to this translation below.

- 2 This question has been refined and mapped by Rama in his book, *La Ciudad Letrada* (Hanover, Ediciones del Norte, 1984). In order to appreciate the significance of the quoted phrase, see p.46. For related essays, see Rama's *La Crítica de la Cultura en América Latina*, ed. by Saúl Sosnowski and Tomás Eloy Martínez (Caracas, Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1985). See also José Luis Romero, *Latinoamérica: las ciudades y las ideas* (México, Siglo XXI, 1976). I am also indebted to Carlos Altamirano and Beatriz Sarlo's *Literature/Sociedad* (Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1983), particularly the essays 'Del campo intelectual y las instituciones literarias', pp. 83-100, and 'De la historia literaria en la perspectiva sociológica', pp. 119-161. For a complex and very suggestive account of intellectuals and power, see Paul A. Bové, *Intellectuals in Power: a genealogy of critical humanism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986).
- 3 See in particular Nancy M. Farriss, *Maya Society under Colonial Rule: the collective enterprise of survival* (Princeton, Princetown University Press, 1984); and Rolena Adorno, *Guaman Poma: Writing and Resistance in Colonial Peru* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1986). Both are major treatments of the subject, with powerful and convincing arguments. See also Adorno's 'La ciudad letrada y los discursos coloniales', *Hispanamérica*, año 16, núm. 48 (1987): pp.3-24. For the concept of 'subaltern', see the very rich discussion in the volume edited by Rajanit Guha and Gayatri S. Spivak, *Selected Subaltern Studies* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988). In addition, by G.S. Spivak, various essays *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York, Routledge, 1988).
- 4 In Joan W. Scott's remarkable book, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1988) p.6.
- 5 Edward S. Said, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1985) p.41. Said's wide-ranging studies are all relevant to these questions; particularly, his extremely suggestive critical study of Western knowledge about the exotic and the intellectual tradition which 'invented' the 'Orient', *Orientalism* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1978).
- 6 I deliberately use the terms '*letrados*' and 'intellectuals' to draw a distinction. The problem is a historical one. I use '*letrados*', following Rama's definition, to refer to an older cultural tradition, in opposition to oral subaltern cultures. It should be clear that what I am concerned with here is precisely the transformation of *letrados* into modern intellectuals with new institutions and practices. However, as the examples of Pedreira and Guerra show, this process was very unstable and precarious. Modern intellectuals in the Caribbean often retain many of the characteristics and functions of the old *letrados*. They are simultaneously archaic and very modern.
- 7 I use the term 'imaginary' in the sense given to it by Cornelius Castoriadis in *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987). See especially chapters 3 'The Institution and the Imaginary' and 4, 'The Social-Historical', pp.115-220. Castoriadis writes: 'History is impossible and inconceivable outside of the *productive* or *creative imagination*, outside of what we have called the *radical imagination* as this is manifested indissolubly in both historical *doing* and in the constitution, before any explicit rationality, of a universe of *significations*'.

- (p.146). On the concept of 'intellectual traditions', see Edward Shils, 'Intellectuals, Tradition, and the Traditions of Intellectuals: some preliminary considerations', in S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard (eds.), *Intellectuals and Tradition*, I, (New York, 1973), pp.21-34.
- 8 Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a derivative discourse?* (London, The United Nations University, 1986), p.42. The renewed interest in the study of nationalism is amply proven by recent publications: see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, Verso, 1983) and Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). A very useful collection of essays dealing with nationalist narratives, in Homi K. Bhabha (ed.) *Nation and Narration* (London and New York, Routledge, 1990), notably the essays by Timothy Brennan, 'The National Longing for Form', Doris Sommer, 'Irresistible Romance: The Foundational Fictions of Latin America', and Homi K. Bhabha, 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation'. See also, as an example of a growing Latin American rethinking of the same problem, Oscar Terán, *En Busca de la Ideología Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Catálogos Editora, 1986).
 - 9 For problems dealing with the relationship between history and literature as well as French Romantic historiography, see especially Lionel Gossman, *Between History and Literature* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1990). Hayden White's *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) is already considered a classic for the study of the poetics of history. A useful analysis of the debate in Suzanne Gearhart, *The Open Boundary of History and Fiction* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986). See also Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
 - 10 He adds: 'The historiographical discourse itself, occults the social and technical apparatus of the professional institution that produces it.' See de Certeau *Heterologies*, p.203. Later on, he writes: 'We must recognize today that the conflict between discourse and power hangs over historiography itself and at the same time remains an integral part of it,' p.215. For historiography and history-writing in general, see his book *L'Écriture de l'histoire* (Paris, Gallimard, 1975).
 - 11 Simón Bolívar, *Carta de Jamaica* (1815). This text has been frequently included in anthologies of Bolívar. I have been using the text included in *Pensamiento político de la emancipación*, II, edited by José Luis Romero and Luis Alberto Romero (Caracas, Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1977), pp.83-99. An English translation has been made by Lewis Bertrand, in *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, I, *op.cit.* (1951), pp.103-125.
 - 12 The *Jamaica Letter*, p.110.
 - 13 José Martí, *La República Española ante la Revolución Cubana*. I quote from the critical edition published by the Centro de Estudios Marianos, *Obras completas*, I (La Habana, 1983), pp.103-113. A significant new reading of politics and literature in the nineteenth century, and specifically on Martí, is to be found in Julio Ramos, *Desencuentros de la Modernidad en América Latina: literatura y política en el siglo XIX* (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989).
 - 14 *Ibid.*, p.109. The essays and poetry of the Cuban writer Cintio Vitier

provide good examples of the rewritings of nationalist discourse inspired by Martí. See for example his *Temas Martianos*, with Fina García Marruz (La Habana, Biblioteca nacional José Martí, 1969). I have discussed this tradition in *Cintio Vitier: la memoria integradora* (San Juan, Editorial Sin Nombre, 1987).

- 15 I will not attempt here an intellectual biography of either Pedreira or Guerra; however, it is important to emphasize that both were located at universities and were trained in academic institutions. Pedreira studied at the Universidad de Puerto Rico in the early 1920s. Later on, he did graduate work at Columbia University in New York (1925-7) in the Department of Hispanic Studies. Upon his return to Puerto Rico, he was appointed chairman of the recently created *Departamento de Estudios Hispánicos* at the University. He was one of the founders of the journal *Índice* (1929-31), and in 1931 travelled to Spain to complete his doctoral studies. The intellectual climate of the Spanish Republic exerted a great influence on Pedreira. For more information, see Cándida Maldonado de Ortiz, *Antonio S. Pedreira: vida y obra* (Barcelona, Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1974).

Ramiro Guerra was an active participant in Cuban political life. He worked as a public school teacher in Cuba and was selected to follow a special course for Cuban teachers at Harvard University at the beginning of the century. He devoted a great deal of his life to the organization and supervision of the public school system in Cuba and wrote a number of textbooks for the schools. Later, in 1927, he became a professor at the Universidad de La Habana. In 1932, during the government of Machado, he acted as Secretary of the Presidency. In 1935 he was designated consultant for the National Association of Hacendados and relocated to Washington DC. Back in Cuba, he was appointed editor of *Diario de la Marina* (1943-6) and was one of the collaborators and editors of *Historia de la Nación Cubana*, published in ten volumes (1952). For bibliography and more information, see *Diccionario de la Literatura Cubana*, I, (La Habana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1980), pp.397-400.

- 16 Recent publications on the period and the debates include Angel Quintero Rivera, *Patricios y Plebeyos: burgueses, hacendados, artesanos y obreros* (Río Pieras, Ediciones Huracán, 1988), with important essays on the ideological and social contradictions of this moment. See José Luis González, *El País de Cuatro Pisos* (San Juan, Ediciones Huracán, 1980), and also the essays edited by Gerardo Navas Dávila, *Cambio y Desarrollo en Puerto Rico: la transformación ideológica del Partido Popular Democrático* (Río Piedras, Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1985). See the volume *Puerto Rico: identidad nacional y clases sociales (Coloquio de Princeton)* (Río Piedras, Ediciones Huracán, 1979), with essays by Quintero, González, Ricardo Campos, and Juan Flores.
- 17 One of the best recent contributions to the understanding of this period is Louis Pérez, *Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986). In *Historiography in the Revolution: A Bibliography of Cuban Scholarship, 1959-1979* (New York, Garland Publishing, 1982), Pérez writes: 'Very early, republican historiography was placed at the service of a national ideal . . . This mission, in turn, conferred on Cuban historiography a distinctive redemptive purpose.' (p.xii).
- 18 The intensely politicized debate central to these essays, as well as the

definition of liberal high culture, has been discussed in Juan Flores, *Insularismo e Ideología Burguesa* (Río Piedras, Ediciones Huracán, 1979); and in María Elena Rodríguez Castro, 'Tradición y modernidad: el intelectual puertorriqueño ante la década del treinta,' (*op. cit.*) *Boletín del Centro de Investigaciones Históricas de la Universidad de Puerto Rico* 3 (1987-8): pp.45-65. I have tried to deal with some of the issues raised by these texts in previous articles: Recordando el Futuro Imaginario: la escritura historia en la década del treinta, *Sin Nombre* 14.3 (1984): pp.16-35 and Tomás Blanco: la Reinención de la Tradición, (*op. cit.*), *Boletín del Centro de Investigaciones Históricas* 4 (1988-9): pp.147-182. Also in 'Tomás Blanco: racismo, historia, esclavitud', introduction to an edition of his *El Prejuicio Racial en Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras, Ediciones Huracán, 1985), pp.15-91.

- 19 I do not have the space here to spell out these issues or to discuss the bibliography. Among the best of recent reinterpretations of Cuban and Caribbean intellectual and political traditions is Antonio Benítez Rojo, *La isla que se repite: el Caribe y la perspectiva posmoderna* (Hanover, Ediciones del Norte, 1990); and Gustavo Pérez Firmat, *The Cuban Condition: Translation and Identity in Modern Cuban Literature* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 20 The word *insularismo* provided Pedreira and his readers with many connotations, both positive and negative. It is interesting to note that Pedreira's perspective of insularity in the parochial sense emerges after his trips to the United States and to Spain. His essay is a vivid expression of the need to become fully modern and to be closer to the historical centres of the world. He writes as both an insider and an outsider.
- 21 I am quoting and translating from the first edition of *Insularismo: ensayos de interpretación puertorriqueña* (Madrid: Tipografía Artística, 1934), p.10. I shall quote from this edition in the discussion that follows.
- 22 In the section entitled *Tablero de ajedrez* (Chessboard), p.138.
- 23 Agnes Heller, *Can Modernity Survive?* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990), p.170.
- 24 Limitations of space here preclude tracing the importance of Rodó, Mañach, Pedro Henríquez-Ureña or the Spanish writers of the 'Generation of 1898' in Pedreira. See a very useful essay by Robert González Eschevarría, 'The Case of the Speaking Statue: *Ariel* and the magisterial rhetoric of the Latin American essay', in *The Voice of the Masters: writing and authority in modern Latin American literature* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985), pp.8-32. Also Martin S. Stabb's excellent book, *In Quest of Identity: patterns in the Spanish American essay of ideas, 1890-1960* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967). For discussions on *hispanismo* and the reaffirmation of the prestige of Spanish culture after 1898 see Fredrick B. Pike, *Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish conservatives and liberals and their relations with Spanish America* (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1971); and Carlos Rama, *Historia de las Relaciones Culturales entre España y la América Latina* (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982). A recent and important account of the political and cultural relationship between Spain and Latin America after independence is in Tulio Halperín Donghi, 'España e Hispanoamérica: miradas a través del Atlántico', in *El Espejo de la Historia: Problemas Argentinos y Perspectivas Latinoamericanas* (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana,

- 1987) pp.67-110.
- 25 There is, of course, a long tradition of representing 'the people' as inarticulate, particularly in Romantic historiography. Lionel Gossman, discussing Michelet, writes: 'Michelet, it should be emphasized, never doubted that the people had to be led or that its books had to be written *for* it. Like nature, or woman, or the past, in other words, the people was inarticulate, *infans*, and could attain self-awareness and self-expression only through the mediation of one who was both of it and beyond it, like Michelet himself.' In his 'Michelet and Romantic Historiography', now in *Between History and Literature*, (*op.cit.*) p.188.
- 26 *Insularismo*, p.175.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p.99.
- 28 *Ibid.*, pp.14-15.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp.49-50.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p.22.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p.29. For a discussion of racial ideologies in the Spanish American essay in the context of the positivist tradition, see Martin S. Stabb, *In Quest of Identity*, *op.cit.* especially Chapters 2, 'The Sick Continent and its Diagnosticians', and 3, 'The Revolt Against Scientism', pp.13-57. See also the excellent essay by Charles A. Hale, 'Political and Social Ideas', in Leslie Bethell (ed.) *Latin America: Economy and Society, 1870-1930*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp.225-99.
- 32 *Ibid.*, pp.106-7.
- 33 *Ibid.*, pp.36-7.
- 34 *Ibid.*, see the relevant passages on pp.132-7. It would be interesting to pursue further the place of women in Pedreira's discourse, especially the association of women with mass culture, while the 'authentic' culture remains the prerogative of men. See Andreas Huyssen, 'Mass Culture as Woman: modernism's other', in *After the Great Divide* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1986) pp.44-62.
- 35 *Azúcar y población*, p.43.
- 36 The first edition was published in Cuba (La Habana, Cultural S.A., 1927). This essay has been translated by Marjory M. Urquidí as *Sugar and Society in the Caribbean: an economic history of Cuban agriculture*, with an introduction by Sidney W. Mintz (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964). I will be quoting from both the Spanish original and the English translation.
- 37 *Sugar and Society*, pp.1-2.
- 38 *Ibid.*, Sidney W. Mintz's introduction, p.xxiv.
- 39 *Ibid.*, pp.85-6.
- 40 *Ibid.*, pp.49-50.
- 41 I am quoting from the second edition, *Mudos Testigos: crónica del ex-cafetal Jesús Nazareno* (La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1974). This edition contains an introduction by Manuel Moreno Fraguas.
- 42 *Mudos Testigos*, pp.91-2.
- 43 In *Nationalist Thought*, p.73.

CHAPTER 7

The dilemmas of Puerto Rican intellectuals

Juan García Passalacqua

The Caribbean island of Puerto Rico has had an intense and rich intellectual life, most particularly in the twentieth century.¹ The essential characteristic of this intellectual life has been a continued search for the identity of its people, the question of 'being' Puerto Rican.

Working within a colonial context, all intellectuals in the island have had to deal with two differing dimensions of their quest, the cultural and the political. In the cultural sense, there has been an ever-increasing affirmation of the nationality of our people, the workings of a nation-in-the-making. However, this has run counter to colonial political developments, which have in effect stifled the political expression of such cultural nationalism. As a result, the people have been conditioned to fear political independence, and oppose it in massive numbers. That dialectic has framed the crucial dilemmas of Puerto Rican intellectuals in the twentieth century. But it is one that – at last, after a hundred years – seems on the verge of solution.

Original intellectual positions

The birth of modern intellectual life in Puerto Rico may be traced to the 1850s, when a group of young students in Madrid, the colonial metropolis, endeavoured to collect materials for a first history of the island. The first analyst of the Puerto Rican ethos, Alejandro Tapia y Rivera (1826-82) published his collection of historical materials in those years.² In his case, and that of later writers, the experience of exile nurtured the effort to understand Puerto Rico, and produced the most fruitful interpretations away from its shores.

Another resident of Madrid articulated for the first time the case of independence for Puerto Rico, and would become the island's foremost intellectual figure of all time: Eugenio María de Hostos (1839-1903). The third precursor of Puerto Rican intellectualism was a historian and social analyst, Salvador Brau (1842-1912), who wrote the first history of the island. In all three authors it was evident that the conception of Puerto Rico as a *patria*, a motherland (separate from

Spain) was already developed and certain. The phenomenon, however, was occurring only within a narrow élite.

The invasion of Puerto Rico by the United States in 1898 threw intellectual life in the island into turmoil and recession for many decades. The nation-in-formation suffered a severe setback, since the efforts to 'Americanize' the island³ were so strong and pervasive as to pose for many years to come the danger of transculturation.⁴

In 1922, however, the United States decided not to incorporate Puerto Rico into the Union, and in 1929 the Great Depression was to have pernicious effects on the island. These and other events generated social turmoil that in turn motivated a reawakening of intellectual discourse. In that year, a group of young intellectuals founded a literary review called *Indice*, that was to become the forerunner of a whole movement of new intellectual ferment in Puerto Rico.

It was *Indice* that first posed the search for the ethos of Puerto Ricans, the definition of the essential traits of the 'Puerto Rican personality', a search for its past and a delineation of its future. The effects of four hundred years of Spanish colonialism and three decades of American colonialism on a still-emerging people were seen as putting the island 'adrift' in a sea of troubles. 'How are we? What are we?' became obsessive questions for a whole generation of thinkers.

Two books published in 1942, written by two of the founders of *Indice*, set the tone of the intellectual exploration of the times. The newly founded *Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños* published Antonio S. Pedreira's seminal *Insularismo*⁵ and Vicente Geigel Polanco's *El Despertar de un Pueblo*.⁶ Pedreira's book is, in effect, the first coherent effort to 'interpret' Puerto Rican reality, 'our life as a people'. Geigel's, in turn, is a declaration that the mass of the people of the island have, at last, become historically conscious, and that a people that seemed 'on the verge of dissolution' a few years before, 'has awakened'.

Both books are products of a generation of thinkers that acknowledged the leadership of Luis Muñoz Marín, then a socialist who favoured independence, and to whom Geigel's book is dedicated. Both were published for mass distribution two years after Muñoz's party had come into power in the island's Legislative Assembly, following the elections of 1940. Both represent the rescue of the world view that Puerto Ricans were in effect, 'a people' who had resisted assimilation in the previous forty years, and who were on the verge of framing their own historical project and destiny.

The intellectuals of colonialism

However, Puerto Rico was to suffer another interruption in the articulation of its intellectual and political purposes. The decade of the 1930s saw the emergence of a militant nationalism that attempted to wrest independence by force of arms. With the beginning of the Cold War in 1946, the United States decided to stamp out any possibility of Puerto Rican independence. Luis Muñoz Marín abandoned his socialist and *independentista* ideologies, and the United States proceeded to govern Puerto Rico as an outright colony, with the consent of his Popular Democratic Party. Pedreira had died by then, leaving a cadre of disciples at the University of Puerto Rico, and Geigel was fired from the colonial government because of his protest over the repression of an armed nationalist movement in 1950.

A wave of political and intellectual repression was unleashed on the island for a decade,⁷ known in Puerto Rican history as 'the years of the gag', when those intellectuals who were believers in independence were persecuted, and literally driven into exile or jailed.

One group of thinkers, however, served the régime well in trying to justify colonialism and adapt the examination of the nature of life in the island to political 'realism'.

Tomás Blanco (1897-1975) had produced a highly acclaimed book of historical interpretation in 1935, reprinted in 1943.⁸ He argued that 'a people' was already taking shape in Puerto Rico when the American invasion occurred and that this invasion had caused 'disorientation' (except that the peasants felt 'redeemed' from the Spanish oppressors by the invaders). Denouncing colonialism in this early work, his subsequent work dealt mainly with social, not political themes, and he became an advocate of autonomy within the United States.

Jaime Benítez (born 1908) abandoned nationalism early in his life and became the main exponent of the theory of Puerto Rican 'occidentalism', a value that 'transcended narrow nationalisms' and inserted the island, through Spain, into the main currents of Western thought. This effort to distract the intellectual discourse from the essential nationalist elements of the people was successful for many years, after he became Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico and imposed the theory that such an institution was 'a house of studies', using that concept to repress all political expressions within its walls, particularly those favouring independence.⁹

Arturo Morales Carrion (1913-89) was the third exponent of colonialist interpretations. He argued that Puerto Ricans needed 'tutelage' from the United States, and were grateful that they had got it for many years after the invasion.¹⁰ He was the first to emphasize the historical ties of the island with the non-Hispanic Caribbean, but offered only 'autonomism' as the essence of the Puerto Rican world view, as opposed to nationalism. **Salvador Tio** (born 1911) is still today the main defender of the present colonial condition of the island and its relationship with the United States in its alleged 'autonomist' terms.

These intellectuals, all born after the invasion, differed from their predecessors in abandoning the search for a native world view, and embracing the influence of the United States and colonialism as a positive development in the history of the people of Puerto Rico. This was so particularly after 1952, when the United States Congress allowed the Muñoz-Marín government to adopt its own constitution for the island, and when it was argued that colonialism had ended by the expressed consent of the people of Puerto Rico. That political situation subsists to this day.

Unwittingly, an *independentista* essayist contributed to the self-depreciation of the era. **René Marqués** (1919-79) wrote a controversial essay in 1960 arguing that the essential characteristic of the Puerto Rican people was their 'docility' when faced with the colonial problem. In other essays he described the contradiction between what he termed 'literary pessimism and political optimism' in the island.¹¹ As the 1950s ended, this dismal view of the Puerto Ricans seemed to dominate the island's intellectual landscape.

The nationalist affirmation of the 1960s

The Cuban revolution's triumph in 1959 had profound effects throughout Central America and the Caribbean; it had a momentous impact on Puerto Rican intellectual life. For the first time in our history, Marxist theoreticians dared to challenge the traditional intellectual discourse, and most particularly the colonialist mentality of those close to the Muñoz Marín government. Juan Angel Silen broke new ground, from the position of a Marxist intellectual, when he answered René Marqués in a book entitled 'Towards a Positive Vision of the Puerto Rican' (a title that said it all), and defended the national affirmation of our people.¹²

The best exponent of this third wave of intellectuals was Manuel

Maldonado Denis (born 1934), with the first international publication of a Marxist interpretation of Puerto Rican history, in 1969.¹³ The book was presented at the University of Puerto Rico on 2 February 1970 and caused an intellectual commotion. The importance of this work on many generations of Puerto Rican students since then is exemplified by the fact that it is in its sixteenth printing today. Its main thesis was that the people of Puerto Rico had 'a will for independence'. Many intellectuals disagreed then and continue to disagree – including myself.¹⁴

Contrary to the thesis expounded by Maldonado Denis, Puerto Rico has lived its historical life between *being* and *fearing*. Fear, the sense that dangers lurk around the island and its people, has been the determinant factor in the public's world view. Since 1582 Puerto Rico has been nothing more than a military bastion for two empires: Spanish and American. Internal government had always had an autocratic nature, and when the Spanish colonies began to rebel, the loyalist officers migrated from the mainland to one of the last bastions of military hegemony: San Juan. They brought with them a visceral dislike for independence and freedom as well as horror stories of republican armies and governments. From that era on, mothers will chastise their children when they misbehave with the terrible admonition: 'What do you think this is, a Republic?' The people of Puerto Rico have lived through a dialectical process between fear and imprisonment on one hand, and the emergence of a nationality on the other. Fear has grown, most precisely because of the Cuban revolution and its communistic nature. Maldonado Denis ignored that reality.

The presence of the United States on Puerto Rican soil added another dimension in addition to that of military bastion – modernization and materialism. By 1866 the United States had already absorbed the island into its hemispheric market. When the invasion occurred in 1898, the mass of the people, instead of rejecting it, welcomed it. However, after the crude attempts at Americanization of the population, and the failure of that metropolitan project, they continued to behave on the basis of their native heritage, and searched for a synthesis between their economic dependence on the Americans and their nation-in-the-making status. That synthesis excluded the possibility of independence. The 'will' of independence, if any, remained rooted mainly in intellectual circles.

Maldonado Denis and his intellectual generation blame the United States, repression, imperialism and colonialism for that situation. I would argue that he is wrong. It has been, and is, a result of the Puerto Rican people preferring to enjoy their cultural differentiation without transforming it into a political movement for independence: Puerto Rico

has never demanded independence. This fact was crucially emphasized by the granting of American citizenship to all persons born in the island, in 1917. The decision, made by the United States to solidify their hegemony over the island in the face of a possible attempt at invasion by Germany in the First World War, sealed a political relationship between the *individual* Puerto Rican and the colonial metropolis that, to this day, complicates the political self-definition of each and every person living in the island.

Even Pedro Albizu Campos, the most prominent political advocate of independence for the island and the father of its nationalism, recognized that such an option had no possibility whatsoever of prevailing through electoral means. The progress that we live in was the ideological basis of colonialism by consent and it became a political formulation in the years of hegemony of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) between 1940 and 1968.

During all those 28 years, pro-independence intellectuals took refuge in a rabid *hispanismo*, as a front for nationalist positions that were outlawed in the island. Interestingly, it was not until the defeat of the PDP in 1968 by a party favouring annexation to the United States that the independence movement was able to come out and fight openly for its beliefs. Although a Pro-Independence Party had existed in the island and participated in all elections after 1945, it was only in 1987 that the Puerto Rican Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a practice of outlawing membership in pro-independence groups by drawing lists of its followers in police files, and ordering this practice to cease.¹⁵

It seems obvious that all these forces would drive the nationalist sentiments of the population outside legal and constitutional channels, and permit only the expression of those favouring colonialism by consent. Maldonado Denis and his fellow pro-independence intellectuals refused to admit to the conditioning of the people, and thus blamed American colonialism.

Maldonado and others attempted to blame the triumph of the annexation movement on the decision by Muñoz and his party to abandon independence as an ideology. He was wrong in this too. What really happened was that in the years of PDP hegemony, the tenets of corporate capitalism and of the consumer economy began to contribute to the already existing fear of going it alone. As seen by Herbert Marcuse, it is obvious that the Puerto Rican people developed 'a second nature' that lured them to possess and consume, a consequence of the penetrations of Puerto Rico by those American corporations that sold their wares in the island, their fifth biggest market in the world.

Maldonado finished his book in 1969 with a call for the people of

Puerto Rico 'to take note of their own nationhood in the face of attempts to denaturalize it'. His book was an anguished cry to battle on behalf of Puerto Rican nationalism, in the face of the first triumph by an annexationist party in 1968. In the 30 years since then, annexationism in the island, instead of fading, has grown by leaps and bounds, and at this point is favoured by 60 per cent of the people of Puerto Rico. The chasm between island intellectuals and the mass of the people has continued to widen.

Thus two forces have fought each other and complemented each other in a dialectical tension in the last thirty years in Puerto Rico: economic-political assimilation and socio-cultural affirmation. The tension produced by the strengthening of these two contradictory tendencies at the same time has produced a tragic stalemate between Puerto Rican intellectuals and political society, misunderstood by many as 'polarization' between pro-independence and pro-annexation forces. Maldonado predicted a final 'confrontation', maybe violent, between the forces of 'Northamericanization' and 'Puertoricanization'. This is too simple an analysis. The real confrontation is one between the people and their priorities and the intellectuals and theirs.¹⁶ The essential flaw in the view of *independentista* intellectuals can be summarized in the words of Eugenio María de Hostos: one thing is certain about the Puerto Ricans, 'Only when thou shalt kill the God of Fear will you be free'.¹⁷

A new intellectual vision from exile

Progress, however, has been made. For the first time, essayists and historians began to look not to Puerto Rico, the island, but to the Puerto Ricans, not to what had happened 'in' Puerto Rico or to the 'forces' affecting the island, but to the history of our *people*. This was a crucial departure for Puerto Rican intellectuals.

In 1980, Puerto Rico's intellectual life was revolutionized by a short essay of 35 pages, written by an exile in Mexico. José Luis González offered an alternative interpretation of Puerto Rican history and life, and of our nature as a people.¹⁸ It was a completely new vision, which prompted a three-day seminar at the Universidad Autónoma de México,¹⁹ ushering in a completely new era in the search for a Puerto Rican world view, and offering a new solution to an old dilemma.

Puerto Rico was born – José Luis González argued – as a walled city of foreigners living oblivious to its countryside. The first distinctive Puerto Rican element began to arrive in 1520 with the emergence of slavery, creating the true 'Afro-Antillean' nature of the Puerto Rican

people. Simultaneous with the acclimatization of the black element, two separate subcultures in turn, Spaniards 'from there' and 'from here', split. The rural peasant, the *jibaro*, developed an autochthonous nature that contrasted with the Spanish inhabitants of the cities. Refugees and immigrants from the Latin American revolutionary wars and Europe were added, and a *criollo* rural gentry and professional class developed and began to fight for control of the state apparatus, through a political movement for autonomy from Spain.

The net result of all these currents was 'a nation-in-formation', not yet gelled, when the United States invaded in 1898. The invasion, González argued, interrupted that formative process and caused a historical disruption. It created a populist mulatto proletariat that embraced a pro-American mentality, with a plantation élite in the sugar-cane industry that was equally annexationist. Meanwhile, the old hacienda owners, menaced by the new development, turned towards an idealized *jibaro* and Hispanic values as means to preserve their recently won hegemony. A conservative autonomist sentiment emerged within this precariously exposed class, one that prevailed until the late 1960s.

The interpretation of José Luis González provided a new framework for intellectual debate in Puerto Rico. His theory was based on a race and class analysis of our society. His emphasis on the African element as defining Puerto Ricans as a people was completely new and daring: it placed us squarely within the experience of the whole Caribbean Sea.²⁰ It is easy to understand the strong reaction against his views from the traditional defenders of our white 'culture', based on the fact that he threatened their monopoly on patriotism. 'What are the masses really like?' he asked. Very few, even among *independentista* intellectuals, wanted to hear the answer. Yet his book became a runaway bestseller among the young, and is by now the bestseller in all of Puerto Rican intellectual history.

The end of the search seems at last to be near. The intellectual vision of what the people of Puerto Rico are really like is much closer to the real nature of its multitudinous masses. Will Puerto Rico join the Caribbean in the 1990s as one more Afro-Antillean nation? Or will the opposite be true, and that chapter of our history remain unwritten, as the island is absorbed as a state of the United States?

On 17 January 1989 the three leaders of the Puerto Rican political parties wrote a joint letter to the President and Congress of the United States demanding that Puerto Ricans be at last consulted on their choice of a political destiny, after almost 500 years of suffering colonialism. A plebiscite on that momentous question will probably be held in late 1991. On the way to that political decision, our intellectuals have at last created a theory of ourselves that can in effect correspond with

a political agenda for the mass of the people. We must now wait and see whether the intellectual and political wills can at last join forces and whether the Puerto Rican people will see where their real interests lie and act accordingly, when making their final decision.

Notes

- 1 The best survey of works and authors is Josefina Divera de Álvarez, *Literatura Puertorriqueña: su proceso en el tiempo* (Madrid, Partenon, 1983).
- 2 Manuel García Díaz, *Alejandro Tapio y Rivera: su vida y su obra* (San Juan, Coqui, 1964). It is essential to note at this point that this first study of Alejandro Tapia y Rivera, written in 1933 by University of Puerto Rico professor Manuel García Díaz, my father, could not be published in the island until 1964, owing to official censorship of historical figures that were understood to promote pro-independence fervour.
- 3 Aida Negrón de Montilla, *Americanization in Puerto Rico and the Public-School System 1900-1930* (Rio Piedras, Edil, 1971).
- 4 Germán de Granda, *Transculturación e Interferencia Lingüística en el Puerto Rico Contemporáneo (1898-1968)* (Bogotá, Caro y Cuervo, 1968).
- 5 Antonio S. Pedreira, *Insularismo: Ensayos de Interpretación Puertorriqueña* (San Juan, Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1942). A limited edition had been published in 1934, and had such an impact on intellectual life that it was reprinted eight years later, after the author's death, getting much wider distribution.
- 6 Vicente Geigel Polanco, *El Despertar de un Pueblo* (San Juan, Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1942).
- 7 Ivonne Acosta, *La Mordaza* (Rio Piedras, Edil, 1988) is a detailed, well-documented, and brilliant exposition of that era, its origins and consequences.
- 8 Tomás Blanco, *Prontuario Histórico de Puerto Rico* (San Juan, Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1943). The first edition had been published in Madrid in 1935.
- 9 Jaime Benítez, Puerto Rico: entre el pasado y el futuro, *El Mundo*, 16-24 de junio de 1968. See also his book *Junto a la Torre: Jornadas de un Programa Universitario (1942-1962)* (San Juan, Universidad, 1962).
- 10 Arturo Morales Carrión, *Ojeada al Proceso Histórico de Puerto Rico*, (San Juan, Instrucción, 1956). See also *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural History* (New York, W.W. Norton, 1983), his latest work, in which he insisted on the 'tutelage' theory.
- 11 René Marqués, *Ensayos (1953-1966)* (Madrid, Antillana, 1967).
- 12 Juan Angel Silen, *Hacia Una Visión Positiva del Puertorriqueño* (Rio Piedras, Edil, 1970). See also his *Historia de la Nacion Puertorriqueña* (Rio Piedras, Edil, 1973).
- 13 Manuel Maldonado Denis, *Puerto Rico: Una Interpretación Histórico Social* (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1969).
- 14 See my essay 'Dialéctica del Ser y del Temer: Apuntes sobre una interpretación de Puerto Rico', *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* (Universidad de

- Puerto Rico, 1970), and *El Nuevo Dia*, 31 December 1989, p.47.
- 15 Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Comisión de Derechos Civiles, *Informe de Discrimen y Persecución por Razones Políticas: La Practica Gubernmental de Manetner Listas, Ficheros y Expedientes de Ciudadanos por Razon de su Ideología Política*, San Juan, 1ro de febrero de 1989.
- 16 The limits of space do not permit me to elaborate here this crucial difference. For a detailed elaboration see my essay 'Dignidad y Jaibería: Los paradigmas políticos puertorriqueños', in Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, *Anales: Revista de Ciencias Sociales e Historia*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1984.
- 17 Eugenio María de Hostos, *La Peregrinación de Bayoan, Obras Completas*, La Habana, 1939.
- 18 José Luis González, *El Pais de Cuatro Pisos*, (Rio Piedras, Huracán, 1980). The book is now on its sixth printing.
- 19 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, *Simposium, Puerto Rico: Una Nueva Visión Histórica*, 1, 2 y 3 de julio de 1981. The proceedings have never been published but deserve to be. Participants were Arcadio Diaz Quiñones, Manuel Maldonado Denis, Angel Quintero Rivera, José Luis Orozco, Gerard Pierre Charles, Carlos Rama, Ignacio Sosa, Leopoldo Zea, Abelardo Villegas, the author of the essay and the author of this chapter.
- 20 An extensive elaboration of this historical event in our intellectual history can be found in my essay, 'La literatura como fuente histórica del Caribe', in *Revista Talleres*, Puerto Rico Junior College, vol. 4, no. 1, 1986.

CHAPTER 8

Ideology, intellectuals, identity: the Dominican Republic 1880-1980 – Some preliminary notes

Harmannus Hoetink

Recent changes in university infrastructure

From the end of the nineteenth century until the early 1960s there was an intermittent growth of the academic infrastructure (generally during periods of political stability and/or economic prosperity), but its scale remained small: there was only one university, whose modern campus was built during the Trujillo regime (1930-61). Since the fall of Trujillo there has been an explosive growth in the number of universities (several of which are of dubious quality) and in their enrolment. During the first presidency of Balaguer (1966-78), several large museums, a national theatre and a national library were built, and an Academy of Sciences was founded. During the last 25 years, the number of scholarly publications has increased greatly, and the quality of newspapers has improved. Especially since the late 1960s, intellectual and artistic life has been vibrant and free.

Even though prior to the 1960s the pursuit of academic studies was not entirely restricted to high-income groups, the changes occurring after 1961 made for a massive 'democratization' of the student body. This led the Universidad Autónoma, the state university – with its regional campuses by far the largest of all – to embark upon an open admissions policy. It is still trying to cope with the consequences. Against this changing background, three specific trends during the period under discussion may be noted. The first is the trend away from the *pensador/poligrafo* type of intellectual (though the type is not yet extinct) and toward the academic specialist/technocrat. The second trend is away from private academic resources (the large private library, the private archive or collection) toward a preponderance of collective resources. The third trend is that from a situation where a relatively small number of mostly middle- or upper-class students could easily be absorbed by the private or public sector, to one in which excessively large numbers of students of uneven academic levels form a politically significant group. The future careers of the members of this class will depend to a large extent on their absorption in the public sector. Their prospects, though still based on family connections and the academic

reputation of their Alma Mater and themselves, tend to follow political party lines, political affiliation providing a strategic link to potential public resources. This does not mean to say that political affiliation was of no importance before the explosive growth of the student population, but that the politicization of student and intellectual life during the last quarter-century cannot be fully understood unless we take into account the almost desperate competition for jobs in the 'mostly public' service sector of the economy. In this context it should be kept in mind that even though some of the new universities emphasize in their curricula the need for professionally trained accountants, agronomists, paramedics, nurses, laboratory staff and the like, the traditional preference for the liberal professions – medicine, law, architecture – as well as for the liberal arts – sociology, history, social economy, political science – is, broadly speaking, still intact.

External influences

If we now look at changes in the extent and content of contacts with external academic and ideological modes of thought, the trend over the last hundred years is predictable: from diffuse, incidental and mostly individual, sometimes contradictory, influences at the end of the last century, to a strong and wide impact of modern universal ideologies, and of methodological paradigms, often with their own local infrastructure, today. Here again, the early 1960s come close to being a watershed. In Dominican historiography, to take but one example, the change from a predominantly 'aristocratic', heroic interpretation of history to a 'sociologization' of history-writing took place in those years.

In the late-nineteenth century, an influential figure such as Eugenio María de Hostos, trained in the *Krausista* variant of positivism, was exceptional in his methodology and ideological coherence, as well as in his organized, *caudillo*-like leadership, in keen competition with the Church-sponsored traditional education.¹

The ideological position of many of his contemporaries, and of the intellectuals of the early-twentieth century, was generally too vague or contradictory to fit clear labels. There were vague influences of social Darwinism, of French liberalism, of romantic *arielismo*. It is perhaps symptomatic that recently two scholars, trying to establish the ideological identity of such an important self-made sociologist as Pedro Francisco Bon, reached opposite conclusions, one calling him a critic of (Dominican) liberalism,² and the other seeing him as a 'typical representative of social liberalism'.³ In his perceptive essay on another late-nineteenth-century *pensador*, José Ramón López, Michiel Baud

notes López's belief in the guiding role of an intellectual life which by its example and actions should remedy the social ills of the lower classes. Baud uses the term 'cooperative élitism' to denote this mode of thought which he apparently associates with López only.⁴ This term is attractive precisely because of its wider applicability. 'Corporate élitism', the notion of a self-appointed élite, be it of technocrats, of enlightened philosophers or of an ideological vanguard, destined to lead the nation, is perhaps the one morphological concept which under different ideological guises has been common to most political thought in the Dominican Republic, and indeed in Latin America, over the last hundred years. From Thomistic political philosophy to positivism's élitism (Porfirio Díaz's *técnicos*), to Trujillo's quasi-corporativism, to Juan Bosch's self-invented *dictadura con apoyo popular*, to various quasi-Leninist projects of ideological vanguardism, the central notion is a leadership mandated by Destiny or reason to guide the masses and the nation. Such a notion not only responds to long-established cultural traditions, it is also functional in societies with deep social divisions. Its modern variants are also attractive to all those who seek to legitimate their status as political successors.

Throughout this period, France and Spain have remained centres for Dominican intellectual and artistic inspiration (with Germany, owing to its economic connections with the tobacco-growing Cibao-valley, attracting its share of students prior to the First World War). During the Trujillo period, Spanish influence was perhaps especially strong, coming as it did from three directions: from *franquista* political and intellectual circles (as was the case in many Latin American countries, from Albizu's Puerto Rico to Vargas's Brazil); from Ortega y Gasset and his *Revista de Occidente* (again as part of a continent-wide influence); and finally, and unexpectedly, from the group of Spanish republican intellectuals and artists who came to the country as refugees in the wake of the Spanish Civil War. The painters among them (Zanetti, Gausach and others) were influential in forming a new generation of talented Dominicans (Pérez, Pichardo, Ledesma, Giudicelli), supported by an extensive infrastructure of which the new *Palacio de Bellas Artes* was the backbone.⁵ The influence of this group of *exilados* on a similar renaissance of literature, as well as on intellectual thought generally, is also discernible, but awaits further analysis.

In addition, since the early 1960s, intellectual contacts with the United States have increased considerably, as have those with Mexico and (through scholarships) with the Soviet Union.

Intellectual debates

A common way to try to gain a greater understanding of the role of intellectuals is to study the extent of their participation, and their points of view, in debates caused by problems or events of national importance.

One might try to enumerate such debates in the Dominican Republic in chronological order: the debate on the agrarian problem at the end of the last century when the social, economic and political consequences of the introduction of modern sugar plantations were first discussed; the debate on the problem of increasing foreign debts in the first decade of the present century; the debate on the origins and solutions of the United States military occupation (1916-24); the debate on the origins and consequences of the Trujillo dictatorship (at the time restricted to its apologists inside and its adversaries outside the country, but subsequently widened to a still ongoing national discussion);⁶ the debate on the causes of the Civil War and the US intervention of 1965; the debate on the increasing external debts, and on the failure of a Dominican variant of democratic socialism in our days. Such a list would point to some recurrent themes such as that on dictatorship, democracy and anarchy; on independence and dependency; on national identity and diversity.

Space forbids a fuller description, let alone an analysis, of these debates, their main protagonists, and the presumed links between their class position and their ideological stance. However, it can be noted how many of these protagonists who took part in several subsequent debates have displayed remarkable inconsistencies, contradictions and changes in their ideological viewpoints. During much of the period under discussion, the political culture dictated a predominance of *oportunismo* (not an immoral, but an amoral, concept) over ideological consistency. It is tempting to suggest that the ideological *shift* was – and perhaps still is – more characteristic of many intellectuals' behaviour than ideology itself, analogous perhaps to the ease of change in role behaviour ('code switching') which some anthropologists consider a typical Caribbean cultural trait. In a patronage-dominated society, one's ideology is often perceived as an individual, pragmatic tool for patron-linked advancement, rather than as a legitimation of a collective world view to which one adheres out of inner and, in principle, durable conviction. The shifts are, moreover, facilitated by the 'corporative élitism' common, as suggested, to many prevailing successive ideologies. This shared ingredient makes it easier, or so it seems, to switch from one legitimation to another.

On national identity

The declaration of independence of 'Spanish Haiti' (1821), the declaration of independence from Haiti (1844), the struggle against invading Haitian armies in the 1840s and 1850s, the *Guerra de Restauración* against Spain (1863-5), all were signs of a slow and intermittent process leading, by the 1880s, to a situation where, albeit in a weak state, an ideology of nationalism was slowly being formulated. In the armed struggles against Haiti and Spain, many members of the rural middle and lower classes were involved and their shared experiences gave some social support to the diverse projects for national independence, the intellectual authors of which – Nuñez de Caceres, Duarte, Sanchez, Mella – were, perforce, members of the small literate, urban population. This is not to say that national independence and its attendant ideology were the products of a united bourgeoisie. In the first place, it was only in the 1880s that a *national* bourgeoisie was slowly being formed. Secondly, the regional élites and their *caudillos* who dominated the political landscape after 1844 for a long time to come, devised – in the face of Haiti's military and economic superiority at the time – several projects intended to bring the country under the protectorate of France, Spain or the United States.

Those who, like Luperón, struggled in the 1870s against such plans were not members of an established élite, but rather persons of humbler social origins whose earlier military feats had made them politically visible and socially mobile. Indeed, whilst throughout the entire period under discussion many members of the national bourgeoisie were at one time or another notable for their pronounced nationalism, it remains remarkable that *derrotismo* (defeatism), including feelings of self-hate and notions about the fictitiousness of the Dominican Republic as a nation, can be more easily detected across the entire political spectrum of the upper classes than in the rest of society.⁷

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, mostly coinciding with Heureaux's dictatorship (1882-99), the economic structure of the country changed drastically. Sugar, grown in the coastal plains, soon became the largest export crop; the infrastructure – roads, harbours, railroads, telegraph – was notably improved; the population increased greatly; the position in terms of power vis-à-vis Haiti was reversed. The regional élites came in closer contact with each other, leading to a greater sense of class consciousness on the national level. In this emergent national bourgeoisie, many recent successful immigrants were also absorbed, as well as a number of Heureaux's protégés who had risen socially and economically during his régime.

It was in this period that the first products of a national historiography appeared. In it, much attention was given to the intellectual construction of a national pantheon and of the exact stature and relative position of each of the nation's heroes, martyrs and villains. In fact, much of traditional historiography to this day is but a reworking and revision of this project: dependent on the author's regional, familial, social or political convictions or allegiances. The historical roles and importance of Luperón, Sanátana, Baez, Cabral, Sanchez and others are under constant review. Sometimes, when the predilection of the current president for one of these heroes is known (as is that of Balaguer for Juan Pablo Duarte), helpful prestigious intellectuals will come forward with projects for books and institutes (all to be subsidized by the Government) meant to eternalize both the hero's and the patron's name. Just as in the case of José Martí in Cuba, some of these heroes lend themselves well to different ideological interpretations.

All this, of course, is not typical of any particular country. It is only that a small country with a late date of independence, such as the Dominican Republic, lends itself very well to the study of the genesis of 'national' heroes and their manipulation. The 1880s also saw the adoption of a national hymn, and the flourishing of a new national literature (traditional Latin American dictatorship is not necessarily incompatible with a flowering of the arts, as some believe).

Indianism and anti-black racism

As part of this literature, and as part of the romantic *indianismo* in Latin America at that time, several works and poems were written dealing with the native Amerindian population. The most famous of these is *Enriquillo* (1882), by Manuel de José Galván. Some critics believe that this Dominican interest in a native population which as a group was extinguished long ago, should be understood as an example of élitist escapism at best, and of élitist anti-black racism at worst.

Anti-black racism exists in Santo Domingo and elsewhere, but I do not think that this particular case proves it. First, one of the other equally famous *indianista* novels, *Tabaré* (1886), was written by Juan Zorilla de San Martín from Uruguay, a country noted neither for a large proportion of Amerindians, nor, for that matter, of blacks. Quite apart from a certain exotic ingredient, there is also a plausible psychological explanation for both books, namely the need to establish a continuity between the earliest inhabitants and the present population and, by so doing, to legitimate the latter's historical claim on the land they inhabit. The custom, still very much in use today among many

classes, to name one's children after a native *cacique* flows from this same need. And it was Gregorio Luperón (not particularly noted for racism) who put this need into words when he expressed his belief that 'the laws of climate' and environment would work to make the 'mixed race' resemble more and more the aboriginal population, thereby claiming the right, of course, for the large Dominican population of mixed descent to consider themselves the true heirs to the country.⁸

Moreover Santo Domingo did not differ from the rest of Latin America in its successive governments' preference for European over all other immigrants; the *gobernar es poblar* ('to govern is to populate') dictum of more southern countries implied a similar racist ingredient which was also endemic in much of the literature and social commentary well into the present century.

This racism led in Santo Domingo (as well as elsewhere) to a systematic neglect of the cultural contributions of the black population group, a tendency which started to be reversed only in the 1970s. This neglect should not be linked causally to anti-Haitianism: we find a similar neglect in Puerto Rico, in Venezuela and indeed, in Haiti itself where the critical work of Jean Price-Mars and the *africaniste* movement of Duvalier and others fought an uphill struggle against similar tendencies. As for the United States, the time in which serious sociological studies distinguished between 'Americans' and 'Negroes' is not that far behind us either.

Dominican attitudes to Haiti

Dominican attitudes vis-à-vis Haiti are more complex than commonly depicted. We can identify a number of cross-threads within these complexities.

1. An animosity is still fostered by much of Dominican national historiography towards the Haitian state and its pretensions, at a time when it was superior in power, to establish one government for the entire island, which it considered to be 'une et indivisible'.

2. There is a long history of friendly relations – well into the present century – between segments of the leading classes of both countries, of Dominican élite families living in exile in Haiti, of their children being educated there, of mutual political and financial support.

3. There is the awareness of a relatively open border between two countries of vastly different resources and demographic pressures, with 'peaceful invasions' of poor rural Haitians stretching over many decades.

4. Dominican employers, large and small, have a contradictory

interest in fostering the employment of Haitian labour at sub-human wage levels (yet higher than in their own country), while at the same time deploring its allegedly adverse social and cultural effects.

5. There is at present a strong penetration of the Haitian market by Dominican merchants, leading perhaps to a *de facto* common market.

6. Intermittently some Dominicans are aware that closer co-operation between the two nations is needed in order to confront the severe problems common to both. This awareness was already discernible among some intellectuals of the late-nineteenth century, and is increasingly strong among some young intellectuals in our days. (Others sometimes intimate that the United States government would welcome such closer co-operation in so far as it might reduce Haitian migration to its shores.)

The functions of nationalist ideology

The Dominican nationalist ideology as it was formed in the later nineteenth century served the functions such creeds are supposed to fulfil: it legitimated a linkage to the country's past, and it tried to define the national culture's boundaries by emphasizing the durability and value of certain specific attributes – the Spanish language, the Catholic religion, and the notion of a predominantly mixed and Spanish population rather than one of predominantly African descent. In doing so, it clearly identified as Hispanic American both country and culture, and it implicitly underlined its cultural differences both with its neighbour Haiti, and with the dominant power of the region, the United States. This ideology was supported and elaborated by the work of subsequent generations of Dominican intellectuals (as in the case of Pea Batlle, in a discussion with Jean Price-Mars and his work) and was then adopted, ready-made, by the Trujillo régime, which went on to strengthen its impact both extensively (across the national territory) and intensively (across all social layers). The régime was able to popularize these ideas because of its control over ever more effective vehicles of communication and indoctrinating institutions such as schools, the armed forces and the political party. The Trujillo régime did strengthen an inclusive nationalist ideology because of the absence of an explicit class-based ideology, and because of the desire to de-emphasize the existing deep social divisions in favour of a quasi-corporativist creed. (For somewhat analogous reasons, the emphatic and frequent use of the national flag and hymn in both private and public spheres is striking in both Americas.)

This is not the place to analyse in detail to what extent Trujillo's

actual policies squared with his professed nationalism. A growing literature, some of it 'revisionist', deals with his economic policies (including his purchase of US-owned sugar factories and other enterprises), his varying attitudes towards the United States (including the régime's last-ditch effort to form an alliance with Castro's Cuba) and his immigration and agricultural-colonization policies (including his *dominicanización de la frontera*). Nationalist fervour, aided by the economic crisis, reached a pitch in the 1930s when – simultaneously with Cuba – the Dominican Republic adopted laws ordering the expulsion of foreign (mostly British Caribbean and Haitian) cane workers. This *dominicanización* also found an horrendous expression in the massacre, in 1937, of thousands of Haitians living in the Dominican border area, a massacre that was to weigh heavily on the conscience of later generations of Dominicans.

The existence of at least two currents within the quasi-corporatist ideology of the Trujillo years can be mentioned here. One of these was the orthodox élitist variety; the other had more populist ingredients sustained and propagated by those who, like Trujillo himself, came from the social classes located just beneath the national bourgeoisie – *los de segunda*, leading families from small towns, journalists, teachers, artisans, small merchants and farmers, and the like. An analysis of the ways in which these currents were played off against each other, and during which periods one became temporarily dominant and why, has to wait for further research. A comparison with Duvalier's régime (not to mention that of Batista or Somoza) might be enlightening here.

Definitions of national culture

In the course of the present century, changes in 'racial' composition have had some effect on the way national cultural symbols were defined. The increasing immigration of sugar workers from the Commonwealth Caribbean (the *cocoliches*) and Haiti, as well as the generally foreign character of the sugar enclaves, led to the selection, perhaps as early as the 1920s, of the Cibao Valley (with its traditional peasantry and its relatively prosperous middle-size tobacco, cacao and coffee farmers of long standing, with its mixed 'native' population and *criollo* customs) as the quintessential 'national' domain.⁹ Before the advent of the modern sugar economy elsewhere in the country, the Cibao had been the economic pillar of the nation, and its strong élite has continued to produce many intellectuals and politicians. The elevation of *cibao* culture, with its *merengue* as the national dance and with its romanticized *campesino* folkways,¹⁰ also served to foster a nostalgia

for 'the times of *Concho Primo*', long before sugar became king. Here, parallels may be drawn with the Puerto Rican *jibaro* and the Cuban *guajiro* as regional symbols promoted to national stature.

On the other hand we saw, especially during the last fifteen years, that a re-evaluation is under way of the cultural contributions of the 'black' part of the Dominican people which is gradually leading to symbolic gestures such as the placing of a 'black' statue in front of the National Museum, next to that of an Amerindian and a Spaniard. Greatly stimulated by developments in the United States, the number of publications on the Afro-Dominican cultural heritage is by now considerable. In itself the massive contact with the United States and its cultural products – film, television and so on – and the large-scale migration back and forth (a phenomenon of the last 25 years) cannot fail to influence Dominican self-perception and hence its intellectual interpretation.

The social definitions of 'black' and 'white' in use in the United States will have their most perplexing effect on those Dominicans who in their own country are perceived as belonging to neither category. Those who are perceived and treated as 'white' by the United States population, will only see this as a reaffirmation of their 'racial' position in Dominican society; those who perceive themselves as 'black' by Dominican standards will not be surprised to see themselves labelled as such in the United States context as well. The very large group which, under a wide variety of labels, finds itself somewhere between these two 'extremes', will probably emphasize more than ever their own *dominicanidad* and express this by stressing those cultural attributes that they have learnt to perceive as its markers. While also in this respect a social agility in shifting from one to another identifying label may be observed, one would suppose that so long as those identifying themselves as 'mixed' contribute the majority of the Dominican population, their definition of national culture will tend to prevail, although perhaps in increasing competition with alternative definitions elaborated by the intellectuals of the newly articulate 'black' group.

Epilogue

Finally, I want to categorize two 'ideal types' of intellectuals which I believe to have some relevance for Dominican society.

One type is that of the theorizing, deductive mind, parting from a given set of assumptions, and elaborating these with hardly any reference to empirical investigation. We might speak of a scholastic style because it

is the product of a long tradition of thomistic casuistry, mediated and inculcated by Catholic teaching traditions and, more generally, by an eminently Catholic 'high' culture.'

Its counterpoint is the raconteur or *cuentista* style, intent on painting reality with attention to factual detail, in some cases restricting itself to sheer 'documentation' or enumeration (the *memorioso*), at times with a great flair for social and psychological nuance, but rarely with the felt need to establish a link between description and 'grand theory'. At most, some impromptu theory is devised to fit the local findings. This could be called the descriptive style; it may be linked to both oral and literary traditions of 'realistic' story-telling.¹¹

It is tempting to try to locate pairs of Dominican intellectuals on different ends of the continuum between the two styles of thought: Hostos versus Bon; Juan Isidro Jiménez Grulln versus Juan Bosch; Balaguer (to some extent) versus Rufino Martínez, Pedro Mir and Rodríguez Demorizi; Fernández Spencer or Pedro Peix versus Manuel Mora Serrano or Manuel del Cabral.

There are, in this artificial dichotomy, suggestions of other dichotomies: of capital city versus province; of élite versus *los de segunda*; of cosmopolitan versus *criollo*; of university-trained versus self-educated; but in none of these cases is there an entirely convincing correlation.

Nor is there correlation with political persuasion. Indeed, of those with a scholastic style of thought several have made the jump from scholastic conservatism to scholastic radicalism with an ease that should not surprise us since their mental preference for essence over existence, and for revelation over empirical inquiry, could remain intact, not to mention their predilection for 'corporative élitism'. Those with a descriptive style of thought, on the other hand, lacking as they do a set of clearly preconceived and explicit assumptions, and aware as they are of reality's inherent contradictions, may tend to be more sceptical of the validity of political theory, but precisely for this reason they may either be resigned to political passivity or opportunistically change political banners as often as reality, as perceived by them, demands it.

Both styles then, one rooted in a tradition of scholastic speculation about the metaphysical world, the other in a narrative tradition related to the intimacy of the directly surrounding social and material world, may provide an additional and complementary explanation of the ease with which many – though not all – Dominican intellectuals in this century have changed from one ideological point of view to another.

A tentative typology of intellectual styles such as presented here might, if it makes any sense at all, have some relevance for Latin

America at large. This brings me to a final observation.

In the preceding pages I have, *inter alia*, suggested the need for constant comparison of Dominican developments and structures with those of other societies in its vicinity or in Latin America generally. One may, as does Frank Moya Pons in an interesting essay,¹² trace the evolution of a 'typical' Dominican pessimism from Hostos's anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic fulminations through Lopez's and Lugo's *derrotismo* to Despradel Batista's 'racial' pessimism of the 1930s (based on the negative evaluation of the three main cultural heritages: Indian, Spanish, African), but one should be constantly aware of similar trends and thoughts elsewhere – Puerto Rico, Cuba, Brazil, and the southern cone of South America come to mind here. To take another example, one should not treat a term such as *blanco de la tierra* as if it were a typically Dominican invention, or without further comparative investigation believe that a term such as *indio* for a particular phenotype is exclusively Dominican,¹³ or that Dominican racism stands in a category by itself. In all this, the admirable recent growth in our knowledge of Dominican history and society should be coupled to our knowledge of comparable histories and societies. Only in this way the pitfalls of narrative particularism may be avoided, and plausible theories, based on empirical comparison, constructed, thus producing, in the end, a promising synthesis of the two 'styles of thought' that have competed with each other for so long.

Notes

- 1 See H. Hoetink, *The Dominican People: 1850-1900: notes for a historical sociology* trans. from the Spanish by Stephen K. Ault (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) pp.142 ff.
- 2 Raymundo González, Bon, un Critico del Liberalismo Dominicano en el siglo XIX, *Ciencia y Sociedad* X, 4, 1985, pp.472-90.
- 3 Michiel Baud, Ideología y Campesinado: El Pensamiento Social de José Ramón López, *Estudios Sociales*, XIX, 64, 1986, pp.63-81.
- 4 Michiel Baud, *op.cit.*
- 5 See Danilo de los Santos, *La Pintura en la Sociedad Dominicana* (Santiago R.D., 1978), pp.78 ff.
- 6 This debate was particularly lively in December 1987 and January 1988, when, in the newspapers *Hoy* and *Listin Diario*, the role of intellectuals during the Trujillo régime was discussed by Bernardo Vega, Hector Pérez Reyes, Raymundo González, José Israel Cuello H., Luis S. Pegeuro Moscoso and others. The main question here was whether several leading intellectuals who had collaborated with and defended the régime, had done so wholeheartedly or under pressure. Also discussed, as part of this debate, were such topics as the continuity between pre-Trujillo social thought and

policy, and those during the régime; the traditional attitudes toward Haiti; and the definition of Dominican cultural identity.

- 7 Federico García Godoy and Américo Lugo are earlier examples of such upper-class pessimism. More recently, Juan Isidro Jiménez Grulln (*La República Dominicana: una Ficción*, Mérida, 1965), though as a Marxist confident about an 'ultimate' change for the better, wrote in much the same vein and belonged to the same social stratum.
- 8 Gregorio Luperón, *Notas Autobiográficas y Apuntes Históricos* (2nd ed., Santiago R.D.) I, p.27, cited in Hoetink, *op.cit.* (1982), p.188.
- 9 See H. Hoetink, *El Cibao 1844-1900: su Aportación a la Formación Social del la República*, *Emé-Emé Estudios Dominicanos*, VIII, 48, 1980, pp.3-21.
- 10 As in R.E. Jiménez, *Al Amor del Bohío: Tradiciones y Costumbres Dominicanas* (2 vols., Santiago R.D., 1927-9).
- 11 After writing this Epilogue, I read the essay *La Decadencia de la Dominicanidad* (*Hoy*, 5 de dic. 1987) by Manuel Nuñez, in which he writes: 'Our scholarship may be characterized as catalogue-like (Alfau Durn, Rodríguez Demorizi), as schematic (Cass), as dissolving in polemics (Jiménez Grulln) or as rhetorical (Balaguer)' (my translation). His first two categories correspond – in inverse order – to mine. His last two characterizations are – by definition, as it were – more typical of the 'scholastic' style. In this context, and implicitly referring to authors of different ideological persuasion, Nuñez speaks of a 'fundamentally Jesuitic' way of thinking, of 'scholasticism' and 'Manicheism'.
- 12 Frank Moya Pons, 'Modernización y Cambios en la República Dominicana', in B. Vega, C. Dobal, C.E. Deive, R. Sili, J. del Castillo, F. Moya Pons, *Ensayos Sobre Cultura Dominicana* (Santo Domingo, 1981), p.211.
- 13 As does, for example, José Alcantara Almnazar, *Black Images in Dominican Literature*, *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids/New West Indian Guide*, 61, nrs 3/4, 1987, pp.161-74.

CHAPTER 9

Politics and populist historiography in the Caribbean

Anthony P. Maingot

The political role of history

'I can see myself, sitting, a little boy', Winston Churchill once wrote, '... always feeling the glory of England and its history surrounding me and about me'.¹

It appears to be one of the great realities of our time that historical consciousness, awareness of a past, is a near universal fact. It is a factor at the collective and the individual level of consciousness.²

Nineteenth-century Europe was strongly influenced by the rewriting and reinterpreting of national histories. It has been argued that this predominance of history in political action during the nineteenth century can be compared with the role that ideology plays in the twentieth century. 'The role that ideology plays in our century,' says Fritz Stern 'history tended to play in the last century. Both conservatives and liberals used historical slogans to shape and sustain their ambitions.'³ They became political historians and, according to Stern, their impact upon their society was of 'incalculable importance'. History was central, for instance, to the politics of England and France.⁴ Perhaps the most celebrated (and influential) idea of history was Karl Marx's distinction between the material conditions of life – 'real' history – and ideological forms of life. It was his version of 'real' history which became an integral part of his political arguments.

From a functional point of view, the analogy between the sociological roles of history and ideology continues to be valid and useful. From a sociology of knowledge perspective in particular, both history – especially popular history – and ideology respond to similar social and economic needs and serve very similar functions. Similarly, historical models – usually in the form of analogies – tend to function in the decision-making process the way ideology does.

Both the historian and the ideologue operate in a *trialectical* fashion: the past as interpreted, the present as perceived and a desired (or feared) future interact with each other. This trialectical process operates in every-day contexts but tends to be especially compelling

when the historian is also an active politician or statesman writing in a period of rapid or radical change.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr confesses to being perplexed by the interaction between history and public decision 'because the role of history in this partnership remains both elusive and tricky'.⁵ He is not sure whether historical interpretations are the sources of policy decisions or merely *post facto* vindications of such decisions. Yet, Schlesinger maintains that all decisions of public policy involve historical judgment, an assumption concerning future developments derived from an interpretation of the past. These assumptions can remain unstated but often they are made explicit and appear to transcend ideological differences.⁶

Similarly, Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May speak of their experiences with people in universities, in the media, and even Washington decision-makers, who despite themselves actually used history in their decisions, at least for advocacy or for comfort, 'whether they knew any or not'.⁷ Throughout their study they show Washington decision-makers using, and misusing, historical analogies to good or ill effects.

Throughout the literature on historiography, one is made aware of the role of historical models. Once 'created', these models tend to acquire an existence and influence of their own. The identification of the present with the past drives action through what Schlesinger calls 'the bewitchment of analogy'.

While logicians readily agree that analogies are central to human thinking, they also recognize the danger of false analogies of a historical nature, fallacies which often follow the stereotype that 'history teaches'.⁸ Clearly the potential for such fallacies is great precisely because, as E.H. Carr has noted, history properly so-called can be written only by those who find and accept a sense of direction in history itself, i.e. people who hold the belief that we have 'come from somewhere'.⁹

It is evident, therefore, that the historian – through his or her writings – influences both decision-makers and public opinion. In fact, F.A. Hayek goes so far as to say that historians are more influential than political theorists who launch new ideas because the historian is 'at least one step nearer to direct power over public opinion than is the theorist'.¹⁰ There is also wide agreement that the use of history and its subsequent influence, rather than decreasing in the twentieth century, is increasing. Its function seems to place it in the same category as ideology or belief systems.¹¹

Nowhere is this use of history more evident than in revolutionary or post-colonial periods, periods in which, virtually by definition, much of the past as remembered is perceived in terms of exploitation and

injustice. It appears that a conception of the past as repugnant is in many ways a necessary precondition for radical social change. Clearly, therefore, not everyone shares Churchill's comfort and satisfaction with their known past. 'Despoiled . . . of his history, he is a stranger to himself',¹² writes an African historian speaking for considerable sectors of the non-Western world and not a few 'minorities' in the Western world. This view explains the high priority the nationalist policy-makers give to elevating their version of history to a place of honour; they rewrite history as a means of restoring their self-respect.¹³

Immanuel Wallerstein notes that intense nationalism in Africa has made increasingly relevant the query, '*We revive the past, but which past?*' He tells us that revival always implies a selection of the past, a selection that is made not only in terms of the exigencies of the present but also in terms of 'the plans for the future'.¹⁴ The search is for 'useful' history. The following exchange with Brazilian ethnologist Gilberto Freyre illustrates the trend.¹⁵

Botsford: We are all agreed they should use their own history, but, is all of it useful? What should they select?

Freyre: They select on a pragmatic basis, on the basis of a *usable past*.

Botsford: And what is done with the past one does not wish to use?

Freyre: It is repudiated. A people repudiates that part of its past which it cannot, or should not, use. It throws it into what I have called the 'historical garbage' . . .

Marx's dictum that 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness,' though widely accepted even by non-Marxist exponents of the sociology of knowledge,¹⁶ is only partly true. Historical models, like ideologies, do have independent influences. Engels understood this. It was, he said, 'a fatuous notion' of certain ideologists to deny that ideologists had any effect upon history. 'These gentlemen', noted Engels, 'often almost deliberately forget that once a historic element has been brought into the world by other ultimately economic causes, it reacts, can react on its environment and even on the causes that have given rise to it'.¹⁷ Whatever the original social and economic context of the interpretation and reinterpretation of history, the new formulations especially when authored by people both in and out of authority become influential in their own right.

Despite the disparate personal situations of the comfortable Churchills of our day and the revolutionary or nationalistic historian, there is one important factor common to both: they write history in order to build a different future. It is on this pragmatic, goal-oriented

ground that the Churchills of our day and the nationalistic-revisionist historians analysed here meet. Because they are all historically conscious social beings, they are from the sociology of knowledge perspective engaged in fundamentally the same enterprise even though as historians they might be worlds apart in methodology and ultimate goals.

The Trinidadians Eric Williams and C.L.R. James differed from each other in ideology and political paths. Their historiography reflected these differences. These Trinidadians in turn differed from Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic. Their differences reflect and express the great variety of cultures and world views that is the Caribbean. They had one feature in common, however: they each interpreted and wrote history as part of a wider political activism. This is not a critique of that activism or what it aspired to; it is a critical look at the trialectical interaction between present perceptions, aspirations for the future and interpretations of the past. The analysis of this political historiography demonstrates that the 'use' of history in social movements serves two functions: it provides powerful myths for the movement and it provides historical analogies to assist in decision-making.

The anti-imperialist as historian

In 1932 C.L.R. James left his native Trinidad for London. Within a short period of time he was involved in the anti-imperialist movement that Italy's invasion of Ethiopia had unleashed. It is within this context in 1938 that he published *The Black Jacobins* appropriately subtitled 'Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution'.¹⁸ He had come a long way from his days as a member of Trinidad's 'Beacon' Group where Fabianism, not Marxism, was the dominant influence. The Haitian revolution and Toussaint, replacing the labour unionism of his former hero, Trinidad's Captain Arthur ('Tattoo') Cipriani, now provided the historical model.¹⁹ James clearly understood the reasons behind this ideological shift. He was writing, he said, in an age of turmoil, violence and oppression, his context a revolutionary movement striving for clarity and influence. 'Such is our age and this book is of it, with something of the fever and the fret'.²⁰ The relevant, contemporary and 'applied' nature of *The Black Jacobins* was not lost on the reviewers of the time.²¹ The explicitly political and revolutionary purpose behind the book was evident. Paraphrasing Marx, James notes that merely to criticize Toussaint was not enough. One had further to ask: What should Toussaint have done differently? James thought that he had an answer: An alternative course marked by a hundred and fifty years of history

and the scientific study of revolution begun by Marx and Engels and amplified by Lenin and Trotsky.

What James suggested was the strategy he would advocate all his political life: revolutionary populism, direct action of the masses led by men who spring from the masses and keep an organic relationship with them. Not surprisingly, he was writing in London in an atmosphere charged with non-white nationalism. Such sentiments were fired by the plight of India and Ethiopia, the rise of Nazi racism, the betrayals of Stalin and the continuation of Western imperialism. It was in that context that the idea of a 'racial' revolution which would precede the class revolution was widely discussed. Promoting the theme of race before class was another black Trinidadian, George Padmore, who had a strong influence on James.²²

Among those who would be influenced by James in turn was another Trinidadian, Eric Williams, a doctoral student at Oxford, whom James had tutored back home. Williams's doctoral thesis, 'The Economic Aspect of the Abolition of the British West Indian Slave Trade and Slavery' was to be expanded into his classic, *Capitalism and Slavery*, published in the USA in 1944.²³ Williams acknowledged his debt to James. The relationship between capitalism and slavery, he wrote in 1944, had been 'stated clearly and concisely and, as far as I know, for the first time in English' in C.L.R. James' *The Black Jacobins*.²⁴ But Williams did not follow James's historiographical orientation. His ongoing concern was not with voluntaristic revolutionary actions but with the shifts in élite behaviour caused by economic changes. Policy, said Williams, shifts as economic interests change. Williams was content with recording the 'facts', satisfied with the inevitability of their radical implications.

This was not James's central concern. James was concerned with the masses and their leaders, in the colonies and in the metropolis. He argued that both the half-savage slaves of San Domingo and the advanced workers of revolutionary Paris, were 'showing themselves subject to the same historical laws . . .'²⁵ The slave rebels, thus, were 'Revolutionaries through and through . . . our brothers of the Cordeliers in Paris and the Vyborg workers in Petrograd . . .'²⁶

Distinct from the strict materialist interpretations of Williams, James's conception was more voluntarist. He continually asserted the fundamental subordination of men to the necessities of their environment. But that environment is so loosely defined that in fact his heroes continually appear to transcend it:

By a phenomenon often observed, the individual leadership responsible for this unique achievement was almost the work

of a single man Toussaint L'Ouverture . . . The history of the San Domingo revolution will, therefore, largely be a record on his achievements and his political personality.²⁷

But men make history, and Toussaint made the history that he made because he was the man he was.²⁸

After 1794, it is impossible to say where the social forces end and the impress of personality begins.²⁹

This was not Williams's emphasis. Williams was much closer to Engels who depersonalized history by making a distinction between the 'necessity' of having a 'great man' and the sheer 'accident' of who that man might be.³⁰ For Engels, as for Williams, there were no indispensable heroes.

James's historiographical methodology ran parallel to his newly found political ideology, Trotskyism.³¹ Williams's orthodox Marxist models on the other hand reflected his academic, non-involved – perhaps even distant – approach to radical historiography. This partly explains another fundamental area of difference between Williams and James: the role they assigned to race. Williams was categorical in maintaining that in the Caribbean slavery had been 'too narrowly identified with the Negro . . . a racial twist has thereby been given to what is basically an economic phenomenon'.³²

James was an activist dealing with the complexities of a slave uprising in a multi-racial society; he had a more difficult time with the race factor. He repeatedly attempted to interpret group actions in terms of class not colour.³³ In fact, his analysis shifted consistently to the race and colour dimensions of the conflict. James's verdict on Toussaint's leadership rests on the strategic question of whether he used the racial issue adequately. His conclusion was that he had not. 'Knowing the race question for the political and social question that it was', wrote James, '[Toussaint] tried to deal with it in a purely political and social way. It was a grave error'.³⁴ This explained the disillusionment of the blacks of the North who, James argued, inevitably thought in terms of colour. It was because of this failure, says James, that 'the black revolution had passed him by'. Jean-Jacques Dessalines, on the other hand, had no qualms about using racial hatred as a weapon; he promised to make blacks independent and not to leave a white in San Domingo. To James, Dessalines' adamancy represented 'not only a programme, but tactics. The lying and treacherous Bonaparte and Leclerc had met their match at last'.³⁵ Much later in 1962, James would dismiss Dessalines as 'a barbarian';³⁶ but in 1938, he saw him as a cruel but necessary man.

Despite these fundamental differences in historical interpretation and political strategy, Williams felt indebted to James for more than the thesis of the impact of slavery on capitalism. He learned from James that historiography had to serve a political end. Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery* is full of references to colonialism and to Ethiopia and he ended his book with this assertion:

The historians neither make nor guide history. Their share in such is usually so small as to be almost negligible. But, if they do not learn something from history, their activities would be cultural decoration, or a pleasant pastime, equally useless in these troubled times.³⁷

Very early in his career Williams decided that there was a close relationship between his being a West Indian colonial and his desire to study the nature of colonialism in the West Indies. When questioned about this by the examiner at Oxford, Williams was candid: 'I replied that I could not see the value of study unless there was the connection with the environment.'³⁸ Once in politics that environment was logically a political one. It was in and about politics that Williams sharpened his consciousness of the past. History and policy became linked as he gave shape to the future he desired. He always mediated that desire, however, with a realistic sense of capabilities and possibilities. None of James's voluntarism crept into Williams's historiography at this early stage.

Writing in the early 1960s for the African journal of Négritude, *Présence Africaine*, Williams noted that the most important task facing any political leader in the West Indies was to look at the history of the deliberate colonial isolation of one territory from its neighbours, and then, 'looking to the history of the future,' consciously to seek, with equal deliberation, to break down that isolation and to foster closer association.'³⁹

The interaction of present, future and past evident in this passage also appears in Williams's reminiscences on the early political campaigns and his use of history. 'My principal theme . . . was West Indian history . . . I sought always to instil pride, to give a new sense of dignity to our people. Our history was the politics of the past, made for us by others. *It was a necessary guide to the politics of the future* made for us by ourselves.'⁴⁰ Preparing for independence, Williams continued to lecture widely on world issues, and as he put it to the Fourth People's National Movement (PNM) Party Convention, 'The world history of the last ten years is there to tell us the outcome of this struggle.'⁴¹

It is evident that the choice to make 'history' the very heart of his political campaign and nationalist ideology was not unrelated to the

obvious populist appeal of that approach. Williams the historian had understood history's political worth. This explains why, very soon after his return to Trinidad, he decided, in his own words, 'not to pursue an ivory tower existence with my history of the Caribbean, I set about popularizing it.'⁴² Recounting his experience upon returning to Trinidad in 1944 after a twelve-year absence, Williams recalled the emotional response of his large audiences noting that, 'the pandemonium was unbelievable'. Again, the politician overlaps with the historian as he recalls his reaction:

I who had suffered with them [the masses] the tribulations of colonialism had come back as, so one called me, 'the philosopher of West Indian nationalism'.

... I knew then that the nationalist historian, unlike the prophet, had his greatest honour among his own people. All their pent-up nationalist pride and West Indian dignity ... One day, I knew, they too would assert the rights of man and rewrite the history it was my privilege to teach them.⁴³

In 1956 Williams and a large group of middle-class black Trinidadians founded the People's National Movement (PNM). He did not forget his ideological mentor, C.L.R. James. In 1958 James was invited to edit the PNM's party paper, *The Nation*. James accepted and joined Williams in the nationalist movement. Once back in Trinidad (1958-60) James plunged into lecturing on history and political theory to the masses. His lectures during this period were published by the PNM in 1960 and they reflected the 'moderate' tone Williams and his middle-class adherents had given to the movement. James's themes were esoteric to say the least (for example 'What we owe to Ancient Greece').

The racial theme received no attention from James at this time,⁴⁴ as it did from Williams. Since Williams arrived on the island in 1955, many of his speeches had dealt with the history of race relations in the West Indies. Such was the academic tenor of these presentations that the central square where he held most of his meetings became known as 'The University of Woodford Square'. It was there that on 22 March 1961 he delivered his 'Massa Day Done' speech. It was a landmark event since it made historical interpretations of race relations an integral part of the island's politics. It did not matter that Williams warned against interpreting 'Massa' as relating to any specific local ethnic group, or that the concept was derived from 'more than 20 years of assiduous research ...'; in the racially charged atmosphere of Trinidad's politics, the speech (and its publication as a widely distributed pamphlet) was seen in purely racial terms. 'Massa' referred to the white sector. History, accurately or inaccurately, was now fully in the service of politics.

In 1956 the Barbadian novelist, George Lamming, was invited to write for the *PNM Weekly*. In a piece entitled 'Trinidad and the Revolution of Intelligence',⁴⁵ Lamming noted that whatever misgivings one might have about the value of Eric Williams's 'popular education', the fact was that it had 'become an achievement of genius'. Lamming's assessment recalls Butterfield's conclusion that whatever else Whig historiography did for English history, it did wonders for English politics. The mere fact that Williams should want Lamming's analysis published in 1956, and that he repeats it in his 1969 autobiography, is a telling commentary on his strategic and political use of history. To cite Lamming:

He turned history, the history of the Caribbean, into gossip, so that the story of a people's predicament seemed no longer the infinite, barren track of documents, dates and texts. Everything became news: slavery, colonization, . . . His lectures retained always the character of whisper which everyone was allowed to hear, a rumour which experience had established as the truth.⁴⁶

In the midst of political campaigning, and especially once in power, Williams abandoned the orthodox historical materialism of his early scholarship and adopted a much more voluntarist approach. He also abandoned his 1944 assertion that the historian neither makes nor guides history. The history of Trinidad and Tobago since 1956 is witness to the shift from his earlier stance. The populist politician had turned history into 'rumour and gossip' and those into powerful proselytizing instruments. Nothing illustrates this fact and the power available to those politicians who control the way history is written, more than the fall from grace of C.L.R. James. This occurred in 1960 and Williams was the dominant recorder of the events.

At first there was nothing but praise. On 30 May 1960 Williams told a large crowd that the 'great lie of West Indian history remains', that he had dedicated his life to the exposure of that lie, and that others would also forge ahead, 'following the trail blazed over twenty years ago by C.L.R. James' monumental analysis of the Haitian segment of our history'.⁴⁷ On 24 September, 1960, Williams proclaimed that when the story came to be written of the fight in Trinidad and Tobago for full internal self-government and West Indian independence, 'the name of C.L.R. James . . . will have its rightful place at the very top of the roll of honour'.⁴⁸ And again, only a few days later, commenting on James's resignation:

I say, as Political Leader, that James' pronounced intellectual gifts, with which I have been personally familiar at close quarters for some thirty years, and his political sagacity contributed immeasurably to the succesful vindication of our claims and position in respect of self-government, the return of Chaguaramas, a strong and viable federation and the achievement of independence . . .⁴⁹

Alas, when the history was actually written, C.L.R. James's name was nowhere to be found. Independence for the island, 1962, was celebrated by the publication of Williams's *The History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago*. Not only was it read chapter by chapter over the radio, but a reasonably priced paperback was put on sale from special mobile units variously located during independence celebrations. This 'official' history contained not one word about James nor, indeed, about Williams's immediate predecessor as Premier, Albert Gomes.⁵⁰ It did contain many negative words about previous history writers in Trinidad.

Later, when Williams mentioned James at all, it was negatively. For example, on the original hiring of James:

. . . many of our good party members on the General Council objected to his admittance into the Party on the grounds of his notorious political record . . . He used the Party paper to build up himself and his family.⁵¹

Rather than the 1960 expressions of regret at James's resignation, Trinidadians were being told that James was brought before the Disciplinary Committee of the Party and expelled. The situation James left, said Williams, 'bordered on chaos'.⁵²

As was to be expected, James saw the situation differently. Although he never detailed the history of the break anywhere, he was not averse to threatening those who doubted his version of Caribbean and Trinidad history. Anyone 'who opposes what I here advocate', he remarked as he left the PNM in 1960, 'is an enemy of the Party and of the People of the country. Mark them well and distrust them now and for always'.⁵³ James was in no position, of course, to carry out any such threat but his attitude reflected the extent to which the politicians who used history would go to insure their views against total oblivion. Theirs was a political battle, not just a historical debate.

With the author of *The Black Jacobins* in golden exile, lecturing harmlessly to European and American college audiences, Williams dominated the historical scene of the English-speaking Caribbean. Because his books were translated into Spanish, he became widely

accepted as a spokesman for Caribbean history as a whole. He retained that dominance until 1970. That year he had to share the world's interest in the Caribbean with another historian-politician, Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic.

Williams versus Bosch

If ever there were two men who, on the face of it, were capable of breaking down the cultural and linguistic barriers which balkanize the Caribbean they were the scholars Eric Williams and Juan Bosch. Williams – Trinidadian, Oxford-trained historian, statesman, teacher in the United States, official of the Caribbean Commission (a defunct colonial entity at one time located in Puerto Rico) – was a man whose scholarship accurately reflected his Caribbean-wide vision. He was a researcher whose interest in the Caribbean led him to virtually every major archive in the area, the U.S., and Europe. Originally elected to office in 1956, he held that office until his death in 1981. Bosch – Dominican statesman exiled for years in the Cuba of Prío Socarrás,⁵⁴ the Costa Rica of José Figueres, the Venezuela of Rómulo Betancourt and, more recently, the archives of Spain – was a self-made man with Caribbean-wide interests. Elected President of the Dominican Republic in 1962, he was overthrown by the military in 1963. He would emerge again as the focus of the attempted revolution in 1965 and since 1986 has been once again a viable candidate for the presidency.

Not surprisingly, in 1970, by 'spontaneous generation' from the experience and visions of these two Caribbean intellectuals there appeared books with the same title, *From Columbus to Castro*.⁵⁵

Neither Bosch nor Williams had meant these works to be vehicles through which to convey their own personal experiences as Caribbean leaders. They had done that elsewhere: Bosch in *La Crisis de la Democracia de América en la República Dominicana* (1964) and Williams in *Inward Hunger* (1968). Be that as it may, the two 1970 works were more than two histories by two prominent Caribbean scholars; they were also testimonials to the trialectical role of historical consciousness as it operated and influenced two great Caribbean politician-historians.

If there were some parallels between the Caribbean experiences and political goals of the authors, the similarity between these books was limited to the identical titles, time frames, the fact that neither author footnoted nor cited the sources of his data and the fact that they were clearly meant for wide, popular audiences. The differences were more numerous; and much more than the traditional differences of

geographical or historical emphasis. These, to be sure, were present. No English-speaking West Indian author, for instance, would assert that the Bahamas are not historically, politically, culturally or economically part of the Caribbean; nor would he call Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados 'republics' (at least not in 1970), nor would he leave the three Guianas out of his geographical and historical definition of the Caribbean. Bosch does all this. No Hispano-Caribbeanist would write, 'The Platt Amendment, . . . was to govern American relations with Cuba down to the advent of Fidel Castro' nor would he accept the interpretation that 'The Castro Revolution in 1958 was a belated attempt to catch up with the nationalist movement in the rest of the Caribbean.' Both are in Williams's work. Such mistakes by Caribbean scholars reflect the enormity of the informational gap which exists between the various Caribbean linguistic areas. The truly significant difference between the books, however, lies in their focus and approach to the major forces driving Caribbean history, reflections of fundamentally different types of historical consciousness in the Caribbean.

Bosch saw the Caribbean as a major imperial frontier, and set out to describe the European events which had had a direct bearing on conditions and events in the frontier area. He wrote from the Hispanic point of view, justified, as he tells us, because this was a Spanish frontier which other nations were determined to rip apart and conquer. Over half the book is spent on the period up to the Peace of Paris (1763). All major imperial military campaigns are described in detail, complemented by often perceptive treatments of 'internal' violence against the imperialists by Indians, black slaves, and later, free men. In essence, Bosch wrote in a vein which in non-Hispanic Caribbean scholarly circles was no longer acceptable: Caribbean history seen as an extension of European political history.

To Bosch in 1970 the main issue in the Caribbean was imperialism, first from Europe and then from the United States. To Williams, on the other hand, the issue was colonialism, defined in the more contemporary, comprehensive and sociological sense. A few cases will illustrate these differences.

At a time when Spain considered its Caribbean possessions '*islas inútiles*', as Bosch correctly notes, Barbados, according to Williams, was 'the most important single colony in the British Empire'.⁵⁶ Where Bosch is more prone to providing a detailed account of filibuster and buccaneer life, Williams is more interested in demonstrating how, by the seventeenth century, the Caribbean Sea had become 'virtually a Dutch canal . . .' with all its economic implications.⁵⁷ While Bosch is still describing the doings of corsairs, buccaneers and pirates, Williams tells us that Jean Baptiste Colbert, French Minister of Marine, had

become 'the architect and symbol of the seventeenth-century colonial system'.⁵⁸ It is not surprising, therefore, that Colbert is not mentioned even in passing by Bosch. Similarly, Bosch notes that the Spanish-(Cuban)-American War of 1898 signalled the entry of the US into the Caribbean as an 'empire'. Williams's analysis of the Yankee trading circles illustrates how the New Englanders had already entrenched themselves economically in the area by the second half of the seventeenth century. American economic interests in the Caribbean antedated by over two centuries their military and political designs on it. For Williams, the economic frontier consistently anticipates the military-political one. For Bosch, the latter is supreme.

Williams does not waste much time getting to the point regarding Caribbean 'internal' history. By page 25 he brings Caribbean history into focus by noting that the main features of colonialism were already present in 1520: subsidies from and protection by the state; concentration of ownership; all productive activity for export and an abandonment of the domestic market. The central imperial concern – ensuring a stable market in the colonies – had crystallized very early.

The different political contexts and challenges had had their impact on Williams and Bosch. To Williams governing a post-colonial and multi-racial society it was slavery and the plantation which had engendered Caribbean historical consciousness. His task as a historian, and, not incidentally, as a politician, was to explain and deal with the racial and class differences bequeathed by this plantation past.

Bosch's challenge in 1970 was different: it was regaining power in the face of imperialism. This explains why despite his adherence to conventional historiographical approaches of emphasis and periodization, Bosch's intention throughout *De Cristóbal Colón a Castro* is revolutionary. In fact, Bosch's 'revolutionary' phase had begun with two works of contemporary populist historiography: *Pentagonismo* (1967), an attack on US imperialism, and *Dictadura con Respaldo Popular* (1969), a new revolutionary model for Latin America and the Caribbean. It appears, then, that this 1970 book was the complementary historical treatise. Not surprisingly, Bosch spent his pages documenting imperial aggressions. As he put it, 'This book is designed to be exclusively an account of the imperial aggressions produced in the Caribbean'.⁵⁹ Thus in describing the Haitian Revolution Bosch noted that the phenomenon of the social displacement of one group in Haiti 'corresponds to what we can call the private history of Haiti' and therefore had no place in the book.⁶⁰ Similarly, in his discussion of the Wars of Independence of Nueva Granada, Bosch suddenly stopped to announce that 'in any case, given the fact that these struggles were internal there is no place in this book to describe them;'⁶¹ When he

departed from this methodological stricture, his analysis of events and actors became excessively rigid, even mechanistic and deterministic. All of the members of the *petit-bourgeoisie* behave the way *petit-bourgeois* are supposed to behave; all upper-class members behave as their class is supposed to behave; the success or failure of any movement is nearly always attributed to the particular class origins of its leaders; all leaders who spring from the people fight for the people. In this Bosch was consistent with his 1964 attacks on the middle class of his own country. They have, he said, no patriotism.⁶² This deterministic focus led Bosch in 1970 to the creation of a few myths.

Bosch versus Bosch

In his 1970 description of the Venezuelan Wars of Independence, a leader of the Royalist cavalry, José Boves, became one of Bosch's new heroes. Bosch's reasoning was that Boves was a populist leader because his followers were the rural mulatto and mestizo *llaneros*. Bolívar's motives, on the other hand were suspect; true popular leadership could not come from a member of the white *mantuano* class to which he belonged. Nowhere did Bosch tell us that Boves's real name was José Tomas Boves y de la Iglesia, that he was a white Asturian of considerable education and some economic status before he took up the Royalist cause. Bosch included him in the pantheon of popular Caribbean heroes which includes the likes of César Augusto Sandino, José Martí, and Toussaint L'Ouverture.

The fact is that by 1970 Bosch had assumed a radically different posture towards the role of violence in Caribbean politics and, from there, in history. This explains why in 1970 he eliminated any reference to the atrocities which he had attributed to Boves in a highly acclaimed 1966 book, *Bolívar y la Guerra Social*. Bosch's 1966 version of Boves's sadistic cruelty are dramatic enough to warrant restatement:⁶³

1. The entire population of the towns of San Joaquín and Santa Ana (that is, men, women, children of all ages) were ordered to be put to the knife by Boves *after* they had surrendered.

2. The wives, mothers and daughters of captured officers in Valencia were made to dance to whiplashes while their menfolk were being decapitated. In Barcelona the same scene took place, but with an added touch: an orchestra of creole musicians were decapitated one by one each half hour; the last remaining violinist being made to play while the women were raped and decapitated.

3. The systematic herding of men, women and children before the

altar of the local church where they were raped and disembowelled was another of Boves's techniques.

Boves's penchant for ritualistic and sadistic killing (captured officers were known to be put in local bull rings with bull horns stuck to their foreheads and made to play bull while the '*picadores*' stabbed at them) was clearly psycho-pathological. In 1966 Bosch had not minimized the importance of Boves in the *guerra social* of 1812-14 nor did he minimize the 'mass' or popular aspect of Boves's following. But he retained in 1966 a balanced analysis when evaluating the *personal* roles and merits of Boves and Bolívar, a balance which is lost in his *De Cristóbal Colón a Fidel Castro* book. Noting in 1966 that Boves's idea was simply to destroy the high-status *criollo* whites (*mantuanos*), Bosch stated that for Boves, equality was not sought by means of the creation of a state which would guarantee and maintain it through the authority of law, it was sought through the destruction of the *mantuano* class. 'The *guerra social* of Venezuela from 1812 to 1814 was, thus, destructive, not creative', Bosch concluded. 'Only Bolívar tried to find, and offered to those who had made [the *guerra social*] a constructive way out.'⁶⁴

Bosch very carefully noted in 1964 that being a *mantuano*, himself, Bolívar could not offer the masses the same immediate gratifications which Boves could. Bolívar did, on the other hand, offer them something which in the long run would have been more revolutionary because it attacked the structural rather than the superstructural aspects of social action: the nationalization of all property. Bosch noted that in declaring on 25 January 1814 that all property belonged to the State Bolívar had established his revolutionary credentials: 'A more revolutionary and equalizing piece of legislation could not be given. Not even Lenin, upon taking power a hundred years later, dared declare that "all property belongs to the State".'⁶⁵

In 1966 Bosch seemed to believe that given the then-existing historical stage of development, the masses were not in a position to appreciate the depth of Bolívar's reformist measures. By 1970, however, he had abandoned this sympathetic understanding of Bolívar's intentions, substituting it with a rigid class analysis of leadership merits.

The crucial historiographical question is, however: If Bosch had dealt with Boves and Bolívar in a balanced way in 1966, why did he change his interpretation radically in 1970? Did he discover 'new' sources? None are indicated by Bosch, and certainly the recognized scholarship on Boves and on that period hardly supported his new position. Quite the contrary. Germán Carrera Damas's massive historiographical study of the literature on Boves dealt specifically with the new populist interpretation that Boves was an 'agrarian reformer', the initiator of the struggle for land and justice.⁶⁶ Understanding the

politically controversial nature of the questions, Carrera Damas produced a subsequent work in which he submits the issue to a rigorous methodological test of sources and interpretations.⁶⁷ He repeats his fundamental conclusion: the analysis showed that the version of Boves as reformist leader was a political myth, 'not based on respectable foundations'. Boves appeared rather as an *administrador de secuestros* confiscating property not for his followers but for the Real Hacienda of the King of Spain.

In this manner, utilizing the known documentation, it was not possible to state that Boves turned out to be a distributor of land, or a 'redistributor' of property; instead, that same documentation authorizes us to believe that Boves was an orthodox *administrador de secuestros*, and so we concluded.⁶⁸

Carrera Damas also approvingly published the new findings of Professor Julio Febres Cordero who concluded that Boves 'did not have, nor could he have had, agrarian concerns since his role was reduced to being a simple guarantor of the properties and possessions of the Crown.'⁶⁹ These and similar new findings were published in the 1968 Preface to the 2nd edition, and were thus readily available to Bosch.

The shift in Bosch's interpretation of the roles Bolívar and Boves played in the Venezuelan conflict was not an isolated instance. An ideological shift was also apparent in the reinterpretation given to many of his own previous versions of important Caribbean controversies. His treatment of Haitian history illustrates this. In 1970 he consistently elevated the populist virtues of black King Henri Christophe while denigrating the 'bourgeois' mulatto president Alexandre Pétion. Again, the new litmus test appears to be the social origins of each plus the use of massive violence to eliminate the existing 'bourgeois' system. But note his 1966 treatment of the same issue and same two leaders: Henri Christophe I and Alexandre Pétion, Bosch maintained then, used the lands of the nation in quite different ways. The King [Christophe] returned to the *latifundio colonial* for the benefit of himself and that of the nobility he had created, and with the *latifundio* 'he resuscitated slavery in fact, if not in law'. Pétion, on the other hand, distributed among the peasants of the south the lands of the State, frequently doing the distributing himself. With a population in which all the adults had been born slaves or at best black and ex-slave freedmen, the agrarian republic of Pétion, noted Bosch, 'lived in a simple and peaceful sort of patriarchal democracy, equally nationalistic as calm ...' Bosch's general conclusion in 1966 was unequivocal: 'in 1816 Haiti in the south was happy but poor, it would never again be the splendid land of other times; Haiti in the north was a tyranny of horror'.⁷⁰

Again, the fact is that new and pertinent scholarly literature supported Bosch's 1966 position, not the radical reinterpretation of 1970. Leslie Manigat's meticulous study of the agrarian policy of Pétion is a case in point. Manigat was under no illusions as to Pétion's reformist motives; he understood the political expediency behind them. But he did conclude that Pétion's policies represented a 'decisive epoch' in Haitian history: 'The moment it represents is, thus, a key moment in the evolution of Haiti's agrarian sector, a moment of property division which stamped its imprint on the rural face of the country'.⁷¹

Similarly, other social scientists studying contemporary social structures in northern and southern Haiti continue to document the regional differences, legacies of the differences between Henri Christophe and Alexandre Pétion. Caroline J. Lagerman, for instance, discovered in Haiti's South a relatively stable core population which had been cultivating its own lands since the time of independence if not before. She found that housing, family life and other socio-cultural aspects in the South compared most favourably with the other areas studied where large-scale production, absentee landlordism, wage labour and share cropping predominated.

The point is that since Bosch did not present any new sources of historical evidence to refute the version of Pétion which he himself maintained in 1966, one has to seek a sociological, not a historiographical explanation for his shift in 1970. The answer is not fully at hand, but there are some fruitful propositions to be derived from a sociology of knowledge approach to the question. For one, it is evident that Bosch was an author in ideological transition. If one examines his works from, for instance, his *Cuba, la Isla Fascinante* (1955), to his *De Cristóbal Colón a Fidel Castro* (1970) one finds an increasing ideological shift to the left. It is also evident that Bosch's ideological shifts coincided with major watersheds in his political career and fortunes. There did not occur, however, a parallel methodological shift; in fact, there was not even a consistent methodology. Bosch appears to move painlessly and unselfconsciously from an economic interpretation of social change to a psychological one, to a psychoanalytical, and even a mystical one.⁷² To call Bosch's work 'Marxist', as is done in certain circles, is profoundly misleading.

Marxism like 'radicalism' is an ideology. But Marxism unlike 'radicalism' is also a method of analysis in which 'historical materialism' subordinates human voluntarism and social particularisms to the dialectic resulting from class conflict. Bosch's 1970 versions of populist and revolutionary leadership utilized a crude determinism in an attempt to provide historical justifications for his new political thesis and call for a 'dictatorship with popular support'. Bosch's choices as examples,

Boves and Christophe, though thoroughly dictatorial, were hardly 'popular'. That origin of birth is only one of the variables involved in the making of a revolutionary is something that Marx and Engels were always aware of when they considered the historical role that dissident and disaffected members of the bourgeoisie could play. The history of the Caribbean is replete with illustrative cases, not the least of which are the divergent historical roles of Fulgencio Batista, a lower-class mulatto from rural Oriente, and Fidel Castro, also from rural Oriente but white and bourgeois.

Even more disputable than his interpretation of personalities was Bosch's 1970 interpretation of revolutionary movements, and specifically his assertion that the Haitian Revolution embodied every idea Marx ever had of revolution. Bosch noted that this interpretation was limited to the struggle stage since afterwards the Haitian revolution would be something else than Marxist, 'but up to the moment of gaining power any student of Marx can find all the ideas of Marx converted into actions'.⁷³

Should not Bosch have wondered why Marx, who knew the history of the French Revolution well and must certainly have known about the Haitian Revolution, never mentioned Haiti in any of his major works? The populist political purpose of Bosch's historiography in 1970 made such queries unlikely. Not unnaturally, therefore, once Bosch asserted this new historical model of the Haitian revolution it was only logical that he would extend the analogy one step further; and indeed in 1970, Bosch demonstrated the power of historical analogy in politics. One hundred and sixty years later, he noted, what had happened in Haiti would be repeated in Cuba and it would be a fortuitous repetition. 'The Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro would historically be a daughter of the Haitian Revolution'.⁷⁴ Unfortunately Bosch's treatment of the Cuban Revolution is limited to an analysis of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, a result of his emphasis on the 'imperial frontier'. The statement must, therefore, be judged on exterior evidence or deduced from Bosch's central thesis of revolution and the desirability of popular dictatorship, that is from Bosch's new political vision of the Caribbean and its historical dynamics.

Because Bosch maintained that the Caribbean is a unit shaped by one major historical phenomenon, imperialism, and since this imperialism had one common source and thus one common impact in the Caribbean he concludes that, 'Logically, therefore, no country of the Caribbean can be seen isolated from the rest'.⁷⁵ To Bosch the only way to confront this imperialism throughout the Caribbean was with revolution. But the question is, did Bosch's new thesis of the imperial frontier provide an adequate description and explanation of past and

contemporary revolutions of the Caribbean even as described in 1970 by Bosch himself? It is not at all evident that it does, as his version of Cuban history during the nineteenth century illustrates.

No country in the Caribbean, says Bosch, has had an historical process similar to that of Cuba. The wars in Haiti were provoked directly by the French Revolution; the wars in Venezuela and Nueva Granada by the Napoleonic intervention in Spain; the independence in Central America was a by-product of the wars in Venezuela, Nueva Granada and Mexico; all the events which resulted from the French Revolution influenced the birth of the Dominican Republic. 'But the case of Cuba', he writes, 'was and has continued to be different . . . Cuba became the source of its own historical acts, something singular in the Caribbean'.⁷⁶ All this raises the question as to how Fidel Castro's revolution can be considered to be a daughter of the Haitian Revolution, and part of a broader struggle on the imperial frontier, when Cuba's previous history of struggles is also said to have responded to unique internal socio-economic contradictions. Part of the explanation lies in Bosch's Hispanicism which leads to the thesis that Spain was not an imperial power since it did not have the one social ingredient necessary for such a role, a national bourgeoisie. Time and again he repeats this assertion without ever fully explaining why a national bourgeoisie is essential for imperial colonization. Can anyone claim that the role of Portugal in Africa was not an imperial colonization? Yet few would claim that Portugal's weak and underdeveloped national bourgeoisie was the crucial factor in the imperialist venture. Portuguese imperialism, like Spanish imperialism before it, was a state-administered enterprise which responded to the interests of the dominant social and economic élites of that country.

Another explanation can be found in the excessively political purpose of Bosch's history which in turn created a methodological confusion in the structure of the book. Because Bosch attempts on the one hand to provide a Marxist interpretation of events, but at the same time use historical interpretation to bolster a given political theory and platform, the results are confusing and blurred. It could not be otherwise when the proselytizing political message is reached independently from any historically derived conclusion. Surely Bosch must have understood that, if one concludes, as he does, that the history of decolonization and liberation in the Caribbean in the past as in the present and future, has been, is, and will be achieved only through revolutionary violence, something more than an analysis of past battles and conflicts was necessary. Indeed, despite his Sorelien concern with violence, nowhere does Bosch's analysis deal with the array of practical and theoretical considerations dealt with for instance by Frantz Fanon,

a Martinican scholar who saw in violence the necessary 'cleansing' process to psychological decolonization.⁷⁷ In fact, Bosch does not even mention Fanon, another reflection of the linguistic and cultural compartmentalization of Caribbean scholarship.

Interestingly enough, and by comparison, Williams's straightforward Marxist analysis lent itself much more to a revolutionary conclusion. He, however, never drew such a radical policy conclusion or recommendation from his history. His treatise consistently revealed the role of historical paradox, – how and why a given political or constitutional act in the Caribbean hardly ever had its expected social and economic complement; to win a military battle was rarely to win the social war. He saw lessons in the fact that the passing of slavery in Haiti and then in the West Indies meant the dawn of a new era of slavery in Brazil and Cuba. Metropolitan interests were hardly affected by Abolition in the British West Indies. Indeed, England adopted a free-trade policy in 1852 and so became the largest single market for slave-produced sugar, against which the sugar produced by free labour in its colonies could not compete. In the same way, the decline of the sugar economies of Haiti and the British West Indies signalled a new era of sugar *latifundismo* in other parts of the Caribbean – Puerto Rico, Hispaniola – and the beginnings of the industrialization of the colonial crop in Cuba. Williams made a point of noting how watersheds for one island rarely meant the same for the rest of the islands. Somehow historical lessons, no matter how heroic, were lost as each Caribbean people seemed determined to go through the same historical process. Characterized by the same colonial structures and competing for the same metropolitan markets, the problems and travails of one often redounded to the profit of the other. It was so in the past, it was so in 1970, said Williams, pointing to the redistribution of the American sugar quota following the cutting off of the Cuban share in 1960. Williams consistently addressed this fundamental economic issue of the Caribbean and his candidness is chilling, a result, no doubt, of the experiences of being a sitting Prime Minister. Commenting on René Dumont's suggestion that Cuba should diversify its economy and seek a broader market in the Caribbean area, Williams did not beat around the bush:

But Trinidad and Tobago, producing sugar, ammonia, petroleum, garments, condensed milk and other products competing with Cuba's, could hardly be expected to surrender its independent development of its own economy in order to be a dumping ground for Cuba's products and allow Castro to be the sugar bowl of the Caribbean.⁷⁸

The vision of a Cuba capable of producing ten million tons of sugar annually was not one the Caribbean leadership relished. They did not believe that their island economies could long withstand it.

In 1970, Juan Bosch's historical interpretations reflected the revolutionary politics of a man fighting to regain power; Eric Williams's interpretations reflected the pragmatism of the leader of a small democracy. In both cases, historiography was at the service of politics and, as such, was susceptible to the fallacies and contradictions common to populist historiography.

Williams versus Williams

It is in the last two chapters on 'Castroism' and 'The Future of the Caribbean' of *From Columbus to Castro* that Williams, the scholar, complements Williams, the statesman. This was a role with which he was quite comfortable. Yet major questions of Trinidad's history remained either muddled or outright contradictory. Aside from the question of the historical role of individuals such as C.L.R. James and Albert Gomes already mentioned, there were many other questions about his use of history. Butterfield's methodological stricture may be applied to it, that among various tests to which any politician's memoirs should be submitted, there is one which is very apt: 'the comparison of the narrative which was written in retrospect with the correspondence of the same author at the time when the events were actually taking place'.⁷⁹ Several questions of Trinidad's history, and Williams's versions of it, also deserve such treatment. An important issue is the origin of the model or programme of social, political and economic development of the island which Williams and the PNM adopted. What, in other words, were the sources of Williams and the PNM's early political ideology? It is clear, and Williams records it so in *Inward Hunger*, that the original model was a copy of the Puerto Rican one. In fact, two architects of Puerto Rico's system, the Puerto Rican Teodoro Moscoso and the St Lucian W. Arthur Lewis, were intimately involved in Trinidad.⁸⁰

In June 1956 Williams and the PNM sent a long memorandum to the British Governor for onward transmission to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Among the points made was that the PNM's economic programme, 'is modelled consciously on the experience and achievements of another Caribbean community, Puerto Rico ...'⁸¹ The question is: at what point, if ever, did Williams abandon the Puerto Rican model? This is not answered in his history.

By 1970 Williams's thinking on development and Caribbean integration had undergone great changes. His history writing reflected

these. In *From Columbus to Castro* he speaks of three competing models that were discussed: the Puerto Rican type of industrialization for the United States market, the Cuban model, and the Trinidad and Tobago model, 'a path less revolutionary and more gradualistic, and less totalitarian and more democratic than the Cuban path, but more autonomous and ultimately self-reliant than the Puerto Rican one'.⁸² Williams projects this model only for the Commonwealth Caribbean, noting that it is not possible to sketch at this time what the relationship will be towards the rest of the area. This conscious ignoring of the rest of the area causes Williams's analysis to lose some of its sharp focus. On the one hand he asserts that integration makes necessary looser ties between France and its *départements* in the Caribbean, on the other he visualizes 'true' integration without Puerto Rico which he sees irremediably (a *fait accompli* he calls it) moving toward closer ties with the US. Not that Williams seems happy over this. 'Economic growth has been achieved (in Puerto Rico), but national identity lost', he notes, adding, 'What shall it profit a country if it gain the whole world and lose its own soul?'⁸³ What indeed?

It is clear that if Williams judged the Cuban model to have resulted in totalitarianism and advocated steps to prevent its exportation, and also rejected the Puerto Rican model for the Caribbean, one is left only with the Trinidad and Tobago development model as a viable alternative. One can hardly criticize a politician for changing his mind about 'models' of development, but the same dispensation cannot be made towards the rewriting of history to suit those shifts in policy. Again, Butterfield's cautions are appropriate. 'Our politicians', he warned, 'now know that the historians are on their track. So they prepare for them in advance – they write with the public in mind or they leave crucial things unrecorded'.⁸⁴

In 1981, a posthumous collection of Williams's speeches appeared. *Forged from the Love of Liberty*⁸⁵ represents an autobiographical look at his years in power, 1955-80. It is a good companion volume to his *Inward Hunger* and a good source for a 'Williams versus Williams' review. Because the book represents a sort of political last will and testament of a leader who passed away only months after the work went to press, it is the best collection of materials available with which to judge the protagonist, his changing goals, his success or failure in fulfilling them, and his recording of them for posterity.

In this volume there is the Williams of 1955 eulogizing Puerto Rico and Arthur Lewis, whom he would emulate in his effort to make 'Trinidad the industrial center of the entire Caribbean'.⁸⁶ There is Williams promising to end the immorality and dishonesty of Trinidad life by creating a disciplined political party modelled on the PNP of

Jamaica.⁸⁷ There is Williams accepting the Westminster Parliamentary constitution and system, reasoning that 'After all, if the British Constitution is good enough for Great Britain, it should be good enough for Trinidad and Tobago'.⁸⁸ Or, again in 1955, there is Williams in Woodford Square using history and sociology to build a political following. 'This problem of race is essentially modern', he would tell his largely black working-class audiences, introducing them to Sepúlveda, Las Casas, Long, Edwards, Froude, Carlyle, Trollope, Fernando Ortiz, José Martí, Frank Tannenbaum. And so his speeches were lectures on the meaning of Federation (when the PNM suffered its one and only electoral loss), independence and its various five-year plans. This volume also has the Williams of 1970, first sympathizing with the demands of Black Power – 'If this is Black Power then I am for Black Power.' (Was this not an extension of his 1961 'Massa Day Done' speech?) But it contains no documentation of his appeals, on the verge of being overthrown, for British, US and Venezuelan assistance: these appeals would be seen in 1972 as 'one of the greatest acts of betrayal in Caribbean history' by A.N.R. Robinson, who resigned as Williams's Deputy Prime Minister in 1970.⁸⁹ There is the post-Black Power call and promise of a shift in economic policy toward state-driven development at all levels of the economy, from sugar plantations to oil.

In other words, in these pages there is the early Williams and the later Williams, and as with any leader whose career spans such a length of time, it is difficult to conclude which is the 'real man'. This is where the Epilogue tips the scales towards a particular historical interpretation of Williams. The historian in him kept him writing and attempting to shape the historical record to the end. With a stream-of-consciousness style, Williams left a document steeped in cynicism and invective; an outpouring of resentment and frustration, pettiness and pique so palpable that it portrays the tortured nature of the last year in office of the politician historian.

This last evaluation is not made lightly, for the evidence of Williams's persistent sense of persecution and fear of victimization began to appear in the late 1970s. The first to write of it publicly was Dr Winston Mahabir,⁹⁰ a minister in the first pre-independence Cabinet, who related the Prime Minister's constant fears of plotting by his ministers, by Muslims and even, at one point by a 'Chinese coalition'. Next came Dr Patrick Solomon who, like Mahabir, was a physician. Solomon was close to Williams from the very beginning, holding down several cabinet and diplomatic posts until 1977 when he 'could no longer continue to serve a Prime Minister whose petty spite and personal animosities were placed before the national interests'.⁹¹

In other words, by the late 1970s Williams had lost the monopoly in the way that Trinidad's history would be told. His political opponents were having their say. The pervasive, collectively held fear of Williams among PNM leaders which Selwyn Ryan calls the 'fear of the old man'⁹² was waning.

Williams's final Epilogue is worth analysing in depth for reasons other than the search for the psychopathological in Williams's personality. It is the clearest indication thus far of the depth and scope of the radical change in the early, original historical interpretations and ideas as well as the decline of the ideals with which Williams through the PNM launched Trinidad into party politics, independence and nationhood.

The scholar whose celebrated historical materialist interpretations of capitalism and slavery never once quoted Marx, Engels or any other early historical materialists now quoted Lenin to describe Latin America as financially and diplomatically 'dependent'. The Caribbean, that area about which he made so many claims to understanding and explaining sympathetically, was now nothing more than 'an appendage of metropolitan economies, pandering to metropolitan vices and contemporary deviants'. The Puerto Rico he once so admired was now 'a farce', Cuba and Jamaica were 'mere dependencies', and even the Caribbean sea was becoming 'as polluted as the Mediterranean'.⁹³ The Caribbean Group for Co-operation and Economic Development 'originally a Trinidad and Tobago proposal' was now 'a high-falutin title . . . much ado about nothing'. CARICOM? ' . . . that too is on its last legs'.⁹⁴ The man who spent his political career calling for 'discipline and production' turned to lambasting the island's private sector for calling for the same values and then borrowed from Vidia Naipaul to jeer: 'What will our capitalist mimic men do now?' More, he warned that the private sector was 'still as hostile as ever to the PNM (*sic*) whom they are determined to remove by hook or by crook – more likely by crook'.⁹⁵ There is a list of 'enemies among us' and those outside. But one need not delve further. The point has been made that this was a political leader in personal isolation and turmoil. The call for relief which ended the apostasy he labelled an Epilogue is telling: 'The Political Leader awaits the Party's democratic arrangements and decisions for the election of a new leader to lead Party and Nation forward . . .'⁹⁶

In any country of the world, Eric Williams would have stood out. In Trinidad, he overwhelmed. His native intelligence, his capacity for work, his political instincts, were all exceptional. But perhaps most exceptional was his 'inward hunger', for as he wrote in 1969, he was 'determined to prove that, like Dante's Ulysses, I could conquer the inward hunger that I had to master earth's experience, and to attain

knowledge of man's mind, both good and bad'.⁹⁷ History, writing about it and using it, was his chosen vehicle. He left a mixed and complex legacy.

Conclusion

The sociological analysis of populist history differs in one important aspect from the sociology of knowledge as traditionally understood.⁹⁸ While the latter is principally concerned with the social and political origin of unrealistic thought ('ideology' or 'utopia' in the Mannheim sense), the former is interested in the shifting uses of facts, – that is of realistic thought. Given the historical consciousness of contemporary man, the search is for 'what really happened.' The more real and factual the history, the greater its persuasive power. The problem is that while all history writing is a matter of interpretation, populist history is even more so.

That historical 'fact' is a matter of interpretation is now agreed to by sociologists and historians. As E.H. Carr put it: 'The facts speak only when the historian calls on them . . . The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy . . .'⁹⁹ All this leads Carr to suggest the principle that one should 'study the historian before you begin to study the facts.'¹⁰⁰ Yet Carr will not surrender totally to this historiographical pragmatism for, as he says, it might lead to the danger of a 'purely pragmatic view of the facts, and maintain that the criterion of a right interpretation is its suitability to present purpose'.¹⁰¹ The latter is, of course, precisely the purpose of populist historiography and the cause of its often shifting interpretations of the same events or facts.

There is no easy resolution of this 'present-mindedness', especially not in those areas where the need to rewrite a 'colonial' history is deeply felt. It is in those countries and especially among its politician-historians that one finds solid agreement with Michael Oakeshott's view that 'History is the historian's experience. It is "made" by nobody save the historian: to write history is the only way of making it'.¹⁰²

However, one has to take Carr's caution seriously. This is especially true when the major authors are powerful politicians writing history for political ends, that is using history. The danger is not that they have their unique interpretations but that their interpretations become the only ones; that populist historiography becomes official history.

It is a telling fact that the degree of debate and controversy surrounding a nation's 'true history' says a great deal about the state

of civil liberties and social-political diversity of that society. From that perspective, C.L.R. James, Eric Williams and Juan Bosch have done their share for Caribbean intellectual freedom. They will be intellectually honoured to the extent that their historiographical positions are debated and disputed if need be.

Notes

- 1 Quoted in Henry Steel Commager, Winston Churchill: The Statesman as Historian, *Saturday Review*, 18 May 1968 p.26.
- 2 Mirca Eliade traces the genesis of man's historical consciousness to the rise of the Jews as a people (*Cosmos and History, the Myth of the Eternal Return*. New York, 1959); John Lukacs sees it as one of the important developments of the last 'three or four centuries' (*Historical Consciousness or the Remembered Past*. New York, 1968). The phenomenon differs only qualitatively from past periods when such an awareness was avidly desired, for as John Stuart Mill noted in his 1861 work on *Representative Government*: 'The strongest cause for the feeling of nationality . . . is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past'.
- 3 Fritz Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History* (New York, Meridan, 1956), p.18-19.
- 4 For the English case see Herbert Butterfield, *King George III and the Historians* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1959); for France see Peter Geyl, *Napoleon: For and Against* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949).
- 5 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966* (New York, 1967); See further by the same author, and on the same problem: *The Historian and History, Foreign Affairs* (April 1963), pp.491-7; and *On the Writing of Contemporary History, The Atlantic* (March, 1967), pp.69-74.
- 6 For works which show similar relationships between political needs and the uses of history across ideological lines are C.E. Black (ed.), *Rewriting Russian History* (1962), and in the United States, C.Vann Woodward, *American Attitudes Towards History* (1955) and Cushing Stout, *The Pragmatic Revolt in American History* (1959).
- 7 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernst R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York, The Free Press, 1986), p.XII.
- 8 Cf. Stuart Chase, *Guides to Straight Thinking* (New York, Harper and Row, 1956), pp.81-8.
- 9 Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?* (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1963), p.176.
- 10 Compare to F.A. Hayek: 'The influence which the writers of history thus exercise on public opinion is probably more immediate and extensive than that of the political theorists who launch new ideas . . . The historian is in this respect at least one step nearer to direct power over public opinion than is the theorist': 'History and Politics', in F.A. Hayek (ed.), *Capitalism and the Historians* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963), p.4.

- 11 Cf. Butterfield: 'The tendency to look for an historian who will serve as an "authority" is one which seems to have increased during my lifetime ...' (*op. cit.*, p.8).
- 12 J. Ki Zerbo. *Histoire et Conscience Nègre, Présence Africaine*, Vol. 16 (October-November, 1957), p.53.
- 13 Cf. Rupert Emerson. *From Empire to Nation* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1960), pp.152-6. The rewriting of history in ex-colonial countries is dealt with extensively in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.), *Social Change, The Colonial Situation* (New York, John Wiley, 1966), pp.583-658.
- 14 Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa and the Politics of Independence* (New York, Vintage Books, 1961), p.134.
- 15 Interview, *Encounter* (November 1972). Emphasis added.
- 16 Cf. Karl Mannheim's 'thesis' that 'how one looks at history and how one construes a total situation from given acts, depends on the position one occupies within society'. *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, Hartcourt, Brace & World, 1936), p.125.
- 17 F. Engels, letter to Franz Mehring, 14 July 1893, in Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), p.767.
- 18 C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins* (New York, Vintage Books, 2nd ed. rev., 1963.) Originally published in London by Frederic Warburg, 1938).
- 19 James's first effort at history writing was *The Life of Captain Cipriani* (London, Nelson, Lancashire, Coulton & Co., Ltd., 1932). He also wrote a novel, *Minty Alley* (London, Secker and Warburg, 1932) which showed strong sympathies for working-class Trinidadians.
- 20 *The Black Jacobins*, p.xi.
- 21 Cf. the reviewers in 1938: 'Mr. James is not afraid to touch his pen with the flame of ardent personal feelings, a sense of justice, love of freedom, admiration for heroism, hatred for tyranny ...' (*New York Times Book Review*, 11 December 1938); '[the story] is told in terms which have contemporary significance ... It may prove to be the text of tomorrow's events in Africa'. (*Saturday Review of Literature*, 7 January 1939).
- 22 Padmore was a Trinidadian friend of James and Williams and the first black to be a member of the Soviet Comintern. Cf. James R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary. George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism* (London, Pall Mall Press, 1967).
- 23 Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1944).
- 24 *Ibid.*, p.268.
- 25 *The Black Jacobins*, p.243.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p.276.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p.ix-x.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p.91.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p.249.
- 30 F. Engels, Letter to H. Starkenburg, 25 January 1894 in Tucket (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, pp.767-8.
- 31 Warburg, the anti-Stalinist publisher who published *The Black Jacobins* also published James's *World Revolution* which became a popular Trotskyist handbook.
- 32 *Capitalism and slavery*, p.7.
- 33 Cf. *The Black Jacobins*, pp.166, 276, 283, 285.

- 34 *Ibid.*, p.186. Elsewhere James notes that 'It was in method, and not in principle, that Toussaint failed'. (*Ibid.*, p.282).
- 35 *Ibid.*, p.315.
- 36 This appears in an Appendix ('From Toussaint L'Ouverture to Fidel Castro') of the 1962 edition of *The Black Jacobins*, p.393.
- 37 *Capitalism and Slavery*, p.212.
- 38 Eric Williams, *Inward Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister* (London, Andre Deutsch, 1969), p.43.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p.270. Emphasis added.
- 40 *Ibid.*, pp.262-3, Emphasis added.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p.223.
- 42 *Ibid.*, p.109.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p.94.
- 44 Cf. C.L.R. James, *Modern Politics* (Port-of-Spain: The Nation Press, 1960).
- 45 The *PNM Weekly* (30 August 1956), pp.1 ff.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 Eric Williams, *Perspectives for the West Indies* (PNM Publishing Company), p.11.
- 48 Eric Williams, *Our Fourth Anniversary* (PNM Publishing Co., 1950), p.6.
- 49 Eric Williams, *Responsibilities of the Party Member* (PNM Publishing Co., 1960), pp.15-16.
- 50 Gomes called Williams's *The History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago*, 'a thinly disguised and extended political manifesto' (the *Trinidad Guardian*, 5 September 1962.) For Gomes's own version of the history of modern Trinidad see, *Through a Maze of Colour* (Port-of-Spain, Key Caribbean Publications, 1974.)
- 51 Williams, *Inward Hunger*, pp.267-8.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p.268.
- 53 C.L.R. James, *Party Politics in the West Indies* (San Juan, Trinidad, Vedic Enterprises, 1962), p.8.
- 54 There Bosch would write two books, one full of admiration for Cuban politics and society as it was developing under the 'democratic' period, 1944-53 (*Cuba, La Isla Fascinante*, Santiago de Chile, 1955). The other, a history of Caribbean dictators not published until 1988 (*Poker de Espanto en el Caribe*, Santo Domingo, Editora Alfa y Omega, 1988.)
- 55 Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969* (London, Andre Deutsch, 1970); Juan Bosch, *De Cristóbal Colón a Fidel Castro* (Madrid, Ediciones Alfaguara, 1970.)
- 56 *Ibid.*, p.142.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p.157.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p.159.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p.32.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p.417.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p.486.
- 62 Bosch continued this line of analysis in his *La Pegueña burguesía en la Historia de la República Dominicana* (Santo Domingo, Editora Alfa y Omega, 1986.)
- 63 Juan Bosch, *Bolívar y la Guerra Social* (Buenos Aires, 1966), pp.87-8 and *passim*.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p.15 (my translation).

- 65 *Ibid.*, p.85.
- 66 Germán Carrera Damas, 'Sobre el significado socio-económico de la acción histórica de Boves', in his *Materiales para el Estudio de la Cuestión Agraria en Venezuela, 1800-1830*. Tomo I, Caracas, 1964. (Later appeared under the title, *Boves: aspectos socio-económicos*, 1968.)
- 67 Germán Carrera Damas, *Historiografía Marxista Venezolana* (Caracas, 1967).
- 68 *Ibid.*, pp.31-2.
- 69 *Ibid.*, pp.32 note.
- 70 Bosch, *Bolívar y la Guerra Social*, pp.122-6.
- 71 Leslie F. Manigat, *La Politique Agraire du Gouvernement d'Alexandre Pétion, 1807-1818* (Port-au-Prince, 1962), p.73.
- 72 Cf. Juan Bosch, *Trujillo: Causas de una Tiranía sin Ejemplo* (Caracas, Grabados Nacionales, 1959) in which the trauma of hurricanes appear to determine then-dictator Rafael L. Trujillo's psyche.
- 73 Bosch, *De Cristóbal Colón a Castro*, p.400.
- 74 *Ibid.*, p.411.
- 75 *Ibid.*, p.20.
- 76 *Ibid.*, p.594.
- 77 Cf. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York, Grove Press, 1968). Fanon's emphasis on ethnicity and nationalism and his rejection of the idea that the proletariat is the only 'vanguard' class would seem to be in critical contrast with Bosch's approach.
- 78 Williams, *From Columbus to Castro*, *op.cit.*, p.497.
- 79 Butterfield, *King George III and the Historians*, *op.cit.*, p.22.
- 80 Williams, *Inward Hunger*, *op.cit.*, p.246.
- 81 *Ibid.*, p.150.
- 82 *From Columbus to Castro*, p.511.
- 83 *Ibid.*, p.515.
- 84 Butterfield, *King George III and the Historians*, p.36.
- 85 Eric Williams, *Forged from the Love of Liberty: Selected Speeches of Dr. Eric Williams*. Compiled and introduced by Paul K. Sutton (Trinidad, Longman Caribbean, 1981).
- 86 *Ibid.*, p.8.
- 87 *Ibid.*, p.109.
- 88 *Ibid.*, p.129.
- 89 Speech, November 1972, reprinted in A.N.R. Robinson, *Caribbean Man* (Port-of-Spain, Imprint Publication, 1985), p.155. It is ironic that years later when, as Prime Minister, Robinson was taken hostage (27 July 1990), several of his cabinet members appealed for foreign assistance.
- 90 Winston Mahabir, *In and Out of Politics* (Port-of-Spain, Imprint Caribbean, 1978).
- 91 Patrick Solomon, *Solomon: an Autobiography* (Port-of-Spain, Imprint Caribbean, 1981).
- 92 Selwyn Ryan, Doctorphobia and Decision-Making, *Sunday Express* (28 March 1982), pp.23, 25.
- 93 *Forged from the Love of Liberty*, p.420.
- 94 *Ibid.*, pp.446, 448, 449.
- 95 *Ibid.*, p.427.
- 96 *Ibid.*, p.458.
- 97 *Inward Hunger*, p.343.

- 98 The underlying assumption of the sociology of knowledge as developed by Marx, Weber, Scheler and Mannheim is that the social, economic and political context within which knowing or understanding takes place, lays down the basic structure within which intellectual creations are engendered. Once created, however, these creations can have an influence of their own.
- 99 Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?*, *op.cit.*, pp.9-10.
- 100 *Ibid.*, p.126.
- 101 *Ibid.*, p.31.
- 102 Michael Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1933), p.99.

CHAPTER 10

Blazing mirrors: the crisis of the Haitian intellectual

Michael Dash

At that moment the fire lighted up the mirrors of the palace, the crystal goblets, the crystal of the lamps, glasses, windows, the mother-of-pearl inlay of the console tables—the flames were everywhere, and it was impossible to tell which were flames and which were reflections. All the mirrors of Sans Souci were simultaneously ablaze.¹

As the novel *The Kingdom of this World* draws to a close, Alejo Carpentier imagines King Christophe as an individual tragically trapped in self-delusion. As the world around him goes up in flames, Christophe in his Hall of Mirrors cannot distinguish between reflection and reality, hallucination and truth. The black ‘sun king’, his image mockingly multiplied in a thousand blazing mirrors, finally shoots himself in the head, when the reflected fires and the real fires become one.

Christophe was no intellectual in the ordinary sense. For Carpentier, however, he was the incarnation of the extravagant demiurge, the unrelenting reformer who attempted to shape his kingdom in accordance with his high-minded vision. Christophe’s tragic self-deception functions as a haunting symbol of generations of men who have seen themselves as privileged interpreters of Haitian society and who have used their intellects as the route to political power. The Haitian intellectual has provided legitimacy for radical movements and respectability for state repression. Far too often, he like Christophe is caught in a Hall of Mirrors which magnifies his own importance and prevents him from seeing the real flames on the outside.

In Haitian literature the figure of the Haitian intellectual has been more often than not the source of humour rather than tragedy. Novelists in the late-nineteenth century had the first laugh at the ‘nègre lesprit’ and seem determined to have the last laugh as well. For the Haitian writer, the intellectual is the social equivalent of the ponderous and insensitive Bouki of Haitian folklore. In the folk imagination Bouki’s bloated self-importance is opposed to the mentally and physically agile Ti Malice. The latter gets the better of Bouki in the folk tale but in

the Haitian novel we witness the tragi-comic ascendancy of the *arriviste* intellectual.

At the turn of the century in Haiti, the ambitious and scheming intellectual became a stock character in the novel of social satire. Frédéric Marcelin in *Thémistocle Epaminondas Labasterre* (1901) created the character Telemaque, a journalist who manipulates nationalist sentiment for his own particular purposes. His high-sounding pleas to 'safeguard our intellect, the soul of younger generations by entrusting them to indigenous teachers', to create 'a ministry driven by the inspiration of our ancestors, a true ministry of national defence',² is simply a cynical ploy to further his own ambitions. He suppresses the fact that he was educated in France. In the novel he does become a minister who is predictably corrupt.

Marcelin's Telemaque is simply the prototype for a number of intellectuals lampooned in Haitian fiction. No matter what the ideology, there is always some scheming figure ready to exploit it for self-promotion. In 1932 Fernand Hibbert in his novel *Les Simulacres* (The Mimic Men) provides another version of Telemaque in the character of Héliénus Canton. This time it is Bolshevism in the service of personal cupidity.

M. Caton had a great admiration for Bolshevism. To strip an aristocracy of its wealth in the name of the people seemed to him the ultimate form of justice . . . This unlikely Communist, owner of several houses, markets and villas, intended to keep what he already owned and increase his share of real estate because, since he was slightly dark, he thought himself one of the people.³

Manifestations of the intellectual's opportunism in the political arena seem endless. In 1931 Jacques Roumain's short novel *Les Fantoques* (The Puppet Men) seems not only to echo the title of Hibbert's earlier work but to revive the image of the intellectual demagogue. Roumain's 'noiriste' politician Aristide Marau is 'in his heart nothing but "grimaud" who is furious because he is not accepted as a mulatto'.⁴ The politics of racial authenticity and an ostensible concern with the welfare of the masses will enable him to have the power to make himself accepted socially. Even if the intellectual is not grotesquely opportunistic, he is at least spineless. For instance, the poet and lawyer Carles Osmin in Jacques Stephen Alexis's *Les arbres musiciens* (The musical trees, 1957) in spite of his enlightened nature, ends up impregnating a peasant girl and running off to a diplomatic post in Washington. He is a less worthy version of the character of Roger Sinclair in the novel *Le nègre masqué* (The masked negro, 1933) who resolutely fights the Americans but must also flee Haiti.

The critique of the Haitian intellectual continues unabated. In his 1978 Creole play *Pelin-tet (Head trap)* Franckétienne imagined a lively exchange between an intellectual and a worker. Set in a New York apartment, the play is a sharp attack on the verbal mystification of the Haitian intellectual. The intellectual, Polidor, is a tropical offshoot of Beckett's Lucky in *Waiting for Godot*. Polidor in his jacket is the equivalent of Lucky wearing his hat. Pozzo can mercifully cut short Lucky's 'quaquaqua' nonsense. Piram, the Haitian worker, is Franckétienne's Pozzo.

You with the high language, pretty words, logic, you can
speechify without mistake. But, lord help me! You are nothing
but words . . . always with a jacket on your stooped shoulders
and a briefcase stuffed with paper, every blessed day and night
...⁵

The Haitian intellectual is an actor who uses words to obfuscate. Since the fall of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986, the stereotype of the well-fed, voluble 'nègre lesprit' has been identified by some with the short-lived 'zombie' presidency of Leslie Manigat. In *Albert Burbon ou le profil d'une élite* (1988) Gary Victor fiercely satirizes the 'diasporization' of Haitian politics by intellectuals who have recently returned. Albert Buron is as self-important as his predecessors in Haitian literature, with his grandiose plans and his political party, absurdly called the M.T.O.P.P.C.R.D.D.H.E.V.P. (Mouvement Total d'Organisation Populaire des Patriotes Concernés pour le Redressment Immédiat, l'Instauration de la Démocratie, la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, l'Egalité de la Femme et la Vigilance Patriotique). In the comic highpoint of his work Buron succeeds, in a dream, in selling his ideas to St Peter and God.⁶ For Gary Victor, Buron's dream is Haiti's nightmare.

In literature Haitian intellectuals have a monopoly on Julien Benda's vision of the betraying intellectual. This phenomenon has also been described in non-fiction work as well. Frantz Fanon in the *Wretched of the Earth* (1961) concentrated on the betrayal of the intellectual élite who become 'not even the replica of Europe but its caricature'.⁷ Hopelessly disoriented, shut up in their 'Hall of Mirrors', they are the incarnation of self-deception. This image has been further reinforced in the case of Haiti by David Nicholls who in both *Dessalines to Duvalier* (1979) and *Haiti in Caribbean Context* (1985) uses the figure of Edmond Tardieu to typify the high-minded Haitian intellectual.⁸ Tardieu is imagined as writing his political speeches upstairs in the family grocery, while Madame Tardieu takes care of the family business downstairs. The crisis of the Haitian intellectual turns on the tragic distance which separates 'upstairs', with its sonorous rhetoric and grand visions, from the real world of 'downstairs'.

The nineteenth century – intellectuals on the defensive

Perhaps, the problematic nature of the relationship between intellectual and society in Haiti is tied to the origins of intellectual activity in Haiti. From the outset, intellectuals in Haiti trafficked in illusion. They do not fit into the pattern of the Western intellectual who has an adversary relationship to his own society. As Edward Shils explains, the Western model is built around 'contestation', a contempt for the ruling class and a distrust of political activity most apparent in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe.

The intellectuals' tradition of hostility and disparagement of their own societies is a long and illustrious one. It has been common among literary men for nearly two centuries; in the course of the 19th century this attitude became the stock-in-trade of sociologists and certain kinds of economists.⁹

This was not the case in Haiti. Intellectuals served as apologists for certain régimes, as in the case of the Baron de Vastey in Christophe's kingdom, or defended class interests, as in the rewriting of the events of Haitian history to suit mulatto or black legends of competence or victimization.¹⁰ They reserved their contempt and hostility for foreign critics of whom there was an inexhaustible supply in the nineteenth century.

Intellectual activity, or being a man of letters, was an important means of demonstrating that Haiti was not uncivilized. As Laennec Hurbon states in *Comprendre Haiti*, it is important that 'Haiti' should provide intellectuals: they were the proof of the capabilities of the Haitian . . . the former slave to be equal to the white man.¹¹ Anthropology, sociology and the creative imagination were not means of scrutinizing Haiti's shortcomings. As in the case of Edmond Laforest, who tied a Larousse dictionary around his neck and drowned himself, the Haitian intellectual lived and died by his high culture. As the Larousse dictionary also implies, the model used for the interpretation of Haitian society was European. Anténor Firmin, Louis Joseph Janvier, Jacques Nicholas Léger, Hannibal Price and Dantès Bellegarde were all Haitian versions of Procrustes, who attempted to make Haitian culture fit a bed designed with Europe in mind. In his defensiveness on the question of Haitian society, the intellectual set out to suppress the African features of his society. As Rémy Bastien pointed out in 1960:

The Haitian intellectual of sixty years ago, when he criticized Vodun, for instance, labeling it a superstition and denying its

importance, was at the same time piously defending his country against attacks from European and American writers.¹²

Nicholls's assessment of these early intellectuals echoes Bastien's comment . . . 'their purpose was basically to persuade European readers that Haiti was a civilised country'.¹³

The alienation of the Haitian intellectual was also tied to the written word. A clue to this fascination with the written text is given by Duraciné Vaval in his *Histoire de la Littérature Haitienne ou l'Âme Noire*, when he declares:

Each text written by a black man or a mulatto reduces daily the number of those who criticize Haiti and adds to the number of those who are convinced of the moral and intellectual capacity of the black man.¹⁴

Etzer Vilaire in the nineteenth century dreamed of the emergence of a literary élite in Haiti and 'the production of strong and lasting works which (would) demand the attention of our intellectual metropolis'.¹⁵ This almost Mallarméen obsession with the written word seems related to the nineteenth-century belief that writing and literacy were the criteria by which racial and cultural achievement were judged. Hippolyte Taine's concept of the 'community of blood and intellect' meant that racial destiny was intimately related to intellectual capacity. Mind, character and sensibility were seen as inherent and congenital characteristics. Those cultures which had writing were seen to be inherently superior to those stranded at the oral stage.

Writing arose in Haiti partly as a reaction against the accusation that it could not be produced by blacks. The written text became the fetish of the intellectual élite. Similar reactions occurred elsewhere. For instance, the case of Phyllis Wheatly, the black slave who could write poetry inspired by Milton and Pope, caused a scandal in eighteenth century Boston. Also of some relevance is the celebration of intellectual refinement and high culture by the Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó in his *Ariel* (1900). In order to reject the stereotype of crudeness and illiteracy in Caliban, Rodó exhorts the New World intellectual to become the epitome of good taste – Ariel. Rodó, like his Haitian counterparts, saw the world and their existence in terms defined by Prospero. The roots of intellectual activity in Haiti can be found in the idea of the magical properties of the written text, in the capacity for sustaining illusions in the name of the Haitian people and of the black race. It was not until the American Occupation in 1915 that the intellectual as cultural virtuoso, high-minded Ariel, yielded to the intellectual as déclassé and misfit in the twentieth century. The intellectual now emerged as 'enfant terrible', as vengeful Caliban.

Peasants in Port-au-Prince

The 1920s signalled a widespread criticism of nineteenth-century black intellectuals by young radicals. The polemical thrust of the *Harlem Renaissance*, of *Légitime Défense*, was no different from the repudiation of the intellectual culture of the nineteenth century during the American Occupation in Haiti. As Rémy Bastien put it:

The past is put in the dock and found guilty without appeal. In the Haiti of 1928 the trial took an unprecedented turn: The country was in misery because its responsible elite had rejected its intrinsic personality . . . Only by returning to its cultural sources could Haiti regenerate itself and regain its pride.¹⁶

The attack on the Eurocentric and bookish nineteenth-century intellectual was led by Jean Price-Mars. In *La Vocation de l'Élite* (1919) and *Ainsi Parla l'Oncle* (1928) Price-Mars criticized the 'bovarysme collectif' of Haiti's intellectuals, who had in the past insisted on their Frenchness. He asked that greater attention be paid to the Haitian peasantry—their religion, their language and their view of the world. In championing the cult of racial authenticity, Price-Mars became the 'maitre-à-penser' of Haiti's younger generation. Haiti's intellectuals now moved from the illusions of 'upstairs' to embrace the masses 'downstairs'. But 'downstairs' too had its illusions.

At this time little attention was paid to the relationship between the Haitian cult of authenticity and the European counter-culture of the period; that Haitian Indigenism shared similar objectives with French Surrealism and German Expressionism; that the very concept of a black racial essence was the creation of white anthropologists such as Delafosse and Lévy-Bruhl. Haitians and other black intellectuals were busy discovering themselves through models provided by white anthropologists. These models were the product of the European fascination with cultural difference, with racial 'otherness'. The imaginative appropriation of non-European cultures by the modernist radicals in Europe became the point of departure for Haitian indigenism. Otherness, with its dangerous oversimplifications, became the stimulant to the white as well as black imagination in the 1920s.

Whereas there existed a homogenizing thrust to theories of race and culture in the nineteenth century, the 1920s meant the celebration of difference. Once seen as polished, mannered, ornate, now Haitian culture was projected as irredeemably 'other'. At its most benign, the cult of authenticity meant the honouring of artistic intuition and a rediscovery of the expressivity of Creole. At its most extreme, it meant the celebration of cannibalism, black magic, sensual abandon and

dictatorship—all anathema to the apologists for universal civilization in the previous century. Intellectual activity was dominated by the young drop-out, resentful of his staid upper-class parents and longing for a utopian order believed to be freer and more life-enhancing than the world of his forebears. Haiti's radicals sought emotional and cultural authenticity in the slums of Port-au-Prince, the countryside and wild voodoo rituals—presumably remote from the encroachments of bourgeois respectability.

The modernist legend in Haitian literature began at this time and no literary figure is perhaps more legendary than Carl Brouard. The contradictions of an entire generation are mirrored in Brouard's tormented existence. In Brouard's non-conformity, his obsession with his libidinal impulses, his strident politics and his ultimate failure, we see the prototype of the romantic fantasizing of the Haitian avant-garde before the emergence of Duvalierism, itself a product of these fantasies. Brouard, the anti-intellectual, sought to reconcile political radicalism and the aesthetics, or perhaps erotics, of art. In Brouard's story we have an echo of the problematic relationship between political radicalism and the avant-garde, the Commune and Rimbaud, the Communist Party and Breton, Fascism and Pound. The anti-bourgeois alliance between the artist and the masses was Brouard's desperate dream in the 1920s. It was the same dream which led to the demise of Jacques Stephen Alexis in 1961.

The literary imagination of the 1920s is dominated by the lure of open spaces, internal or external. Hallucination could as easily provide an answer to the creative impulse as could the streets of Port-au-Prince or the primeval bush. No longer isolated in his private library or book-lined study, the intellectual was not a *'flâneur'*. The promenades of *L'amour fou* and *Paysan de Paris* were replayed in Port-au-Prince. Haiti's capital was perhaps better suited to liberating the imagination than Paris. The former could be seen as bizarrely romantic in its capacity to juxtapose the archaic, the mysterious and the dilapidated. It could become the environment most appropriate to the dissolute avant-garde . . . 'les extravagants, les bohèmes, les fous, les poètes' as they are listed in Brouard's poem 'Nous'. The sites for poetic inspiration could range from night-clubs with their stock of prostitutes and drunks ('Bouge') to cannibalistic orgies in the Haitian bush ('Nostalgie').

The intellectual as uninhibited 'nègre' repudiated the scribal traditions of his predecessors for the world of the non-verbal. Like his contemporaries in the Négritude movement, he saw writing as one of the corrupt symptoms of civilization. This Rousseauesque rejection of writing led to a new orality and a celebration of the unconscious. The route to the individual as well as the folk unconscious for Brouard and

his fellow iconoclasts lay in eroticism and in possession. The emergence of ancestral values through the unconscious gave the artist a sense of community. Art could provide access to the folk unconscious. Some of the most unlikely individuals tried this method. François Duvalier was a poet, for a while. Even Jacques Roumain, one of the fiercest critics of racial mystification, passed through this phase ('Quand bat le tam-tam ...') The idea lasted into the 1950s as is seen in the carnal 'défoulement' of Comrade Éros, René Depestre.

Like many of his counterparts in modernist movements elsewhere, the Haitian radical was tempted by total political solutions. Brouard again provides a vivid illustration. Art could be made to serve politics. Literary authenticity and political 'noirisme' could be linked. Brouard could easily slip from the individual intuition, to folk examination, to dictatorship.

The most ignorant peasant feels which voodoo temple is more artistic ... in the same way he will docilely obey a dictatorship which works for order, truth and the common good, because those ideas are inborn.¹⁷

The *noiriste* utopia envisaged by Brouard was only one of the many similar dreams of closed worlds where paradise would be regained. At the end of *Gouverneurs de la Rosée* (Masters of the Dew, 1945) Roumain imagines Eden restored and a yet unborn Manuel who might well inherit his father's kingdom. In 1946, the young René Depestre is haunted by a similar version of 'Tomorrow when I will be king of my creation when I will be king of each drop of sweat ...'¹⁸ Tomorrow never came for the Haitian avant-garde. Or when it did come it was appropriated by politicians for their own ends.

Brouard died neglected and rambling about his white ancestors, in the *noiriste* utopia he had helped conceptualize. Roumain died prematurely and entered myth. Depestre would have his one disappointing taste of a people's revolution in Cuba. Alexis, driven to 'concrete solutions' died grotesquely at the hands of another intellectual François Duvalier. The Haitian avant-garde created no generalized 'prise de conscience'. The folk who stimulated their imaginations were as dispossessed as before. Duvalierism meant the systematic state suppression of intellectuals and the end of the heroic legend of the Haitian avant-garde. Art brought about no political revolution: it was political fantasies which served the cause of artistic dissent and experimentation. The legacy of the avant-garde in Haiti was a sophistication in artistic expression which stands in striking contrast to the barbarity of that country's politics.

Beyond illusion – Duvalier and after

Like Plato, François Duvalier banished intellectuals from his republic. An intellectual himself, Duvalier saw other intellectuals as a threat and saw himself as the epitome of the Haitian intellectual. His collected works were significantly entitled *Oeuvres Essentielles*. As Laennec Hurbon concludes, 'in Duvalier there existed the belief that he alone incarnated the essence of the Haitian intellectual, in the sense that . . . the history of all intellectual activity culminated in him.'¹⁹ In order to safeguard his own pre-eminence, Duvalier paid the ultimate tribute to Haiti's intellectuals: he took them seriously. His régime co-opted, eliminated or scattered some of Haiti's intellectual luminaries, as can be seen in the experiences of René Piquion, Jacques Stephen Alexis and René Depestre respectively.

Duvalier treated intellectuals as just another potential source of subversion – like the church, the army and the mulatto élite. His régime put an end to the hubris of intellectual engagement that dominated Haitian thought from the 1920s to the 1950s. The collapse of the 'avant-garde', the pleasures and pressures of exile, the widely dispersed nature of intellectual activity and the divisions between those who left Haiti and those who remained meant that the role of intellectual was mired in self-doubt and uncertainty. The *Nouvelle Optique* group in Montreal became the most vibrant centre for ideological debate. However, self-definition was confined to a much narrower radius. The one theme which seemed constant in the ideological orientation of the exiled intellectual was the rejection of *noirisme*. Haitian intellectuals led the attack on the monolithic racial pretensions of Négritude. René Depestre attacked Price-Mars's ideas and revealingly entitled a collection of essays *Bonjour et Adieu à la Négritude* (1980).²⁰ More generally, the celebration of cultural 'difference' has given way to a conception of Haitian culture in less narrow racial terms. The old nineteenth-century notion of world civilization was not revived. Rather, Haiti's identity was situated in the Americas. Anthony Phelps in 1983 created quite a stir when he refused to be seen as a black poet at a congress of French Writers in Padua. The only prefix he would allow before 'poet' was 'American', in its widest sense. In so doing, Haitian intellectuals were also rejecting the influence of Parisian intellectuals such as Pierre Mabille and André Breton, who championed the study of the occult and Haiti's 'otherness' in the 1940s in Port-au-Prince.

Two of the shaping forces on Haitian intellectuals in the last two decades have been exile and Post-Modernism. Exile should be seen not so much as something physical but rather in terms of the sense of estrangement felt by the intellectual – whether he left Haiti or remained

there. He was no longer the privileged spokesman for the masses. He could no longer pretend to be articulating the world view of a community. He was unhoused—ignored by the ordinary people and threatened by the State. The condition of exile emerges not in terms of Romantic alienation but, in recent thought, as an exemplary state which provides the intellectual with a sobering view of his limitations. As René Depestre confessed, 'I have to transcend . . . the notion of exile [which] evokes someone torn from his native land [who] undergoes on a foreign soil a painful experience of nostalgia and grief'.²¹ Jean-Claude Charles, the Haitian novelist residing in Paris, defiantly concurs when he declares that 'I consider exile an opportunity . . . I quite expect to remain exile to the bitter end'.²² Anthony Phelps, living in Montreal, associates exile and creativity when he says 'all creation for me is a solitary act which necessitates absence'.²³ This feeling of no longer being *en situation* can quite easily lead to nihilism and a paralysing sense of impotence.

The sense of the depleted importance of the intellectual's public role, of the gratuitous nature of the written word, finds a rationale in the Post-Modernist movement. The full impact of Post-Modernism on contemporary writing still remains to be assessed but it can contribute to a sense of exhaustion. Old beliefs have crumbled. The Haitian writer is no longer a Caribbean Orpheus or Prometheus. No new sense of mission has settled in, and past earnestness can well be replaced by a self-regarding irony and a sense of the ludicrous, which ultimately affirms the world's resistance to interpretation. Significantly, in Franckétienne's *Pelin-tet*, not only is the intellectual role-playing, but so is the worker. Nevertheless, this sense of a politically blocked situation can also provide the opportunity to scrutinize overlooked areas of Haitian life. Writers are no longer required to provide moral uplift or political instruction. Writing by women has also made significant strides in recent years. At least the simplifications of narrow ideological systems may possibly yield to a savouring of the complexities of the relationship between individual and community.

In February 1986, the Duvalier dynasty came to an end. The anti-Duvalier movement was not led by intellectuals; the language of the movement was not French nor did it contain ideological jargon. In this sense, it gave new life to Creole just as it paid scant attention to Haiti's intellectual élite. It remains to be seen what new role intellectuals will play in Haiti where the military and the people struggle for power. The Albert Burons will return to seek personal profit from the current state of political uncertainty. They are the minority, however; the majority of Haitian writers and intellectuals in exile have not gone back. When Felix Morisseau-Leroy visited Haiti recently, he said at the airport that he

had an announcement to make. When the press gathered, he declared that he would not be a candidate for president. In mocking the past tendency for the Haitian intellectual to see himself as *maître*, Papa, or Head of State, Morisseau-Leroy focused attention on a new self-consciousness. At least for the time being, the Haitian intellectual is not a Manuel bringing the light to the ignorant peasantry. The bitter experience of Duvalierism may have totally destroyed the possibility of being trapped again in a Hall of Mirrors.

Notes

- 1 Alejo Carpentier, *The Kingdom of this World*, (London, Victor Gollancz, 1967), pp.188-9.
- 2 Frédéric Marcelin, *Thémistocle Epaminondas Labasterre* (Paris, Imp. St Denis, 1901), p.216.
- 3 Fernand Hibbert, *Les Simulacres*, (Port-au-Prince, Imp. Cheraquit, 1923), p.16.
- 4 Jacques Roumain, *Les Fantoches*, (Port-au-Prince, Coll. Indigène, 1931), p.34.
- 5 Franckétienne, *Pelin-tet*, (Port-au-Prince, Ed. du Soleil, 1978).
- 6 Gary Victor, *Albert Buron ou le Profil d'une Élite*, (Port-au-Prince, L'imprimeur 11, 1988), p.165.
- 7 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969), p.141.
- 8 David Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier* (Cambridge, CUP, 1979).
- 9 Edward Shils, An Age of Embarrassment, *Encounter*, Vol. LI, No.4, October 1978, p.88.
- 10 See David Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, *op.cit.* (1979), p.100.
- 11 Laennec Hurbon, *Comprendre Haiti*, (Paris, Katharla, 1987), p.46.
- 12 Rémy Bastien, The Intellectual in Haitian Plural Society, *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 83, 1960, p.844.
- 13 *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, *op.cit.* (1979), p.128.
- 14 Duraciné Vaval, *Histoire de la Littérature Haitienne ou l'Âme Noire*, (Port-au-Prince, Imp. Heraux, 1933), pp.476-7.
- 15 Etzer Vilaire, 'Notice Autobiographique', *Poèmes de la Mort*, (Paris, Librairie Fischbacher, 1907).
- 16 Rémy Bastien, 'Vodun and Politics in Haiti', *Religion and Politics in Haiti*, (Washington DC, Ins. for Cross Cultural Research, 1966), p.54.
- 17 *Les Griots*, Vol. 2, No. 2, October–December 1938, p.155.
- 18 René Depestre, *Gerbe de sang*, (Port-au-Prince, Imp de l'état, 1946), p.77. In later work, Depestre is less confident of his capacity to play the role of 'grand seigneur caribéen' in his 'mémoires de géolobertinage' (1973).
- 19 Hurbon, *Comprendre Haiti*, *op.cit.* (1987) p.53.
- 20 René Depestre, *Bonjour et Adieu à la Négritude* (1980).
- 21 *Magazine Littérature*, No. 221, July–August 1985, p.52.
- 22 Jean Jonassaint, *Le Pouvoir des Mots, les Mots au Pouvoir*, (Montreal, Dérives, 1986), p.1960.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p.106.

CHAPTER 11

Between the particular and the universal: dilemmas of the Martinican intellectual

Richard D.E. Burton

If to be Martinican is, as the Martinican poet and philosopher René Ménénil has claimed,¹ to possess a double consciousness as both a West Indian and, since the departmentalization law of 1946, an integral citizen of France, then to be a Martinican *intellectual* is to live that condition of doubleness and dichotomy to the utmost limits of its capacity to confuse, torment and fecundate.

The Martinican intellectual of the late-twentieth century is the product of a process of cultural and political assimilation now two centuries long (Martinique, like Guadeloupe, was first, if only for a brief period, declared to be a *département* of France in 1793). He therefore confronts the metropolitan power and its intellectual tradition both as 'other'—since, its departmental status notwithstanding, Martinique is still ultimately a *possession* of France—and as 'same' since, for all his difference, he has in some large measure interiorized, even as he contests them, its values, thought-patterns and, most crucially of all, its language.² The Other is both outside him and within, and when he wishes—as, since the early 1930s, many Martinican intellectuals have wished—to challenge that Other and assert his own particularity, he finds all too often that the only terms in which he can do so are the universalist or pseudo-universalist terms defined by the Other, be it Cartesian logic, republican humanism, dialectical materialism, Freudian psychoanalysis, Sartrean existentialism or, in the case of the poet-politician Aimé Césaire (whose career contains in microcosm all the tensions and potentialities of the Martinican intellectual), the 'miraculous weapons' of subversive surrealist poetry. But to speak of 'doubleness' or 'dichotomy' in relation to the Martinican intellectual is radically to simplify his condition; for in the first instance he is not just 'French' and 'West Indian', but a black, brown or, more rarely, white or Indian West Indian. To his already chronic bifocalism on the particular (Martinique) and the universal or pseudo-universal (France or, more broadly, Europe), a third, fourth, or even fifth term may commonly be added. It could, in the case of the poets and ideologists of the Négritude movement, be Africa, or in that of proponents of the concept of 'Antillanité', the Anglophone and

Hispanic Caribbean. Similarly, adherents of the recent theory of 'Créolité' focus not only on other French Creole-speaking communities in the Caribbean (Haiti, St Lucia and Dominica as well as the *départements d'outre-mer*) but on similar communities in the Indian Ocean (Réunion, Mauritius and the Seychelles for example); Louisiana and Quebec are also invoked as points of reference and comparison. Central or South America,³ or Afro-America as a sphere of culture, commonly fall within the contemporary Martinican intellectual's field of vision; a somewhat earlier generation looked for inspiration and example to the Third World as a whole (and particularly to those parts of it – Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam above all – that had come under and fought against French and/or American domination). At the same time, more generally still, the many Martinican intellectuals who owe or owed allegiance to one or another form of Marxism see or saw no solution to the particular problems of their island-department outside the universalist terms of 'world revolution' or the 'global proletariat'. Sometimes it seems that the condition of Martinican intellectuals is one of chronic extroversion: they can see, grasp and understand *everything* except themselves and their own particular situation. At other times, or indeed even, perplexingly, at the same time, the minutiae and trivia of local political and intellectual life became the object of obsessive reflection and discussion. World political events are routinely diffracted through the distorting prism of island loyalties and enmities, as when – to take an instance witnessed by the present writer during his most recent visit (December 1989) – the reaction of a prominent (and highly intelligent) local novelist and journalist to the overthrow of the Ceauşescu dictatorship was to search through back-numbers of the local communist weekly *Justice* for incriminating statements in praise of the *conducator* and his régime made by the secretary of the Parti Communiste Martiniquais during one or other of his visits to Eastern Europe. The vision of the Martinican intellectual is, at the best of times, split astygmatically between the particular and the universal, between the Same (which, thanks to assimilation, is also the Other) and the Other (which is also, and for the same reason, the Same). As myopia alternates, or even coexists with, presbyopia, a clearly focused, synoptic vision both of what Martinique is in itself and of how it relates to the outside world is often conspicuous by its absence. Sometimes it appears that, alienated from themselves and their immediate situation by the very sophistication of their thought and discourse, Martinican intellectuals can do anything but 'think' and 'talk' Martinican; at other times, it seems they can do nothing else. This chapter seeks first to chart the history of the endemic 'other-directedness' of Martinican mental and intellectual life – what one Martinican intellectual has, characteristically, called its 'collective

exerisis'⁴—and then to examine the principal doctrines or discourses, assimilationism, Marxism, Négritude, Antillanité and Créolité, through which Martinican intellectuals have sought to resolve the tension between the particular and the universal on which their life and thought—in this no more than a heightened, self-conscious version of the lives and thinking of Martinicans as a whole—have pivoted for so long. If the diagnosis may strike some as unduly pessimistic, the prognosis may err in the fundamentally optimistic and positive view it takes of the multiple dehiscences and competing identifications that make up the Martinican intellectual experience.

The origins and nature of assimilation

A colony of France since 1635, Martinique was, at the height of its prosperity as a slave colony in the mid-eighteenth century, not essentially different in terms of social structure and relationship to metropole from comparable British slave colonies such as Barbados and Jamaica. Like them a pigmentocracy pyramidically triangulated into a white élite (itself internally divided into planters, merchants and an indeterminate subclass of *petits blancs*), an intermediate class of free people of mixed race (the *gens de couleur libres*) and a black slave majority that outnumbered the rest of the population by something like eight to one, Martinique was bound to France by a series of political and economic arrangements, collectively known as the *Exclusif*. This effectively reduced it to the level of an appendage of the metropolitan power, to the fury and frustration of the white élite (the *békés*) which wanted nothing more than the freedom to be able to trade at will with non-French markets, most notably with Britain's North American colonies. Despite the requirement of the *Code Noir* (1685) that slaves be baptized and instructed in the Catholic faith, it does not seem that, by the outbreak of the French Revolution, the slave population had been acculturated in any large measure into the values and thought-patterns of the (in any case markedly irreligious) white élite.

The situation was different, however, with the *gens de couleur libres* who, the emancipated offspring of the union of (usually) white men and black female slaves, had, from the late-seventeenth century onwards, done their utmost to assimilate the life-styles of the élite, prompting the latter to seek by every means possible to *dissimilate* themselves from those who sought to emulate them. At regular intervals throughout the eighteenth century, the *gens de couleur libres* were forbidden to wear the same clothes as whites (1720), to use French surnames (1773) or the titles 'sieur' and 'dame' (1781), to work as apothecaries or notaries (1765),

to bear arms or hold meetings (also 1765), to visit France (1763 and 1777) and to sit alongside whites in church or theatre. Yes, at the same time that they sought to identify culturally with their reluctant 'white' father, the *gens de couleur libres* sought to differentiate themselves from their despised and unacknowledged black 'mother', not least because by 1790 they themselves owned something like a quarter of the slaves in the colony. The rage-for-whiteness and horror-of-blackness – in Frantz Fanon's terms, 'lactification' and 'negrophobia'⁵ – that would characterize the coloured *petite bourgeoisie* of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Martinique (the class from which, together with its somewhat later addition the black *petite bourgeoisie*, almost all the island's intellectuals have originated) was already well established among the *gens de couleur libres* in the mid-eighteenth century.⁶ This condition of 'neither-nor-ness' or 'in-between-ness' has been the seed-bed and stimulus of almost all significant political and intellectual activity in Martinique for over two hundred years.

As already indicated, the situation in Martinique in 1730, 1750, 1770 or 1780 would not have differed in its essentials from that obtaining in Barbados or Jamaica at the same dates. By 1790, however, Martinique had entered into a fundamentally different problematic situation from that which continued to obtain in the formerly comparable British colonies. The onset of revolution in France the previous year propelled the island, along with Guadeloupe, on the radically different political and, by corollary, intellectual trajectory which brought it, in 1946, to legal and institutional assimilation into France at a time when Jamaica and Barbados were already well advanced along the path that would take them into political independence in the 1960s. Ironically, it is the Revolution and the revolutionary tradition in France, along with the thought-patterns and discourses that tradition produced, that have, until now, impeded Martinique and the other *vieilles colonies* from taking the radical step into complete political independence from the *mère-patrie*.

The pattern in Martinique between 1789 and 1794 of alignments with and dissociations from the Revolution in France provides the paradigm for almost all subsequent political developments in the island and defines the basic problematic in which almost all subsequent intellectual reflection and discussion will be conducted. To put a bewilderingly complex situation very simply (and ignoring the many changes of position and shifts of alliance that occurred as events in France and Martinique unfolded):⁷ while the *gens de couleur libres* identified with the Revolution and sought to assimilate and make their own its values, meanings and benefits, the slave-owning whites sought to distinguish themselves and the colony they still dominated from the political and intellectual logic that lay at the Revolution's core.

Thus, from September 1789 onwards, the *gens de couleur libres* sought, both in Martinique and through their representatives and allies in Paris, to secure for themselves the rights and privileges of full French citizenship and thereby obtain release from the straightjacket of discriminatory legislation in which the whites had systematically enmeshed them; significantly, though, they opposed the continued enslavement of blacks only in so far as such opposition was necessary to the acquisition of civil rights for themselves. While the *gens de couleur libres* aligned themselves, broadly, with the democratic thrust of the Revolution and, to that extent, committed themselves to its universalist or pseudo-universalist assumptions, the white slave-owners (sometimes in alliance with white merchants, sometimes against them) committed themselves no less passionately to the defence of their particular interests. They sought by every means possible to abstract or exempt Martinique from the democratic-universalistic implications of the Revolution, especially as embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man (August 1789), the Constitution of 1793 which declared colonies to be an 'integral part' of France itself (*partie intégrante du territoire*) and, as such, subject to the same constitutional arrangements, and, most crucially of all, the abolition of slavery (4 February 1794) which further declared that all males resident in the colonies *without distinction of colour* were henceforth French citizens and would 'enjoy all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution'.⁸ Ironically, therefore, it was the *békés* and not the *gens de couleur libres* (or the slaves) who first stressed the 'particularity' or 'specificity' of Martinique in resistance to the universalizing pressures emanating from the metropole, and their tacit encouragement of and effective collaboration in the British occupation of the island between 1794 and 1802 show the lengths to which they would go to defend that 'particularity' and their own very particular interests within it. Of all the groups in Martinique, it has been the *békés* who have, historically, been least inclined to adulate *la mère-patrie* and who, until very recently, have had the strongest sense of the specific identity of Martinique and of their specific identity within it. Needless to say, this early identification of separatism, *autonomisme* and even a kind of *indépendantisme* with the reactionary white élite is replete with implications for the subsequent development – or non-development – of similar sentiments amongst the black and brown populations of the island. Historically, the discourse of separation from France has, in Martinique, been the discourse of reaction.⁹

With the coming to power of Napoléon and the signing of peace with Britain, Martinique was returned to French control and the island's black population to legal slavery, the condition they had never in fact left thanks to the British capture of the colony almost immediately after

the passing of the 1794 decree. At the same time (1802), the *gens de couleur libres* lost the political and civic rights they had received under the 1793 constitution (but which, again, the British occupation had prevented them from ever exercising), thus establishing a pattern that would be repeated at regular intervals during the next 150 years or so. The political rights advanced to the *vieilles colonies* by democratic republican-universalist régimes in France would, at the earliest opportunity, be withdrawn by authoritarian régimes, creating a paradoxical situation in which it was régimes of the Right that were most likely to sustain the specific identity of the colony (if only negatively by denying its inhabitants the rights of full French citizenship) and régimes of the Left or Centre which, by the mere fact of their democratic impulse, were most prone to undermine that specificity in the name of universalist or pseudo-universalist republican values.¹⁰

In December 1823 there appeared, under the pseudonym of the Sieur d'Avila, what may be regarded as the first substantial intellectual work in Martinican history, *De la Situation des Gens de Couleur Libres aux Antilles Francaises*, the publication of which earned its authors, the mulattos Charles-Auguste Bisette, Jean-Baptiste Volny and Louis Fabien, the punishment of branding, banishment to France and finally, when the *békés* protested at the 'leniency' of their sentences, incarceration in the convict ships off Brest. But, true to the oscillatory rhythm indicated above, when the reactionary Restoration monarchy was superseded in 1830 by the more liberal and democratic Bourgeois Monarchy, the *gens de couleur libres* were amongst the first to benefit, gaining the rights of full French citizenship under the decree of 24 April 1833: not for nothing has the *affaire Bisette* been described as the 'starting-blow in the campaign for assimilationist recognition'.¹¹ Although Bisette's pamphlet made no mention of slavery, many *gens de couleur libres* reached the conclusion in the 1830s and 1840s that it was only through the liberation of *all* Martinicans that their own position could be guaranteed and advanced in the teeth of *béké* hostility, and it was accordingly with their (in some cases grudging) support that, in 1848, the new republican régime (the Second Republic) followed the example of its illustrious predecessor, declared slavery abolished and immediately extended the rights of full French citizenship (including the right to vote) to all adult male ex-slaves by dint of the decree of 27 April 1848.

The circumstances of abolition provide an interesting example of the clash between 'universalist' and 'particularist' interpretations of Martinican history, since, before news of the April decree reached Martinique, the island's slave population had revolted on 22 May 1848 and forced the Governor to declare slavery abolished on his own

initiative. Whether the end of slavery should be commemorated on 27 April or 22 May remains a controversial issue in contemporary Martinican political-intellectual life: present-day assimilationists prefer the former date and their autonomist or *indépendantiste* adversaries the latter, claiming that Martinican slaves liberated themselves unilaterally, unaided by the activities of abolitionists in metropolitan France. Edouard De Lépine's masterly survey of these conflicting interpretations in *Questions sur L'Histoire Antillaise* (1978) is recommended to all who would understand the ambiguities and complexities of political-intellectual debate in contemporary Martinique.¹²

During the three years of the Second Republic's existence (1848–51), Martinique functioned as a *département* of France in all but name, with all adult males entitled (though few exercised that right) to vote for local councillors and for deputies to the National Assembly in France; of no less importance in the long term (for in the short term it had little effect) was the provision, by dint of the decree of 27 April 1848, for free compulsory education for children aged between six and ten years. All these rights (except that of freedom for the ex-slaves) were rescinded after Louis Napoléon seized power in France by military coup in December 1851. By 1854, universal suffrage had been abolished, formerly elected councillors were replaced by government nominees, freedom of the press was curtailed, such educational provision that existed was assigned to the control of the Church, and harsh measures were introduced to return the labour force to the sugar plantations which it had abandoned *en masse* in 1848. The combined effect of these measures was to consign Martinique once more to the status of a colony after the quasi-departmentalization of 1848–51 and so to confirm the oscillatory pattern that we have already observed in operation in the 1790s: republican régimes in France broadly favoured the interests of brown and black Martinicans but undermined the island's specificity by extending to it the institutional structures of the metropole, while authoritarian régimes (such as the First and Second Empires) unambiguously favoured the *békés* by withdrawing democratic rights from the brown and black population but, by their very unwillingness to assimilate, paradoxically confirmed the island in its separate identity.

This basic pattern was further confirmed when, following military defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 (a defeat which coincided with a major uprising of black peasants in the south of Martinique), the Second Empire was superseded by the Third Republic, which proceeded, like its predecessors, to extend democratic rights and institutions to Martinique, in the teeth, needless to say, of bitter opposition from the *békés*, who for some years openly backed the cause of the Comte de Chambord, the ultra-reactionary pretender to the French

throne.¹³ In December 1870 universal male suffrage was reintroduced into Martinique as in France, measures were taken to remove primary education from the control of the Church; in 1880, a *lycée*, the secular republican institution *par excellence*, was established at Saint-Pierre. As early as 1874, the mulatto-dominated Conseil Général of Martinique passed a resolution asking that, since Martinicans were 'French by rights, language, customs and in their innermost hearts', their island should no longer be treated as a colony but be assimilated in its entirety and in every respect into the *mère-patrie*. In 1882 a further such resolution demanded bluntly that 'Martinique be constituted as soon as possible as a department of France'.¹⁴ It would be more than sixty years before this wish would be granted, but the instinct of brown (and to a lesser, but growing, extent) of black Martinicans to look to Republican France, rather than to themselves, to defend and advance their interests against the rigidly anti-assimilationist *békés* had already taken root. The extroversion, or heteronomy,¹⁵ of almost all subsequent political-intellectual activity in Martinique has its origins in the widespread valorization of the Other (Republican France) and the corresponding, if only implicit, devalorization of the Self that occurred in the 1870s and 1880s.

The switches of régime in France between 1848 and 1880, with their necessary and immediate refractions in Martinique, generated a series of myths – myths, it should be stressed, that often have a solid basis in reality – that have continued to inform Martinican political-intellectual debate to this day. The first and most tenacious myth is that France – meaning, initially, *republican* France but increasingly, as time went on, France *per se* – is 'generous' towards Martinique in its extension of citizens' rights to colonial subjects and its promotion – more apparent than real – of its black and brown citizenry to full equality with its white citizenry in France itself. In Martinique this faith in Republican generosity is known as Schoelcherism, a psycho-political complex which takes its name from Victor Schoelcher,¹⁶ the principal French proponent of abolition in 1848 and a resolute defender of the interests of non-white Martinicans thereafter. Schoelcherism has as its affective core the idea of the 'good Frenchman' or 'good white man' (as opposed to the 'bad white man', the *béké-pays*, and to the 'bad Frenchman', a corrupt or authoritarian colonial official, perhaps, or detested *gendarme à cheval*, or racist soldier or sailor) who, father-like, extends his bounty and protection to his black or brown 'children'. The myth of Victor Schoelcher – memorably embodied in the statue before the Palais de Justice in Fort-de-France that depicts him raising a kneeling and recently unchained slave to his feet – continues, despite much nationalist criticism, to pervade the whole of Martinican life and is activated whenever the bonds between

Martinique and *mère-patrie* need, by whichever party or interest-group to be affirmed. Coinciding as it did with the centenary of abolition, the implementation of the *loi de départementalisation* in 1948 produced a spate of books on Schoelcher, including a selection of his writings prefaced by the then-communist deputy, Aimé Césaire.¹⁷ Some thirty years later, on the day of his election as President of France in 1981, François Mitterand, to the accompaniment of much publicity, placed a rose on Schoelcher's grave in Paris:¹⁸ not for nothing has the subsequent transformation of Martinique into a *région monodépartementale* of France in 1982 and the accompanying cult of François Mitterand in certain Martinican circles been condemned by nationalist critics as unwanted manifestations of neo-Schoelcherism'.¹⁹

The ideology, initially, of the French-oriented mulatto middle classes, Schoelcherism was widely disseminated through the colony's non-white population between 1870 and 1914 through the interlocking agency of masonic lodges, *sociétés mutualistes* and, above all, the primary and secondary schools. These in Martinique as in France itself, were charged with the diffusion of a secular, rationalist and humanist world view that was held by its propagators to be of universal validity. It is the Republican school and the Republican schoolteacher, *instituteur* and *professeur* alike, at first French and then, increasingly, Martinican, which together ensured the triumph and then the almost unchallenged hegemony of the assimilationist idea in Martinique between 1870 and the mid-1950s. The reputation of these 'superbes et dérisoires baroquissants qu'étaient nos maîtres d'école en 1939' (Edoard Glissant)²⁰ has collapsed in recent years after the virtual cult – evident in the novel and film *La Rue Cases-Nègres* – that surrounded them until doubts concerning the assimilationist idea began to surface in the 1950s. The authors of a recent anti-assimilationist manifesto have condemned them as 'les négriers de notre élan artistique',²¹ and their role in the development of a Martinican intellectual and artistic tradition, to say nothing of their role in political debate, has indeed been an ambiguous one. On the one hand, French and Martinican alike, they initiated generations of mainly but not exclusively middle-class Martinicans (and much more boys than girls) to the supposedly unrivalled clarity and sublimity of the French language, encouraging that almost fetishistic cult of 'good French' replete with inversions, concessive clauses, recondite vocabulary and remote tenses that still surfaces not only in public and private speech in Martinique but also, and more paradoxically, in the avowedly anti-assimilationist writings of a Césaire or a Glissant. On the other hand, this valorization of the French language – it was even said of the great Martinican clarinet-players of the 1920s and 1930s²² that they made their instruments *palé français* – had as its

necessary corollary the disparagement and attempted prohibition, on school premises, of Creole, the first and, in a much larger proportion than was (and is) believed, the only language of the vast majority of Martinicans. The ordeal of 'la pièce'—the coin or other object that the inadvertent utterer of a phrase in Creole had to carry until he or she could pass it on to another pupil surprised in the act of *lèse-français*, with the last child holding the coin at the end of the class receiving a beating²³—is still vividly recalled by older Martinicans. It should not be supposed, however, despite the provision, since 1982, of *some* classes in Creole in Martinican schools, that the school is any less an agent of creolophobia than it was in 1900, 1920 or 1940. The authors of *Éloge de la Créolité* (1989), the manifesto referred to above, have even argued that 'the drama of many of our writers stems from the castration of which, linguistically, they were the victims during their childhood'.²⁴ The primary, and most debilitating, form of extroversion or heteronomy to which Martinican intellectual and artistic life has been exposed is that of language. It will take more than a handful of ministry-sponsored courses in and on Creole to repair the 'cultural amputation'²⁵ that a century of creolocidal education policy (French-inspired but backed and implemented by generations of local teachers), has inflicted on the Martinican people.

As for the content of the education transmitted by Martinican schools during the assimilationist heyday between 1880 and 1940, enough has been written of the ritual incantation of 'nos ancêtres les Gaulois' by generations of decidedly not-flaxen-haired 'French' West Indian and 'French' African schoolchildren for its alienating effects to require little further emphasis here. Suffice it to say that, from the *leçons de choses* undergone at the age of six or seven, via the study, from nine to twelve, of the standard Third Republic textbook, *Le Tour de France Fait par Deux Enfants*, to—for the tiny minority of pupils who got that far—the *classes de philo* from sixteen to eighteen, everything conspired to detach the Martinican child from the particular, and especially from that which was 'African' or 'black' in the local cultural heritage, and propel him or her into a realm of abstraction which the French educational system, faithfully reflecting and transmitting republican ideology, decreed to be universally valid. In philosophy it was the rationalism of Descartes or the secularism of Voltaire, in literature it was Racinian classicism or the realism of Balzac. Yet in mentally 'deporting',²⁶ generations of Martinican schoolchildren from the particular to the universal or the pseudo-universal, the republican school also, and despite itself, made available to a handful amongst them the intellectual and literary weapons with which the assimilationist idea might itself be challenged. To have to read Brunschvig or Alain, the quasi-official philosophers of the Third Republic, was to acquire, whether the system

wished it or not, the ability to read Hegel or Marx; the study of Hugo or Musset could lead, as it did for Césaire and others of his generation, to the discovery of Rimbaud, Lautréamont and the Surrealists. More generally, to master 'le français français' (Léon Damas)²⁷ was also, potentially, to be able to turn it, Caliban-like, against the white or coloured Prosperos that taught it and the colonialist values they embodied.

Thus it is that the Martinican school has been both the principal agent of assimilationism and, through a minority of its products, its principal antagonist as well. Almost all of the writers and intellectuals mentioned in these pages have passed through the Lycée Schoelcher in Fort-de-France, and not a few of them – one thinks of René Ménil, Edouard de Lépine, Vincent Placolty and, above all, Aimé Césaire – have taught there, transmitting to their students skills and knowledge derived from assimilationism in such a way that they, like their teachers before them, might turn those skills against the assimilationist hegemony itself. Yet, as we shall see, such is the hold of the assimilationist idea on the Martinican mind, that, even as they contest it, as some Martinican writers and intellectuals began to do in the 1930s, more still did in the 1950s and 1960s, and yet more do today, there is a seemingly ineluctable tendency to reproduce in opposition the thought-patterns and basic mind-set of assimilationism, notably its instinctive search outside of Martinique rather than within for models to follow and examples to emulate. 'Africa' may replace 'France' as the valorized Other, as it did for the poets and theorists of the Négritude movement, but the fundamental extroversion or heteronomy that are assimilationism's most baleful legacy remain unchanged.²⁸ Perhaps, indeed, the Martinican intellectual is never more 'French', never more assimilated, than when, precisely, he opposes assimilationism.

Marxism in Martinique

The paradoxes of assimilationism are nowhere more apparent than in the development and influence of Marxism in twentieth-century Martinique.²⁹ The very fact that it is possible to speak of a Marxist tradition in Martinican thought (as it would not be possible – with all due respect to *individual* Marxists such as Richard Hart and C.L.R. James – to speak of there being a Marxist *tradition* within Jamaican or Trinidadian thought) is evidence of the presence within the French political-intellectual tradition, of a powerful Marxist current from the 1880s onwards. What Fabian socialism was, say, to many Jamaican intellectuals (especially teachers) in the 1930s, so Marxism was to many

of their Martinican equivalents. An identifiable Marxist current in Martinique dates from December 1919. A group of young and mainly middle-class mulatto members of the *Fédération Socialiste de la Martinique* (founded 1901) broke with that party after its leader, Joseph Lagrosillière, had, in a phrase that has achieved proverbial status in Martinique, decided to 'faire un bout de chemin avec l'usine' – in other words to enter into an electoral compact with the *békés* to ensure 'social stability' and advance his own political career. Using its newspaper *Justice* (founded 1920) to transmit a Marxist analysis of Martinican society, the *Groupe Jean-Jaurès*, as the dissident socialists called themselves, gained some small influence in intellectual and trade union circles in the 1920s, but, with the onset of the global economic crisis, the group became a significant presence in Martinican politics. A major strike of cane-cutters in February 1935 revealed the full extent of popular misery in the island and the prevalence of class (and, by corollary, racial) conflicts beneath the outwardly placid surface of social and political life. In 1935, the *Groupe Jean-Jaurès* amalgamated with another Marxist group, *Front Commun* (discussed in the following section), to form the *Fédération Communiste de la Martinique* (FCM). In 1937, in alliance (like the *Parti Communiste* in France) with local socialists and radicals, the group secured the election of its first *conseiller général* Léopold Bissol.

What is significant about the rise of communism in Martinique is that *at no point* did its leading figures – Jules Monnerot *père*, Joseph Del, Juvénal Linval, André Alikér, Victor Lamon or Bissol himself – challenge the assimilationist idea either in general or in any of its particulars. Indeed, along with the local branch of the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO), the FCM advocated from its inception a form of assimilationism more totally integrationist in its implications than the more qualified associationist model preferred by the local radicals and other centre or centre-right parties.³⁰ Instinctively, the FCM looked to revolution (or, failing that, a communist-socialist electoral victory) *in France* as the solution to the problems of Martinique, and at no time in the 1930s did it pose the question of autonomy, let alone of independence, for the island-colony. Focusing all of its efforts on the critique of *capitalism*, the *Groupe Jean-Jaurès* and its successors conspicuously failed to develop a critique of *colonialism*.

The ultra-assimilationism of Martinican communists was deepened still further, if that were possible, by the experience of 1940–3, when, as is well known, Martinique was physically separate as never before from the *mère-patrie* even as it was controlled, via Admiral Georges Robert and his fleet, by the collaborationist régime in Vichy.³¹ At the

Liberation, by which time the Parti Communiste had emerged as a decisive political force in France. Martinican communists' desire for total assimilation as an integral *département* of France knew no bounds:

We want complete assimilation, we are ready to make the greatest sacrifices, we are ready to bear all the burdens borne by French tax-payers, all the burdens, but we want in return for our island to benefit from all the advantages enjoyed by metropolitan French citizens, we want our island to be administered with the same attentiveness as a French département. Such is the mandate that our deputies will have to fulfil.

(*Justice*, 5 January 1946)³²

By 1946, of course, one of those communist deputies was Aimé Césaire who had published in 1939 his *Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal* in which, as we shall see later, an explicitly anti-assimilationist message coexists, characteristically, with a set of unacknowledged assimilationist assumptions. He was, in circumstances that remain obscure, recruited by the strongly assimilationist FCM some time in 1943-4. In February 1944, Césaire published a manifesto in *Tropiques* in which he laid down what he called

the principle of a sound political course for the French West Indies: open the windows. Air. Air. From which it follows that I condemn any idea of independence for the French West Indies. I know only one France. That of the Revolution. That of Toussaint l'Ouverture. So much for the Gothic cathedral.³³

On 21 July 1945 (the feast of Saint-Victor), Césaire delivered a panegyric to the memory of Victor Schoelcher who, he said, by 'associating in our minds the word France and the word Liberty, bound us to France by every fibre of our hearts and all the power of our minds'.³⁴ On the day that the *loi de départementalisation* was finally passed by the French National Assembly, Deputy-Mayor Césaire who had been the law's *rapporteur* sent the following eloquent telegram to his comrades in Fort-de-France: '*Grande victoire pour classe laborieuse et fonctionnaires – assimilation obtenue – vive P.C.*'³⁵ By *fonctionnaires* we may be sure that Césaire meant primarily his fellow-teachers, communists and non-communists alike. If the Third Republic was known, famously, as *le République des professeurs*, then the complete assimilation into France that Martinique obtained at the beginning of the Fourth Republic was, before all else, a triumph for its teachers.

The post-1946 evolution of Marxism in Martinique,³⁶ which it is not possible to trace in detail here, offers yet further evidence of the difficulty, for Martinican intellectuals, of escaping and thinking outside

the assimilationist problematic. Even before Césaire broke with the PCF in 1956, forming his own Parti Progressiste Martiniquais (PPM) two years later, a number of local communists had registered unease about the total assimilation they had so strenuously advocated so very few years previously. After Césaire's departure, the Parti Communiste Martiniquais was for a number of years, and particularly after the serious anti-French riots in Fort-de-France in December 1959, a far more vigorous proponent of some form of autonomy for Martinique than the fledgeling PPM. Between 1960 and 1963 *Justice* was repeatedly seized by the French authorities, and leading party militants such as Armand Nicholas and Camille Sylvestre were fined on a number of occasions for denouncing the war in Algeria, condemning the brutal police suppression of a strike at Le Lamentin in March 1961 (when three strikers were killed and twenty-three injured) and, in June 1961, for advocating autonomy for Martinique. Internally and externally, the years 1960-3 presented the optimum conditions for the launching of an out-and-out *indépendance* movement in Martinique but, in common with its rival, the PPM, at no time, then or later, did the PCM advocate anything more than *autonomy* (i.e. a large, but undefined, measure of internal self-government) within the context of a continuing (but also undefined) association with France. Although it had cut its organizational links with the PCF, the PCM still looked to communist success in France as the key to the solution of Martinique's problem, and its failure to take the qualitative leap from autonomism into true *indépendantisme* prompted many younger militants to leave the party and launch unambiguously *indépendantiste* parties in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Yet even these ultra-leftist nationalist groups, many of them springing from the very radical Organisation de la Jeunesse Anticolonialiste Martiniquaise (OJAM) and Association Générale des Étudiants Martiniquais (AGEM) of the early 1960s, often revealed in their very ideological sophistication the inveterate 'Other-centredness' of the Martinican Left. Thus the Trotskyist Combat Ouvrier and Groupe Révolutionnaire Socialiste (GRS) looked to 'proletarian internationalism' or 'world revolution' for the realization of the goals, the Maoist formation Asé Pléré Anou Lité (APAL) found for a time its revolutionary exemplar in China, others looked to Cuba, to Algeria, to Vietnam, to the PLO, and so on. No less significantly, the rigorous class analysis of Martinican society favoured by such Marxist *groupuscules* often prevented them from engaging with what is the most obvious (if not necessarily most profound) feature of Martinican society, namely its stratification along, broadly, racial lines. The role of race and racism is certainly not neglected, but it is commonly seen as a

phenomenon of the superstructure, derived from, reflecting and sanctifying an oppressive economic and political infrastructure, a by-product of a particular class situation, not its cause or motivating force.³⁷ In a peculiar way, race, as in this statement from a GRS manifesto of the early 1970s, is made into a non-racial issue: 'It is not true that capitalists in the French West Indies are exclusively white. And even if every single capitalist were white, our struggle would still not be a racial struggle . . . The struggle against racial hatred is possible only when one has transcended a racial perception of it'.³⁸ The result of this almost instinctive (and very PCF!) subordination of race to class is that the issue of the *blackness* of a substantial majority of the Martinican people is repeatedly eluded or elided. It is almost as though, as Daniel Maragnes has suggested,³⁹ race has become the unthinkable, and certainly the unthought, in contemporary French West Indian reflection, and this amongst individuals and groups that regularly invoke their fellow Martinican Frantz Fanon's *Peau Noire Masques Blancs* and *Les Damnés de la Terre* as their inspirational texts *par excellence*. On the question of race, as on so many others, one witnesses the fatal tendency of Martinican thought, as soon as it begins to engage with the concrete, the immediate and the particular, forthwith to fray away and unravel into the abstract, the global, the 'universal'. The ease with which a significant number of former *indépendantistes* – Auguste Arnet, Edouard Jean-Elie and, above all, Edouard de Lépine, the former leading ideologist of the GRS – have in recent years rallied to the essentially (if covertly) assimilationist PPM reveals nothing more, perhaps, than the fact that, deep down, they had never in reality thought themselves out of the assimilationist mind-set at all.

Négritude and its Enemies

If Martinican Marxism never sought to challenge the assimilationist idea (at least not until the mid-1950s, by which time the damage had, in effect been done), the same cannot, self-evidently, be said of the ideology of Négritude which, though by no means an exclusively Martinican, or even French West Indian, creation, nonetheless represented the principal current of anti-assimilationist thinking in Martinique from the mid-1930s until the early 1980s. Here, surely, (and above all in the poetry, plays, political writings and political actions of Aimé Césaire) is evidence at last of a coherent and fully achieved anti-assimilationist project – evidence that it *is* possible for a black Martinican to place himself entirely outside of the assimilationist problematic and posit himself as other from the Other (rather than, as assimilationism

implies, essentially the same), endowed with being-in-himself (and not just being-for-the-Other, as though everything he is, has and does is a creation of that Other) – to postulate himself, in short, as specific, unique and, not least, as *black*. On the face of it, the theory and practice of Négritude offer a dramatically simple and straightforward way out of the bogus universalism of assimilationism. In reality, as we shall see, the situation is far more complex.

It is traditional (though tradition here is a notoriously poor guide⁴⁰) to date the origins of the Négritude 'movement' from the appearance, in Paris, of *Légitime Défense* (March 1932),⁴¹ a manifesto-cum-collection of poems animated by three middle-class mulatto students from Martinique, Etienne Léro, René Ménil and Jules Monnerot *fils*. This was followed, in 1935, by the single number of a review called *L'Étudiant Noir* which owed its (somewhat inflated) reputation to the fact that, supposedly for the first time, it brought together a group of French West Indian students (Aimé Césaire, Gilbert Gratiant, Léopold Sainville but *not*, contrary to tenacious myth, Léon Damas) and a single French-speaking African, Léopold Sédar Senghor. A close reading of these two publications – closer than can be attempted here – and of what is, by common consent, the poetic masterpiece of the Négritude movement in its 'heroic' phase, Césaire's *Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal* (first published 1939, and substantially rewritten since) – suggests that, far from breaking decisively with the assimilationist problematic, the nascent Négritude movement operated within it as a counter-discourse that not only derived from its opponent most of the terms and concepts it employed but unconsciously reproduced assimilationism's underlying processes even as it contested them. Thus *Légitime Défense* sought to precipitate a process of change in Martinique by proposing – as its model, the French Surrealist movement, had done before it – a fusion of Marx, Hegel, Rimbaud, Lautréamont and Freud that would, it was claimed, shake the assimilationist monolith to its foundations. The fact, though, that the tools with which it attempts to demolish that monolith are themselves as fundamentally French (or European) as the tools that built it raises immediate doubts as to the efficacy of *Légitime Défense*'s project. These doubts are instantly confirmed by a reading of the accompanying poems which are, alas, as thoroughly derivative of French models – now surrealist rather than romantic or Parnassian – as the works of the established French West Indian poets so roundly denounced in the manifesto. Not surprisingly, Ménil, Léro and Monnerot were soon re-absorbed into the assimilationist consensus when the Marxist *groupuscule* they formed in 1934, Front Commun, amalgamated the following year with the Groupe Jean-Jaurès. As we have seen, the resulting Fédération Communiste de la

Martinique was strongly assimilationist. The first blast against assimilationism in the French West Indies turns out to have been a classic case of being hoisted with one's own petard.

The anti-assimilationist credentials of *L'Étudiant Noire*⁴² are much more impressive. There is no invocation of either Surrealism or Marxism, the emphasis is on the need for 'black', rather than Martinican or French West Indian distinctiveness, and the general problematic of the review's one number is culturalist rather than political, positing the problems of colonized blacks in terms of a denial of identity rather than (as *Légitime Défense* had done) of the reality of exploitation.⁴³ The clearest anti-assimilationist statement comes in Césaire's own contribution entitled 'Négrerie: Jeunesse noire et assimilation':

Assimilation, born of fear and timidity, always ends in contempt and hatred, since it contains within it the seeds of conflict: the conflict of the same versus the same, in other words the worst of conflicts. It is for this reason that black youth is turning its back on the tribes of the Elders. The tribe of the Elders says 'assimilation', we reply: resurrection! What does Black Youth want? To live. But to live authentically, one must remain oneself.⁴⁴

In a very real sense, the whole of the Négritude movement springs from this primary assertion of otherness. The problem was, however, that neither Césaire, Damas nor Senghor, all of whom had, with varying degrees of intensity, been exposed to the deracinating effects of an assimilationist upbringing, had any clear *concept* (though they had a powerful gut *feeling*) of what it was to 'be' or 'remain oneself'. Succumbing to an intellectual or ratiocinative urge that one cannot but regard as 'typically French', they turned, in the absence of any satisfactory self-definition, to European concepts of the primitive and the pre-logical (together with the associated concept of the organic community) to supply them with their definitions of 'blackness', the 'black personality' and 'black culture'. In so doing, they took on board some very dubious intellectual company indeed – Frobenius, Lévy-Brühl, Maurice Barrès, even Gobineau⁴⁵ – with the result that their mythic construct of Négritude, though it comprehensively turned European racist stereotypes on their head, nonetheless preserved the basic structure of these stereotypes even as it contested them. Of course, as the ideology of Négritude developed in the 1940s and 1950s, it acquired much greater philosophical, psychological and anthropological subtlety than was possible or even necessary in the coercive circumstances of the 1930s. There is a sense, however, in which it never escaped or transcended its primary recourse to the Other for its definition of blackness.

Although Césaire's concept of Négritude was decidedly less essentialist than that of Senghor, the fact that it derived ultimately from the organicist-irrationalist tradition of the European *Right* rather than from the dialectical materialism of the Left created obvious tensions during the ten years that he spent as communist deputy for Fort-de-France, tensions which, amongst others, he tried to resolve by breaking with the party in 1956. The celebrated public letter to Maurice Thorez in which Césaire announced his departure from the PCF contains the clearest possible formulation of his own dilemma and that – for in this, if in nothing else, Césaire's case is entirely typical – of the Martinican intelligentsia in general: 'I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. But neither do I wish to lose myself in a disembodied universalism ... There are two ways of destroying oneself: either by segregating oneself off behind walls in the particular or by dilution in the universal'.⁴⁶ Have Césaire and the autonomist party he founded in 1958 had any more success than his predecessors (of whatever ideological colouring) in negotiating the inevitable tension between these two principal poles of the Martinican experience?

To the extent that, through the constitution of Martinique as a *région monodépartementale* in 1982, Césaire obtained a 'solution' to the tension between the particular and the universal that clearly satisfied him at the time⁴⁷ (but whether it will by the time Martinique is incorporated into a unified European market in 1992 is quite another matter), one could say that he and his party could not have been more successful.⁴⁸ The fact, though, that he and it owed their success, characteristically, to a socialist electoral victory *in France* and not to any positive decision by the Martinican people (which voted massively *against* the socialist presidential candidate in 1981⁴⁹) merely shows how the basic inequation between Martinique and the metropole has not yet been resolved. It could further be argued that, far from having made the best of both the particular and the universal (as supporters of regionalization claim), Césaire and his party have actually had, and made, the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, Martinique remains as dependent, ultimately, as ever on the metropole with no power whatsoever to effect measures of which the metropole disapproves.⁵⁰ Far from being a synthesis of the particular and the universal, regionalism is, in effect, blurred, camouflaged or mitigated assimilationism. Through its incorporation into the structures of French domination since 1982, autonomism has been revealed for what it always in fact was: not an alternative to the assimilationist idea, but a mere sub-discourse within it. On the other hand, the Négritude-inspired definition of the 'particularity' or 'specificity' of Martinique is experienced as more and more confining by large numbers of Martinicans who see in its

mythification of 'blackness' or 'African-ness' – as embodied, for example, in the virtual fetishization of the drum (the *gros-ka*) in PPM culturalist discourse and practice⁵¹ – as a distortion of a community as ethnically, phenotypically and culturally diverse as Martinique. As a result of the PPM's domination (in alliance with the PCM and the local socialists) of the *Conseil Régional* since 1982, Négritude (or something akin to it) has now become the official hegemonic discourse of pseudo-power in Martinique.⁵² The precedent of former French Africa suggests that the point at which Négritude is transformed from an oppositional into an establishment discourse is also the point at which its in-built reifying, essentialist and above all anti-historical character is released, with potentially serious consequences for the community it seeks to define and interpret. Ironically, Négritude is the official ideology of a party which – Césaire himself apart – is dominated by people who, in Martinique, would be defined as *mulâtres*.⁵³ It would be entirely within the logic of the assimilationist idea, with its seemingly infinite capacity to recuperate oppositional discourses, if an assimilationist mulatto élite (backed not only by France but also by the *békés*) finally achieved dominance of a totally assimilated Martinique in the name of a supposedly anti-assimilationist and aggressively 'black' ideology.

Beyond assimilationism and Négritude? The concepts of Antillanité and Creolité

If Négritude is, in the view of many contemporary Martinican intellectuals, no more than a disguised or inverted form of assimilationism, does this mean that Martinican thought is doomed to turn forever within the barracoon of the assimilationist problematic, always looking outwards – first to 'France' and then to 'Africa' – for the liberating idea which, when it arrives, is forthwith recuperated by the consensus? The development, in the last twenty years, of the concept of *Antillanité* and, more recently, of its ally and derivative, *Creolité*, suggests that, after close to two centuries of chronic extroversion, Martinican intellectuals are at last beginning to look within to Martinique and, adjusting their sights to middle rather than long range, outwards to the *West Indian* societies and cultures immediately around them in search of the Philosopher's Stone of identity that has eluded them in 'Europe' and 'Africa'.

The concept of Antillanité is associated above all with the name of Edouard Glissant and finds its fullest discursive elaboration in his massive *Discourse Antillais* (1981) and its highly paradoxical artistic embodiment in the succession of novels – *La Lézarde* (1958), *Le Quatrième Siècle* (1964), *Malemort* (1975), *La Case du Commandeur*

(1981) and, most recently, *Mahogany* (1987) – in which Glissant has set out to explore the bewildering tangle of connections and disconnections, convergences and divergences, that make up the complex totality of the Martinican experience.⁵⁴

The related concept of Creolité is developed in the powerfully argued *Éloge de la Créolité* (1989) jointly written by Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant and in the authors' own individual writings: the authoritative studies of Martinican creole by Bernabé (*Fondal-Natal*, 1983, and *Fondas Kréyol-la* 1987); the novels of Chamoiseau (*Chronique des Sept Misères*, 1986, and *Solibo Magnifique*, 1988), and of Confiant (*Bitako-a*, 1985, *Kod Yanm*, 1986, and *Marisocé*, 1987) – all these being written in good Creole – and *Le Nègre et l'Amiral*, 1988, written in a potent fusion-fission of Creole and French); and also the journalistic and polemical activities of all three. Given the difficulty of many of these works, the comments that follow are based entirely on the highly accessible *Éloge de la Créolité* and do not take into account the fact that, while the concepts of Antillanité and Créolité inhabit the same problematic, there are significant differences of emphasis amongst the individuals who adhere to them, as well as differences between the two concepts themselves, notably in the degree of importance they accord to the question of Creole.

What distinguishes the concepts of Antillanité and Créolité from their predecessors and rivals is that they propose an open and flexible model – complex, multifaceted, polysemic, diverse – on which a possible Martinican identity can be based. This is to be not a single univocal identity but one based on a dynamic assumption of the multiplicity of the island's human and cultural components rather than, as so often in the past, on only one of its constituent parts: 'French' in the case of the old-style assimilationists, 'African' in that of the equally old-style (in the view of *Éloge de la Créolité*) proponents of the idea of Négritude. Créolité is defined as 'the interactional or transactional aggregate of those cultural elements – Carib, European, African, Asian and Levantine – that the yoke of History has brought together on the same soil'.⁵⁵ 'Our History is a braid (*une tresse*) of histories', the authors continue,

We have sampled every language, every way of speaking (*parlures*). Fearing this uncomfortable magma, we have vainly tried to fix it in a series of mythical elsewhere (the outward look, Africa, Europe, even today, India or America), to seek refuge in the closed normalcy of age-old cultures, without realizing that we were the harbingers of cultural contact, of the future world that is already dawning. We are everything at

one and the same time, Europe, Africa, nourished by contributions from Asia, the Levant, India and we incorporate too survivals from Precolumbian America. Créolité is *the world diffracted and then recomposed*, a maelstrom of signifieds in a single signifier: a Totality.

Créolité is at once an inner-directed discourse in that it focuses intensely on the Martinican human and cultural patrimony in all its heterogeneity ('the very essence of our identity is complexity'⁵⁶) and outer-directed in that it looks outward, not towards 'Europe' or 'Africa' or in the direction of some bogus universalism, but towards other similarly diverse societies, ethnically, linguistically and culturally, in the Caribbean (Guadeloupe and Guyane in the first instance, then Haiti, Dominica and St Lucia, then Trinidad, Jamaica, Surinam, and so on) and beyond (Réunion, Mauritius). In every instance, it is *language* (in the form of Creole, perhaps the *only* cultural form in Martinique that has *never* been recuperated by either the assimilationist consensus or by the newly hegemonic ideology of Négritude), rather than 'race', that is advanced as the foundation, first, of a national-cultural particularity or, better, unity-in-diversity, and, beyond that, of a possible federation or 'regroupement' of, initially, the French Creole-speaking peoples of the Caribbean. Unlike Négritude, Créolité is, in the eyes of its proponents, essentially a forward-looking discourse: its fulfilment lies in a possible, if difficult, future rather than a mythical, irrecoverable past.

The concept of Créolité has been strongly criticized in established nationalist or pseudo-nationalist circles in Martinique – by Marxists, inevitably but justifiably, for its neglect of the economic and political underpinnings of Martinique's cultural domination, by the mulatto-dominated PPM for, ironically, its alleged valorization of 'la mulâtrité' and 'la mulâtritude'.⁵⁷ It is unlikely that the discourse of Créolité will rapidly or wholly supplant the older concept of Négritude, and it is perhaps not desirable that it should do so since (in the present writer's view) it fails to address itself directly to the crucial fact that, within Creole Martinique, some Creoles – notably those with white or light skins and, still more so, those *males* with white or light skins – continue to enjoy vastly more political, social, economic and cultural power than others who, though no less Creole, suffer from the stigma of being either black or female or, above all, both. Nor is it clear what, if any, political praxis – and in this most unreal of societies where superstructures determine infrastructures, where, in a sense, everything is superstructure, the 'problem' is above all a *political* problem – will flow from the concept of Créolité which, it is to be feared, may be no less subject to recuperation by the status quo than, allegedly, Négritude before it.

Nonetheless, *Éloge de la Créolité* has the signal merit of providing, for the first time, a theoretical model for an independent Martinique in which all of the island's present indigenous population – blacks, whites, Indians, Lebanese, Chinese and all their possible inter-permutations – could, if they wished, find a place, and which, while strongly focused on its own specificity, would at last become the consciously *West Indian* – rather than exported European or transported African – society that, in its innermost creole reality, it has always been. 'It is through *Creolité* that we shall be Martinicans. It is by becoming Martinicans that we shall become West Indians (Caribéens), hence Americans after our own fashion. It is through *Creolité* that we shall crystallize Antillanité, the ferment of an Antillean civilization.' The next few years should reveal whether, freed at last from 'the obsessive concern with the Universal',⁵⁸ a new generation of Martinican intellectuals will succeed in transforming the experience of dichotomy that so perplexed its forebears into a principle of renewed creative fertility.

Notes

- 1 'The whole of Martinican society has been side-tracked into the dead-end of a double consciousness'. René Ménil, *Tracées: Identité, Négritude, Esthétique aux Antilles* (Paris, Robert Laffont, 1981), p.46.
- 2 My use of the masculine form throughout this essay is partly due to a (no doubt culpable) desire for simplicity but also reflects the fact that in Martinique (unlike Guadeloupe), the vast majority of important writers and intellectuals have been male.
- 3 See, for example, Raphaël Confiant's comments recently on Radio France – Culture on the 'sud-américanité', as well as the 'caribéanité', of Martinique; L'Héritage de Césaire, *Antilla*, 369, 8 February 1990, p.39.
- 4 André Lucrèce, *Civilisés et Énergumènes: De l'Enseignement aux Antilles* (Paris, Editions Caribéennes/L'Harmattan, 1981), p.123.
- 5 See Frantz Fanon, *Peau Noire Masques Blancs* (Paris, Seuil, 1952), esp. pp.58-9 and 174-5.
- 6 For a powerful and perceptive characterization of the Martinican *petite bourgeoisie*, see Francis Affergan *Anthropologie à la Martinique* (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1983), pp.46-58.
- 7 For a valuable and succinct account of the period, see the special number of *France-Antilles*, *La Révolution, les Îles du Vent et la Guyane*, published in December 1989.
- 8 See Liliane Chauleau, *La Vie Quotidienne aux Antilles Françaises au Temps de Victor Schoelcher (XIXe Siècle)* (Paris, Hachette, 1979), p.29.
- 9 On the subject of separatism amongst the white élite at the time of the Revolution, see Edouard de Lépine, 'Les Colons Martiniquais et L'Idée de Spécificité Coloniale au Début de la Révolution Française', in Groupe de Recherche et d'Étude des Littératures et Civilisations de la Caraïbe et des Amériques Noires, *La Période Révolutionnaire aux Antilles*, (Paris, C.N.R.S./Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1986) pp.405-17.

- 10 For a fuller discussion of this question, see Richard D.E. Burton, *Assimilation or Independence? Prospects for Martinique* (Occasional Monograph Series No.13, Montreal, Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 1978), pp.1-7.
- 11 See Jean-Claude William, 'Les Origines de la Loi de Départementalisation', in *Historial Antillais* (Pointe-à-Pitre, Dajani Editions, 1981), 6, p.52.
- 12 Edouard De Lépine, *Questions sur L'Histoire Antillaise* (Fort-de-France, Desormeaux, 1978), pp.27-165.
- 13 On the royalism of Martinican *békés* after 1870, see Jacques Adelaïde, *Les Origines du Mouvement Ouvrier à la Martinique, de 1870 à la Grève de 1900* (Cahiers du CERAG, No.26, 2e trimestre 1972), p.104.
- 14 Quoted from William, 'Les Origines ...' *op.cit.* (1981) p.54.
- 15 For the term 'heteronomy' applied to assimilationist discourse, see the valuable article by André Lucrèce, *Le Mouvement Martiniquais de la Négritude. Essai d'analyse d'un Discours Idéologique*, *Acoma*, 2 (1971), 94-9.
- 16 On the distinction to be made between Schoelcherism and Schoelcher himself, see De Lépine, *Questions ...*, *op.cit.* (1978) p.40.
- 17 See Lucrèce, *Civilisés ...*, *op.cit.* (1981) pp.91-3.
- 18 See William F.S. Miles, *Elections and Ethnicity in French Martinique: a paradox in Paradise* (New York, Praeger Special Studies, 1986), p.83.
- 19 See Raphaël Confiant, 'Les Néo-schoelchéristes ont le Vent en Poupe', *Antilla*, 286, 5 May 1988, pp.24-6.
- 20 Edouard Glissant, *Le Discours Antillais* (Seuil, 1981), p.339 ('the superb and derisory masters of the baroque that were our schoolmasters in 1939').
- 21 Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant, *Éloge de la Créolité* (Paris, Gallimard/Presses Universitaires Créoles, 1989), p.44. The expression means, approximately, 'slave-drivers who crushed our artistic élan.'
- 22 See Glissant, *Discourse*, *op.cit.* (1981) p.380.
- 23 On 'la pièce', see Lucrèce, *Civilisés*, *op.cit.* (1981) p.155.
- 24 Bernabé *et al.*, *Éloge*, *op.cit.* (1989) p.45.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p.44.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p.14. 'We have been deported from ourselves at every stage of our scriptural history'.
- 27 See the poem 'Hoquet' in Léon Damas, *Pigments* (Paris, Présence Africaine, 1962), p.35.
- 28 See Bernabé *et al.*, *Éloge*, *op.cit.* (1989) p.20. 'A violent and paradoxical form of therapy, Négritude supplanted the illusion of Europe with that of Africa.'
- 29 For a detailed discussion of this subject, see René Ménil, Notes sur le Développement Historique du Marxisme à la Martinique, *Action*, 13 (1967), 17-30 and 14-15 (1967), 35-46; and Cécile Celma, La Vie Politique à la Martinique des Années 1910 à 1939, *Historial Antillais*, 5, 325-9.
- 30 See De Lépine, *Questions*, *op.cit.* (1978) pp.184-6.
- 31 For a discussion of the importance of the 'Vichy interlude' in the development of Martinican political consciousness, see Richard D.E. Burton, Vichysme et Vichyistes à la Martinique, *Cahiers du CERAG*, 34 (1978), esp. pp.85-95.
- 32 Quoted in De Lépine, *Questions*, *op.cit.* (1978) p.192.
- 33 Aimé Césaire, 'Panorama', *Tropiques*, 10 (1944), 10.

- 34 Aimé Césaire, 'Hommage à Victor Schoelcher', *Tropiques*, 13-14 (1945), 233.
- 35 *Justice*, 16 April 1946. Quoted in Fred Reno and Jean-Claude William, 'Le Statut Départemental entre l'Égalitarisme et les Particularismes', in Jean-Claude Fortier (ed.), *Questions sur l'Administration des DOM, Décentraliser Outre-mer?* (Aix-en-Provence, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 1989), p.60.
- 36 See Edouard De Lépine, Le Parti Communiste et le Mouvement Ouvrier à la Martinique de 1945 à nos Jours, *Historial Antillais*, 6, 181-295.
- 37 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Burton, *Assimilation*, *op.cit.* (1978) pp.52-6.
- 38 Claudie Guitteaud, Philippe Pierre-Charles and Edouard De Lépine, *Pour la Révolution Socialiste Antillaise* (Fort-de-France Groupe Revolution Socialiste, no date (1973?)), p.36.
- 39 Danile Maragnes, 'Contre la Mort Lente', in Alain Brossat and Daniel Maragnes (eds), *Les Antilles dans l'Impasse?* (Editions Caribéennes, 1981), pp.68-9. Maragnes's comments on the role of 'l'effet-Fanon' in this 'deracialization' of political debate in Martinique are of particular interest.
- 40 The account given by Lilyan Kesteloot in her pioneering work *Les Écrivains Noirs de Langue Française: naissance d'une littérature* (Brussels, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1965) contains many inaccuracies and omissions and needs to be revised in the light of the articles by Martin Steins and Edward O.Ako referred to below.
- 41 On *Légitime Défense*, see the exceptionally well-informed and highly critical study by Martin Steins, Non-Lieu, *Cultures et Développement*, 9, 1 (1977), 32-63.
- 42 On *L'Étudiant Noir*, see Martin Steins, Jeunesse Nègre, *Neohelicon*, 4, 1-2 (1976), 91-121, and Edward O. Ako, *L'Étudiant Noir* and the Myth of the Genesis of the Négritude Movement, *Research in African Literatures*, 15, 3 (1984), 341-53.
- 43 For this distinction, see the useful discussion in Alain Blérald, *Négritude et Politique aux Antilles* (Paris, Editions Caribéennes, 1981), pp.28-9.
- 44 Quoted in Ako, 'L'Étudiant Noir', *op.cit.* (1984), pp.343-4.
- 45 On the influence of Gobineau on the ideology of Négritude, see René Ménil, 'Le Spectre de Gobineau', in *Tracées*, *op.cit.* (1981), pp.90-6.
- 46 Aimé Césaire, *Lettre à Maurice Thorez* (Paris, Présence Africaine, 1967), p.15.
- 47 See the interview that Césaire gave to *France-Antilles* on the 40th anniversary of the *loi de départementalisation*, *France-Antilles*, 19 March 1986, p.7, and also the interview in *Antilla*, 278, 16 March, 1988, p.16: 'The Region is our identity card . . . , the identity of Martinique at last recognized, I mean officially recognized'.
- 48 For an excellent discussion of responses to regionalization in Martinique, see Fred Constant, Les Usages Politiques de la Décentralisation dans les DOM: le cas de la Martinique, *Cahiers de l'Administration Publique d'Outre-mer*, 2 (1989), 43-65 and, more generally, the same author's *La Retraite aux Flambeaux: société et politique en Martinique* (Paris, Editions Caribéennes, 1988).
- 49 On the 1981 presidential elections, see Miles, *Elections and Ethnicity*, *op.cit.* (1986), esp. pp.56-87.
- 50 For a searching discussion of the actual powers conferred by regionaliza-

- tion, see Jean-Paul Eluther, 'La Régionalisation: pour quoi faire?', in Jean-Claude Fortier (ed.), *Questions sur l'Administration des DOM*, op.cit. (1989) pp.73-84.
- 51 On the fetishization of the *gros-ka*, see the interview with Yves Leborgne in Brossat and Maragnes (ed.), *Les Antilles dans l'Impasse?*, op.cit., (1981), 'We have operated a kind of false return to the Africanity of the *gros-ka* ... The resurrection of the *gros-ka* is not so much the sign of an intact presence of Africa amongst us as a kind of avowal that we are casting on ourselves an exotic look. We appreciate ourselves as foreigners appreciate us, and we appreciate in our country what we see foreigners appreciate' (p.107).
 - 52 On the 'officialization' of Négritude in Martinique since 1981, see Patrick Chamoiseau, Plaidoyer pour un Nouveau Festival, *Antilla*, 341, 10 July 1989, pp.24-9. On Négritude as a disguised form of assimilationism, see Marcel Bourgade, Le PPM Dernier Bastion du Colonialisme en Martinique, *Antilla*, 324, 13 March 1989, pp.39-40.
 - 53 See Raphaël Confiant, Le Nègre, le Mulâtre et les Créoles, *Antilla*, 351, 28 September 1989, pp.30-33.
 - 54 For an introduction to Glissant's discursive and novelistic universe, see Richard D.E. Burton, *Comment peut-on être Martiniquais?* The Recent Work of Edouard Glissant, *Modern Language Review*, 79, 2 (1984), 31-12.
 - 55 The growing interest in Martinique's 'East Indian' minority is reflected in the work of Gerry L'Étang and in the number of the review *Carbet* (No.9, 1990) which he has edited and which is devoted to the theme of 'L'Inde en nous, des Caraïbes aux Mascareignes'. See the interview with him in *Antilla*, 369, 8 February 1990, pp.32-3. His brother Thierry L'Étang is a specialist in Carib studies.
 - 56 All quotations from Bernabé *et al.*, *Éloge*, pp.26-8.
 - 57 See Confiant, 'Le Nègre', p.30-1.
 - 58 Bernabé *et al.*, *Éloge*, p.51.

CHAPTER 12

Mexican intellectuals and collective biography in the twentieth century

Roderic A. Camp

This chapter will examine weaknesses in our traditional methodologies for exploring characteristics of intellectual life. Moreover, it will suggest gaps in our knowledge of intellectuals and their relationships to other groups. Examples from Mexico will be used to demonstrate how techniques in collective biography, obtained through documentary research, surveys, or interviews can answer important questions about intellectuals. Finally, some speculations will be made as to the significance of trends presently taking place among Mexican intellectuals.

Defining the intellectual

The most obvious problem the careful student of intellectuals encounters is one of *definition*. The reason for the ambiguity found in most definitions of intellectuals is that most analyses of this subject have not been offered by scholars, but rather by intellectuals writing for an audience of their peers. This is not to say that intellectuals cannot provide a useful definition, but rather that precision has never characterized their attempts.

Methodologically speaking, definitions of intellectuals fall into two general categories: élitist and broad, or Marxist and eclectic. Of the more than three dozen descriptions or pseudo-definitions I have encountered in the literature published since the 1940s, the range of who is to be included or excluded among intellectuals is mind-boggling: one definition actually identified intellectuals as anyone receiving a college education while one only included literary figures.¹

Naturally it is important to take great care when outlining the qualities used to describe the intellectual. Not only is this necessary in rationalizing what an intellectual is, but it is crucial to conclusions reached through a collective biographical method. This essay is not the place to criticize the assumptions of numerous definitions, which I have already done at length elsewhere; rather, I suggest that most definitions err in being absurdly tied to formal educational achievements and

professional categories, or to a discipline bias.² These biases stem from historical conditions in the nineteenth century when few persons obtained higher education. It was an age when men of knowledge were generalists whose renaissance breadth was truly admirable. At that time one *could* conclude more accurately that a formally well-educated person was an intellectual. The prejudice favouring literary types emerged from the extraordinary importance of the written word, and consequently, of those who were skilled wordsmiths.³

Intellectual-producing cultures are not the same today as they were 100 or even 25 years ago. Higher education in many societies is now accessible to a relatively large population, so there is nothing exclusive about the formal credentials of an intellectual. Written media have undergone so many alterations, and other forms have come to play such an important role, that writing is not the only means of reaching a large audience. Finally, the technification of many aspects of our society is reflected in the proliferation of professional specializations, many unknown before World War II.⁴ These changes are obvious. Intellectual definitions have altered slowly; consequently, they do not correspond appropriately to the changed environment.

The mismatch between definition and cultural reality can be seen in one striking example. The best work today on North American intellectuals is that by Charles Kadushin, a pioneering effort in collective biography. Entitled *The American Intellectual Élite*, the title suggests that it focuses broadly on all intellectuals. Instead, as the author carefully explains, it is really an analysis of literary figures and social scientists.⁵ Kadushin's definition of the population from whom he selected his intellectuals automatically excluded artists, musicians, and, for the most part, scientists. Not surprisingly, Kadushin tends to identify like types as other intellectuals, rather than permitting a random sample from all disciplines to select important figures. When using the method of collective biography, a definition which excludes or includes certain types of individuals, such as Kadushin's, ensures that only certain characteristics will be apparent.⁶

A second weakness among standard definitions is an attempt, *a priori*, to associate intellectuals with a larger social category or class, borrowing from traditional Marxist analysis. This approach grows out of the synonymous use of the words *intelligentsia* and *intellectual*. These terms no longer seem to have the same meaning, at least in terms of actual usage. The term *intelligentsia* is now the broader of the two words, commonly used to refer to a well-educated, professional person. Thus one could argue that by definition most intellectuals are members of the *intelligentsia*, but that the reverse is not true. The association of intellectuals with a social class is further emphasized by the popularity

in the 1970s of labelling the intelligentsia (and intellectuals among them) as the 'New Class'.⁷ Scholars from the ideological Right and Left use the term 'New Class', but the most sophisticated analysis identifying this group as a class in a Marxist sense is the work of the late Alvin Gouldner.⁸ The difficulty with Gouldner's approach is, I believe, the assumption that intellectuals are a rather large group and that they represent the interests of this new class. I would argue that intellectuals themselves are too eclectic to represent the universal interests of a single class, and that furthermore, often their personal philosophical goals are contradictory to their own self-interest.

Research approaches for collective biography

Students of intellectual life who pursue their interpretations based on eclectic, personalized definitions have, more often than not, little rigour in their approach. In fact, almost no methodologies have been rigorously applied to exploring intellectual life. Again, because of the ideas of those who have done these analyses, and those who have been interested in the subject of intellectuals, the two major eclectic approaches are humanistic. Literary scholars are responsible for most studies of intellectuals which, going beyond individual biographies, centre on books and articles describing literary circles. A notable example of this for Mexico is Merlin Forster's contribution on the '*Contemporáneos*'.⁹ Actually, even this common literary methodology has produced only a handful of important contributions.¹⁰ A second humanistic approach combines literary analyses with philosophy, subsumed under the category of 'intellectual history'. Such studies abound, especially for Latin America, and the works of Leopoldo Zea, William Rex Crawford, Irving A. Leonard and many others readily come to mind.¹¹

Students of literary groups and the history of ideas have contributed nearly all of what we presently know about intellectuals in Mexico, Latin America, and elsewhere.¹² Their focus, however, is primarily on the source of and changes in intellectual ideas and the make-up of groups sharing similar views. What these studies fail to provide is empirical data on the structure of intellectual life: that is, how intellectuals are recruited, where they are socialized, what are the sources of their credentials, who are their families, where are they educated, what are their professional backgrounds, what is their relationship to other intellectuals, who are their leaders in cultural institutions, and perhaps most important of all, what is their relationship to the State? Using collective biography as a methodology, I believe all of these questions can and should be answered. Moreover, in addition to providing us with

a more complete record of past contributions, this approach can tell us about the present and future contributions to be made by Mexican and other intellectuals.

The art of collective biography as a methodology in Mexico and Latin America is at a neophyte stage. It has been widely used in some social-science subdisciplines in North America. Unfortunately, we must borrow from studies done elsewhere, many having little applicability to the Mexican or Latin American scene. The most important works using this approach are those by Charles Kadushin on North America, Edward Shils on India, Juan Marsal and Margery Arent on Latin America, and Enrique Krauze on Mexico.¹³ Because Krauze's work is the only one dealing specifically with Mexico, and because he examines a very small generation, two other authors' contributions, in addition to my own work, are instructive: those of Peter H. Smith and Luis González. These authors are the first to apply collective biography in the study of Mexico, but their subject matter is political leadership.¹⁴ All of these works, regardless of the method used to convey their generalizations, owe an intellectual debt to the sociologists and political scientists who advocated élite and/or generational research.

Documentary research

The term *collective biography* is being used rather broadly in this essay. As I suggested in the introduction, I believe three techniques can be used individually or in combination as sources for this approach. Documentary research on intellectuals reveals numerous essays written by Europeans and North Americans.¹⁵ These works provide many useful speculations on what an intellectual is, what he should be, and the role he should play. But little exists, even at this level, for Mexico. Thus, this literature provides a universal measure from which to test and explore similar characteristics in Mexico. However, because intellectuals in all cultures are widely read, the researcher has to take great care to identify the influences which foreign intellectuals have on the definition and role which Mexican and Latin American intellectuals perceive for themselves. In this vein of literature, the most useful work for Mexico is that of Gabriel Careaga.

Going beyond the scholarly literature on intellectuals, documentary research can be useful in several other ways. Perhaps the most important documentary sources of information about intellectuals in most societies, especially Mexico, are autobiographies. Intellectuals have done far better than politicians in leaving us a written account of their lives and times. Remembering the natural caveat that comes with reading any

autobiographical work, such memoirs, if read with a collective goal in mind, provide reams of data about the deficiencies in scholarly examinations of intellectual life identified above. Moreover, read carefully, autobiographies contain the seeds of many appropriate questions suggestive of the structure of intellectual life. For Mexico, the benchmark work for the nineteenth century is the multi-volume self-portrait by José Vasconcelos.¹⁶ An example of what can be accomplished by an analysis of a single man's work is illustrated in the probing and controversial work of José Joaquín Blanco, *Se llamaba Vasconcelos*.¹⁷ Other, more recent examples include recollections by Jesús Silva Herzog and Daniel Cosío Villegas.¹⁸

The special advantage of intellectual autobiographies to the student of collective biography is that they provide the reader with an intellectual's view of his role over time. Thus, he can more clearly piece together succeeding generations of intellectuals from the 1920s to the present. Of course, many memoirs are not characterized by the audacity, depth and perception of Vasconcelos. Nevertheless, ferreting out what is significant is the grist of the detective work for the political historian.

A special source of autobiographical material less commonly available to the scholar is that of personal papers. Most Mexican intellectuals and public men retain all of their personal correspondence. Occasionally, these papers come to light publicly, as in the excellent volume of the correspondence of Marte R. Gómez (a leading figure in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s in agricultural policy and politics).¹⁹ More often, unfortunately, private papers are only accessible to the immediate family, or to a persevering scholar who obtains access to them. This form of documentation has traditionally been used to write a major biography of an individual, but the imaginative scholar can broaden the applicability of such sources by describing a generation, which Enrique Krauze accomplished in his magnificent *Caudillos Culturales de la Revolución Mexicana*, a penetrating exploration of the 1915 generation.²⁰

The other type of documentary source useful to collective biography as a methodology for examining intellectuals is the standard biography. Oddly, serious intellectual biographies, legion in North American and European literature, scarcely exist in Mexico. Consequently, biographies of Mexican intellectuals are helpful in collecting biographical and career information about prominent individuals, but provide almost none about the intellectual community.²⁰ Some exceptions to this are the works of Bertram Wolfe on Diego Rivera, Enrique Krauze on Daniel Cosío Villegas, and Hayden Herrera on Frida Kahlo.²¹ Each scholar had access to the biographee or the biographee's papers, and made use of interviews with friends and acquaintances. They are as useful for their discussion of the intellectual's times as they are of his or her life.

Finally, documentary research into the proceedings of the major academies, and the bibliography and staff of the significant reviews, is the only manner of collecting information about the frequency of contributions, the nature of contributions over time, the representation of ideological points of view, the names of the editorial gatekeepers, and the membership of prestigious academies which certify and promote intellectual careers. This is simple spadework for the researcher, but basic to understanding Mexican intellectual life. Moreover, as will be seen in the discussion of survey research, quantifiable data in the form of individual names and contributions often determine who is in the researcher's intellectual population.

Survey research

Survey research is the second major technique which, like documentary research, can be used to supply information about intellectuals as a group. It has certain limitations, as normally defined. The typical method of survey research is to identify a population and then survey it randomly through a telephone, oral or written questionnaire. In Mexico, however, written questionnaires do not have much success. Professional interviewers work well for large surveys, as in the Almond and Verba studies, or those done by Wayne Cornelius and by Mexican sociologists, but our focus is on an élite, hardly a group willing to submit to an impersonal interview technique.²³ Also, the survey approach has the distinct disadvantage of confining itself to contemporary figures, and therefore does not have much historical value. Two approaches can be used, however, with some success. Both Peter Smith and I found that personal letters to individual Mexicans worked well when trying to obtain biographical information from politicians. I found further that letters pursuing intellectual questions about various subjects often brought lengthy and valuable responses from public men. Individuals were quite willing to discuss educational and home environment, family history, the political milieu of their youth, and perceptions of their generation's attitudes. For example, I received interesting responses to letters about José Vasconcelos's 1929 presidential campaign and Agustín Yáñez's political career.²⁴ The older the respondent and the subject, the more likely a response.

An alternative approach to traditional survey research is to provide the answers yourself, either by asking an informed third party, personally interviewing the proposed respondent, or acquiring necessary information through biographical research. These techniques alone cannot provide interpretative materials for large groups of intellectuals, but they

do provide such helpful information as parents' background, political activities, place, level and field of education, age, sex, ideology, and so on, from which useful interpretations may be drawn. Knowledge about each piece of data is critical to completing a group portrait of intellectuals. The researcher who acquires this type of data can manipulate various variables in order to answer a wide variety of questions. Juan Marsal was able to use this technique in his useful study of Mexican essayists.²⁵

Personal interview

The least used technique in the methodology of Mexican collective biography is interviewing the subject of the study. Personal interviews are valuable for a number of reasons.

1. They can help the researcher to identify the boundaries of his sample if the interviewer asks each respondent to recommend other intellectuals.

2. Skilful interviewing draws out apparent contradictions in unpublished interpretative material. Interviews also make available strongly stated opinions atypical of expressionless published materials.

3. Most important, a researcher who does his own interviewing is able to alter his questions as circumstances dictate. Although open-ended questionnaires with a consistent set of questions for each respondent are often best, as the interviewer's knowledge grows, new perceptions can be explored spontaneously in the interview process. New questions produce findings never foreseen in the initial research design, or even well into the project, after serious documentary research has been completed.

Selecting the subject of biography

The most difficult single task in the collective biography procedure is deciding just who is to be included in the study. Here, the definition of an intellectual becomes critical. After much exploration of the subject, I chose a definition which will not please everyone. It has no disciplinary bias nor does it presuppose fixed credentials, but implies that few individuals in any society at a given time are truly intellectuals. In my studies, an intellectual is defined as someone who creates, evaluates, analyses or presents symbols, values, ideas and transcendental interpretations regularly to a broad audience. In my own research on Mexico, I also set a time frame, 1920 to 1980. Thus, covering a period of sixty years, and using a definition which limits intellectuals to a group

probably no larger than five hundred individuals during those years, how does one decide who is a member of this august collection?

The pitfalls of *élite* research, from which collective biographical methodology is borrowed, have been thoroughly discussed, most recently for Mexico by Robert Peterson.²⁶ Generally, selections are made on the basis of position or reputation. For the study of Mexican intellectuals, the positional approach could advocate choosing intellectuals on the basis of membership of an editorial board; leadership and membership in *élite* academies and cultural organizations such as the National College, the Seminar of Culture, the Academy of Arts; and leadership of prestigious academic institutions, such as El Colegio de México or the National University. Other measures for choosing intellectuals include their level of contributions to leading intellectual journals, and finally, their receipt of major national prizes in literature, art, humanities, social sciences and the natural sciences. The trouble with relying exclusively on the positional approach is that while many of these individuals would qualify by my definition as intellectuals, some would not. Thus any analysis on these criteria alone is prejudiced by automatically including unqualified subjects.

To counteract the limitations of the positional approach, social-science researchers developed the reputational methodology. This technique, which overtly is less rigorous, suggests that knowledgeable individuals should be asked who are the important intellectuals. Then, after a process of elimination, the most frequently mentioned names would ultimately make up the sample. This complements the positional approach by adding names of intellectuals who may never have held formal positions, and simultaneously eliminates names of individuals who did hold formal positions, but were not intellectuals. To obtain the broadest possible sample, and to gain different sets of perceptions, I asked three groups to identify prominent intellectuals: North American Mexican specialists, prominent Mexican public figures identified in my previous work, and individuals I and others in the scholarly literature considered to be intellectuals. One of the inherent weaknesses in this approach is that celebrity intellectuals, who are currently in vogue, tend to receive the most attention. Surviving leading intellectuals from the 1920s were either unknown to the present generation or were even thought to be deceased. Therefore, the scholar needs to take great pains to compensate for this bias.

To strengthen the choices in my overall selection of intellectuals, and to compensate for the weaknesses in the positional and reputational approaches, I also made use of literary criticism and histories of the arts, sciences, letters, and so on, to obtain the names of individuals whom experts and peers described as making notable contributions to their

respective fields. Combining these names with those acquired from the other two approaches, I developed a master list. Using this as a preliminary list, I winnowed it down on the basis of whether or not each individual met my criteria for an intellectual, and the number of times and in what context the individual's name was mentioned.

The value of collective biography

To what degree has the methodology of collective biography been able to 'fill in the gaps' of unanswered questions about the structure of Mexican intellectual life? I believe it has been most successful. Let us briefly examine each of the points described above.

Intellectual recruitment in Mexico has taken place essentially through two mentors: university professors and editors. Biographies, autobiographies and interviews with intellectuals were most useful in determining this finding. The advantage of using collective biography, however, was that it illustrated how the type of mentor had changed over a long period of time. Like politicians, Mexican intellectuals have always used the university as a place of employment and as a means to attract brilliant disciples. Two important examples of teaching intellectuals are Mario de la Cueva, a leading figure in labour law, and José Gaos, a Spanish immigrant who collected a generation of outstanding intellectuals in his seminars at El Colegio de México.²⁷ But in recent years, the editor, who uses the prestige of his journal or cultural supplement to a major daily newspaper to attract willing disciples, is more common. An excellent illustration of this type of mentor is Octavio Paz, who has directed a series of intellectual reviews and supplements since the 1930s, but has never shown an inclination to teach. As the pattern represented by Paz becomes more strongly entrenched in Mexico it will decrease the importance of the university as a locus for recruitment and give greater power to the journal as a credentialling agent for prestigious intellectuals.

The family background of intellectuals is of interest for many reasons. Among other things, it can tell us who has access to intellectual careers, how closed the intellectual community is to new blood, and to what extent cultural élites are members of the lower power élite of military, political and business leaders. Collective biographical data show quite clearly that intellectual-producing families are almost exclusively middle and upper class, much more so than with any other leadership group. This has been as true in the 1920s as in the 1980s. Thus, only a tiny minority of young people from working-class families (which make up the vast majority of the Mexican population) have achieved

intellectual status. Equally interesting is the finding that the social upheavals of the Revolution of 1910 did not permanently disrupt the intellectual leadership among leading families from the Porfiriato. Numerous cases exist of leading figures from the nineteenth century continuing to take leadership positions in cultural academies after 1920. Interestingly, however, children of leading nineteenth-century intellectuals did not necessarily fare well in cultural circles, but grandchildren re-emerged as rather successful examples. The Justo Sierra and Ireneo Paz families provide only two examples.²⁸ Finally, my findings show that numerous ties exist among political and intellectual families, either through sanguinal or kinship relationships. Thus, a ready channel of communication exists among and between intellectuals and politicians. Biographies, biographical directories and genealogies were essential sources for determining these social characteristics.

Educational and professional backgrounds, the outlines of which can often be sketched from biographical directories and autobiographies, reveal many fascinating qualities of Mexican intellectuals. For example, the belief that intellectuals are often self-educated is a myth. Nearly all have had college educations, many have done postgraduate work, and a sizeable group studied abroad. Over time, the disciplinary backgrounds and hence the careers of intellectuals have changed. From an emphasis on law in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, a definite switch occurred to the humanities and social sciences in the 1960s and 1970s. As a consequence of this switch, literary types have become dominant among Mexican intellectuals. Careers have also changed. Most interesting has been the decline in intellectuals pursuing governmental careers, and the concomitant increase among those following full-time careers elsewhere, especially in academia and the media. Moreover, a small but significant group, exemplified by Enrique Krauze and Gabriel Zaid, operate their own businesses.

One of the most interesting questions left unexamined by earlier studies is how Mexican intellectuals relate to each other and the consequences of their relationships for the structure of intellectual life. Documentary research into editorial boards, journal contributions and academy membership were all useful in determining these relationships. Interviews with intellectuals about cases of self-censorship established intellectual attitudes towards each other. Equally important, traditional empirical approaches in collective biography alone would have missed the psychological environment so important to the cultural milieu in which the intellectual operates. Although there is considerable overlap socially and professionally, intellectuals are characterized more by their divisions than their unity. These divisions are self-created. One important consequence of intellectual divisions in Mexico is that they divert serious

attention from some of the policy issues on which intellectuals should focus.

Mexican intellectuals have been very active among establishment institutions. Interestingly, membership of the National College gives better representation to certain types of careers than is generally found among intellectuals themselves. On the other hand, many recent members of the National College are intelligentsia, not intellectuals. Generally, these bodies are characterized by their diversity, although many younger-generation members are the personal disciples of older members, indicating somewhat closed credentials for successful entry. The *Memorias* of various academies supplied data for these conclusions. Again, the ability to note longitudinal patterns over time was significant to understanding the evolution of Mexican intellectual life since the revolution.

The intellectual's relationship to the State is the most complex of all the questions raised in this chapter. While difficult if not impossible to summarize briefly, two alternative models serve to highlight this feature of intellectual life. The first model, similar to that found in France, views the intellectual as a politician; that is, no separation between roles exists in the mind of the intellectual or his peers. The second model, representative of the relationship found in North America, separates the intellectual from the politician. There is no interchange in roles. North American intellectuals rarely serve in public life. Mexico, of course, like every other Latin American culture and most Third World countries, pursued the French model. But beginning in the 1950s, and especially provoked by the events of 1968, Mexican intellectuals began to emulate the North American model. The independent intellectual came into vogue. Octavio Paz's resignation in 1968 as Ambassador to India highlighted the determination of some intellectuals to pursue this course. Over time, data from multiple biographies reveal the definitiveness of this change. Moreover, they show that this pattern is being passed on to the next generation, since disciples almost always pursue the intellectual model of their mentors. Finally, intellectuals have become divided into two broad groups, those who relate to and receive the attention of politicians, and those who do not. These findings would have been impossible to determine without surveying and interviewing *both* intellectuals and politicians.

As this short summary of findings from my larger study indicates, the value of the methodology of collective biography is that it begins to open new doors to what we can learn about intellectual life in Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean. In recent years, Mexican and North American scholars have begun to see the value of this approach. What is to be avoided, however, is turning collective biography into a cold,

empirical methodology which neither captures nor understands the importance of the psychology and cultural milieu of the intellectual. This understanding can only be obtained through a breadth of approaches, old-fashioned historical research, and extensive personal contact with the culture and its participants. In combination, these approaches provide for the best in method and scholarship. Alone, they can only fill in smaller pieces of the puzzle.

Notes

- 1 For a discussion of some of these definitions, see L.G. Churchward, *The Soviet Intelligentsia, An Essay on the Social Structure and Roles of Soviet Intellectuals during the 1960s* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); and Norman Birnbaum, 'Problem of a Knowledge Elite', *Massachusetts Review*, Vol. 12 (Summer, 1971), pp.620-36.
- 2 *Intellectuals and the State in 20th Century Mexico* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985), Chapter 3.
- 3 Alvin Gouldner discusses this history in his *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (New York, Seabury Press, 1976).
- 4 The best works on this are by Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'America in the Technetronic Age', *Encounter*, Vol. 30 (January, 1968), pp.16-26, and Heinz Eulae, *Technology and Civility, the Skill Revolution in Politics* (Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1977).
- 5 Charles Kadushin, *The American Intellectual Elite* (Boston, Little-Brown, 1974).
- 6 He discusses this at greater length in his 'Who Are the Elite Intellectuals?', *The Public Interest*, Vol. 29 (Fall, 1972), pp.109-27.
- 7 The best single work to date on the 'New Class' is that edited by B. Bruce-Briggs, *The New Class?* (New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1979).
- 8 *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York, Seabury Press, 1979), and his Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals, *Telos* (Winter, 1976-7), pp.3-36.
- 9 'The "Contemporáneos", 1915-1932: A Study in Twentieth-Century Mexican Letters' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1960).
- 10 One of the best is the work of Lewis A. Coser. See his 'The Differing Roles of Intellectuals in Contemporary France, England and America,' Symposium on Sociology of the Intellectuals, Buenos Aires, July 3-5, 1967.
- 11 Their most important works are, *Apogeo y Decadencia del Positivismo en México* (Mexico, Colegio de México, 1944); *A Century of Latin America Thought* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961); and *Baroque Times in Old Mexico* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966).
- 12 Two of the best works using variations on this approach are those by Henry Schmidt, *The Roots of Lo Mexicano, Self and Society in Mexican Thought, 1900-1934* (College Station, Texas A & M, 1978) and Gabriel Careaga, *Los Intelectuales y la Política en México* (Mexico, 1971).
- 13 Shils uses primarily interviews in his research on Indian intellectuals in the 1950s. *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: the Indian*

- situation (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1961). Juan Marsal, sometimes in co-authorship with Margery Arent, has done the best work with broad statistical analysis. See his edited work, *El intelectual latinoamericano* (Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1970). See also more recently the work of the Chileans J.J. Bruner and A. Flisfisch. Finally, Enrique Krauze has done a generational study in his *Caudillos Culturales en la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1976).
- 14 *Labyrinths of Power, Political Recruitment in 20th Century Mexico* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979); *Los Artífices del Cardenismo, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 1934-1940*, No. 14 (Mexico, El Colegio de México, 1979); and *Mexico's Leaders, Their Education and Recruitment* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1980), *The Making of a Government, Political Leaders in Modern Mexico* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1984).
- 15 The most useful over the years can be found in *Encounter, Daedalus, Massachusetts Review, Atlantic, Harpers*, and in three or four edited volumes in the 1970s.
- 16 They have passed through more editions than any other autobiography in the twentieth century. The five-volume memoirs included: *El Desastre, En el ocaso de mi vida, El proconsulado, La tormenta and Ulises Criollo*, published by Editorial Jus, various dates. The only memoir of similar quality is the multi-volume recollections of Jaime Torres Bodet.
- 17 José Joaquín Blanco, *Se Llamaba Vasconcelos* (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1977).
- 18 Silva Herzog has two separate volumes, *Mis Ultimas Andanzas, 1947-1972* (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1973) and *Una Vida en la Vida de México* (Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1972). Cosío Villegas's memoirs, brief and succinct, are entitled *Memorias* (Mexico, Joaquín Mortiz, 1976).
- 19 *Vida Política Contemporánea, Cartas de Marte R. Gómez*, 2 vols (Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1978).
- 20 Enrique Krauze, *Caudillos, op.cit.* (1976).
- 21 See, for example, the biographies of Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos. John H. Haddox, *Antonio Caso, Philosopher of Mexico* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1971) and *Vasconcelos of Mexico* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1967).
- 22 *The Fabulous Life of Diego Rivera* (New York, Stein and Day, 1963); *Daniel Cosío Villegas, una Biografía Intelectual* (Mexico, Joaquín Mortiz, 1980); and Hayden Herrera, *Frida, A Biography of Frida Kahlo* (New York, Harper & Row, 1983).
- 23 *The Civic Culture* (Boston, Little Brown, 1963).
- 24 Some of their interpretations have been published in my articles on La Campaña Presidencial de 1929 y el Liderazgo Político en México, *Historia Mexicana*, Vol. 27 (Fall, 1977), pp.231-49, and Un Intelectual en la Política Mexicana: Agustín Yáñez, *Relaciones*. Vol. 2 (Summer, 1981), pp.137-62.
- 26 'Los Ensayistas Socio-políticos de Argentina y Mexico' (Working paper, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, 1969).
- 26 'Elites and Non-Elites in Mexico, A Methodological Assessment and Reappraisal' (Paper presented at the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies, Las Cruces, New Mexico, 1981).
- 27 Gaos was not the only immigrant to attract such groups. Another who did so, but in a less formal way, was Manuel Pedroso, whose students

included Luis Echeverría and Carlos Fuentes. De la Cueva is possibly the single most important influence from the National School of Law on President de la Madrid's generation.

- 28 Ireneo is Octavio's grandfather, and was a major literary figure in journalism and publishing in the nineteenth century. His father was a Zapatista and revolutionary. Sierra's family splits into numerous branches. His son, grandsons, and presently a great-grandson have all held prominent political or administrative posts in arts and letters and education.

CHAPTER 13

Future agenda: some notes

Alistair Hennessy

In comparing the Hispanic islands it has been shown how wide were the variations between them, based on differences of size, of the colonial process, of the timing and intensity of the plantation experience, of differences in demographic patterns, and of variations in social, economic and political development. Common to all, however, has been their experience of US hegemony as well as of actual physical occupation. All had experienced an economic transformation in which sugar became king: in Cuba through the first and second sugar revolutions; in Puerto Rico through the shift from a highland coffee peasant economy to lowland sugar plantations; in the Dominican Republic sugar, post-dating slave abolition, replaced cattle and tobacco. In all these instances economic changes not only affected the labour force but also the élite. In Cuba, creole planters were decimated and deeply divided by the wars of independence; in Puerto Rico they lacked the power base to resist the encroachments of US capital after 1898, and in the Dominican Republic divisions between cattlemen and tobacco farmers facilitated the rise of foreign-financed sugar corporations. In all countries intellectuals, drawn from the economic élite, confronted a cultural crisis. Spanish power was unable to protect them against the incursions of economically more powerful competitors.

Adopting American mores or turning to European example was one way of asserting their independence of a decayed and corrupt colonialism, but the realities of US power were a world removed from those writers such as the Transcendentalists admired by Martí. There were, indeed, 'two Americas' and it was to be the Caribbean's misfortune to experience the full force of the underside of the American myth. National humiliation was attributed, as with Guerra and Pedreira, to dependence on monoculture, and to the impersonal corporation. Nationalist discourse involved a search for origins on the part of the literary intelligentsia whereas social scientists were drawn to Marxist and dependency analysis.¹ Some of this Marxist theorizing was of high quality but it could also descend into vulgarization and distortion, as Maingot's chapter shows. As intellectuals in the developed world have

been seduced by the 'Other', so those on the periphery can be lured by the attractions of the authoritative metropolitan text and of secular bibles. Apportioning the blame to outside influences can be more immediately satisfying than looking inwards and exposing internal blemishes, and exploring the imperatives determining the course of a nation's history. With the collapse of the socialist alternative to capitalism, Caribbean and especially Cuban intellectuals face an acute crisis. What god will replace the one that has failed? There is no shortage of religions on offer.

To understand the responses to the challenges facing countries which are marginalized in the new economic order and losing geopolitical clout by those thinkers suddenly confronting intellectual orphanhood, it is not enough simply to analyse the strategies available to them; we need to know more about the structures of intellectual life and the formative influences on individual thinkers. It is one thing to study ideas and their history: it is quite another to study the thinkers themselves.

Biography is an underdeveloped art in the Caribbean. Hispanic societies have a culture of *expresión oral* rather than *letra impresa*. It is rare to find examples of painstaking biographical studies, similar to those in English, often the fruit of a decade or more's work, which throw light on the nooks and crannies of cultural history, and which illuminate the origins of creative and original thought.² Most intellectuals in the developing world are in a hurry: they cannot afford the leisured pace of full-time biography either in pecuniary or psychological terms. They are under pressure to catch up and to reverse or speed up historical processes.

The previous chapter by Camp sketches the collective-biography method which provides one approach to the study of intellectuals. The scale of the Mexican case is clearly different but the role which Mexican intellectuals played in elaborating national myths, in providing a consensus and enabling the Government to exert cultural hegemony makes the example an apposite one, and the problems he confronted in his research have a relevance elsewhere. The following points briefly elaborate and add to those which he makes:

1. Oral and psycho-history

In developed countries intellectuals have traditionally been left of centre, as they are in most developing countries, seeking allies among the working class. For long this appeared a natural alliance on the part of those intellectuals, for the most part bourgeois alienated from their roots.

In the 1960s a fissure occurred when intellectuals began to despise workers for their consumerism (although the latter only wished to enjoy a comparable life-style). Violence, whether in the form of the rural

guerrilla or urban terror became a substitute. The origins of intellectuals' anti-bourgeois bias – their conscience-stricken and corrosive self-hatred and their flirting with violence can best be explained by analysing individual circumstances and motivation. Oral history, comparatively undeveloped in Caribbean historiography, provides one entrée. Another is psycho-history. Whatever reservations may be held about some of the more extreme forms of mono-causal psychological explanations of human behaviour, and whatever the doubts about concepts such as the authoritarian, charismatic or narcissistic personality, a critical application of its techniques can be illuminating in societies where personalistic norms still prevail and where *caudillismo* still commands respect and attention.³

2. Élite analysis⁴

How do intellectual élites form, coalesce, circulate and perpetuate themselves? What is their method of recruitment? How impermeable are they or how open to new blood? Why do some develop into cults or sects? How do they relate to other élites, either through intermarriage, co-optation or affinities? How important are regional factors in determining élite alignments?

3. Generational analysis

It is striking to what extent Hispanic societies, and in particular Cuba, interpret their history in generational terms.⁵ There is scarcely a speech by Fidel Castro which does not invoke generational consciousness. Generational analysis is however a slippery business, difficult to employ in political analysis although widely used in analysing cultural phenomena and groups.

A distinction has to be made between biological generations – the perennial conflict between fathers and sons – and sociological generations.⁶ Why have students been so active in Hispanic American politics? Structural reasons connected with the lack of economic opportunity is only part of the explanation. Student rebelliousness can be explained as a type of *rite de passage* in highly politicized societies where the sons of the élite, themselves with high expectations, serve an apprenticeship to the practice of politics during their university career. But it can also be an expression of a revulsion against the patriarchal Hispanic family. Is there continuity or discontinuity in attitudes between the generations; and how often do children break away from parental advice, particularly in the crucial question of choice of professions with their inherited prestige ratings?

Most analysis of student movements in the critical decades of the 1960s and 1970s, generally based on a naïve behaviourism, rarely questioned why so many Young Turks of today turned so quickly into the Old Pashas of tomorrow.

Sociological generations are more difficult to pin down. They deal with deeper structural determinants as well as with shared sensibilities. Historians have been so concerned with conflict between nations and classes that they have tended to overlook conflict between generations, whether these be biological or sociological.⁷ It can be argued that generational analysis is implicitly conservative, a means of softening the harsh realities of inevitable class conflict—a view perhaps encouraged in traditionally conservative Hispanic societies by the fact that Ortega y Gasset constructed a whole philosophy of history round generational analysis. No one can deny the shared sensibilities of particular generations (that of the Generation of 1898 discussed earlier is a case in point) but it becomes increasingly difficult to define sociological generations, as the length of each tends to shorten with the accelerating pace of change.⁸ As each succeeds the other, elders are often condemned to be voyeurs of a psychodrama they can never share. Yet difficult though the concept is, it can be an important indicator in accounting for the rise and fall of intellectual groupings and of fashions.

4. Patronage

How does this operate in intellectual circles? Camp underlines the importance of mentors, the professor with his group of graduate students, the charismatic seer with his acolytes. Patronage operates at all levels, in all societies, although taking different forms, but through the centrality of the family, the extended family and the god-parent relationship, patronage has proved to be particularly resilient in Hispanic countries. The line between patronage and corruption is a fine one and in patron-dominated societies corruption needs to be carefully defined. Hoetink comments on the frequent inconsistencies, contradictions and changes in intellectuals' viewpoints. He sees *oportunismo* as an amoral rather than an immoral concept replacing ideological consistency. Ideology, he suggests, is often perceived as an individual, pragmatic tool for patron-linked advancement, rather than as a legitimation of a collective world view to which one adheres out of an inner and, in principle, durable conviction. This may provide one explanation for the lack of success of Pi y Margall described earlier. Ideological fixity for federals as for anarchists in Spain was a passport to failure and the attempt in Cuba to root out *amiguismo* and *personalismo* may still prove

to be its greatest weakness. In patron-dominated societies no one can afford to have too deep a vested interest in a particular ideology.

As pressures from outside influences increase, the intellectual's role as articulator of uniqueness and differentiation is enhanced. With the rise of nationalism the intellectual's role as oracle and as the creator of nationalist myths was sanctified, but for those who come under the spell of Western universalism there must always be a tension between universalist and particularist values which can be either productive or destructive. The reasons why nationalist movements can go one way or the other are rooted in both structuralist factors and in the inner recesses of personal motivation.

5. Identity

The point was made in Volume I of the extent to which Commonwealth Caribbean intellectuals have been concerned with the elusive problem of identity, and that until this is resolved it will prove difficult to liberate creative rather than destructive energies. This concern can be explained by the pervasiveness and durability of colonial legacies as well as by the impact of the accelerating pace of cultural homogenization through the mass media. But there are those in the Caribbean who play down the emphasis on identity and argue that for migrant people multiple identities are a positive advantage in the modern world, enabling them to fulfil the role of interpreting one culture to another.

The French West Indies and Puerto Rico face particular and very different problems.⁹ Both are enmeshed in the web of assimilationism which raises acute questions of cultural identity in which, as in nineteenth-century nationalism in Eastern Europe, and now increasingly in ethnic movements, language becomes the touchstone.

6. The diaspora

With the increasing mobility of intellectuals, which will be exacerbated by the new US immigration requirements as well as by the shortage of skilled personnel in the developed world, the relationship between intellectuals in the diaspora and the homeland needs analysis.¹⁰ The case of Cuba is clearly the most acute but it is a problem facing every Caribbean country. To what extent, for example, are foreign scholarship programmes self-defeating, inculcating values which may bear little relevance to the home country, and how far do they contribute to the brain-drain?¹¹

7. Institutional factors

We need more detailed empirical case studies on the structure of intellectual life—the imperatives under which institutions operate, the role of schools, universities, academies, professional associations, research centres, their sources of funding, methods of evaluation, patterns of recruitment and advancement, their susceptibility to political pressures and degree of freedom of expression, what is tolerated and what is not; the role of informal as distinct from formal institutions—the café, tertulia, cénacle, club.¹² The role of cultural bureaucrats needs evaluating, as does that of the omnipresent ‘consultant’, and of reproducers as well as producers together with the role of the media—radio, film, television and the music industry—and of their distribution networks. Journals provide a sensitive indication of intellectual trends and some of the most interesting work in cultural history has been on the analysis of the ‘little journals’ of the avant-garde.¹³ Over all, studies are needed of the arbiters of taste and the tyrants of criticism.

8. Dichotomies, typologies and ideal types

We think in dichotomies which trap us in artificial juxtapositions—in Manichaeian confrontations between good and evil, between black and white—and which are created in an effort to simplify the multi-faceted complexities of our lives. Typologies and ‘ideal types’ serve to clarify, and reduce chaos to some sort of order. Dichotomies can distort our sense of reality by shunting us into tramlines from which it is difficult to escape, as in the case of the political spectrum of Left and Right, and the tunnel vision which this engenders. Dichotomies can also fulfil a legitimating function as in the case of ‘Civilization versus Barbarism’, discussed earlier, which enabled writers to consign indigenous peoples to oblivion and to legitimate the dominance of a Europeanized élite.

Hoetink’s typology of intellectual styles—where he postulates, on one side, the theorizing deductive mind, and the scholastic style, rooted in the thomistic casuistry of the Catholic tradition and on the other the *cuentista* style which, in its emphasis on factual detail, ignores ‘grand theory’—is highly suggestive. He warns us, though, against making precise correlations in the case of other dichotomies such as capital versus province, élite versus subaltern, university-trained versus self-taught. To these might be added, remembering his caveat, ‘outsider’ versus ‘insider’, ‘Establishment’ versus non-Establishment, Dionysiac versus Apollonian, ‘high’ versus ‘low’ intellectuals (as mass education causes wider differentiation), ‘mandarins’ versus ‘clerks’, and those

nuances where social and intellectual snobbery merge as in Oxbridge, Grands Écoles or Ivy League versus the rest.

Intellectuals, by definition, must grapple with complexity but in doing so typologies, dichotomies and ideal types can provide useful signposts along the way.

Whatever the agenda for future research this must give pride of place to analysing those factors which inhibit and those which encourage original creative thought. Intellectuals in the Caribbean, to a greater extent than anywhere else in the developing world, live in the shadow of metropolitan influences. With the present pace of change they cannot afford to follow where others lead. New challenges require new solutions.

As argued in the first volume the issue was posed in graphic form by Henri Saint Simon in the 1820s when he argued the need for a new type of expert to cope with and manage the changes associated with the Industrial Revolution. These changes had relegated the *oisifs* to the dustbin of history. Power had to be handed to the *producteurs*. Although a proponent of technocracy he had also a firm belief in the power of the imagination and the role of the artist in social engineering. It is to be hoped that this part of his prophecy will not go unheeded.

Notes

- 1 There is an enormous literature on dependency, but see the spirited critique by one of its major proponents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States*, *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 12, no.3, 1977.
- 2 Why biography and the 'Life and Letters' genre should be so highly developed in the English-speaking world raises interesting questions in the sociology of culture. Political biographies can flourish in open political systems where there is a 'loyal opposition' but in closed systems knowledge is power and has to be hidden from predatory rivals. For an example of the type of biography that is needed, see Wayne Cooper's biography of Claude McKay, a labour of love for over twenty years, and Arnold Rampersad's biography of Langston Hughes. Angel Augier's biography of Nicolás Guillén is the nearest example from Cuba. For Mexico see the work of Enrique Krauze such as *Los Caudillos Culturales*. Autobiography is an even rarer genre: José Vasconcelos's *Ulises Criollo* is a monumental exception.
- 3 The case of Fidel Castro is an obvious Caribbean example. For the suggestive idea of the 'hubris-nemesis' complex see E. González and D. Ronfeldt *Castro, Cuba and the World* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1986) and also the psychological insights of P. Bourne's *Castro* (London, Macmillan, 1986). Much psycho-history focuses on child-rearing patterns and, following Freud, in the sexual impulse as, for example, in Reich's exploration of the relationship between sexuality and fascism. Homosexuality can provide the

- cement for intellectual coteries as well as for para-military groups.
- 4 To my knowledge no one has tried to apply Pareto's model of the circulation of élites to intellectuals.
 - 5 See N. Valdés, *Análisis Generacional: Realidad, Premisas y Método*, *Areito* (New York) 3, No.4, 1977. The concept has been applied to the Cuban Revolution by M. Zeitlin in *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965) and E. González, *Cuba under Castro: the limits of charisma* (Boston, 1974).
 - 6 The 1960s focused attention on generational conflict. For an overview see A. Hennessy, Apotheosis of the Innocents, *International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 3, July 1971. Two useful articles are P. Abrams, Rites de Passage: the conflict of generations in industrial society, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1970 and A. Spitzer, The Historical Problem of Generations, *American Historical Review*, Vol. 78, No. 5, 1973.
 - 7 One important exception, and the most ambitious study of student movements generally, using a Freudian approach, is Lewis Feuer, *Conflict of Generations: the character and significance of student movements* (London, Heinemann, 1971) where he refers to the 'obscure workings of generational conflict'. The book is full of insights but its weakness stems from monocausation which limits his approach. The crux of his argument is that 'whenever a set of alternative possible routes towards achieving a given end presents itself, a student movement will usually tend to choose one which involves a higher measure of violence or humiliation directed against the older generation' (p.531). Student movements assume an importance when there is a 'breakdown in generational equilibrium'. For a critique see Hennessy, *op.cit.* (1971).
 - 8 See Ortega's leading follower Julian Mariás, *El Método de las generaciones* (Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1949) and for 1898, D.L. Shaw, *The Generation of 1898 in Spain* (London, Benn, 1975).
 - 9 Raymond Aron's *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (London, Secker and Warburg, 1957), although dated is still thought-provoking as is Régis Debray's up-to-date *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: the intellectuals of modern France* (London, Verso, 1970).
 - 10 The rising illiteracy rate in developed countries due to a variety of causes should benefit highly motivated immigrants.
 - 11 An interesting question here is the extent to which the scholarship programme for Cubans in Eastern bloc countries proved to be counter-productive. Did first-hand experience of the Soviet system strengthen or weaken communist conviction?
 - 12 The best short introduction to the sociology of culture is Raymond Williams, *Culture* (London, Fontana, 1981).
 - 13 For some examples and models see Judith Weiss, 'Casa de las Americas', *an Intellectual Review in the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1977) and Susan Frenk, Two Cultural Journals of the 1960s: 'Casa de las Americas' and 'Mundo Nuevo', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 3, 1984; John King, *Sur: a Study of the Argentine Literary Journal and its Role in the Development of a Culture, 1931-70* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986); Francis Mulhern, *The Moment of 'Scrutiny'* (London, Verso, 1979).

Selected bibliography

More detailed references may be found in the notes to each chapter as well as in Volume I, where general books on intellectuals are listed. Among journals, readers are referred to the *Casa de las Americas*, *Anales del Caribe*, the cultural pages of *Granma* (Cuba), and *Homines* (Puerto Rico).

- Abel, C. and Torrents, N. 1986. *José Martí: revolutionary democrat*. Durnham NC, Duke University Press.
- Albornoz, O. 1989. *Juventud y Educación en Venezuela: inserción y reproducción social*. Caracas, Cuadernos Lagoven.
- Albornoz, O. 1989. 'Venezuela'. In P. Altbach (ed.), *Student Political Activism*. New York, Greenwood Press.
- Aron, R. 1957. *The Opium of the Intellectuals*. London, Secker & Warburg.
- Balfour, S. 1990. *Castro*. London, Longman.
- Barnet, M. 1988. *The African Presence in Cuban Culture*. University of Warwick, 2nd Walter Rodney Memorial Lecture.
- Bauman, Z. 1987. *Legislators and Interpreters: on modernity, post modernity and intellectuals*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Bosch, J. 1976. *Hostos el Sembrador*. Rio Piedras, Ediciones Huracan.
- Bosch, J. 1970. *De Cristobal Colón a Fidel Castro: El Caribe, frontera imperial*. Madrid, Alfagara.
- Burton, R. 1979. *Assimilation or independence? Prospects for Martinique*. Montreal, McGill Centre for Development Studies.
- Cabrera Infante, G. 1980. *Three Trapped Tigers* (Tres Tristes Tigres, 1965), trans. D. Gardner and S.J. Levine. London, Picador.
- Cabrera Infante, G. 1984. *Infante's Inferno* (La Habana para un Infante Difunto, 1979), trans. D. Gardner and S.J. Levine. London, Faber & Faber.
- Cabrera Infante, G. 1981. *'Bites from the Bearded Crocodile'*. London, Junction Books.
- Calder, B. 1984. *The Impact of Intervention: the Dominican Republic during the US occupation 1916-24*. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Camp, R.A. 1985. *Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico*. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Carpentier, A. 1900. *The Kingdom of this World* (El Reino de Este Mundo, 1949), trans. H. de Onis. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
- Carpentier, A. 1968. *The Lost Steps* (Los Pasos Perdidos, 1953), trans. H. de Onis. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
- Carpentier, A. 1971. *Explosion in a Cathedral* (El Siglo de las Luces, 1962), trans. J. Sturrock. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
- Carr, R. 1982. *Spain, 1808-1975*. 2nd edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Carr, R. 1984. *Puerto Rico: a colonial experiment*. New York, New York University Press.

- Césaire, A. 1983. *The Collected Poetry* (French and English), trans. with an introduction by C. Eshleman and A. Smith. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Césaire, A. 1972. *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. from the French by J. Pinkham. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Caute, D. 1971. *Fanon*. London, Fontana.
- Chanan, M. 1985. *The Cuban Image: cinema and cultural politics in Cuba*. London, BFI Publishing.
- Chapman, C.E. 1927. *A History of the Cuban Republic*. New York, Macmillan.
- Conangla, F. 1947. *Cuba y Pi y Margall*. La Habana, Editorial Lex.
- Coulthard, G.R. 1962. *Race and Colour in Caribbean Literature*. London, Oxford University Press.
- Craig, S. (ed.) 1981. *Contemporary Caribbean: a sociological reader*. Two volumes, Marcus, Trinidad and Tobago, College Press.
- Cross, M. and Heuman, G. (eds) 1988. *Labour in the Caribbean*. London, Macmillan.
- Dash, M. 1981. *Literature and Ideology in Haiti, 1915-61*. London, Macmillan.
- Dathorne, O.R. 1981. *Dark Ancestor: the literature of the black man in the Caribbean*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press.
- Debray, R. 1968. *Revolution in the Revolution*. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.
- Debray, R. 1970. *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities*. Introduction by F. Mulhern, trans. D. Macey. London, Verso.
- Díaz-Quinones, A. 1987. *Cintio Vitier: la memoria integrada*. San Juan, Editoria Sin Nombre.
- Díaz Quintero, A. 1988. *Patricios y Plebeyos: burgueses, hacendados, artesanos y oiberos*. Rio Piedras, Ediciones Huracan.
- Dobson, A. 1989. *An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Draper, T. 1965. *Castroism: Theory and Practice*. New York, Praeger.
- Draper, T. 1982. *Castro's Revolution, Myths and Realities*. New York, Praeger.
- Enderman, S., Moya Pons, F. and Moreno Fragnals, M. (eds) 1985. *Between Slavery and Free Labour: the Spanish speaking Caribbean in the 19th century*. Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Fabre, M. 1985. *La Rive Noire: De Harlem à la Seine*. Paris, Lieu Commun.
- Fagan, R.R. 1969. *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- Falcoff, M. and Pike, F.B. 1982. *The Spanish Civil War 1963-9: American hemispheric perspectives*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska.
- Fanon, F. 1952. *Black Skin, White Masks*. Foreword by H. Bhabha. London, Pluto Press.
- Farber, S. 1976. *Revolution and Reaction in Cuba 1933: a political sociology from Machado to Castro*. Middletown, Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press.
- Galvan, M. de J. 1964. *Enriquillo: Leyenda Historica Dominicana: Carta prologo de José Martí*. New York, Las Americas.
- Gillespie, R. (ed.) 1990. *Cuba after 30 years: rectification and the revolution*. London, Cass.
- González, E. R. 1977. *Alejo Carpentier: the Pilgrim at Home*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- González, M. 1984. 'The culture of the heroic guerrilla'. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 3.
- Grendzier, I.L. 1973. *Frantz Fanon: a Critical Study*. London, Wildwood House.

- Gualberto Gómez, J. 1954. *Por Cuba Libre*. Oficina del Historiador de la ciudad de Habana.
- Guerra y Sánchez, R. 1964. *Azúcar y Población en las Antillas*. (Havana, 1927), trans. in *Sugar and Society in the Caribbean*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Guillén, N. 1975. *Prosa de Prisa, 1929-72* Editorial Arte y Literatura La Habana.
- Harrison, J.P. 1961. 'The confrontation with the political university', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*.
- Hennessy, A. 1962. *The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Spanish Federal Republican movement 1868-74*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Hennessy, A. 1982. 'Cuba'. In Falcoff, M. and Pike, F. B. (eds), *The Spanish Civil War 1936-9: American hemispheric perspectives*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.
- Hennessy, A. 1967. 'University Students in National Politics'. In Veliz, C. (ed.) *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Hennessy, A. 1979. 'Students in the Latin American University'. In Maier, J. and Weatherhead, R.W. (eds), *The Latin American University*. Albuquerque, New Mexico Press.
- Hoetink, H. 1982. *The Dominican People: notes for a historical sociology* trans. by S.K.Ault. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Huberman, L. and Sweezey, P.M. (eds) 1968. *Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Hymans, J.L. 1971. *Léopold Ségar Senghor: an Intellectual Biography*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Jackson, R.L. 1976. *The Black Image in Latin American Literature*. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
- Jackson, R.L. 1979. *Black Writers in Latin America*. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
- Jenks, L. 1970. *Our Cuban Colony: a study in sugar* (original 1928). New York, Arno Books.
- King, J. 1930. *Magical Reels: a history of cinema in Latin America*. London, Verso Books.
- King, J. (ed.) 1987. *Modern Latin American Fiction: a survey*. London, Faber & Faber.
- Kutzenski, V.M. 1987. *Against the American Grain: myth and history in William Carlos Williams, Jay Wright and Nicolás Guillén*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press.
- Levy, D.C. 1986. *Higher Education and the State in Latin America: private challenges to public dominance*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Lewis, G.K. 1983. *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought: the historical evolution of Caribbean society in its ideological aspects, 1492-1900*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lewis, G.K. 1963. *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Lewis, G.K. 1974. *Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Liebman, A. 1970. *The Politics of Puerto Rican University Students*. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Liss, S.B. 1987. *Roots of Revolution: radical thought in Cuba*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press.

- López, A. and Petras, J. (eds) 1974. *Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: studies in history and society*. New York, John Wiley.
- McCulloch, J. 1983. *Black Soul White Artifact: Fanon's clinical psychology and social theory*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Maier, J. and Weatherhead, R.W. (eds) 1979. *The Latin American University*. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
- Maldonado, D.M. 1972. *Puerto Rico: a Socio-historical Interpretation*. New York, Vintage Press.
- Marías, J. 1949. *El Método Histórico de las Generaciones*. Madrid, Revista de Occidente.
- Marqués, René 1977. *El Puertorriqueño Docil y Otros Ensayos*. San Juan, Editorial Antilla.
- Marqués, Roberto 1972. *Man-making Words: selected poems of Nicolás Guillén*. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press.
- Martí, J. 1963-5. *Obras Completas*. La Habana.
- Martí, J. 1975. *Inside the Monster: writings on the United States and imperialism*. Ed. P. Foner, trans. E. Randall. New York, Monthly Review Press.
- Mathews, T. 1954. 'The project for a confederation of the Greater Antilles'. *Caribbean Historical Review*, Vol. 3/4. December 1954.
- Martin, G. 1989. *Journeys through the Labyrinth: Latin American fiction in the 20th century*. London, Verso Books.
- Menton, S. 1975. *Prose Fiction of the Cuban Revolution*. Austin, University of Texas Press.
- Moore, C. 1978. *Castro, the Blacks and Africa*. Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- Moreno Fragnals, M. 1978. *El Ingenio*. 3 vols, La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Nicholls, D. 1979. *From Dessalines to Duvalier*. London, Macmillan.
- Nicholls, D. 1984 *Haiti in the Caribbean*. London, Macmillan.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. 1969. *The Revolt of the Masses* (Rebelión de las masas, 1929). London, Allen & Unwin.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. 1962-70. *Obras Completas*. 7 vols, Madrid, Revista de Occidente.
- Ortiz, F. 1974. *Cuban Counterpoint: tobacco and sugar*. New York, Knopf.
- Pedreira, A. 1934. *Insularismo*. Madrid.
- Pérez, L.A. Jr. 1983. *Cuba between empires 1878-1902*. Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press.
- Pérez, L.A. Jr. 1988. *Cuba between Reform and Revolution*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Pérez, L.A. Jr. 1988. *Cuba: an Annotated Bibliography*. New York, Greenwood Press.
- Pike, F.B. 1971. *Hispanismo 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and their relations with Latin America*. University of Notre Dame.
- Poyo, G.E. 1989. 'With All and for the Good of All': *the emergence of popular nationalism in the Cuban communities of the United States 1848-1898*. Durham, Duke University Press.
- Price, R. (ed.) 1973. *Maroon Societies: rebel slave communities in the Americas*. Garden City, New York, Anchor Books.
- Problems of the New Cuba*, Report on the Commission on Cuban Affairs, 1935. New York, Foreign Policy Association.
- Rampersad, A. 1986 and 1988. *The Life of Langston Hughes*, Vol. I (1902), Vol. II

- (1941), 67. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Roa, R. 1964. *Retorno a la Alborada*. 2 vols. La Habana.
- Sartre, J-P. 1961. *Sartre on Cuba*. New York, Ballantine Books.
- Solow, B. and Engerman, S. (eds) 1987. *British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Stubbs, J. 1989. *Cuba: the Test of Time*. London, Latin American Bureau.
- Szulc, T. 1986. *Castro: A Critical Portrait*. London, Hutchinson.
- Thomas, H. 1971. *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*. London, Eyre & Spottiswoode.
- Turton, P. 1986. *José Martí; Architect of Cuba's Freedom*. London, Zed Books.
- Verdès Leroux, J. 1989. *La Lune et le Caudillo: la rêve des intellectuels et le régime cubain (1959-71)*. Paris, Gallimard.
- Weiss, J. 1977. 'Casa de las Americas': a cultural journal of the Cuban revolution. Chapel Hill, University of North California.
- Williams, E. 1964. *From Columbus to Castro: the history of the Caribbean 1492-1969*. London, Deutsch.
- Williams, E. 1964. *Capitalism and Slavery*. London, Deutsch.
- Williamson, E. 1987. 'Coming to Terms with Modernity: magical realism and the historical process in the novels of Alejo Carpentier'. In J. King, *Modern Latin American Fiction: a survey*. London, Faber & Faber.
- Wright, I. 1977. *Cuba* (New York, 1910). Madrid, Edición Hispánofila.
- Wright, W.C. 1960. *Listen Yankee: the revolution in Cuba*. New York, Ballantine Books.
- Zavala, I. and Rodriguez, R. (eds) 1975. *The Intellectual Roots of Independence*. New York, Monthly Review Press.

Index

Numbers in brackets refer to notes.

ABC organization 65, 68

African heritage 8-9

Cuba 18, 21-3

Dominican Republic 27, 141

French Caribbean 3

Puerto Rico 108-10

America *see* USA

anarchism, Spanish 11, 12

annexationism 31 (n6), 127-8

Antillanité 128-9, 186-7, 204-7

apartheid 18

assimilationism 9, 229

in Martinique 186, 188-96

and communism 197-8

and Négritude 201-2

in Puerto Rico 123

Auténtico government 66, 69, 71

autonomy 11-12, 199, 203, 231 (n1)

barbarism-civilization dichotomy 19,
109, 230

Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio 65, 66,
69, 71-2

Baud, Michel 133-4

békés 188, 190, 193, 197, 208 (n13)

Benítez, Jaime 124

biography 214-17, 226, 231 (n2)

Black Jacobins, The (James) 148-9

Blanco, Tomás 124

Bolívar, Simón 2-4, 103, 116-17 (n1),
158, 159-60

Bosch, Juan 28, 155-65

bourgeoisie 64-5, 136, 163

Bovés, José 158-60

Brau, Salvador 122

Brouard, Carl 181-2

Cabrere Infante, Guillermo 86, 87,
90, 91-2

Campos, Albizu 20

Capitalism and Slavery (Williams)
28, 149, 151

Carbonell, Walterio 18

Carpentier, Alejo 23-5, 85, 175

Carrion, Arturo Morales 125

Castro, Fidel 5-6, 83-4, 87, 231 (n3)
and intellectuals 16-17, 86-7,
93, 94-5

and Martí 12-13

and Padilla 92-3

and USA 83-4

Castro, Raúl 91, 98 (n6)

Catholic Church 4, 29, 60-1

caudillismo 4, 5, 26-7, 136

censorship 46

Césaire, Aimé

and autonomy 203

and Négritude 30, 202

recruited by FCM 198

and Schoelcher 194

and surrealism 186

Chatterjee, Partha 101, 116

Chibás, Eduardo 71, 73, 82 (n20)

choteo 70, 79 (n19)

Christophe, Henri 3, 29

Citadelle, the 29, 35 (n60)

civilization-barbarism dichotomy 19,
109, 230

class analysis 129, 157

collective biography 213-16, 217-22,
226, 231 (n2)

colonialism 58-9, 104, 124-5, 156

colour *see* race relations

communists

anti-culture 85-6

and assimilationism 197-8

in Cuba 5-6, 63-4

in Martinique 197, 198, 201-2

see also PSP

compadrazgo 4, 31 (n5)

Córdoba, University of 14, 49,
63

- Creole 29
 expressivity 180-1
 in Haiti 184-5
 in Martinique 195, 206
- Créolité 187, 204-7
- criollo* class 59, 108, 129, 159
- Cuba
 chronology of events 80-1
 colonial period 58-9, 104
 communists 5-6, 63-4
 intellectuals 58-69, 84-5, 92, 96-7
 and Martí 12-13, 15
 Marxism 62-3, 73
 national identity 8-9, 18-19, 59, 70, 79 (n19), 103, 106-8
 nationalism 59, 70-1, 77, 112-15
 Padilla affair 85, 90-6
 PM affair 86-9
 restructuring 64, 65-6, 69-70
 students 62, 64-5
 trade unions 64, 69-70
 UNEAC 87-8, 89, 90-1
 and university reform 14-16
 and USSR 88-9, 95-7
see also Castro
- Cuban Revolution 83, 84
 apartheid 18
 cinema role 16
 coalition 64, 65
 and culture 16-18, 85-6, 91-2, 96-7
 intellectuals 5-7, 16-18
 and Puerto Rico 125
- Cueva, Mario de la 219
- culture, as political reality 30-1, 115-16
- diasporas 7-8, 67-8, 229
- Directorio Estudiantil Universitario* (DEU) 64, 65
- documentary research 214-16
- Dominican Republic
 and Haiti 136, 138-9
 intellectuals 134, 135, 141-3
 national identity 27, 136-7, 140-1
 nationalism 139-40
 pessimism 136, 143, 144 (n17)
 and Puerto Rico 25-7
 racism in 137-8
 and sugar 25-7, 135, 136
 Trujillo régime 132, 139-40, 143 (n6)
 universities 132-3
- Duvalier, François 177, 182, 183
- education 16, 62-3, 195-6, 230
see also universities
- elitism 116, 134, 142
- erotomaniac literature 14, 182
- exile 7, 8, 183-4
- family background, intellectuals'
 113, 114-15, 217, 219-20
- Fanon, Frantz 3, 30, 163-4, 177, 189
- FCM (Fédération Communiste de la Martinique) 197, 198, 201-2
- Franqui, Carlos 83, 84, 87, 97-8 (n5)
- French heritage 3, 8, 28-31
- French Revolution 2, 3, 189-90
- Front Commun 197, 201
- Gálvan, Manuel de José 137-8
- Gaos, José 219
- Garvey, Marcus 21, 30
- generational conflict 227-8, 232 (n6)
see also student movements
- gens de couleur libres* 188-90
- Glissant, Edouard 204-5
- Gómez, Marte R 215
- González, José Luis 128-9
- Gouldner, Alvin 213, 222 (n3)
- gros-ka* 204, 210 (n51)
- Groupe Jean-Jaurès 197
- Guerra, Ramiro y Sánchez 18-19, 20, 100, 104-11, 119 (n15)
- guerrillas 6-7, 16, 18, 54, 61
- Guevara, Che 6-7, 16, 95
- Guillén, Nicolás 21-2, 86, 87, 90-1, 92
- Haiti 3, 8, 9
 and Dominican Republic 136, 138-9, 140
 intellectuals in 175-85
 and Marxism 162
 and racism 3, 28
 Revolution in 162
- Harlem Renaissance 21-2
- Havana, University of 10, 15
- Hispanic Americans 2-3, 51, 55-6
- Hispanicism 19-21, 127, 163
- history, political role 27-8, 133-4, 145-8
- homo faber* 59-60, 73, 76
- homosexuality 89, 231-2 (n3)

- Hostos, Eugenio Maria de 10, 11, 26, 122, 133
- illiteracy 51, 99
- Indice* 123
- Insularismo* (Pedreira) 105-6, 108, 110, 120 (n20), 123
- intellectuals
- arriviste 176
 - defined 1-2, 36-8, 47, 211-13, 227
 - and Castro, Fidel 86-7, 93, 94-5
 - Cuba 6-7, 25, 58-69, 84-5, 92, 96-7
 - denounced 91, 96
 - distribution 39-41
 - divided 42-5
 - Dominican Republic 134, 141-3
 - Haitian 175-85
 - marginalized 60, 67, 73-5
 - Martinique 186-8, 193-6, 198-207
 - and Marxist analysis 212-13
 - methodology for studying 213-14
 - Mexican 38-41, 44-5, 213-14, 217-19
 - and politics 54, 61, 83-4
 - Puerto Rico 122-30
 - serving revolution 5-7, 74, 75, 92, 183
 - and state 43-5, 53, 221
 - styles 230-1
 - Venezuela 49, 52-3, 55
 - and workers 226-7
 - see also* *letrados*
- Jamaica, and Trinidad 166-7
- James, C.L.R. 148-50, 153-4
- Kadushin, Charles 212, 214
- Krause, Karl Friedrich 12, 13, 14, 26, 32 (n21), 133
- Krauze, Enrique 214, 215, 220
- landowners
- Creole 106
 - criollo* 59, 129, 159
 - patricio* 19, 111-12, 113-14
 - latifundium* 19, 108, 111, 112, 160
- Latin American University Reform Movement 14-15, 49, 63
- letrados* 99-101, 102-4, 117 (n2, n6)
- see also* intellectuals
- Literacy Campaign 78, 85-6
- Lunes* 85, 86, 87
- Maeztu, Ramiro de 20, 34(n43)
- Maldonado Denis, Manuel 125-6, 127-8
- Mañach, Jorge 105, 106
- Marqués, René 125
- marronage 26, 29
- Martí, José 7, 10, 11, 12-14, 78 (n1)
- and Batista 72
 - and Cuba 12-13, 15, 59-60, 103-4
- Martinique 29
- history 188-96
 - intellectuals 186-8, 193-6, 198-207
 - Marxism 196-200
 - national identity 203-4, 205-7
 - sugar 192
- Marxism
- analysis of history 145, 147, 161-2, 164, 212-13, 225
 - in Cuba 62-3, 73
 - in Haiti 162
 - in Martinique 196-200
 - in Venezuela 51, 56
- McKay, Claude 21, 30
- Mella, Julio Antonio 63-4
- Merton, Robert 52-3
- Mexican Revolution 21, 63
- Mexico
- autobiographies 214-15
 - intellectuals 38-41, 44-5, 213-14, 217-19
- Monroe Doctrine 3, 5
- Morúa Delgado 22-3, 34 (n49)
- national identity 2, 101-2, 229
- Cuba 59-60, 103-4, 106-8
 - Dominican Republic 136-7, 139-41
 - Haiti 3, 9
 - Martinique 199-200, 203-4, 205-7
 - Puerto Rico 29-30, 108-9, 122-4, 125-8
- nationalism
- Cuba 15, 59-60, 70-1, 77, 103-4, 112-15
 - Dominican Republic 139-40
- Négritude 9, 21-3, 30, 183, 196, 200-4, 210 (n52)
- negrophobia 189
- neo-colonialism 60, 75-6

- Neruda, Pablo 84, 98 (n6)
 New Worldism 20-1, 59
noirisme 182 *see also* Négritude
- oportunismo* 135, 176, 228
 oral history 226-7
 Ortega y Gasset 19-20
 Ortiz, Fernando 22, 105
- Padilla, Herberto 85, 90-6
 Padmore, George 149
 Pan-Africanism 9
patricios 19, 111, 113-14
 patronage 228-9
 Paz, Octavio 44, 45, 219, 221
 PDP (Popular Democratic Party)
 124, 127
 Pedreira, Antonio 19, 20, 100, 104-11
 Insularismo 105-6, 108, 110, 120
 (n20), 123
 and land control 106
 national history 106-8
 race 108-9
 training 119 (n15)
 and women's role 110
 Pérez, Andrés 54
 Pi y Margall, Francisco 11, 12
 Platt Amendment 13, 22, 60, 78 (n3)
 PM affair 86-9
 PNM (People's National Movement)
 152, 165
 populist history 169-70
 PPM (Parti Progressiste
 Martiniquais) 199, 204, 206
 Price-Mars, Jean 3, 29, 180
 Pro-Independence Party 127
 Protestantism 61
 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph 12
 PSP (Partido Socialista Popular)
 85, 86, 87
 see also communists
 psycho-history 226-7
 Puerto Rico 128-30
 and Dominican Republic 25-7
 independence 126-7
 intellectuals 122-30
 national identity 29-30, 108-10,
 122-4, 125-8
 and Trinidad 165-6
 and USA 8, 26, 123, 124, 127
 Puerto Rico, University of 10
- quota system 69
- race relations 8-9
 Cuba 9, 13, 18-19, 23, 112
 Dominican Republic 137-8
 Haiti 3, 28
 and C.L.R. James 149
 Martinique 199-200, 201-2
 Puerto Rico 108-9
 and Williams, Eric 152
 US army 22
 see also national identity
- Race War (1912) 23
 Rama, Angel 99, 100
real maravilloso, lo 23-5
 Reciprocity Treaty 60, 66, 78 (n4)
 Revolución 83, 85, 97 (n5)
 riots, student 15
 Rodó, José Enrique 19, 106, 179
 Russia *see* USSR
- San Martín, Grau 15, 65, 66, 79
 (n11)
 Santo Domingo, University of 10
 Sartre, J-P 5, 83, 97 (n5)
 Schoelcher, Victor 193-4, 198
 sciences, in Caribbean 15-16, 37, 41
 Shils, Edward 178, 214, 222 (n13)
 slavery, abolished 191-2
 Socialist Realism 89
 Soviet Union *see* USSR
 Spanish heritage 4, 11-12, 19-21
 Spanish-American War 60
 strikes, at universities 51, 57 (n6)
 student movements 14-16, 62, 64,
 132, 227-8, 232 (n7)
- sugar
 collapse 14, 62, 79 (n6)
 corporations 106, 111
 in Cuba 25-6, 60, 104
 in Dominican Republic 25-7, 135,
 136, 140-1
 latifundium 19, 108, 111, 112, 164
 in Martinique 192
 in Puerto Rico 104, 129
 sugar revolutions 33-4 (n38), 59, 76,
 225
 surrealism 186
- Tapia y Rivera, Alejandro 122
 Third Worldism 75, 77

Tio, Salvador 125
 Toussaint L'Ouverture 3, 198
 trade unions 64, 69-70
 Trinidad 165-7, 168-9
 Trujillo régime 132, 139-40, 143 (n6)

UNEAC (Cuban National Union of
 Writers and Artists) 87-8, 89,
 90-1

Universidad Autónoma 132-3
 Universidad Popular José Martí 62
 universities

Catholic 56-7 (n2)
 Córdoba 14, 49, 63
 Cuba 10, 15, 62
 Dominican Republic 132-3
 experimental 50
 Hispanic models 10, 55-6
 Mexico 41-2
 private 15-16, 49-51, 55, 57, (n4,
 n6)
 political 14-16
 Puerto Rico 10
 Santo Domingo 10
 strikes at 51, 57 (n6)
 Venezuela 49-51, 54-6
see also student movements
 University Reform Movement 14-16,
 49, 63

USA

and Castro 83-4
 and Cuba 67, 88
 and Haiti 3, 76
 hegemony of 225
 and Puerto Rico 8, 26, 123, 124,
 127
 USSR 88-9, 95-7

Vasconcelos, José 21, 215
 Venezuela

intellectuals 52-3, 55-6
 Marxism 51, 56
 society 51-2
 universities 49-51, 54-6
 voluntarism 6-7, 153
 voodoo 24, 29

Williams, Eric 28, 149, 150, 151-4
 and Bosch 155-8
 and Caribbean history 154-5
 changing interpretations 165-9
 and colonialism 156
 effect on Trinidad 168-9
 Marxist analysis 164
 on race relations 152
 and voluntarist approach 153
 women's role 110
 women's writing 184

02

107

Warwick University Caribbean Studies

One of the many spectres now haunting the world is the crisis in intellectual activity to which Caribbean intellectuals are particularly vulnerable. New media technologies, the 'new world order', the marginalization of the Caribbean by the Great Powers and the crisis facing the Cuban Revolution all pose acute challenges to Caribbean thinkers. Will they be able to respond as creatively as they have in the past when scarcely a Third World ideology did not have a Caribbean provenance? This book, which should be read in conjunction with its companion volume, *Intellectuals in the Twentieth-Century Caribbean Volume I, Spectre of the New Class: the Commonwealth Caribbean*, is the first to analyse and compare intellectuals across the region. At the same time it raises many questions and is intended to provoke discussion.

Inevitably the Cuban Revolution to a certain extent dominates the book, as one of its significant features lies in the reformulation of the role which intellectuals should fulfil in revolutionary change in Third World countries. In addition to chapters on the independent islands there are chapters on Puerto Rico and Martinique, with their particular problems of cultural identity. Other chapters deal with the use (or misuse) of history by Juan Bosch and Eric Williams – providing a link with Volume I. Chapters on Mexico and Venezuela relate the Caribbean experience to other parts of Latin America. Themes covered include the pervasiveness of the French and Spanish intellectual traditions, the role of student movements, nationalist discourse and the emergence of black consciousness. The book closes with suggestions for future research on a topic which, in spite of its importance, has attracted curiously little attention.


Alistair Hennessy is Professor of History and Director of the Centre for Caribbean Studies at the University of Warwick where he also founded the unique School of Comparative American Studies. His wide range of publications include *The Federal Republic in Spain 1868-73*; *the Frontier in Latin American History*; and an edited collection of essays, *The Land that England Lost*; *Argentina and Britain, a special relationship*.

He is currently completing a project on West-European Cuban Relations since 1959 and is working on a study of the influence of slave trade and plantation profits on British culture and society in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

M

MACMILLAN
CARIBBEAN

ISBN 0-333-56939-3



9 780333 569399

901

